on sophistical refutations-第1部分

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　SOPHISTICAL　REFUTATIONS





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Aristotle





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　translated　by　W。　A。　Pickard…Cambridge













　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Book　I







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1







　　LET　us　now　discuss　sophistic　refutations；　i。e。　what　appear　to　be



refutations　but　are　really　fallacies　instead。　We　will　begin　in　the



natural　order　with　the　first。



　　That　some　reasonings　are　genuine；　while　others　seem　to　be　so　but　are



not；　is　evident。　This　happens　with　arguments；　as　also　elsewhere；



through　a　certain　likeness　between　the　genuine　and　the　sham。　For



physically　some　people　are　in　a　vigorous　condition；　while　others



merely　seem　to　be　so　by　blowing　and　rigging　themselves　out　as　the



tribesmen　do　their　victims　for　sacrifice；　and　some　people　are



beautiful　thanks　to　their　beauty；　while　others　seem　to　be　so；　by



dint　of　embellishing　themselves。　So　it　is；　too；　with　inanimate　things；



for　of　these；　too；　some　are　really　silver　and　others　gold；　while



others　are　not　and　merely　seem　to　be　such　to　our　sense；　e。g。　things



made　of　litharge　and　tin　seem　to　be　of　silver；　while　those　made　of



yellow　metal　look　golden。　In　the　same　way　both　reasoning　and



refutation　are　sometimes　genuine；　sometimes　not；　though　inexperience



may　make　them　appear　so：　for　inexperienced　people　obtain　only；　as　it



were；　a　distant　view　of　these　things。　For　reasoning　rests　on　certain



statements　such　that　they　involve　necessarily　the　assertion　of



something　other　than　what　has　been　stated；　through　what　has　been



stated：　refutation　is　reasoning　involving　the　contradictory　of　the



given　conclusion。　Now　some　of　them　do　not　really　achieve　this；



though　they　seem　to　do　so　for　a　number　of　reasons；　and　of　these　the



most　prolific　and　usual　domain　is　the　argument　that　turns　upon　names



only。　It　is　impossible　in　a　discussion　to　bring　in　the　actual　things



discussed：　we　use　their　names　as　symbols　instead　of　them；　and



therefore　we　suppose　that　what　follows　in　the　names；　follows　in　the



things　as　well；　just　as　people　who　calculate　suppose　in　regard　to



their　counters。　But　the　two　cases　（names　and　things）　are　not　alike。



For　names　are　finite　and　so　is　the　sum…total　of　formulae；　while　things



are　infinite　in　number。　Inevitably；　then；　the　same　formulae；　and　a



single　name；　have　a　number　of　meanings。　Accordingly　just　as；　in



counting；　those　who　are　not　clever　in　manipulating　their　counters



are　taken　in　by　the　experts；　in　the　same　way　in　arguments　too　those



who　are　not　well　acquainted　with　the　force　of　names　misreason　both



in　their　own　discussions　and　when　they　listen　to　others。　For　this



reason；　then；　and　for　others　to　be　mentioned　later；　there　exists



both　reasoning　and　refutation　that　is　apparent　but　not　real。　Now　for



some　people　it　is　better　worth　while　to　seem　to　be　wise；　than　to　be



wise　without　seeming　to　be　（for　the　art　of　the　sophist　is　the



semblance　of　wisdom　without　the　reality；　and　the　sophist　is　one　who



makes　money　from　an　apparent　but　unreal　wisdom）；　for　them；　then；　it　is



clearly　essential　also　to　seem　to　accomplish　the　task　of　a　wise　man



rather　than　to　accomplish　it　without　seeming　to　do　so。　To　reduce　it　to



a　single　point　of　contrast　it　is　the　business　of　one　who　knows　a



thing；　himself　to　avoid　fallacies　in　the　subjects　which　he　knows　and



to　be　able　to　show　up　the　man　who　makes　them；　and　of　these



accomplishments　the　one　depends　on　the　faculty　to　render　an　answer；



and　the　other　upon　the　securing　of　one。　Those；　then；　who　would　be



sophists　are　bound　to　study　the　class　of　arguments　aforesaid：　for　it



is　worth　their　while：　for　a　faculty　of　this　kind　will　make　a　man



seem　to　be　wise；　and　this　is　the　purpose　they　happen　to　have　in　view。



　　Clearly；　then；　there　exists　a　class　of　arguments　of　this　kind；　and



it　is　at　this　kind　of　ability　that　those　aim　whom　we　call　sophists。



Let　us　now　go　on　to　discuss　how　many　kinds　there　are　of　sophistical



arguments；　and　how　many　in　number　are　the　elements　of　which　this



faculty　is　composed；　and　how　many　branches　there　happen　to　be　of



this　inquiry；　and　the　other　factors　that　contribute　to　this　art。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2







　　Of　arguments　in　dialogue　form　there　are　four　classes：



　　Didactic；　Dialectical；　Examination…arguments；　and　Contentious



arguments。　Didactic　arguments　are　those　that　reason　from　the



principles　appropriate　to　each　subject　and　not　from　the　opinions



held　by　the　answerer　（for　the　learner　should　take　things　on　trust）：



dialectical　arguments　are　those　that　reason　from　premisses　generally



accepted；　to　the　contradictory　of　a　given　thesis：



examination…arguments　are　those　that　reason　from　premisses　which　are



accepted　by　the　answerer　and　which　any　one　who　pretends　to　possess



knowledge　of　the　subject　is　bound　to　know…in　what　manner；　has　been



defined　in　another　treatise：　contentious　arguments　are　those　that



reason　or　appear　to　reason　to　a　conclusion　from　premisses　that



appear　to　be　generally　accepted　but　are　not　so。　The　subject；　then；



of　demonstrative　arguments　has　been　discussed　in　the　Analytics；



while　that　of　dialectic　arguments　and　examination…arguments　has　been



discussed　elsewhere：　let　us　now　proceed　to　speak　of　the　arguments　used



in　competitions　and　contests。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3







　　First　we　must　grasp　the　number　of　aims　entertained　by　those　who



argue　as　competitors　and　rivals　to　the　death。　These　are　five　in



number；　refutation；　fallacy；　paradox；　solecism；　and　fifthly　to



reduce　the　opponent　in　the　discussion　to　babbling…i。e。　to　constrain



him　to　repeat　himself　a　number　of　times：　or　it　is　to　produce　the



appearance　of　each　of　these　things　without　the　reality。　For　they



choose　if　possible　plainly　to　refute　the　other　party；　or　as　the　second



best　to　show　that　he　is　committing　some　fallacy；　or　as　a　third　best　to



lead　him　into　paradox；　or　fourthly　to　reduce　him　to　solecism；　i。e。



to　make　the　answerer；　in　consequence　of　the　argument；　to　use　an



ungrammatical　expression；　or；　as　a　last　resort；　to　make　him　repeat



himself。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4







　　There　are　two　styles　of　refutation：　for　some　depend　on　the



language　used；　while　some　are　independent　of　language。　Those　ways　of



producing　the　false　appearance　of　an　argument　which　depend　on　language



are　six　in　number：　they　are　ambiguity；　amphiboly；　combination；



division　of　words；　accent；　form　of　expression。　Of　this　we　may　assure



ourselves　both　by　induction；　and　by　syllogistic　proof　based　on



this…and　it　may　be　on　other　assumptions　as　well…that　this　is　the



number　of　ways　in　which　we　might　fall　to　mean　the　same　thing　by　the



same　names　or　expressions。　Arguments　such　as　the　following　depend　upon



ambiguity。　'Those　learn　who　know：　for　it　is　those　who　know　their



letters　who　learn　the　letters　dictated　to　them'。　For　to　'learn'　is



ambiguous；　it　signifies　both　'to　understand'　by　the　use　of



knowledge；　and　also　'to　acquire　knowledge'。　Again；　'Evils　are　good：



for　what　needs　to　be　is　good；　and　evils　must　needs　be'。　For　'what



needs　to　be'　has　a　double　meaning：　it　means　what　is　inevitable；　as



often　is　the　case　with　evils；　too　（for　evil　of　some　kind　is



inevitable）；　while　on　the　other　hand　we　say　of　good　things　as　well



that　they　'need　to　be'。　Moreover；　'The　same　man　is　both　seated　and



standing　and　he　is　both　sick　and　in　health：　for　it　is　he　who　stood



up　who　is　standing；　and　he　who　is　recovering　who　is　in　health：　but



it　is　the　seated　man　who　stood　up；　and　the　sick　man　who　was



recovering'。　For　'The　sick　man　does　so　and　so'；　or　'has　so　and　so　done



to　him'　is　not　single　in　meaning：　sometimes　it　means　'the　man　who　is



sick　or　is　seated　now'；　sometimes　'the　man　who　was　sick　formerly'。



Of　course；　the　man　who　was　recovering　was　the　sick　man；　who　really　was



sick　at　the　time：　but　the　man　who　is　in　health　is　not　sick　at　the　same



time：　he　is　'the　sick　man'　in　the　sense　not　that　he　is　sick　now；　but



that　he　was　sick　formerly。　Examples　such　as　the　following　depend



upon　amphiboly：　'I　wish　that　you　the　enemy　may　capture'。　Also　the



thesis；　'There　must　be　knowledge　of　what　one　knows'：　for　it　is



possible　by　this　phrase　to　mean　that　knowledge　belongs　to　both　the



knower　and　the　known。　Also；　'There　must　be　sight　of　what　one　sees：　one



sees　the　pillar：　ergo　the　pillar　has　sight'。　Also；　'What　you　profess



to…be；　that　you　profess　to…be：　you　profess　a　stone　to…be：　ergo　you



profess…to…be　a　stone'。　Also；　'Speaking　of　the　silent　is　possible'：



for　'speaking　of　the　silent'　also　has　a　double　meaning：　it　may　mean



that　the　speaker　is　silent　or　that　the　things　of　which　he　speaks　are



so。　There　are　three　varieties　of　these　ambiguities　and　amphibolies：



（1）　When　either　the　expression　or　the　name　has　strictly　more　than



one　meaning；　e。g。　aetos　and　the　'dog'；　（2）　when　by　custom　we　use



them　so；　（3）　when　words　that　have　a　simple　sense　taken　alone　have　more



than　one　meaning　in　combination；　e。g。　'knowing　letters'。　For　each



word；　both　'knowing'　and　'letters'；　possibly　has　a　single　meaning：　but



both　together　have　more　than　one…either　that　the　letters　themselves



have　knowledge　or　that　someone　else　has　it　of　them。



　　Amphiboly　and　ambiguity；　then；　depend　on　these　modes　of　speech。　Upon



the　combination　of　words　there　depend　instances　such　as　the　following：



'A　man　can　walk　while　sitting；　and　can　write　while　not　writing'。　For



the　meaning　is　not　the　same　if　one　divides　the　words　and　if　one



combines　them　in　saying　that　'it　is　possible　to　walk…while…sitting'



and　write　while　not　writing＇。　The　same　applies　to　the　latter　phrase；



too；　if　one　combines　the　words　'to　write…while…not…writing'：　for



then　it　means　that　he　has　the　power　to　write　and　not　to　write　at　once；



wher