on sophistical refutations-第12部分

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belong　to　the　same　thing　absolutely；　there　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　each　from　belonging　in　a　particular　respect　or　relation　or



manner；　or　to　prevent　one　of　them　from　belonging　in　a　particular



respect　and　the　other　absolutely。　So　that　if　this　one　belongs



absolutely　and　that　one　in　a　particular　respect；　there　is　as　yet　no



refutation。　This　is　a　feature　one　has　to　find　in　the　conclusion　by



examining　it　in　comparison　with　its　contradictory。



　　All　arguments　of　the　following　kind　have　this　feature：　'Is　it



possible　for　what　is…not　to　be？　〃No。〃　But；　you　see；　it　is　something；



despite　its　not　being。'　Likewise　also；　Being　will　not　be；　for　it



will　not　he　some　particular　form　of　being。　Is　it　possible　for　the　same



man　at　the　same　time　to　be　a　keeper　and　a　breaker　of　his　oath？'　'Can



the　same　man　at　the　same　time　both　obey　and　disobey　the　same　man？'



Or　isn't　it　the　case　that　being　something　in　particular　and　Being



are　not　the　same？　On　the　other　hand；　Not…being；　even　if　it　be



something；　need　not　also　have　absolute　'being'　as　well。　Nor　if　a　man



keeps　his　oath　in　this　particular　instance　or　in　this　particular



respect；　is　he　bound　also　to　be　a　keeper　of　oaths　absolutely；　but　he



who　swears　that　he　will　break　his　oath；　and　then　breaks　it；　keeps　this



particular　oath　only；　he　is　not　a　keeper　of　his　oath：　nor　is　the



disobedient　man　'obedient'；　though　he　obeys　one　particular　command。



The　argument　is　similar；　also；　as　regards　the　problem　whether　the　same



man　can　at　the　same　time　say　what　is　both　false　and　true：　but　it



appears　to　be　a　troublesome　question　because　it　is　not　easy　to　see



in　which　of　the　two　connexions　the　word　'absolutely'　is　to　be



rendered…with　'true'　or　with　'false'。　There　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　it　from　being　false　absolutely；　though　true　in　some　particular



respect　or　relation；　i。e。　being　true　in　some　things；　though　not　'true'



absolutely。　Likewise　also　in　cases　of　some　particular　relation　and



place　and　time。　For　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind　depend　upon



this。'　Is　health；　or　wealth；　a　good　thing？'　'Yes。'　'But　to　the　fool



who　does　not　use　it　aright　it　is　not　a　good　thing：　therefore　it　is



both　good　and　not　good。'　'Is　health；　or　political　power；　a　good



thing？'　'Yes。　〃But　sometimes　it　is　not　particularly　good：　therefore



the　same　thing　is　both　good　and　not　good　to　the　same　man。'　Or　rather



there　is　nothing　to　prevent　a　thing；　though　good　absolutely；　being　not



good　to　a　particular　man；　or　being　good　to　a　particular　man；　and　yet



not　good　or　here。　'Is　that　which　the　prudent　man　would　not　wish；　an



evil？'　'Yes。'　'But　to　get　rid　of；　he　would　not　wish　the　good：



therefore　the　good　is　an　evil。'　But　that　is　a　mistake；　for　it　is　not



the　same　thing　to　say　'The　good　is　an　evil'　and　'to　get　rid　of　the



good　is　an　evil'。　Likewise　also　the　argument　of　the　thief　is　mistaken。



For　it　is　not　the　case　that　if　the　thief　is　an　evil　thing；　acquiring



things　is　also　evil：　what　he　wishes；　therefore；　is　not　what　is　evil



but　what　is　good；　for　to　acquire　something　good　is　good。　Also；　disease



is　an　evil　thing；　but　not　to　get　rid　of　disease。　'Is　the　just



preferable　to　the　unjust；　and　what　takes　place　justly　to　what　takes



place　unjustly？　'Yes。'　'But　to　to　be　put　to　death　unjustly　is



preferable。'　'Is　it　just　that　each　should　have　his　own？'　'Yes。'　'But



whatever　decisions　a　man　comes　to　on　the　strength　of　his　personal



opinion；　even　if　it　be　a　false　opinion；　are　valid　in　law：　therefore



the　same　result　is　both　just　and　unjust。'　Also；　should　one　decide　in



favour　of　him　who　says　what　is　unjust？'　'The　former。'　'But　you　see；　it



is　just　for　the　injured　party　to　say　fully　the　things　he　has　suffered；



and　these　are　fallacies。　For　because　to　suffer　a　thing　unjustly　is



preferable；　unjust　ways　are　not　therefore　preferable；　though　in　this



particular　case　the　unjust　may　very　well　be　better　than　the　just。



Also；　to　have　one's　own　is　just；　while　to　have　what　is　another's　is



not　just：　all　the　same；　the　decision　in　question　may　very　well　be　a



just　decision；　whatever　it　be　that　the　opinion　of　the　man　who　gave　the



decision　supports：　for　because　it　is　just　in　this　particular　case　or



in　this　particular　manner；　it　is　not　also　just　absolutely。　Likewise



also；　though　things　are　unjust；　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the



speaking　of　them　being　just：　for　because　to　speak　of　things　is　just；



there　is　no　necessity　that　the　things　should　be　just；　any　more　than



because　to　speak　of　things　be　of　use；　the　things　need　be　of　use。



Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　what　is　just。　So　that　it　is　not　the



case　that　because　the　things　spoken　of　are　unjust；　the　victory　goes　to



him　who　speaks　unjust　things：　for　he　speaks　of　things　that　are　just　to



speak　of；　though　absolutely；　i。e。　to　suffer；　they　are　unjust。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　26







　　Refutations　that　depend　on　the　definition　of　a　refutation　must；



according　to　the　plan　sketched　above；　be　met　by　comparing　together　the



conclusion　with　its　contradictory；　and　seeing　that　it　shall　involve



the　same　attribute　in　the　same　respect　and　relation　and　manner　and



time。　If　this　additional　question　be　put　at　the　start；　you　should



not　admit　that　it　is　impossible　for　the　same　thing　to　be　both　double



and　not　double；　but　grant　that　it　is　possible；　only　not　in　such　a



way　as　was　agreed　to　constitute　a　refutation　of　your　case。　All　the



following　arguments　depend　upon　a　point　of　that　kind。　'Does　a　man



who　knows　A　to　be　A；　know　the　thing　called　A？'　and　in　the　same　way；



'is　one　who　is　ignorant　that　A　is　A　ignorant　of　the　thing　called　A？'



'Yes。'　'But　one　who　knows　that　Coriscus　is　Coriscus　might　be



ignorant　of　the　fact　that　he　is　musical；　so　that　he　both　knows　and



is　ignorant　of　the　same　thing。'　Is　a　thing　four　cubits　long　greater



than　a　thing　three　cubits　long？'　'Yes。'　'But　a　thing　might　grow　from



three　to　four　cubits　in　length；　'now　what　is　'greater'　is　greater　than



a　'less'：　accordingly　the　thing　in　question　will　be　both　greater　and



less　than　itself　in　the　same　respect。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　27







　　As　to　refutations　that　depend　on　begging　and　assuming　the　original



point　to　be　proved；　suppose　the　nature　of　the　question　to　be



obvious；　one　should　not　grant　it；　even　though　it　be　a　view　generally



held；　but　should　tell　him　the　truth。　Suppose；　however；　that　it　escapes



one；　then；　thanks　to　the　badness　of　arguments　of　that　kind；　one　should



make　one's　error　recoil　upon　the　questioner；　and　say　that　he　has



brought　no　argument：　for　a　refutation　must　be　proved　independently



of　the　original　point。　Secondly；　one　should　say　that　the　point　was



granted　under　the　impression　that　he　intended　not　to　use　it　as　a



premiss；　but　to　reason　against　it；　in　the　opposite　way　from　that



adopted　in　refutations　on　side　issues。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　28







　　Also；　those　refutations　that　bring　one　to　their　conclusion　through



the　consequent　you　should　show　up　in　the　course　of　the　argument



itself。　The　mode　in　which　consequences　follow　is　twofold。　For　the



argument　either　is　that　as　the　universal　follows　on　its



particular…as　（e。g。）　'animal'　follows　from　'man'…so　does　the



particular　on　its　universal：　for　the　claim　is　made　that　if　A　is　always



found　with　B；　then　B　also　is　always　found　with　A。　Or　else　it



proceeds　by　way　of　the　opposites　of　the　terms　involved：　for　if　A



follows　B；　it　is　claimed　that　A's　opposite　will　follow　B's　opposite。



On　this　latter　claim　the　argument　of　Melissus　also　depends：　for　he



claims　that　because　that　which　has　come　to　be　has　a　beginning；　that



which　has　not　come　to　be　has　none；　so　that　if　the　heaven　has　not



come　to　be；　it　is　also　eternal。　But　that　is　not　so；　for　the　sequence



is　vice　versa。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　29







　　In　the　case　of　any　refutations　whose　reasoning　depends　on　some



addition；　look　and　see　if　upon　its　subtraction　the　absurdity　follows



none　the　less：　and　then　if　so；　the　answerer　should　point　this　out；　and



say　that　he　granted　the　addition　not　because　he　really　thought　it；　but



for　the　sake　of　the　argument；　whereas　the　questioner　has　not　used　it



for　the　purpose　of　his　argument　at　all。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　30







　　To　meet　those　refutations　which　make　several　questions　into　one；　one



should　draw　a　distinction　between　them　straight　away　at　the　start。　For



a　question　must　be　single　to　which　there　is　a　single　answer；　so　that



one　must　not　affirm　or　deny　several　things　of　one　thing；　nor　one　thing



of　many；　but　one　of　one。　But　just　as　in　the　case　of　ambiguous　terms；



an　attribute　belongs　to　a　term　sometimes　in　both　its　senses；　and



sometimes　in　neither；　so　that　a　simple　answer　does　one；　as　it　happens；



no　harm　despite　the　fact　that　the　question　is　not　simple；　so　it　is



in　these　cases　of　double　questions　too。　Whenever；　then；　the　several



attributes　belong　to　the　one　subject；　or　the　one　to　the　many；　the



man　who　gives　a　simple　answer　encounters　no　obstacle　even　though　he



has　committed　this　mistake：　but　whenever　an　attribute　belongs　to　one



subject　but　not　to　the　other；　or　there　is　a　question　of　a　number　of



attributes　belonging　to　a　number　of　subjects　and　in　one　sense　both



belong　to　both；　while　in　another　sense；　again；　they　do　not；　then　there



is　trouble；　so　that　one　must　beware　of　this。　Thus　（e。g。）　in　the



following　arguments：　Supposing　to　be　good　and　B　evil；　you　will；　if　you



give　a　single　answer　about　both；　be　compelled　to　say　that　it　is　true



to　call　these　good；　and　that　it　is　true　to　call　them　evil　and　likewise



to　call　them　neither　good　nor　evil　（for　each　of　them　has　not　each



character）；　so　that　the　same　thing　will　be　both　good　and　evil　and



neither　good　nor　evil。　Also；　since　everything　is　the　same　as　itself



and　different　f