on sophistical refutations-第2部分

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then　it　means　that　he　has　the　power　to　write　and　not　to　write　at　once；



whereas　if　one　does　not　combine　them；　it　means　that　when　he　is　not



writing　he　has　the　power　to　write。　Also；　'He　now　if　he　has　learnt



his　letters'。　Moreover；　there　is　the　saying　that　'One　single　thing



if　you　can　carry　a　crowd　you　can　carry　too'。



　　Upon　division　depend　the　propositions　that　5　is　2　and　3；　and　odd；



and　that　the　greater　is　equal：　for　it　is　that　amount　and　more　besides。



For　the　same　phrase　would　not　be　thought　always　to　have　the　same



meaning　when　divided　and　when　combined；　e。g。　'I　made　thee　a　slave　once



a　free　man'；　and　'God…like　Achilles　left　fifty　a　hundred　men'。



　　An　argument　depending　upon　accent　it　is　not　easy　to　construct　in



unwritten　discussion；　in　written　discussions　and　in　poetry　it　is



easier。　Thus　（e。g。）　some　people　emend　Homer　against　those　who



criticize　as　unnatural　his　expression　to　men　ou　kataputhetai



ombro。　For　they　solve　the　difficulty　by　a　change　of　accent；



pronouncing　the　ou　with　an　acuter　accent。　Also；　in　the　passage



about　Agamemnon's　dream；　they　say　that　Zeus　did　not　himself　say　'We



grant　him　the　fulfilment　of　his　prayer'；　but　that　he　bade　the　dream



grant　it。　Instances　such　as　these；　then；　turn　upon　the　accentuation。



　　Others　come　about　owing　to　the　form　of　expression　used；　when　what　is



really　different　is　expressed　in　the　same　form；　e。g。　a　masculine　thing



by　a　feminine　termination；　or　a　feminine　thing　by　a　masculine；　or　a



neuter　by　either　a　masculine　or　a　feminine；　or；　again；　when　a



quality　is　expressed　by　a　termination　proper　to　quantity　or　vice



versa；　or　what　is　active　by　a　passive　word；　or　a　state　by　an　active



word；　and　so　forth　with　the　other　divisions　previously'　laid　down。　For



it　is　possible　to　use　an　expression　to　denote　what　does　not　belong



to　the　class　of　actions　at　all　as　though　it　did　so　belong。　Thus　（e。g。）



'flourishing'　is　a　word　which　in　the　form　of　its　expression　is　like



'cutting'　or　'building'：　yet　the　one　denotes　a　certain　quality…i。e。



a　certain　condition…while　the　other　denotes　a　certain　action。　In　the



same　manner　also　in　the　other　instances。



　　Refutations；　then；　that　depend　upon　language　are　drawn　from　these



common…place　rules。　Of　fallacies；　on　the　other　hand；　that　are



independent　of　language　there　are　seven　kinds：



　　（1）　that　which　depends　upon　Accident：



　　（2）　the　use　of　an　expression　absolutely　or　not　absolutely　but　with



some　qualification　of　respect　or　place；　or　time；　or　relation：



　　（3）　that　which　depends　upon　ignorance　of　what　'refutation'　is：



　　（4）　that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：



　　（5）　that　which　depends　upon　assuming　the　original　conclusion：



　　（6）　stating　as　cause　what　is　not　the　cause：



　　（7）　the　making　of　more　than　one　question　into　one。







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　　Fallacies；　then；　that　depend　on　Accident　occur　whenever　any



attribute　is　claimed　to　belong　in　like　manner　to　a　thing　and　to　its



accident。　For　since　the　same　thing　has　many　accidents　there　is　no



necessity　that　all　the　same　attributes　should　belong　to　all　of　a



thing's　predicates　and　to　their　subject　as　well。　Thus　（e。g。）；　'If



Coriscus　be　different　from　〃man〃；　he　is　different　from　himself：　for　he



is　a　man'：　or　'If　he　be　different　from　Socrates；　and　Socrates　be　a



man；　then'；　they　say；　'he　has　admitted　that　Coriscus　is　different　from



a　man；　because　it　so　happens　（accidit）　that　the　person　from　whom　he



said　that　he　（Coriscus）　is　different　is　a　man'。



　　Those　that　depend　on　whether　an　expression　is　used　absolutely　or



in　a　certain　respect　and　not　strictly；　occur　whenever　an　expression



used　in　a　particular　sense　is　taken　as　though　it　were　used　absolutely；



e。g。　in　the　argument　'If　what　is　not　is　the　object　of　an　opinion；　then



what　is　not　is'：　for　it　is　not　the　same　thing　'to　be　x'　and　'to　be'



absolutely。　Or　again；　'What　is；　is　not；　if　it　is　not　a　particular　kind



of　being；　e。g。　if　it　is　not　a　man。'　For　it　is　not　the　same　thing



'not　to　be　x'　and　'not　to　be'　at　all：　it　looks　as　if　it　were；



because　of　the　closeness　of　the　expression；　i。e。　because　'to　be　x'



is　but　little　different　from　'to　be'；　and　'not　to　be　x'　from　'not　to



be'。　Likewise　also　with　any　argument　that　turns　upon　the　point　whether



an　expression　is　used　in　a　certain　respect　or　used　absolutely。　Thus



e。g。　'Suppose　an　Indian　to　be　black　all　over；　but　white　in　respect



of　his　teeth；　then　he　is　both　white　and　not　white。'　Or　if　both



characters　belong　in　a　particular　respect；　then；　they　say；　'contrary



attributes　belong　at　the　same　time'。　This　kind　of　thing　is　in　some



cases　easily　seen　by　any　one；　e。g。　suppose　a　man　were　to　secure　the



statement　that　the　Ethiopian　is　black；　and　were　then　to　ask　whether　he



is　white　in　respect　of　his　teeth；　and　then；　if　he　be　white　in　that



respect；　were　to　suppose　at　the　conclusion　of　his　questions　that



therefore　he　had　proved　dialectically　that　he　was　both　white　and　not



white。　But　in　some　cases　it　often　passes　undetected；　viz。　in　all　cases



where；　whenever　a　statement　is　made　of　something　in　a　certain　respect；



it　would　be　generally　thought　that　the　absolute　statement　follows　as



well；　and　also　in　all　cases　where　it　is　not　easy　to　see　which　of　the



attributes　ought　to　be　rendered　strictly。　A　situation　of　this　kind



arises；　where　both　the　opposite　attributes　belong　alike：　for　then



there　is　general　support　for　the　view　that　one　must　agree　absolutely



to　the　assertion　of　both；　or　of　neither：　e。g。　if　a　thing　is　half　white



and　half　black；　is　it　white　or　black？



　　Other　fallacies　occur　because　the　terms　'proof'　or　'refutation'　have



not　been　defined；　and　because　something　is　left　out　in　their



definition。　For　to　refute　is　to　contradict　one　and　the　same



attribute…not　merely　the　name；　but　the　reality…and　a　name　that　is



not　merely　synonymous　but　the　same　name…and　to　confute　it　from　the



propositions　granted；　necessarily；　without　including　in　the



reckoning　the　original　point　to　be　proved；　in　the　same　respect　and



relation　and　manner　and　time　in　which　it　was　asserted。　A　'false



assertion'　about　anything　has　to　be　defined　in　the　same　way。　Some



people；　however；　omit　some　one　of　the　said　conditions　and　give　a



merely　apparent　refutation；　showing　（e。g。）　that　the　same　thing　is　both



double　and　not　double：　for　two　is　double　of　one；　but　not　double　of



three。　Or；　it　may　be；　they　show　that　it　is　both　double　and　not



double　of　the　same　thing；　but　not　that　it　is　so　in　the　same　respect：



for　it　is　double　in　length　but　not　double　in　breadth。　Or；　it　may　be；



they　show　it　to　be　both　double　and　not　double　of　the　same　thing　and　in



the　same　respect　and　manner；　but　not　that　it　is　so　at　the　same　time：



and　therefore　their　refutation　is　merely　apparent。　One　might；　with



some　violence；　bring　this　fallacy　into　the　group　of　fallacies



dependent　on　language　as　well。



　　Those　that　depend　on　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　to　be



proved；　occur　in　the　same　way；　and　in　as　many　ways；　as　it　is



possible　to　beg　the　original　point；　they　appear　to　refute　because



men　lack　the　power　to　keep　their　eyes　at　once　upon　what　is　the　same



and　what　is　different。



　　The　refutation　which　depends　upon　the　consequent　arises　because



people　suppose　that　the　relation　of　consequence　is　convertible。　For



whenever；　suppose　A　is；　B　necessarily　is；　they　then　suppose　also



that　if　B　is；　A　necessarily　is。　This　is　also　the　source　of　the



deceptions　that　attend　opinions　based　on　sense…perception。　For



people　often　suppose　bile　to　be　honey　because　honey　is　attended　by　a



yellow　colour：　also；　since　after　rain　the　ground　is　wet　in



consequence；　we　suppose　that　if　the　ground　is　wet；　it　has　been



raining；　whereas　that　does　not　necessarily　follow。　In　rhetoric



proofs　from　signs　are　based　on　consequences。　For　when　rhetoricians



wish　to　show　that　a　man　is　an　adulterer；　they　take　hold　of　some



consequence　of　an　adulterous　life；　viz。　that　the　man　is　smartly



dressed；　or　that　he　is　observed　to　wander　about　at　night。　There　are；



however；　many　people　of　whom　these　things　are　true；　while　the　charge



in　question　is　untrue。　It　happens　like　this　also　in　real　reasoning；



e。g。　Melissus'　argument；　that　the　universe　is　eternal；　assumes　that



the　universe　has　not　come　to　be　（for　from　what　is　not　nothing　could



possibly　come　to　be）　and　that　what　has　come　to　be　has　done　so　from　a



first　beginning。　If；　therefore；　the　universe　has　not　come　to　be；　it



has　no　first　beginning；　and　is　therefore　eternal。　But　this　does　not



necessarily　follow：　for　even　if　what　has　come　to　be　always　has　a　first



beginning；　it　does　not　also　follow　that　what　has　a　first　beginning　has



come　to　be；　any　more　than　it　follows　that　if　a　man　in　a　fever　be



hot；　a　man　who　is　hot　must　be　in　a　fever。



　　The　refutation　which　depends　upon　treating　as　cause　what　is　not　a



cause；　occurs　whenever　what　is　not　a　cause　is　inserted　in　the



argument；　as　though　the　refutation　depended　upon　it。　This　kind　of



thing　happens　in　arguments　that　reason　ad　impossible：　for　in　these



we　are　bound　to　demolish　one　of　the　premisses。　If；　then；　the　false



cause　be　reckoned　in　among　the　questions　that　are　necessary　to



establish　the　resulting　impossibility；　it　will　often　be　thought　that



the　refutation　depends　upon　it；　e。g。　in　the　proof　that　the　'soul'



and　'life'　are　not　the　same：　for　if　coming…to…be　be　contrary　to



perishing；　then　a　particular　form　of　perishing　will　have　a



particular　form　of　coming…to…be　as　its　contrary：　now　death　is　a



particular　form　of　perishing　and　is　contrary　to　life：　life；　therefore；



is　a　coming　to…be；　and　to　live　is　to　come…to…be。　But　this　is



impossible：　accordingly；　the　'soul'　and　'life'　are　not　the　same。　Now



this　is　not　proved：　for　the　impossibility　results　all　the　same；　even



if　one　does　not　say　that　life　is　the　sa