on sophistical refutations-第13部分

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neither　good　nor　evil。　Also；　since　everything　is　the　same　as　itself



and　different　from　anything　else；　inasmuch　as　the　man　who　answers



double　questions　simply　can　be　made　to　say　that　several　things　are



'the　same'　not　as　other　things　but　'as　themselves'；　and　also　that　they



are　different　from　themselves；　it　follows　that　the　same　things　must　be



both　the　same　as　and　different　from　themselves。　Moreover；　if　what　is



good　becomes　evil　while　what　is　evil　is　good；　then　they　must　both



become　two。　So　of　two　unequal　things　each　being　equal　to　itself；　it



will　follow　that　they　are　both　equal　and　unequal　to　themselves。



　　Now　these　refutations　fall　into　the　province　of　other　solutions　as



well：　for　'both'　and　'all'　have　more　than　one　meaning；　so　that　the



resulting　affirmation　and　denial　of　the　same　thing　does　not　occur；



except　verbally：　and　this　is　not　what　we　meant　by　a　refutation。　But　it



is　clear　that　if　there　be　not　put　a　single　question　on　a　number　of



points；　but　the　answerer　has　affirmed　or　denied　one　attribute　only



of　one　subject　only；　the　absurdity　will　not　come　to　pass。







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　　With　regard　to　those　who　draw　one　into　repeating　the　same　thing　a



number　of　times；　it　is　clear　that　one　must　not　grant　that　predications



of　relative　terms　have　any　meaning　in　abstraction　by　themselves；



e。g。　that　'double'　is　a　significant　term　apart　from　the　whole　phrase



'double　of　half'　merely　on　the　ground　that　it　figures　in　it。　For　ten



figures　in　'ten　minus　one'　and　in　'not　do'；　and　generally　the



affirmation　in　the　negation；　but　for　all　that；　suppose　any　one　were　to



say；　'This　is　not　white'；　he　does　not　say　that　it　is　white。　The　bare



word　'double'；　one　may　perhaps　say；　has　not　even　any　meaning　at　all；



any　more　than　has　'the'　in　'the　half'：　and　even　if　it　has　a　meaning；



yet　it　has　not　the　same　meaning　as　in　the　combination。　Nor　is



'knowledge'　the　same　thing　in　a　specific　branch　of　it　（suppose　it；



e。g。　to　be　'medical　knowledge'）　as　it　is　in　general：　for　in　general　it



was　the　'knowledge　of　the　knowable'。　In　the　case　of　terms　that　are



predicated　of　the　terms　through　which　they　are　defined；　you　should　say



the　same　thing；　that　the　term　defined　is　not　the　same　in　abstraction



as　it　is　in　the　whole　phrase。　For　'concave'　has　a　general　meaning



which　is　the　same　in　the　case　of　a　snub　nose；　and　of　a　bandy　leg；



but　when　added　to　either　substantive　nothing　prevents　it　from



differentiating　its　meaning；　in　fact　it　bears　one　sense　as　applied



to　the　nose；　and　another　as　applied　to　the　leg：　for　in　the　former



connexion　it　means　'snub'　and　in　the　latter　'bandyshaped'；　i。e。　it



makes　no　difference　whether　you　say　'a　snub　nose'　or　'a　concave　nose'。



Moreover；　the　expression　must　not　be　granted　in　the　nominative　case：



for　it　is　a　falsehood。　For　snubness　is　not　a　concave　nose　but



something　（e。g。　an　affection）　belonging　to　a　nose：　hence；　there　is



no　absurdity　in　supposing　that　the　snub　nose　is　a　nose　possessing



the　concavity　that　belongs　to　a　nose。







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　　With　regard　to　solecisms；　we　have　previously　said　what　it　is　that



appears　to　bring　them　about；　the　method　of　their　solution　will　be



clear　in　the　course　of　the　arguments　themselves。　Solecism　is　the



result　aimed　at　in　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind：　'Is　a　thing



truly　that　which　you　truly　call　it？'　'Yes'。　'But；　speaking　of　a　stone；



you　call　him　real：　therefore　of　a　stone　it　follows　that　〃him　is



real〃。'　No：　rather；　talking　of　a　stone　means　not　saying　which'　but



'whom'；　and　not　'that'　but　'him'。　If；　then；　any　one　were　to　ask；　'Is　a



stone　him　whom　you　truly　call　him？'　he　would　be　generally　thought



not　to　be　speaking　good　Greek；　any　more　than　if　he　were　to　ask；　'Is　he



what　you　call　her？'　Speak　in　this　way　of　a　'stick'　or　any　neuter　word；



and　the　difference　does　not　break　out。　For　this　reason；　also；　no



solecism　is　incurred；　suppose　any　one　asks；　'Is　a　thing　what　you　say



it　to　be？'　'Yes'。　'But；　speaking　of　a　stick；　you　call　it　real：



therefore；　of　a　stick　it　follows　that　it　is　real。'　'Stone'；　however；



and　'he'　have　masculine　designations。　Now　suppose　some　one　were　to



ask；　'Can　〃he〃　be　a　she〃　（a　female）？'；　and　then　again；　'Well；　but　is



not　he　Coriscus？'　and　then　were　to　say；　'Then　he　is　a　〃she〃；'　he　has



not　proved　the　solecism；　even　if　the　name　'Coriscus'　does　signify　a



'she'；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　the　answerer　does　not　grant　this：　this



point　must　be　put　as　an　additional　question：　while　if　neither　is　it



the　fact　nor　does　he　grant　it；　then　the　sophist　has　not　proved　his



case　either　in　fact　or　as　against　the　person　he　has　been



questioning。　In　like　manner；　then；　in　the　above　instance　as　well　it



must　be　definitely　put　that　'he'　means　the　stone。　If；　however；　this



neither　is　so　nor　is　granted；　the　conclusion　must　not　be　stated：



though　it　follows　apparently；　because　the　case　（the　accusative）；



that　is　really　unlike；　appears　to　be　like　the　nominative。　'Is　it



true　to　say　that　this　object　is　what　you　call　it　by　name？'　'Yes'。　'But



you　call　it　by　the　name　of　a　shield：　this　object　therefore　is　〃of　a



shield〃。'　No：　not　necessarily；　because　the　meaning　of　'this　object'　is



not　'of　a　shield'　but　'a　shield'：　'of　a　shield'　would　be　the　meaning



of　'this　object's'。　Nor　again　if　'He　is　what　you　call　him　by　name'；



while　'the　name　you　call　him　by　is　Cleon's'；　is　he　therefore



'Cleon's'：　for　he　is　not　'Cleon's'；　for　what　was　said　was　that　'He；



not　his；　is　what　I　call　him　by　name'。　For　the　question；　if　put　in



the　latter　way；　would　not　even　be　Greek。　'Do　you　know　this？'　'Yes。'



'But　this　is　he：　therefore　you　know　he'。　No：　rather　'this'　has　not　the



same　meaning　in　'Do　you　know　this？'　as　in　'This　is　a　stone'；　in　the



first　it　stands　for　an　accusative；　in　the　second　for　a　nominative



case。　'When　you　have　understanding　of　anything；　do　you　understand　it？'



'Yes。'　'But　you　have　understanding　of　a　stone：　therefore　you



understand　of　a　stone。'　No：　the　one　phrase　is　in　the　genitive；　'of　a



stone'；　while　the　other　is　in　the　accusative；　'a　stone'：　and　what



was　granted　was　that　'you　understand　that；　not　of　that；　of　which　you



have　understanding'；　so　that　you　understand　not　'of　a　stone'；　but　'the



stone'。



　　Thus　that　arguments　of　this　kind　do　not　prove　solecism　but　merely



appear　to　do　so；　and　both　why　they　so　appear　and　how　you　should　meet



them；　is　clear　from　what　has　been　said。







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　　We　must　also　observe　that　of　all　the　arguments　aforesaid　it　is



easier　with　some　to　see　why　and　where　the　reasoning　leads　the　hearer



astray；　while　with　others　it　is　more　difficult；　though　often　they



are　the　same　arguments　as　the　former。　For　we　must　call　an　argument　the



same　if　it　depends　upon　the　same　point；　but　the　same　argument　is　apt



to　be　thought　by　some　to　depend　on　diction；　by　others　on　accident；　and



by　others　on　something　else；　because　each　of　them；　when　worked　with



different　terms；　is　not　so　clear　as　it　was。　Accordingly；　just　as　in



fallacies　that　depend　on　ambiguity；　which　are　generally　thought　to



be　the　silliest　form　of　fallacy；　some　are　clear　even　to　the　man　in　the



street　（for　humorous　phrases　nearly　all　depend　on　diction；　e。g。　'The



man　got　the　cart　down　from　the　stand'；　and　'Where　are　you　bound？'



'To　the　yard　arm'；　and　'Which　cow　will　calve　afore？'　'Neither；　but



both　behind；'　and　'Is　the　North　wind　clear？'　'No；　indeed；　for　it　has



murdered　the　beggar　and　the　merchant。〃　Is　he　a　Good　enough…King？'　'No；



indeed；　a　Rob…son'：　and　so　with　the　great　majority　of　the　rest　as



well）；　while　others　appear　to　elude　the　most　expert　（and　it　is　a



symptom　of　this　that　they　often　fight　about　their　terms；　e。g。



whether　the　meaning　of　'Being'　and　'One'　is　the　same　in　all　their



applications　or　different；　for　some　think　that　'Being'　and　'One'



mean　the　same；　while　others　solve　the　argument　of　Zeno　and



Parmenides　by　asserting　that　'One'　and　'Being'　are　used　in　a　number　of



senses）；　likewise　also　as　regards　fallacies　of　Accident　and　each　of



the　other　types；　some　of　the　arguments　will　be　easier　to　see　while



others　are　more　difficult；　also　to　grasp　to　which　class　a　fallacy



belongs；　and　whether　it　is　a　refutation　or　not　a　refutation；　is　not



equally　easy　in　all　cases。



　　An　incisive　argument　is　one　which　produces　the　greatest



perplexity：　for　this　is　the　one　with　the　sharpest　fang。　Now　perplexity



is　twofold；　one　which　occurs　in　reasoned　arguments；　respecting　which



of　the　propositions　asked　one　is　to　demolish；　and　the　other　in



contentious　arguments；　respecting　the　manner　in　which　one　is　to　assent



to　what　is　propounded。　Therefore　it　is　in　syllogistic　arguments　that



the　more　incisive　ones　produce　the　keenest　heart…searching。　Now　a



syllogistic　argument　is　most　incisive　if　from　premisses　that　are　as



generally　accepted　as　possible　it　demolishes　a　conclusion　that　is



accepted　as　generally　as　possible。　For　the　one　argument；　if　the



contradictory　is　changed　about；　makes　all　the　resulting　syllogisms



alike　in　character：　for　always　from　premisses　that　are　generally



accepted　it　will　prove　a　conclusion；　negative　or　positive　as　the



case　may　be；　that　is　just　as　generally　accepted；　and　therefore　one



is　bound　to　feel　perplexed。　An　argument；　then；　of　this　kind　is　the



most　incisive；　viz。　the　one　that　puts　its　conclusion　on　all　fours　with



the　propositions　asked；　and　second　comes　the　one　that　argues　from



premisses；　all　of　which　are　equally　convincing：　for　this　will



produce　an　equal　perplexity　as　to　what　kind　of　premiss；　of　those



asked；　one　should　demolish。　Herein　is　a　difficulty：　for　one　must



demolish　something；　but　what　one　must　demolish　is　uncertain。　Of



contentious　arguments；　on　the　other　hand；　the　most　incisive　is　the　one



which；　in　t