on sophistical refutations-第9部分

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then；　one　should　not　give　a　single　answer　to　two　questions；　it　is



evident　that　we　should　not　say　simply　'Yes'　or　'No'　in　the　case　of



ambiguous　terms　either：　for　the　remark　is　simply　a　remark；　not　an



answer　at　all；　although　among　disputants　such　remarks　are　loosely



deemed　to　be　answers；　because　they　do　not　see　what　the　consequence　is。



　　As　we　said；　then；　inasmuch　as　certain　refutations　are　generally



taken　for　such；　though　not　such　really；　in　the　same　way　also　certain



solutions　will　be　generally　taken　for　solutions；　though　not　really



such。　Now　these；　we　say；　must　sometimes　be　advanced　rather　than　the



true　solutions　in　contentious　reasonings　and　in　the　encounter　with



ambiguity。　The　proper　answer　in　saying　what　one　thinks　is　to　say



'Granted'；　for　in　that　way　the　likelihood　of　being　refuted　on　a　side



issue　is　minimized。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　one　is　compelled　to　say



something　paradoxical；　one　should　then　be　most　careful　to　add　that　'it



seems'　so：　for　in　that　way　one　avoids　the　impression　of　being　either



refuted　or　paradoxical。　Since　it　is　clear　what　is　meant　by　'begging



the　original　question'；　and　people　think　that　they　must　at　all　costs



overthrow　the　premisses　that　lie　near　the　conclusion；　and　plead　in



excuse　for　refusing　to　grant　him　some　of　them　that　he　is　begging　the



original　question；　so　whenever　any　one　claims　from　us　a　point　such



as　is　bound　to　follow　as　a　consequence　from　our　thesis；　but　is　false



or　paradoxical；　we　must　plead　the　same：　for　the　necessary　consequences



are　generally　held　to　be　a　part　of　the　thesis　itself。　Moreover；



whenever　the　universal　has　been　secured　not　under　a　definite　name；　but



by　a　comparison　of　instances；　one　should　say　that　the　questioner



assumes　it　not　in　the　sense　in　which　it　was　granted　nor　in　which　he



proposed　it　in　the　premiss：　for　this　too　is　a　point　upon　which　a



refutation　often　depends。



　　If　one　is　debarred　from　these　defences　one　must　pass　to　the　argument



that　the　conclusion　has　not　been　properly　shown；　approaching　it　in　the



light　of　the　aforesaid　distinction　between　the　different　kinds　of



fallacy。



　　In　the　case；　then；　of　names　that　are　used　literally　one　is　bound



to　answer　either　simply　or　by　drawing　a　distinction：　the　tacit



understandings　implied　in　our　statements；　e。g。　in　answer　to



questions　that　are　not　put　clearly　but　elliptically…it　is　upon　this



that　the　consequent　refutation　depends。　For　example；　'Is　what



belongs　to　Athenians　the　property　of　Athenians？'　Yes。　'And　so　it　is



likewise　in　other　cases。　But　observe；　man　belongs　to　the　animal



kingdom；　doesn't　he？'　Yes。　'Then　man　is　the　property　of　the　animal



kingdom。'　But　this　is　a　fallacy：　for　we　say　that　man　'belongs　to'



the　animal　kingdom　because　he　is　an　animal；　just　as　we　say　that



Lysander　'belongs　to'　the　Spartans；　because　he　is　a　Spartan。　It　is



evident；　then；　that　where　the　premiss　put　forward　is　not　clear；　one



must　not　grant　it　simply。



　　Whenever　of　two　things　it　is　generally　thought　that　if　the　one　is



true　the　other　is　true　of　necessity；　whereas；　if　the　other　is　true；



the　first　is　not　true　of　necessity；　one　should；　if　asked　which　of　them



is　true；　grant　the　smaller　one：　for　the　larger　the　number　of



premisses；　the　harder　it　is　to　draw　a　conclusion　from　them。　If；　again；



the　sophist　tries　to　secure　that　has　a　contrary　while　B　has　not；



suppose　what　he　says　is　true；　you　should　say　that　each　has　a　contrary；



only　for　the　one　there　is　no　established　name。



　　Since；　again；　in　regard　to　some　of　the　views　they　express；　most



people　would　say　that　any　one　who　did　not　admit　them　was　telling　a



falsehood；　while　they　would　not　say　this　in　regard　to　some；　e。g。　to



any　matters　whereon　opinion　is　divided　（for　most　people　have　no



distinct　view　whether　the　soul　of　animals　is　destructible　or



immortal）；　accordingly　（1）　it　is　uncertain　in　which　of　two　senses



the　premiss　proposed　is　usually　meant…whether　as　maxims　are　（for



people　call　by　the　name　of　'maxims'　both　true　opinions　and　general



assertions）　or　like　the　doctrine　'the　diagonal　of　a　square　is



incommensurate　with　its　side'：　and　moreover　（2）　whenever　opinions



are　divided　as　to　the　truth；　we　then　have　subjects　of　which　it　is　very



easy　to　change　the　terminology　undetected。　For　because　of　the



uncertainty　in　which　of　the　two　senses　the　premiss　contains　the　truth；



one　will　not　be　thought　to　be　playing　any　trick；　while　because　of



the　division　of　opinion；　one　will　not　be　thought　to　be　telling　a



falsehood。　Change　the　terminology　therefore；　for　the　change　will



make　the　position　irrefutable。



　　Moreover；　whenever　one　foresees　any　question　coming；　one　should



put　in　one's　objection　and　have　one's　say　beforehand：　for　by　doing



so　one　is　likely　to　embarrass　the　questioner　most　effectually。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　18







　　Inasmuch　as　a　proper　solution　is　an　exposure　of　false　reasoning；



showing　on　what　kind　of　question　the　falsity　depends；　and　whereas



'false　reasoning'　has　a　double　meaning…for　it　is　used　either　if　a



false　conclusion　has　been　proved；　or　if　there　is　only　an　apparent



proof　and　no　real　one…there　must　be　both　the　kind　of　solution　just



described；'　and　also　the　correction　of　a　merely　apparent　proof；　so



as　to　show　upon　which　of　the　questions　the　appearance　depends。　Thus　it



comes　about　that　one　solves　arguments　that　are　properly　reasoned　by



demolishing　them；　whereas　one　solves　merely　apparent　arguments　by



drawing　distinctions。　Again；　inasmuch　as　of　arguments　that　are



properly　reasoned　some　have　a　true　and　others　a　false　conclusion；



those　that　are　false　in　respect　of　their　conclusion　it　is　possible



to　solve　in　two　ways；　for　it　is　possible　both　by　demolishing　one　of



the　premisses　asked；　and　by　showing　that　the　conclusion　is　not　the



real　state　of　the　case：　those；　on　the　other　hand；　that　are　false　in



respect　of　the　premisses　can　be　solved　only　by　a　demolition　of　one



of　them；　for　the　conclusion　is　true。　So　that　those　who　wish　to　solve



an　argument　should　in　the　first　place　look　and　see　if　it　is　properly



reasoned；　or　is　unreasoned；　and　next；　whether　the　conclusion　be　true



or　false；　in　order　that　we　may　effect　the　solution　either　by　drawing



some　distinction　or　by　demolishing　something；　and　demolishing　it



either　in　this　way　or　in　that；　as　was　laid　down　before。　There　is　a



very　great　deal　of　difference　between　solving　an　argument　when　being



subjected　to　questions　and　when　not：　for　to　foresee　traps　is



difficult；　whereas　to　see　them　at　one's　leisure　is　easier。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　19







　　Of　the　refutations；　then；　that　depend　upon　ambiguity　and　amphiboly



some　contain　some　question　with　more　than　one　meaning；　while　others



contain　a　conclusion　bearing　a　number　of　senses：　e。g。　in　the　proof



that　'speaking　of　the　silent'　is　possible；　the　conclusion　has　a　double



meaning；　while　in　the　proof　that　'he　who　knows　does　not　understand



what　he　knows'　one　of　the　questions　contains　an　amphiboly。　Also　the



double…edged　saying　is　true　in　one　context　but　not　in　another：　it



means　something　that　is　and　something　that　is　not。



　　Whenever；　then；　the　many　senses　lie　in　the　conclusion　no



refutation　takes　place　unless　the　sophist　secures　as　well　the



contradiction　of　the　conclusion　he　means　to　prove；　e。g。　in　the　proof



that　'seeing　of　the　blind'　is　possible：　for　without　the



contradiction　there　was　no　refutation。　Whenever；　on　the　other　hand；



the　many　senses　lie　in　the　questions；　there　is　no　necessity　to　begin



by　denying　the　double…edged　premiss：　for　this　was　not　the　goal　of



the　argument　but　only　its　support。　At　the　start；　then；　one　should



reply　with　regard　to　an　ambiguity；　whether　of　a　term　or　of　a　phrase；



in　this　manner；　that　'in　one　sense　it　is　so；　and　in　another　not　so'；



as　e。g。　that　'speaking　of　the　silent'　is　in　one　sense　possible　but



in　another　not　possible：　also　that　in　one　sense　'one　should　do　what



must　needs　be　done'；　but　not　in　another：　for　'what　must　needs　be'



bears　a　number　of　senses。　If；　however；　the　ambiguity　escapes　one；



one　should　correct　it　at　the　end　by　making　an　addition　to　the



question：　'Is　speaking　of　the　silent　possible？'　'No；　but　to　speak　of



while　he　is　silent　is　possible。'　Also；　in　cases　which　contain　the



ambiguity　in　their　premisses；　one　should　reply　in　like　manner：　'Do



people…then　not　understand　what　they　know？　〃Yes；　but　not　those　who



know　it　in　the　manner　described'：　for　it　is　not　the　same　thing　to



say　that　'those　who　know　cannot　understand　what　they　know'；　and　to　say



that　'those　who　know　something　in　this　particular　manner　cannot　do



so'。　In　general；　too；　even　though　he　draws　his　conclusion　in　a　quite



unambiguous　manner；　one　should　contend　that　what　he　has　negated　is　not



the　fact　which　one　has　asserted　but　only　its　name；　and　that



therefore　there　is　no　refutation。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　20







　　It　is　evident　also　how　one　should　solve　those　refutations　that



depend　upon　the　division　and　combination　of　words：　for　if　the



expression　means　something　different　when　divided　and　when　combined；



as　soon　as　one's　opponent　draws　his　conclusion　one　should　take　the



expression　in　the　contrary　way。　All　such　expressions　as　the



following　depend　upon　the　combination　or　division　of　the　words：　'Was　X



being　beaten　with　that　with　which　you　saw　him　being　beaten？'　and



'Did　you　see　him　being　beaten　with　that　with　which　he　was　being



beaten？'　This　fallacy　has　also　in　it　an　element　of　amphiboly　in　the



questions；　but　it　really　depends　upon　combination。　For　the　meaning



that　depends　upon　the　division　of　the　words　is　not　really　a　double



meaning　（for　the　expression　when　divided　is　not　the　same）；　unless　also



the　word　that　is　pronounced；　according　to　its　breathing；　as　eros　and



eros　is　a　case　of　double　me