on sophistical refutations-第11部分

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'But　suppose　that　of　a　pair　of　things　he　has　discovered　one　and



learned　the　other；　the　pair　is　not　known　to　him　by　either　method。'　No：



'what'　he　knows；　means'　every　single　thing'　he　knows；　individually；



but　this　does　not　mean　'all　the　things'　he　knows；　collectively。　Again；



there　is　the　proof　that　there　is　a　'third　man'　distinct　from　Man　and



from　individual　men。　But　that　is　a　fallacy；　for　'Man'；　and　indeed





every　general　predicate；　denotes　not　an　individual　substance；　but　a



particular　quality；　or　the　being　related　to　something　in　a



particular　manner；　or　something　of　that　sort。　Likewise　also　in　the



case　of　'Coriscus'　and　'Coriscus　the　musician'　there　is　the　problem；



Are　they　the　same　or　different？'　For　the　one　denotes　an　individual



substance　and　the　other　a　quality；　so　that　it　cannot　be　isolated；



though　it　is　not　the　isolation　which　creates　the　'third　man'；　but



the　admission　that　it　is　an　individual　substance。　For　'Man'　cannot



be　an　individual　substance；　as　Callias　is。　Nor　is　the　case　improved



one　whit　even　if　one　were　to　call　the　clement　he　has　isolated　not　an



individual　substance　but　a　quality：　for　there　will　still　be　the　one



beside　the　many；　just　as　'Man'　was。　It　is　evident　then　that　one　must



not　grant　that　what　is　a　common　predicate　applying　to　a　class



universally　is　an　individual　substance；　but　must　say　that　denotes



either　a　quality；　or　a　relation；　or　a　quantity；　or　something　of　that



kind。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　23







　　It　is　a　general　rule　in　dealing　with　arguments　that　depend　on



language　that　the　solution　always　follows　the　opposite　of　the　point　on



which　the　argument　turns：　e。g。　if　the　argument　depends　upon



combination；　then　the　solution　consists　in　division；　if　upon　division；



then　in　combination。　Again；　if　it　depends　on　an　acute　accent；　the



solution　is　a　grave　accent；　if　on　a　grave　accent；　it　is　an　acute。　If



it　depends　on　ambiguity；　one　can　solve　it　by　using　the　opposite



term；　e。g。　if　you　find　yourself　calling　something　inanimate；　despite



your　previous　denial　that　it　was　so；　show　in　what　sense　it　is　alive：



if；　on　the　other　hand；　one　has　declared　it　to　be　inanimate　and　the



sophist　has　proved　it　to　be　animate；　say　how　it　is　inanimate。　Likewise



also　in　a　case　of　amphiboly。　If　the　argument　depends　on　likeness　of



expression；　the　opposite　will　be　the　solution。　'Could　a　man　give



what　he　has　not　got？　'No；　not　what　he　has　not　got；　but　he　could　give



it　in　a　way　in　which　he　has　not　got　it；　e。g。　one　die　by　itself。'



Does　a　man　know　either　by　learning　or　by　discovery　each　thing　that



he　knows；　singly？　but　not　the　things　that　he　knows；　collectively。'



Also　a　man　treads；　perhaps；　on　any　thing　he　walks　through；　but　not



on　the　time　he　walks　through。　Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　the　other



examples。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　24







　　In　dealing　with　arguments　that　depend　on　Accident；　one　and　the



same　solution　meets　all　cases。　For　since　it　is　indeterminate　when　an



attribute　should　be　ascribed　to　a　thing；　in　cases　where　it　belongs



to　the　accident　of　the　thing；　and　since　in　some　cases　it　is



generally　agreed　and　people　admit　that　it　belongs；　while　in　others



they　deny　that　it　need　belong；　we　should　therefore；　as　soon　as　the



conclusion　has　been　drawn；　say　in　answer　to　them　all　alike；　that　there



is　no　need　for　such　an　attribute　to　belong。　One　must；　however；　be



prepared　to　adduce　an　example　of　the　kind　of　attribute　meant。　All



arguments　such　as　the　following　depend　upon　Accident。　'Do　you　know



what　I　am　going　to　ask　you？　you　know　the　man　who　is　approaching'；　or



'the　man　in　the　mask'？　'Is　the　statue　your　work　of　art？'　or　'Is　the



dog　your　father？'　'Is　the　product　of　a　small　number　with　a　small



number　a　small　number？'　For　it　is　evident　in　all　these　cases　that



there　is　no　necessity　for　the　attribute　which　is　true　of　the　thing's



accident　to　be　true　of　the　thing　as　well。　For　only　to　things　that



are　indistinguishable　and　one　in　essence　is　it　generally　agreed　that



all　the　same　attributes　belong；　whereas　in　the　case　of　a　good　thing；



to　be　good　is　not　the　same　as　to　be　going　to　be　the　subject　of　a



question；　nor　in　the　case　of　a　man　approaching；　or　wearing　a　mask；



is　'to　be　approaching'　the　same　thing　as　'to　be　Coriscus'；　so　that



suppose　I　know　Coriscus；　but　do　not　know　the　man　who　is　approaching；



it　still　isn't　the　case　that　I　both　know　and　do　not　know　the　same　man；



nor；　again；　if　this　is　mine　and　is　also　a　work　of　art；　is　it　therefore



my　work　of　art；　but　my　property　or　thing　or　something　else。　（The



solution　is　after　the　same　manner　in　the　other　cases　as　well。）



　　Some　solve　these　refutations　by　demolishing　the　original　proposition



asked：　for　they　say　that　it　is　possible　to　know　and　not　to　know　the



same　thing；　only　not　in　the　same　respect：　accordingly；　when　they　don't



know　the　man　who　is　coming　towards　them；　but　do　know　Corsicus；　they



assert　that　they　do　know　and　don't　know　the　same　object；　but　not　in



the　same　respect。　Yet；　as　we　have　already　remarked；　the　correction



of　arguments　that　depend　upon　the　same　point　ought　to　be　the　same；



whereas　this　one　will　not　stand　if　one　adopts　the　same　principle　in



regard　not　to　knowing　something；　but　to　being；　or　to　being　is　a　in　a



certain　state；　e。g。　suppose　that　X　is　father；　and　is　also　yours：　for



if　in　some　cases　this　is　true　and　it　is　possible　to　know　and　not　to



know　the　same　thing；　yet　with　that　case　the　solution　stated　has



nothing　to　do。　Certainly　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the　same　argument



from　having　a　number　of　flaws；　but　it　is　not　the　exposition　of　any　and



every　fault　that　constitutes　a　solution：　for　it　is　possible　for　a



man　to　show　that　a　false　conclusion　has　been　proved；　but　not　to　show



on　what　it　depends；　e。g。　in　the　case　of　Zeno's　argument　to　prove



that　motion　is　impossible。　So　that　even　if　any　one　were　to　try　to



establish　that　this　doctrine　is　an　impossible　one；　he　still　is



mistaken；　and　even　if　he　proved　his　case　ten　thousand　times　over；



still　this　is　no　solution　of　Zeno's　argument：　for　the　solution　was　all



along　an　exposition　of　false　reasoning；　showing　on　what　its　falsity



depends。　If　then　he　has　not　proved　his　case；　or　is　trying　to　establish



even　a　true　proposition；　or　a　false　one；　in　a　false　manner；　to　point



this　out　is　a　true　solution。　Possibly；　indeed；　the　present



suggestion　may　very　well　apply　in　some　cases：　but　in　these　cases；　at



any　rate；　not　even　this　would　be　generally　agreed：　for　he　knows　both



that　Coriscus　is　Coriscus　and　that　the　approaching　figure　is



approaching。　To　know　and　not　to　know　the　same　thing　is　generally



thought　to　be　possible；　when　e。g。　one　knows　that　X　is　white；　but



does　not　realize　that　he　is　musical：　for　in　that　way　he　does　know



and　not　know　the　same　thing；　though　not　in　the　same　respect。　But　as　to



the　approaching　figure　and　Coriscus　he　knows　both　that　it　is



approaching　and　that　he　is　Coriscus。



　　A　like　mistake　to　that　of　those　whom　we　have　mentioned　is　that　of



those　who　solve　the　proof　that　every　number　is　a　small　number：　for　if；



when　the　conclusion　is　not　proved；　they　pass　this　over　and　say　that



a　conclusion　has　been　proved　and　is　true；　on　the　ground　that　every



number　is　both　great　and　small；　they　make　a　mistake。



　　Some　people　also　use　the　principle　of　ambiguity　to　solve　the



aforesaid　reasonings；　e。g。　the　proof　that　'X　is　your　father'；　or



'son'；　or　'slave'。　Yet　it　is　evident　that　if　the　appearance　a　proof



depends　upon　a　plurality　of　meanings；　the　term；　or　the　expression　in



question；　ought　to　bear　a　number　of　literal　senses；　whereas　no　one



speaks　of　A　as　being　'B's　child'　in　the　literal　sense；　if　B　is　the



child's　master；　but　the　combination　depends　upon　Accident。　'Is　A



yours？'　'Yes。'　'And　is　A　a　child？'　'Yes。'　'Then　the　child　A　is　yours；'



because　he　happens　to　be　both　yours　and　a　child；　but　he　is　not　'your



child'。



　　There　is　also　the　proof　that　'something　〃of　evils〃　is　good'；　for



wisdom　is　a　'knowledge　〃of　evils〃'。　But　the　expression　that　this　is



'of　so　and…so'　（='so…and…so's'）　has　not　a　number　of　meanings：　it　means



that　it　is　'so…and…so's　property'。　We　may　suppose　of　course；　on　the



other　hand；　that　it　has　a　number　of　meanings…for　we　also　say　that



man　is　'of　the　animals'；　though　not　their　property；　and　also　that



any　term　related　to　'evils'　in　a　way　expressed　by　a　genitive　case　is



on　that　account　a　so…and…so　'of　evils'；　though　it　is　not　one　of　the



evils…but　in　that　case　the　apparently　different　meanings　seem　to



depend　on　whether　the　term　is　used　relatively　or　absolutely。　'Yet　it



is　conceivably　possible　to　find　a　real　ambiguity　in　the　phrase



〃Something　of　evils　is　good〃。'　Perhaps；　but　not　with　regard　to　the



phrase　in　question。　It　would　occur　more　nearly；　suppose　that　'A



servant　is　good　of　the　wicked'；　though　perhaps　it　is　not　quite　found



even　there：　for　a　thing　may　be　'good'　and　be　'X's'　without　being　at



the　same　time　'X's　good'。　Nor　is　the　saying　that　'Man　is　of　the



animals'　a　phrase　with　a　number　of　meanings：　for　a　phrase　does　not



become　possessed　of　a　number　of　meanings　merely　suppose　we　express



it　elliptically：　for　we　express　'Give　me　the　Iliad'　by　quoting　half



a　line　of　it；　e。g。　'Give　me　〃Sing；　goddess；　of　the　wrath。。。〃'







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　25







　　Those　arguments　which　depend　upon　an　expression　that　is　valid　of　a



particular　thing；　or　in　a　particular　respect；　or　place；　or　manner；



or　relation；　and　not　valid　absolutely；　should　be　solved　by　considering



the　conclusion　in　relation　to　its　contradictory；　to　see　if　any　of



these　things　can　possibly　have　happened　to　it。　For　it　is　impossible



for　contraries　and　opposites　and　an　affirmative　and　a　negative　to



belong　to　the　same　thing　absolutely；　there　is；　however；　nothing　to



preve