laches-第7部分

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represents　the　courageous　man　as　neither　a　soothsayer；　nor　a　physician；　nor



in　any　other　character；　unless　he　means　to　say　that　he　is　a　god。　　My



opinion　is　that　he　does　not　like　honestly　to　confess　that　he　is　talking



nonsense；　but　that　he　shuffles　up　and　down　in　order　to　conceal　the



difficulty　into　which　he　has　got　himself。　　You　and　I；　Socrates；　might　have



practised　a　similar　shuffle　just　now；　if　we　had　only　wanted　to　avoid　the



appearance　of　inconsistency。　　And　if　we　had　been　arguing　in　a　court　of　law



there　might　have　been　reason　in　so　doing；　but　why　should　a　man　deck　himself



out　with　vain　words　at　a　meeting　of　friends　such　as　this？







SOCRATES：　　I　quite　agree　with　you；　Laches；　that　he　should　not。　　But　perhaps



Nicias　is　serious；　and　not　merely　talking　for　the　sake　of　talking。　　Let　us



ask　him　just　to　explain　what　he　means；　and　if　he　has　reason　on　his　side　we



will　agree　with　him；　if　not；　we　will　instruct　him。







LACHES：　　Do　you；　Socrates；　if　you　like；　ask　him：　　I　think　that　I　have　asked



enough。







SOCRATES：　　I　do　not　see　why　I　should　not；　and　my　question　will　do　for　both



of　us。







LACHES：　　Very　good。







SOCRATES：　　Then　tell　me；　Nicias；　or　rather　tell　us；　for　Laches　and　I　are



partners　in　the　argument：　　Do　you　mean　to　affirm　that　courage　is　the



knowledge　of　the　grounds　of　hope　and　fear？







NICIAS：　　I　do。







SOCRATES：　　And　not　every　man　has　this　knowledge；　the　physician　and　the



soothsayer　have　it　not；　and　they　will　not　be　courageous　unless　they　acquire



itthat　is　what　you　were　saying？







NICIAS：　　I　was。







SOCRATES：　　Then　this　is　certainly　not　a　thing　which　every　pig　would　know；



as　the　proverb　says；　and　therefore　he　could　not　be　courageous。







NICIAS：　　I　think　not。







SOCRATES：　　Clearly　not；　Nicias；　not　even　such　a　big　pig　as　the　Crommyonian



sow　would　be　called　by　you　courageous。　　And　this　I　say　not　as　a　joke；　but



because　I　think　that　he　who　assents　to　your　doctrine；　that　courage　is　the



knowledge　of　the　grounds　of　fear　and　hope；　cannot　allow　that　any　wild　beast



is　courageous；　unless　he　admits　that　a　lion；　or　a　leopard；　or　perhaps　a



boar；　or　any　other　animal；　has　such　a　degree　of　wisdom　that　he　knows　things



which　but　a　few　human　beings　ever　know　by　reason　of　their　difficulty。　　He



who　takes　your　view　of　courage　must　affirm　that　a　lion；　and　a　stag；　and　a



bull；　and　a　monkey；　have　equally　little　pretensions　to　courage。







LACHES：　　Capital；　Socrates；　by　the　gods；　that　is　truly　good。　　And　I　hope；



Nicias；　that　you　will　tell　us　whether　these　animals；　which　we　all　admit　to



be　courageous；　are　really　wiser　than　mankind；　or　whether　you　will　have　the



boldness；　in　the　face　of　universal　opinion；　to　deny　their　courage。







NICIAS：　　Why；　Laches；　I　do　not　call　animals　or　any　other　things　which　have



no　fear　of　dangers；　because　they　are　ignorant　of　them；　courageous；　but　only



fearless　and　senseless。　　Do　you　imagine　that　I　should　call　little　children



courageous；　which　fear　no　dangers　because　they　know　none？　　There　is　a



difference；　to　my　way　of　thinking；　between　fearlessness　and　courage。　　I　am



of　opinion　that　thoughtful　courage　is　a　quality　possessed　by　very　few；　but



that　rashness　and　boldness；　and　fearlessness；　which　has　no　forethought；　are



very　common　qualities　possessed　by　many　men；　many　women；　many　children；



many　animals。　　And　you；　and　men　in　general；　call　by　the　term　'courageous'



actions　which　I　call　rash；my　courageous　actions　are　wise　actions。







LACHES：　　Behold；　Socrates；　how　admirably；　as　he　thinks；　he　dresses　himself



out　in　words；　while　seeking　to　deprive　of　the　honour　of　courage　those　whom



all　the　world　acknowledges　to　be　courageous。







NICIAS：　　Not　so；　Laches；　but　do　not　be　alarmed；　for　I　am　quite　willing　to



say　of　you　and　also　of　Lamachus；　and　of　many　other　Athenians；　that　you　are



courageous　and　therefore　wise。







LACHES：　　I　could　answer　that；　but　I　would　not　have　you　cast　in　my　teeth



that　I　am　a　haughty　Aexonian。







SOCRATES：　　Do　not　answer　him；　Laches；　I　rather　fancy　that　you　are　not　aware



of　the　source　from　which　his　wisdom　is　derived。　　He　has　got　all　this　from



my　friend　Damon；　and　Damon　is　always　with　Prodicus；　who；　of　all　the



Sophists；　is　considered　to　be　the　best　puller　to　pieces　of　words　of　this



sort。







LACHES：　　Yes；　Socrates；　and　the　examination　of　such　niceties　is　a　much　more



suitable　employment　for　a　Sophist　than　for　a　great　statesman　whom　the　city



chooses　to　preside　over　her。







SOCRATES：　　Yes；　my　sweet　friend；　but　a　great　statesman　is　likely　to　have　a



great　intelligence。　　And　I　think　that　the　view　which　is　implied　in　Nicias'



definition　of　courage　is　worthy　of　examination。







LACHES：　　Then　examine　for　yourself；　Socrates。







SOCRATES：　　That　is　what　I　am　going　to　do；　my　dear　friend。　　Do　not；　however；



suppose　I　shall　let　you　out　of　the　partnership；　for　I　shall　expect　you　to



apply　your　mind；　and　join　with　me　in　the　consideration　of　the　question。







LACHES：　　I　will　if　you　think　that　I　ought。







SOCRATES：　　Yes；　I　do；　but　I　must　beg　of　you；　Nicias；　to　begin　again。　　You



remember　that　we　originally　considered　courage　to　be　a　part　of　virtue。







NICIAS：　　Very　true。







SOCRATES：　　And　you　yourself　said　that　it　was　a　part；　and　there　were　many



other　parts；　all　of　which　taken　together　are　called　virtue。







NICIAS：　　Certainly。







SOCRATES：　　Do　you　agree　with　me　about　the　parts？　　For　I　say　that　justice；



temperance；　and　the　like；　are　all　of　them　parts　of　virtue　as　well　as



courage。　　Would　you　not　say　the　same？







NICIAS：　　Certainly。







SOCRATES：　　Well　then；　so　far　we　are　agreed。　　And　now　let　us　proceed　a　step；



and　try　to　arrive　at　a　similar　agreement　about　the　fearful　and　the　hopeful：　



I　do　not　want　you　to　be　thinking　one　thing　and　myself　another。　　Let　me　then



tell　you　my　own　opinion；　and　if　I　am　wrong　you　shall　set　me　right：　　in　my



opinion　the　terrible　and　the　hopeful　are　the　things　which　do　or　do　not



create　fear；　and　fear　is　not　of　the　present；　nor　of　the　past；　but　is　of



future　and　expected　evil。　　Do　you　not　agree　to　that；　Laches？







LACHES：　　Yes；　Socrates；　entirely。







SOCRATES：　　That　is　my　view；　Nicias；　the　terrible　things；　as　I　should　say；



are　the　evils　which　are　future；　and　the　hopeful　are　the　good　or　not　evil



things　which　are　future。　　Do　you　or　do　you　not　agree　with　me？







NICIAS：　　I　agree。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　knowledge　of　these　things　you　call　courage？







NICIAS：　　Precisely。







SOCRATES：　　And　now　let　me　see　whether　you　agree　with　Laches　and　myself　as



to　a　third　point。







NICIAS：　　What　is　that？







SOCRATES：　　I　will　tell　you。　　He　and　I　have　a　notion　that　there　is　not　one



knowledge　or　science　of　the　past；　another　of　the　present；　a　third　of　what



is　likely　to　be　best　and　what　will　be　best　in　the　future；　but　that　of　all



three　there　is　one　science　only：　　for　example；　there　is　one　science　of



medicine　which　is　concerned　with　the　inspection　of　health　equally　in　all



times；　present；　past；　and　future；　and　one　science　of　husbandry　in　like



manner；　which　is　concerned　with　the　productions　of　the　earth　in　all　times。　



As　to　the　art　of　the　general；　you　yourselves　will　be　my　witnesses　that　he



has　an　excellent　foreknowledge　of　the　future；　and　that　he　claims　to　be　the



master　and　not　the　servant　of　the　soothsayer；　because　he　knows　better　what



is　happening　or　is　likely　to　happen　in　war：　　and　accordingly　the　law　places



the　soothsayer　under　the　general；　and　not　the　general　under　the　soothsayer。　



Am　I　not　correct　in　saying　so；　Laches？







LACHES：　　Quite　correct。







SOCRATES：　　And　do　you；　Nicias；　also　acknowledge　that　the　same　science　has



understanding　of　the　same　things；　whether　future；　present；　or　past？







NICIAS：　　Yes；　indeed　Socrates；　that　is　my　opinion。







SOCRATES：　　And　courage；　my　friend；　is；　as　you　say；　a　knowledge　of　the



fearful　and　of　the　hopeful？







NICIAS：　　Yes。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　fearful；　and　the　hopeful；　are　admitted　to　be　future



goods　and　future　evils？







NICIAS：　　True。







SOCRATES：　　And　the　same　science　has　to　do　with　the　same　things　in　the



future　or　at　any　time？







NICIAS：　　That　is　true。







SOCRATES：　　Then　courage　is　not　the　science　which　is　concerned　with　the



fearful　and　hopeful；　for　they　are　future　only；　courage；　like　the　other



sciences；　is　concerned　not　only　with　good　and　evil　of　the　future；　but　of



the　present　and　past；　and　of　any　time？







NICIAS：　　That；　as　I　suppose；　is　true。







SOCRATES：　　Then　the　answer　which　you　have　given；　Nicias；　includes　only　a



third　part　of　courage；　but　our　question　extended　to　the　whole　nature　of



courage：　　and　according　to　your　view；　that　is；　according　to　your　present



view；　courage　is　not　only　the　knowledge　of　the　hopeful　and　the　fearful；　but



seems　to　include　nearly　every　good　and　evil　without　reference　to　time。　



What　do　you　say　to　that　alteration　in　your　statement？







NICIAS：　　I　agree；　Socrates。







SOCRATES：　　But　then；　my　dear　friend；　if　a　man　knew　all　good　and　evil；　and



how　they　are；　and　have　been；　and　will　be　produced；　would　he　not　be　perfect；



and　wanting　in　no　virtue；　whether　justice；　or　temperance；　or　holiness？　　He



would　possess　them　all；　and　he　would　know　which　were　dangers　and　which　were



not；　and　guard　against　them　whether　they　were　supernatural　or　natural；　and



he　would　provi