on sophistical refutations-第6部分

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far　as　its　aim　is　an　apparent　victory；　while　in　so　far　as　its　aim　is



an　apparent　wisdom；　it　will　be　sophistical：　for　the　art　of　sophistry



is　a　certain　appearance　of　wisdom　without　the　reality。　The　contentious



argument　stands　in　somewhat　the　same　relation　to　the　dialectical　as



the　drawer　of　false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　for　it　beguiles　by



misreasoning　from　the　same　principles　as　dialectic　uses；　just　as　the



drawer　of　a　false　diagram　beguiles　the　geometrician。　But　whereas　the



latter　is　not　a　contentious　reasoner；　because　he　bases　his　false



diagram　on　the　principles　and　conclusions　that　fall　under　the　art　of



geometry；　the　argument　which　is　subordinate　to　the　principles　of



dialectic　will　yet　clearly　be　contentious　as　regards　other　subjects。



Thus；　e。g。　though　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the　lunules



is　not　contentious；　Bryson's　solution　is　contentious：　and　the　former



argument　cannot　be　adapted　to　any　subject　except　geometry；　because



it　proceeds　from　principles　that　are　peculiar　to　geometry；　whereas　the



latter　can　be　adapted　as　an　argument　against　all　the　number　of



people　who　do　not　know　what　is　or　is　not　possible　in　each　particular



context：　for　it　will　apply　to　them　all。　Or　there　is　the　method　whereby



Antiphon　squared　the　circle。　Or　again；　an　argument　which　denied　that



it　was　better　to　take　a　walk　after　dinner；　because　of　Zeno's　argument；



would　not　be　a　proper　argument　for　a　doctor；　because　Zeno's　argument



is　of　general　application。　If；　then；　the　relation　of　the　contentious



argument　to　the　dialectical　were　exactly　like　that　of　the　drawer　of



false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　a　contentious　argument　upon　the



aforesaid　subjects　could　not　have　existed。　But；　as　it　is；　the



dialectical　argument　is　not　concerned　with　any　definite　kind　of　being；



nor　does　it　show　anything；　nor　is　it　even　an　argument　such　as　we



find　in　the　general　philosophy　of　being。　For　all　beings　are　not



contained　in　any　one　kind；　nor；　if　they　were；　could　they　possibly　fall



under　the　same　principles。　Accordingly；　no　art　that　is　a　method　of



showing　the　nature　of　anything　proceeds　by　asking　questions：　for　it



does　not　permit　a　man　to　grant　whichever　he　likes　of　the　two



alternatives　in　the　question：　for　they　will　not　both　of　them　yield　a



proof。　Dialectic；　on　the　other　hand；　does　proceed　by　questioning；



whereas　if　it　were　concerned　to　show　things；　it　would　have　refrained



from　putting　questions；　even　if　not　about　everything；　at　least　about



the　first　principles　and　the　special　principles　that　apply　to　the



particular　subject　in　hand。　For　suppose　the　answerer　not　to　grant



these；　it　would　then　no　longer　have　had　any　grounds　from　which　to



argue　any　longer　against　the　objection。　Dialectic　is　at　the　same



time　a　mode　of　examination　as　well。　For　neither　is　the　art　of



examination　an　accomplishment　of　the　same　kind　as　geometry；　but　one



which　a　man　may　possess；　even　though　he　has　not　knowledge。　For　it　is



possible　even　for　one　without　knowledge　to　hold　an　examination　of



one　who　is　without　knowledge；　if　also　the　latter　grants　him　points



taken　not　from　thing　that　he　knows　or　from　the　special　principles　of



the　subject　under　discussion　but　from　all　that　range　of　consequences



attaching　to　the　subject　which　a　man　may　indeed　know　without　knowing



the　theory　of　the　subject；　but　which　if　he　do　not　know；　he　is　bound　to



be　ignorant　of　the　theory。　So　then　clearly　the　art　of　examining　does



not　consist　in　knowledge　of　any　definite　subject。　For　this　reason；



too；　it　deals　with　everything：　for　every　'theory'　of　anything



employs　also　certain　common　principles。　Hence　everybody；　including



even　amateurs；　makes　use　in　a　way　of　dialectic　and　the　practice　of



examining：　for　all　undertake　to　some　extent　a　rough　trial　of　those　who



profess　to　know　things。　What　serves　them　here　is　the　general



principles：　for　they　know　these　of　themselves　just　as　well　as　the



scientist；　even　if　in　what　they　say　they　seem　to　the　latter　to　go



wildly　astray　from　them。　All；　then；　are　engaged　in　refutation；　for



they　take　a　hand　as　amateurs　in　the　same　task　with　which　dialectic



is　concerned　professionally；　and　he　is　a　dialectician　who　examines



by　the　help　of　a　theory　of　reasoning。　Now　there　are　many　identical



principles　which　are　true　of　everything；　though　they　are　not　such　as



to　constitute　a　particular　nature；　i。e。　a　particular　kind　of　being；



but　are　like　negative　terms；　while　other　principles　are　not　of　this



kind　but　are　special　to　particular　subjects；　accordingly　it　is



possible　from　these　general　principles　to　hold　an　examination　on



everything；　and　that　there　should　be　a　definite　art　of　so　doing；



and；　moreover；　an　art　which　is　not　of　the　same　kind　as　those　which



demonstrate。　This　is　why　the　contentious　reasoner　does　not　stand　in



the　same　condition　in　all　respects　as　the　drawer　of　a　false　diagram：



for　the　contentious　reasoner　will　not　be　given　to　misreasoning　from



any　definite　class　of　principles；　but　will　deal　with　every　class。



　　These；　then；　are　the　types　of　sophistical　refutations：　and　that　it



belongs　to　the　dialectician　to　study　these；　and　to　be　able　to　effect



them；　is　not　difficult　to　see：　for　the　investigation　of　premisses



comprises　the　whole　of　this　study。







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　　So　much；　then；　for　apparent　refutations。　As　for　showing　that　the



answerer　is　committing　some　fallacy；　and　drawing　his　argument　into



paradox…for　this　was　the　second　item　of　the　sophist's　programme…in　the



first　place；　then；　this　is　best　brought　about　by　a　certain　manner　of



questioning　and　through　the　question。　For　to　put　the　question



without　framing　it　with　reference　to　any　definite　subject　is　a　good



bait　for　these　purposes：　for　people　are　more　inclined　to　make　mistakes



when　they　talk　at　large；　and　they　talk　at　large　when　they　have　no



definite　subject　before　them。　Also　the　putting　of　several　questions；



even　though　the　position　against　which　one　is　arguing　be　quite



definite；　and　the　claim　that　he　shall　say　only　what　he　thinks；



create　abundant　opportunity　for　drawing　him　into　paradox　or　fallacy；



and　also；　whether　to　any　of　these　questions　he　replies　'Yes'　or



replies　'No'；　of　leading　him　on　to　statements　against　which　one　is



well　off　for　a　line　of　attack。　Nowadays；　however；　men　are　less　able　to



play　foul　by　these　means　than　they　were　formerly：　for　people　rejoin



with　the　question；　'What　has　that　to　do　with　the　original　subject？'　It



is；　too；　an　elementary　rule　for　eliciting　some　fallacy　or　paradox　that



one　should　never　put　a　controversial　question　straight　away；　but　say



that　one　puts　it　from　the　wish　for　information：　for　the　process　of



inquiry　thus　invited　gives　room　for　an　attack。



　　A　rule　specially　appropriate　for　showing　up　a　fallacy　is　the



sophistic　rule；　that　one　should　draw　the　answerer　on　to　the　kind　of



statements　against　which　one　is　well　supplied　with　arguments：　this　can



be　done　both　properly　and　improperly；　as　was　said　before。'　Again；　to



draw　a　paradoxical　statement；　look　and　see　to　what　school　of



philosophers　the　person　arguing　with　you　belongs；　and　then　question



him　as　to　some　point　wherein　their　doctrine　is　paradoxical　to　most



people：　for　with　every　school　there　is　some　point　of　that　kind。　It



is　an　elementary　rule　in　these　matters　to　have　a　collection　of　the



special　'theses'　of　the　various　schools　among　your　propositions。　The



solution　recommended　as　appropriate　here；　too；　is　to　point　out　that



the　paradox　does　not　come　about　because　of　the　argument：　whereas



this　is　what　his　opponent　always　really　wants。



　　Moreover；　argue　from　men's　wishes　and　their　professed　opinions。



For　people　do　not　wish　the　same　things　as　they　say　they　wish：　they　say



what　will　look　best；　whereas　they　wish　what　appears　to　be　to　their



interest：　e。g。　they　say　that　a　man　ought　to　die　nobly　rather　than　to



live　in　pleasure；　and　to　live　in　honest　poverty　rather　than　in



dishonourable　riches；　but　they　wish　the　opposite。　Accordingly；　a　man



who　speaks　according　to　his　wishes　must　be　led　into　stating　the



professed　opinions　of　people；　while　he　who　speaks　according　to　these



must　be　led　into　admitting　those　that　people　keep　hidden　away：　for



in　either　case　they　are　bound　to　introduce　a　paradox；　for　they　will



speak　contrary　either　to　men's　professed　or　to　their　hidden　opinions。



　　The　widest　range　of　common…place　argument　for　leading　men　into



paradoxical　statement　is　that　which　depends　on　the　standards　of　Nature



and　of　the　Law：　it　is　so　that　both　Callicles　is　drawn　as　arguing　in



the　Gorgias；　and　that　all　the　men　of　old　supposed　the　result　to　come



about：　for　nature　（they　said）　and　law　are　opposites；　and　justice　is



a　fine　thing　by　a　legal　standard；　but　not　by　that　of　nature。



Accordingly；　they　said；　the　man　whose　statement　agrees　with　the



standard　of　nature　you　should　meet　by　the　standard　of　the　law；　but　the



man　who　agrees　with　the　law　by　leading　him　to　the　facts　of　nature：　for



in　both　ways　paradoxical　statements　may　be　committed。　In　their　view



the　standard　of　nature　was　the　truth；　while　that　of　the　law　was　the



opinion　held　by　the　majority。　So　that　it　is　clear　that　they；　too；　used



to　try　either　to　refute　the　answerer　or　to　make　him　make　paradoxical



statements；　just　as　the　men　of　to…day　do　as　well。



　　Some　questions　are　such　that　in　both　forms　the　answer　is



paradoxical；　e。g。　'Ought　one　to　obey　the　wise　or　one's　father？'　and



'Ought　one　to　do　what　is　expedient　or　what　is　just？'　and　'Is　it



preferable　to　suffer　injustice　or　to　do　an　injury？'　You　should　lead



people；　then；　into　views　opposite　to　the　majority　and　to　the



philosophers；　if　any　one　speaks　as　do　the　expert　reasoners；　lead　him



into　opposition　to　the　majority；　while　if　he　speaks　as　do　the



majority；　then　into　opposition　to