charmides-第11部分

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Yes。







And　does　not　he　who　does　his　duty　act　temperately　or　wisely？







Yes；　he　acts　wisely。







But　must　the　physician　necessarily　know　when　his　treatment　is　likely　to



prove　beneficial；　and　when　not？　or　must　the　craftsman　necessarily　know　when



he　is　likely　to　be　benefited；　and　when　not　to　be　benefited；　by　the　work



which　he　is　doing？







I　suppose　not。







Then；　I　said；　he　may　sometimes　do　good　or　harm；　and　not　know　what　he　is



himself　doing；　and　yet；　in　doing　good；　as　you　say；　he　has　done　temperately



or　wisely。　　Was　not　that　your　statement？







Yes。







Then；　as　would　seem；　in　doing　good；　he　may　act　wisely　or　temperately；　and



be　wise　or　temperate；　but　not　know　his　own　wisdom　or　temperance？







But　that；　Socrates；　he　said；　is　impossible；　and　therefore　if　this　is；　as



you　imply；　the　necessary　consequence　of　any　of　my　previous　admissions；　I



will　withdraw　them；　rather　than　admit　that　a　man　can　be　temperate　or　wise



who　does　not　know　himself；　and　I　am　not　ashamed　to　confess　that　I　was　in



error。　　For　self…knowledge　would　certainly　be　maintained　by　me　to　be　the



very　essence　of　knowledge；　and　in　this　I　agree　with　him　who　dedicated　the



inscription；　'Know　thyself！'　at　Delphi。　　That　word；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；



is　put　there　as　a　sort　of　salutation　which　the　god　addresses　to　those　who



enter　the　temple；　as　much　as　to　say　that　the　ordinary　salutation　of　'Hail！'



is　not　right；　and　that　the　exhortation　'Be　temperate！'　would　be　a　far



better　way　of　saluting　one　another。　　The　notion　of　him　who　dedicated　the



inscription　was；　as　I　believe；　that　the　god　speaks　to　those　who　enter　his



temple；　not　as　men　speak；　but；　when　a　worshipper　enters；　the　first　word



which　he　hears　is　'Be　temperate！'　　This；　however；　like　a　prophet　he



expresses　in　a　sort　of　riddle；　for　'Know　thyself！'　and　'Be　temperate！'　are



the　same；　as　I　maintain；　and　as　the　letters　imply　（Greek）；　and　yet　they　may



be　easily　misunderstood；　and　succeeding　sages　who　added　'Never　too　much；'



or；　'Give　a　pledge；　and　evil　is　nigh　at　hand；'　would　appear　to　have　so



misunderstood　them；　for　they　imagined　that　'Know　thyself！'　was　a　piece　of



advice　which　the　god　gave；　and　not　his　salutation　of　the　worshippers　at



their　first　coming　in；　and　they　dedicated　their　own　inscription　under　the



idea　that　they　too　would　give　equally　useful　pieces　of　advice。　　Shall　I



tell　you；　Socrates；　why　I　say　all　this？　　My　object　is　to　leave　the　previous



discussion　（in　which　I　know　not　whether　you　or　I　are　more　right；　but；　at



any　rate；　no　clear　result　was　attained）；　and　to　raise　a　new　one　in　which　I



will　attempt　to　prove；　if　you　deny；　that　temperance　is　self…knowledge。







Yes；　I　said；　Critias；　but　you　come　to　me　as　though　I　professed　to　know



about　the　questions　which　I　ask；　and　as　though　I　could；　if　I　only　would；



agree　with　you。　　Whereas　the　fact　is　that　I　enquire　with　you　into　the　truth



of　that　which　is　advanced　from　time　to　time；　just　because　I　do　not　know；



and　when　I　have　enquired；　I　will　say　whether　I　agree　with　you　or　not。　



Please　then　to　allow　me　time　to　reflect。







Reflect；　he　said。







I　am　reflecting；　I　replied；　and　discover　that　temperance；　or　wisdom；　if



implying　a　knowledge　of　anything；　must　be　a　science；　and　a　science　of



something。







Yes；　he　said；　the　science　of　itself。







Is　not　medicine；　I　said；　the　science　of　health？







True。







And　suppose；　I　said；　that　I　were　asked　by　you　what　is　the　use　or　effect　of



medicine；　which　is　this　science　of　health；　I　should　answer　that　medicine　is



of　very　great　use　in　producing　health；　which；　as　you　will　admit；　is　an



excellent　effect。







Granted。







And　if　you　were　to　ask　me；　what　is　the　result　or　effect　of　architecture；



which　is　the　science　of　building；　I　should　say　houses；　and　so　of　other



arts；　which　all　have　their　different　results。　　Now　I　want　you；　Critias；　to



answer　a　similar　question　about　temperance；　or　wisdom；　which；　according　to



you；　is　the　science　of　itself。　　Admitting　this　view；　I　ask　of　you；　what



good　work；　worthy　of　the　name　wise；　does　temperance　or　wisdom；　which　is　the



science　of　itself；　effect？　　Answer　me。







That　is　not　the　true　way　of　pursuing　the　enquiry；　Socrates；　he　said；　for



wisdom　is　not　like　the　other　sciences；　any　more　than　they　are　like　one



another：　　but　you　proceed　as　if　they　were　alike。　　For　tell　me；　he　said；



what　result　is　there　of　computation　or　geometry；　in　the　same　sense　as　a



house　is　the　result　of　building；　or　a　garment　of　weaving；　or　any　other　work



of　any　other　art？　　Can　you　show　me　any　such　result　of　them？　　You　cannot。







That　is　true；　I　said；　but　still　each　of　these　sciences　has　a　subject　which



is　different　from　the　science。　　I　can　show　you　that　the　art　of　computation



has　to　do　with　odd　and　even　numbers　in　their　numerical　relations　to



themselves　and　to　each　other。　　Is　not　that　true？







Yes；　he　said。







And　the　odd　and　even　numbers　are　not　the　same　with　the　art　of　computation？







They　are　not。







The　art　of　weighing；　again；　has　to　do　with　lighter　and　heavier；　but　the　art



of　weighing　is　one　thing；　and　the　heavy　and　the　light　another。　　Do　you



admit　that？







Yes。







Now；　I　want　to　know；　what　is　that　which　is　not　wisdom；　and　of　which　wisdom



is　the　science？







You　are　just　falling　into　the　old　error；　Socrates；　he　said。　　You　come



asking　in　what　wisdom　or　temperance　differs　from　the　other　sciences；　and



then　you　try　to　discover　some　respect　in　which　they　are　alike；　but　they　are



not；　for　all　the　other　sciences　are　of　something　else；　and　not　of



themselves；　wisdom　alone　is　a　science　of　other　sciences；　and　of　itself。　



And　of　this；　as　I　believe；　you　are　very　well　aware：　　and　that　you　are　only



doing　what　you　denied　that　you　were　doing　just　now；　trying　to　refute　me；



instead　of　pursuing　the　argument。







And　what　if　I　am？　　How　can　you　think　that　I　have　any　other　motive　in



refuting　you　but　what　I　should　have　in　examining　into　myself？　which　motive



would　be　just　a　fear　of　my　unconsciously　fancying　that　I　knew　something　of



which　I　was　ignorant。　　And　at　this　moment　I　pursue　the　argument　chiefly　for



my　own　sake；　and　perhaps　in　some　degree　also　for　the　sake　of　my　other



friends。　　For　is　not　the　discovery　of　things　as　they　truly　are；　a　good



common　to　all　mankind？







Yes；　certainly；　Socrates；　he　said。







Then；　I　said；　be　cheerful；　sweet　sir；　and　give　your　opinion　in　answer　to



the　question　which　I　asked；　never　minding　whether　Critias　or　Socrates　is



the　person　refuted；　attend　only　to　the　argument；　and　see　what　will　come　of



the　refutation。







I　think　that　you　are　right；　he　replied；　and　I　will　do　as　you　say。







Tell　me；　then；　I　said；　what　you　mean　to　affirm　about　wisdom。







I　mean　to　say　that　wisdom　is　the　only　science　which　is　the　science　of



itself　as　well　as　of　the　other　sciences。







But　the　science　of　science；　I　said；　will　also　be　the　science　of　the　absence



of　science。







Very　true；　he　said。







Then　the　wise　or　temperate　man；　and　he　only；　will　know　himself；　and　be　able



to　examine　what　he　knows　or　does　not　know；　and　to　see　what　others　know　and



think　that　they　know　and　do　really　know；　and　what　they　do　not　know；　and



fancy　that　they　know；　when　they　do　not。　　No　other　person　will　be　able　to　do



this。　　And　this　is　wisdom　and　temperance　and　self…knowledgefor　a　man　to



know　what　he　knows；　and　what　he　does　not　know。　　That　is　your　meaning？







Yes；　he　said。







Now　then；　I　said；　making　an　offering　of　the　third　or　last　argument　to　Zeus



the　Saviour；　let　us　begin　again；　and　ask；　in　the　first　place；　whether　it　is



or　is　not　possible　for　a　person　to　know　that　he　knows　and　does　not　know



what　he　knows　and　does　not　know；　and　in　the　second　place；　whether；　if



perfectly　possible；　such　knowledge　is　of　any　use。







That　is　what　we　have　to　consider；　he　said。







And　here；　Critias；　I　said；　I　hope　that　you　will　find　a　way　out　of　a



difficulty　into　which　I　have　got　myself。　　Shall　I　tell　you　the　nature　of



the　difficulty？







By　all　means；　he　replied。







Does　not　what　you　have　been　saying；　if　true；　amount　to　this：　　that　there



must　be　a　single　science　which　is　wholly　a　science　of　itself　and　of　other



sciences；　and　that　the　same　is　also　the　science　of　the　absence　of　science？







Yes。







But　consider　how　monstrous　this　proposition　is；　my　friend：　　in　any　parallel



case；　the　impossibility　will　be　transparent　to　you。







How　is　that？　and　in　what　cases　do　you　mean？







In　such　cases　as　this：　　Suppose　that　there　is　a　kind　of　vision　which　is　not



like　ordinary　vision；　but　a　vision　of　itself　and　of　other　sorts　of　vision；



and　of　the　defect　of　them；　which　in　seeing　sees　no　colour；　but　only　itself



and　other　sorts　of　vision：　　Do　you　think　that　there　is　such　a　kind　of



vision？







Certainly　not。







Or　is　there　a　kind　of　hearing　which　hears　no　sound　at　all；　but　only　itself



and　other　sorts　of　hearing；　or　the　defects　of　them？







There　is　not。







Or　take　all　the　senses：　　can　you　imagine　that　there　is　any　sense　of　itself



and　of　other　senses；　but　which　is　incapable　of　perceiving　the　objects　of



the　senses？







I　think　not。







Could　there　be　any　desire　which　is　not　the　desire　of　any　pleasure；　but　of



itself；　and　of　all　other　desires？







Certainly　not。







Or　can　you　im