on sophistical refutations-第4部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！




ignorance　of　what　a　refutation　is；　some　of　them　because　the



contradiction；　which　is　the　distinctive　mark　of　a　refutation；　is



merely　apparent；　and　the　rest　failing　to　conform　to　the　definition



of　a　proof。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7







　　The　deception　comes　about　in　the　case　of　arguments　that　depend　on



ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases　because　we　are　unable　to　divide



the　ambiguous　term　（for　some　terms　it　is　not　easy　to　divide；　e。g。



'unity'；　'being'；　and　'sameness'）；　while　in　those　that　depend　on



combination　and　division；　it　is　because　we　suppose　that　it　makes　no



difference　whether　the　phrase　be　combined　or　divided；　as　is　indeed　the



case　with　most　phrases。　Likewise　also　with　those　that　depend　on



accent：　for　the　lowering　or　raising　of　the　voice　upon　a　phrase　is



thought　not　to　alter　its　meaning…with　any　phrase；　or　not　with　many。



With　those　that　depend　on　the　of　expression　it　is　because　of　the



likeness　of　expression。　For　it　is　hard　to　distinguish　what　kind　of



things　are　signified　by　the　same　and　what　by　different　kinds　of



expression：　for　a　man　who　can　do　this　is　practically　next　door　to



the　understanding　of　the　truth。　A　special　reason　why　a　man　is　liable



to　be　hurried　into　assent　to　the　fallacy　is　that　we　suppose　every



predicate　of　everything　to　be　an　individual　thing；　and　we　understand



it　as　being　one　with　the　thing：　and　we　therefore　treat　it　as　a



substance：　for　it　is　to　that　which　is　one　with　a　thing　or　substance；



as　also　to　substance　itself；　that　'individually'　and　'being'　are



deemed　to　belong　in　the　fullest　sense。　For　this　reason；　too；　this　type



of　fallacy　is　to　be　ranked　among　those　that　depend　on　language；　in　the



first　place；　because　the　deception　is　effected　the　more　readily　when



we　are　inquiring　into　a　problem　in　company　with　others　than　when　we　do



so　by　ourselves　（for　an　inquiry　with　another　person　is　carried　on　by



means　of　speech；　whereas　an　inquiry　by　oneself　is　carried　on　quite



as　much　by　means　of　the　object　itself）；　secondly　a　man　is　liable　to　be



deceived；　even　when　inquiring　by　himself；　when　he　takes　speech　as



the　basis　of　his　inquiry：　moreover　the　deception　arises　out　of　the



likeness　（of　two　different　things）；　and　the　likeness　arises　out　of　the



language。　With　those　fallacies　that　depend　upon　Accident；　deception



comes　about　because　we　cannot　distinguish　the　sameness　and　otherness



of　terms；　i。e。　their　unity　and　multiplicity；　or　what　kinds　of



predicate　have　all　the　same　accidents　as　their　subject。　Likewise



also　with　those　that　depend　on　the　Consequent：　for　the　consequent　is　a



branch　of　Accident。　Moreover；　in　many　cases　appearances　point　to



this…and　the　claim　is　made　that　if　is　inseparable　from　B；　so　also　is　B



from　With　those　that　depend　upon　an　imperfection　in　the　definition



of　a　refutation；　and　with　those　that　depend　upon　the　difference



between　a　qualified　and　an　absolute　statement；　the　deception



consists　in　the　smallness　of　the　difference　involved；　for　we　treat　the



limitation　to　the　particular　thing　or　respect　or　manner　or　time　as



adding　nothing　to　the　meaning；　and　so　grant　the　statement　universally。



Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　those　that　assume　the　original　point；　and



those　of　false　cause；　and　all　that　treat　a　number　of　questions　as　one：



for　in　all　of　them　the　deception　lies　in　the　smallness　of　the



difference：　for　our　failure　to　be　quite　exact　in　our　definition　of



'premiss'　and　of　'proof'　is　due　to　the　aforesaid　reason。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　8







　　Since　we　know　on　how　many　points　apparent　syllogisms　depend；　we　know



also　on　how　many　sophistical　syllogisms　and　refutations　may　depend。　By



a　sophistical　refutation　and　syllogism　I　mean　not　only　a　syllogism



or　refutation　which　appears　to　be　valid　but　is　not；　but　also　one



which；　though　it　is　valid；　only　appears　to　be　appropriate　to　the　thing



in　question。　These　are　those　which　fail　to　refute　and　prove　people



to　be　ignorant　according　to　the　nature　of　the　thing　in　question；　which



was　the　function　of　the　art　of　examination。　Now　the　art　of　examining



is　a　branch　of　dialectic：　and　this　may　prove　a　false　conclusion



because　of　the　ignorance　of　the　answerer。　Sophistic　refutations　on　the



other　hand；　even　though　they　prove　the　contradictory　of　his　thesis；　do



not　make　clear　whether　he　is　ignorant：　for　sophists　entangle　the



scientist　as　well　with　these　arguments。



　　That　we　know　them　by　the　same　line　of　inquiry　is　clear：　for　the　same



considerations　which　make　it　appear　to　an　audience　that　the　points



required　for　the　proof　were　asked　in　the　questions　and　that　the



conclusion　was　proved；　would　make　the　answerer　think　so　as　well；　so



that　false　proof　will　occur　through　all　or　some　of　these　means：　for



what　a　man　has　not　been　asked　but　thinks　he　has　granted；　he　would　also



grant　if　he　were　asked。　Of　course；　in　some　cases　the　moment　we　add　the



missing　question；　we　also　show　up　its　falsity；　e。g。　in　fallacies



that　depend　on　language　and　on　solecism。　If　then；　fallacious　proofs　of



the　contradictory　of　a　thesis　depend　on　their　appearing　to　refute；



it　is　clear　that　the　considerations　on　which　both　proofs　of　false



conclusions　and　an　apparent　refutation　depend　must　be　the　same　in



number。　Now　an　apparent　refutation　depends　upon　the　elements



involved　in　a　genuine　one：　for　the　failure　of　one　or　other　of　these



must　make　the　refutation　merely　apparent；　e。g。　that　which　depends　on



the　failure　of　the　conclusion　to　follow　from　the　argument　（the



argument　ad　impossible）　and　that　which　treats　two　questions　as　one　and



so　depends　upon　a　flaw　in　the　premiss；　and　that　which　depends　on　the



substitution　of　an　accident　for　an　essential　attribute；　and…a　branch



of　the　last…that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：　more　over；　the



conclusion　may　follow　not　in　fact　but　only　verbally：　then；　instead



of　proving　the　contradictory　universally　and　in　the　same　respect　and



relation　and　manner；　the　fallacy　may　be　dependent　on　some　limit　of



extent　or　on　one　or　other　of　these　qualifications：　moreover；　there



is　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　to　be　proved；　in　violation



of　the　clause　'without　reckoning　in　the　original　point'。　Thus　we



should　have　the　number　of　considerations　on　which　the　fallacious



proofs　depend：　for　they　could　not　depend　on　more；　but　all　will



depend　on　the　points　aforesaid。



　　A　sophistical　refutation　is　a　refutation　not　absolutely　but



relatively　to　some　one：　and　so　is　a　proof；　in　the　same　way。　For　unless



that　which　depends　upon　ambiguity　assumes　that　the　ambiguous　term



has　a　single　meaning；　and　that　which　depends　on　like　verbal　forms



assumes　that　substance　is　the　only　category；　and　the　rest　in　the



same　way；　there　will　be　neither　refutations　nor　proofs；　either



absolutely　or　relatively　to　the　answerer：　whereas　if　they　do　assume



these　things；　they　will　stand；　relatively　to　the　answerer；　but



absolutely　they　will　not　stand：　for　they　have　not　secured　a



statement　that　does　have　a　single　meaning；　but　only　one　that　appears



to　have；　and　that　only　from　this　particular　man。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　9







　　The　number　of　considerations　on　which　depend　the　refutations　of



those　who　are　refuted；　we　ought　not　to　try　to　grasp　without　a



knowledge　of　everything　that　is。　This；　however；　is　not　the　province　of



any　special　study：　for　possibly　the　sciences　are　infinite　in　number；



so　that　obviously　demonstrations　may　be　infinite　too。　Now



refutations　may　be　true　as　well　as　false：　for　whenever　it　is



possible　to　demonstrate　something；　it　is　also　possible　to　refute　the



man　who　maintains　the　contradictory　of　the　truth；　e。g。　if　a　man　has



stated　that　the　diagonal　is　commensurate　with　the　side　of　the



square；　one　might　refute　him　by　demonstrating　that　it　is



incommensurate。　Accordingly；　to　exhaust　all　possible　refutations　we



shall　have　to　have　scientific　knowledge　of　everything：　for　some



refutations　depend　upon　the　principles　that　rule　in　geometry　and　the



conclusions　that　follow　from　these；　others　upon　those　that　rule　in



medicine；　and　others　upon　those　of　the　other　sciences。　For　the



matter　of　that；　the　false　refutations　likewise　belong　to　the　number　of



the　infinite：　for　according　to　every　art　there　is　false　proof；　e。g。



according　to　geometry　there　is　false　geometrical　proof；　and



according　to　medicine　there　is　false　medical　proof。　By　'according　to



the　art'；　I　mean　'according　to　the　principles　of　it'。　Clearly；　then；



it　is　not　of　all　refutations；　but　only　of　those　that　depend　upon



dialectic　that　we　need　to　grasp　the　common…place　rules：　for　these



stand　in　a　common　relation　to　every　art　and　faculty。　And　as　regards



the　refutation　that　is　according　to　one　or　other　of　the　particular



sciences　it　is　the　task　of　that　particular　scientist　to　examine



whether　it　is　merely　apparent　without　being　real；　and；　if　it　be



real；　what　is　the　reason　for　it：　whereas　it　is　the　business　of



dialecticians　so　to　examine　the　refutation　that　proceeds　from　the



common　first　principles　that　fall　under　no　particular　special　study。



For　if　we　grasp　the　startingpoints　of　the　accepted　proofs　on　any



subject　whatever　we　grasp　those　of　the　refutations　current　on　that



subject。　For　a　refutation　is　the　proof　of　the　contradictory　of　a　given



thesis；　so　that　either　one　or　two　proofs　of　the　contradictory



constitute　a　refutation。　We　grasp；　then；　the　number　of



considerations　on　which　all　such　depend：　if；　however；　we　grasp　this；



we　also　grasp　their　solutions　as　well；　for　the　objections　to　these　are



the　solutions　of　them。　We　also　grasp　the　number　of　considerations　on



which　those　refutations　depend；　that　are　merely　apparent…apparent；　I



mean；　not　to　everybody；　but　to　people　of　a　certain　stamp；　for　it　is　an



indefinite　task　if　one　is　to　inquire　how　many　are　the