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relation；　but　restricted　them　to　'types　of　nature；'　and　having　become



convinced　that　the　many　cannot　be　parts　of　the　one；　for　the　idea　of



participation　in　them　he　substituted　imitation　of　them。　　To　quote　Dr。



Jackson's　own　expressions；'whereas　in　the　period　of　the　Republic　and　the



Phaedo；　it　was　proposed　to　pass　through　ontology　to　the　sciences；　in　the



period　of　the　Parmenides　and　the　Philebus；　it　is　proposed　to　pass　through



the　sciences　to　ontology'：　　or；　as　he　repeats　in　nearly　the　same　words；



'whereas　in　the　Republic　and　in　the　Phaedo　he　had　dreamt　of　passing　through



ontology　to　the　sciences；　he　is　now　content　to　pass　through　the　sciences　to



ontology。'







This　theory　is　supposed　to　be　based　on　Aristotle's　Metaphysics；　a　passage



containing　an　account　of　the　ideas；　which　hitherto　scholars　have　found



impossible　to　reconcile　with　the　statements　of　Plato　himself。　　The



preparations　for　the　new　departure　are　discovered　in　the　Parmenides　and　in



the　Theaetetus；　and　it　is　said　to　be　expressed　under　a　different　form　by



the　（Greek）　and　the　（Greek）　of　the　Philebus。　　The　（Greek）　of　the　Philebus



is　the　principle　which　gives　form　and　measure　to　the　（Greek）；　and　in　the



'Later　Theory'　is　held　to　be　the　（Greek）　or　（Greek）　which　converts　the



Infinite　or　Indefinite　into　ideas。　　They　are　neither　（Greek）　nor　（Greek）；



but　belong　to　the　（Greek）　which　partakes　of　both。







With　great　respect　for　the　learning　and　ability　of　Dr。　Jackson；　I　find



myself　unable　to　agree　in　this　newly　fashioned　doctrine　of　the　Ideas；　which



he　ascribes　to　Plato。　　I　have　not　the　space　to　go　into　the　question　fully；



but　I　will　briefly　state　some　objections　which　are；　I　think；　fatal　to　it。







（1）　First；　the　foundation　of　his　argument　is　laid　in　the　Metaphysics　of



Aristotle。　　But　we　cannot　argue；　either　from　the　Metaphysics；　or　from　any



other　of　the　philosophical　treatises　of　Aristotle；　to　the　dialogues　of



Plato　until　we　have　ascertained　the　relation　in　which　his　so…called　works



stand　to　the　philosopher　himself。　　There　is　of　course　no　doubt　of　the　great



influence　exercised　upon　Greece　and　upon　the　world　by　Aristotle　and　his



philosophy。　　But　on　the　other　hand　almost　every　one　who　is　capable　of



understanding　the　subject　acknowledges　that　his　writings　have　not　come　down



to　us　in　an　authentic　form　like　most　of　the　dialogues　of　Plato。　　How　much



of　them　is　to　be　ascribed　to　Aristotle's　own　hand；　how　much　is　due　to　his



successors　in　the　Peripatetic　School；　is　a　question　which　has　never　been



determined；　and　probably　never　can　be；　because　the　solution　of　it　depends



upon　internal　evidence　only。　　To　'the　height　of　this　great　argument'　I　do



not　propose　to　ascend。　　But　one　little　fact；　not　irrelevant　to　the　present



discussion；　will　show　how　hopeless　is　the　attempt　to　explain　Plato　out　of



the　writings　of　Aristotle。　　In　the　chapter　of　the　Metaphysics　quoted　by　Dr。



Jackson；　about　two　octavo　pages　in　length；　there　occur　no　less　than　seven



or　eight　references　to　Plato；　although　nothing　really　corresponding　to　them



can　be　found　in　his　extant　writings：a　small　matter　truly；　but　what　a



light　does　it　throw　on　the　character　of　the　entire　book　in　which　they



occur！　　We　can　hardly　escape　from　the　conclusion　that　they　are　not



statements　of　Aristotle　respecting　Plato；　but　of　a　later　generation　of



Aristotelians　respecting　a　later　generation　of　Platonists。　　（Compare　the



striking　remark　of　the　great　Scaliger　respecting　the　Magna　Moralia：Haec



non　sunt　Aristotelis；　tamen　utitur　auctor　Aristotelis　nomine　tanquam　suo。）







（2）　There　is　no　hint　in　Plato's　own　writings　that　he　was　conscious　of



having　made　any　change　in　the　Doctrine　of　Ideas　such　as　Dr。　Jackson



attributes　to　him；　although　in　the　Republic　the　platonic　Socrates　speaks　of



'a　longer　and　a　shorter　way'；　and　of　a　way　in　which　his　disciple　Glaucon



'will　be　unable　to　follow　him'；　also　of　a　way　of　Ideas；　to　which　he　still



holds　fast；　although　it　has　often　deserted　him　（Philebus；　Phaedo）；　and



although　in　the　later　dialogues　and　in　the　Laws　the　reference　to　Ideas



disappears；　and　Mind　claims　her　own　（Phil。；　Laws）。　　No　hint　is　given　of



what　Plato　meant　by　the　'longer　way'　（Rep。）；　or　'the　way　in　which　Glaucon



was　unable　to　follow'；　or　of　the　relation　of　Mind　to　the　Ideas。　　It　might



be　said　with　truth　that　the　conception　of　the　Idea　predominates　in　the



first　half　of　the　Dialogues；　which；　according　to　the　order　adopted　in　this



work；　ends　with　the　Republic；　the　'conception　of　Mind'　and　a　way　of



speaking　more　in　agreement　with　modern　terminology；　in　the　latter　half。　



But　there　is　no　reason　to　suppose　that　Plato's　theory；　or；　rather；　his



various　theories；　of　the　Ideas　underwent　any　definite　change　during　his



period　of　authorship。　　They　are　substantially　the　same　in　the　twelfth　Book



of　the　Laws　as　in　the　Meno　and　Phaedo；　and　since　the　Laws　were　written　in



the　last　decade　of　his　life；　there　is　no　time　to　which　this　change　of



opinions　can　be　ascribed。　　It　is　true　that　the　theory　of　Ideas　takes



several　different　forms；　not　merely　an　earlier　and　a　later　one；　in　the



various　Dialogues。　　They　are　personal　and　impersonal；　ideals　and　ideas；



existing　by　participation　or　by　imitation；　one　and　many；　in　different　parts



of　his　writings　or　even　in　the　same　passage。　　They　are　the　universal



definitions　of　Socrates；　and　at　the　same　time　'of　more　than　mortal



knowledge'　（Rep。）。　　But　they　are　always　the　negations　of　sense；　of　matter；



of　generation；　of　the　particular：　　they　are　always　the　subjects　of



knowledge　and　not　of　opinion；　and　they　tend；　not　to　diversity；　but　to



unity。　　Other　entities　or　intelligences　are　akin　to　them；　but　not　the　same



with　them；　such　as　mind；　measure；　limit；　eternity；　essence　（Philebus；



Timaeus）：　　these　and　similar　terms　appear　to　express　the　same　truths　from　a



different　point　of　view；　and　to　belong　to　the　same　sphere　with　them。　　But



we　are　not　justified；　therefore；　in　attempting　to　identify　them；　any　more



than　in　wholly　opposing　them。　　The　great　oppositions　of　the　sensible　and



intellectual；　the　unchangeable　and　the　transient；　in　whatever　form　of　words



expressed；　are　always　maintained　in　Plato。　　But　the　lesser　logical



distinctions；　as　we　should　call　them；　whether　of　ontology　or　predication；



which　troubled　the　pre…Socratic　philosophy　and　came　to　the　front　in



Aristotle；　are　variously　discussed　and　explained。　　Thus　far　we　admit



inconsistency　in　Plato；　but　no　further。　　He　lived　in　an　age　before　logic



and　system　had　wholly　permeated　language；　and　therefore　we　must　not　always



expect　to　find　in　him　systematic　arrangement　or　logical　precision：'poema



magis　putandum。'　　But　he　is　always　true　to　his　own　context；　the　careful



study　of　which　is　of　more　value　to　the　interpreter　than　all　the



commentators　and　scholiasts　put　together。







（3）　The　conclusions　at　which　Dr。　Jackson　has　arrived　are　such　as　might　be



expected　to　follow　from　his　method　of　procedure。　　For　he　takes　words



without　regard　to　their　connection；　and　pieces　together　different　parts　of



dialogues　in　a　purely　arbitrary　manner；　although　there　is　no　indication



that　the　author　intended　the　two　passages　to　be　so　combined；　or　that　when



he　appears　to　be　experimenting　on　the　different　points　of　view　from　which　a



subject　of　philosophy　may　be　regarded；　he　is　secretly　elaborating　a　system。　



By　such　a　use　of　language　any　premises　may　be　made　to　lead　to　any



conclusion。　　I　am　not　one　of　those　who　believe　Plato　to　have　been　a　mystic



or　to　have　had　hidden　meanings；　nor　do　I　agree　with　Dr。　Jackson　in　thinking



that　'when　he　is　precise　and　dogmatic；　he　generally　contrives　to　introduce



an　element　of　obscurity　into　the　expostion'　（J。　of　Philol。）。　　The　great



master　of　language　wrote　as　clearly　as　he　could　in　an　age　when　the　minds　of



men　were　clouded　by　controversy；　and　philosophical　terms　had　not　yet



acquired　a　fixed　meaning。　　I　have　just　said　that　Plato　is　to　be　interpreted



by　his　context；　and　I　do　not　deny　that　in　some　passages；　especially　in　the



Republic　and　Laws；　the　context　is　at　a　greater　distance　than　would　be



allowable　in　a　modern　writer。　　But　we　are　not　therefore　justified　in



connecting　passages　from　different　parts　of　his　writings；　or　even　from　the



same　work；　which　he　has　not　himself　joined。　　We　cannot　argue　from　the



Parmenides　to　the　Philebus；　or　from　either　to　the　Sophist；　or　assume　that



the　Parmenides；　the　Philebus；　and　the　Timaeus　were　'written



simultaneously；'　or　'were　intended　to　be　studied　in　the　order　in　which　they



are　here　named　（J。　of　Philol。）　　We　have　no　right　to　connect　statements



which　are　only　accidentally　similar。　　Nor　is　it　safe　for　the　author　of　a



theory　about　ancient　philosophy　to　argue　from　what　will　happen　if　his



statements　are　rejected。　　For　those　consequences　may　never　have　entered



into　the　mind　of　the　ancient　writer　himself；　and　they　are　very　likely　to　be



modern　consequences　which　would　not　have　been　understood　by　him。　　'I　cannot



think；'　says　Dr。　Jackson；　'that　Plato　would　have　changed　his　opinions；　but



have　nowhere　explained　the　nature　of　the　change。'　　But　is　it　not　much　more



improbable　that　he　should　have　changed　his　opinions；　and　not　stated　in　an



unmistakable　manner　that　the　most　essential　principle　of　his　philosophy　had



been　reversed？　　It　is　true　that　a　few　of　the　dialogues；　such　as　the



Republic　and　the　Timaeus；　or　the　Theaetetus　and　the　Sophist；　or　the　Meno



and　the　Apology；　contain　allusions　to　one　another。　　But　these　allusions　are



superficial　and；　except　in　the　case　of　the　Republic　and　the　Laws；　have　no