charmides-第7部分

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knowledge。　　Socrates　replies　by　again　dividing　the　abstract　from　the



concrete；　and　asks　how　this　knowledge　conduces　to　happiness　in　the　same



definite　way　in　which　medicine　conduces　to　health。







And　now；　after　making　all　these　concessions；　which　are　really　inadmissible；



we　are　still　as　far　as　ever　from　ascertaining　the　nature　of　temperance；



which　Charmides　has　already　discovered；　and　had　therefore　better　rest　in



the　knowledge　that　the　more　temperate　he　is　the　happier　he　will　be；　and　not



trouble　himself　with　the　speculations　of　Socrates。







In　this　Dialogue　may　be　noted　（1）　The　Greek　ideal　of　beauty　and　goodness；



the　vision　of　the　fair　soul　in　the　fair　body；　realised　in　the　beautiful



Charmides；　（2）　The　true　conception　of　medicine　as　a　science　of　the　whole　as



well　as　the　parts；　and　of　the　mind　as　well　as　the　body；　which　is　playfully



intimated　in　the　story　of　the　Thracian；　（3）　The　tendency　of　the　age　to



verbal　distinctions；　which　here；　as　in　the　Protagoras　and　Cratylus；　are



ascribed　to　the　ingenuity　of　Prodicus；　and　to　interpretations　or　rather



parodies　of　Homer　or　Hesiod；　which　are　eminently　characteristic　of　Plato



and　his　contemporaries；　（4）　The　germ　of　an　ethical　principle　contained　in



the　notion　that　temperance　is　'doing　one's　own　business；'　which　in　the



Republic　（such　is　the　shifting　character　of　the　Platonic　philosophy）　is



given　as　the　definition；　not　of　temperance；　but　of　justice；　（5）　The



impatience　which　is　exhibited　by　Socrates　of　any　definition　of　temperance



in　which　an　element　of　science　or　knowledge　is　not　included；　（6）　The



beginning　of　metaphysics　and　logic　implied　in　the　two　questions：　　whether



there　can　be　a　science　of　science；　and　whether　the　knowledge　of　what　you



know　is　the　same　as　the　knowledge　of　what　you　do　not　know；　and　also　in　the



distinction　between　'what　you　know'　and　'that　you　know；'　（Greek；）　here　too



is　the　first　conception　of　an　absolute　self…determined　science　（the　claims



of　which；　however；　are　disputed　by　Socrates；　who　asks　cui　bono？）　as　well　as



the　first　suggestion　of　the　difficulty　of　the　abstract　and　concrete；　and



one　of　the　earliest　anticipations　of　the　relation　of　subject　and　object；



and　of　the　subjective　element　in　knowledgea　'rich　banquet'　of



metaphysical　questions　in　which　we　'taste　of　many　things。'　　（7）　And　still



the　mind　of　Plato；　having　snatched　for　a　moment　at　these　shadows　of　the



future；　quickly　rejects　them：　　thus　early　has　he　reached　the　conclusion



that　there　can　be　no　science　which　is　a　'science　of　nothing'　（Parmen。）。　



（8）　The　conception　of　a　science　of　good　and　evil　also　first　occurs　here；　an



anticipation　of　the　Philebus　and　Republic　as　well　as　of　moral　philosophy　in



later　ages。







The　dramatic　interest　of　the　Dialogue　chiefly　centres　in　the　youth



Charmides；　with　whom　Socrates　talks　in　the　kindly　spirit　of　an　elder。　　His



childlike　simplicity　and　ingenuousness　are　contrasted　with　the　dialectical



and　rhetorical　arts　of　Critias；　who　is　the　grown…up　man　of　the　world；



having　a　tincture　of　philosophy。　　No　hint　is　given；　either　here　or　in　the



Timaeus；　of　the　infamy　which　attaches　to　the　name　of　the　latter　in　Athenian



history。　　He　is　simply　a　cultivated　person　who；　like　his　kinsman　Plato；　is



ennobled　by　the　connection　of　his　family　with　Solon　（Tim。）；　and　had　been



the　follower；　if　not　the　disciple；　both　of　Socrates　and　of　the　Sophists。　



In　the　argument　he　is　not　unfair；　if　allowance　is　made　for　a　slight



rhetorical　tendency；　and　for　a　natural　desire　to　save　his　reputation　with



the　company；　he　is　sometimes　nearer　the　truth　than　Socrates。　　Nothing　in



his　language　or　behaviour　is　unbecoming　the　guardian　of　the　beautiful



Charmides。　　His　love　of　reputation　is　characteristically　Greek；　and



contrasts　with　the　humility　of　Socrates。　　Nor　in　Charmides　himself　do　we



find　any　resemblance　to　the　Charmides　of　history；　except；　perhaps；　the



modest　and　retiring　nature　which；　according　to　Xenophon；　at　one　time　of　his



life　prevented　him　from　speaking　in　the　Assembly　（Mem。）；　and　we　are



surprised　to　hear　that；　like　Critias；　he　afterwards　became　one　of　the



thirty　tyrants。　　In　the　Dialogue　he　is　a　pattern　of　virtue；　and　is



therefore　in　no　need　of　the　charm　which　Socrates　is　unable　to　apply。　　With



youthful　naivete；　keeping　his　secret　and　entering　into　the　spirit　of



Socrates；　he　enjoys　the　detection　of　his　elder　and　guardian　Critias；　who　is



easily　seen　to　be　the　author　of　the　definition　which　he　has　so　great　an



interest　in　maintaining。　　The　preceding　definition；　'Temperance　is　doing



one's　own　business；'　is　assumed　to　have　been　borrowed　by　Charmides　from



another；　and　when　the　enquiry　becomes　more　abstract　he　is　superseded　by



Critias　（Theaet。；　Euthyd。）。　　Socrates　preserves　his　accustomed　irony　to　the



end；　he　is　in　the　neighbourhood　of　several　great　truths；　which　he　views　in



various　lights；　but　always　either　by　bringing　them　to　the　test　of　common



sense；　or　by　demanding　too　great　exactness　in　the　use　of　words；　turns　aside



from　them　and　comes　at　last　to　no　conclusion。







The　definitions　of　temperance　proceed　in　regular　order　from　the　popular　to



the　philosophical。　　The　first　two　are　simple　enough　and　partially　true；



like　the　first　thoughts　of　an　intelligent　youth；　the　third；　which　is　a　real



contribution　to　ethical　philosophy；　is　perverted　by　the　ingenuity　of



Socrates；　and　hardly　rescued　by　an　equal　perversion　on　the　part　of　Critias。



The　remaining　definitions　have　a　higher　aim；　which　is　to　introduce　the



element　of　knowledge；　and　at　last　to　unite　good　and　truth　in　a　single



science。　　But　the　time　has　not　yet　arrived　for　the　realization　of　this



vision　of　metaphysical　philosophy；　and　such　a　science　when　brought　nearer



to　us　in　the　Philebus　and　the　Republic　will　not　be　called　by　the　name　of



（Greek）。　　Hence　we　see　with　surprise　that　Plato；　who　in　his　other　writings



identifies　good　and　knowledge；　here　opposes　them；　and　asks；　almost　in　the



spirit　of　Aristotle；　how　can　there　be　a　knowledge　of　knowledge；　and　even　if



attainable；　how　can　such　a　knowledge　be　of　any　use？







The　difficulty　of　the　Charmides　arises　chiefly　from　the　two　senses　of　the



word　（Greek）；　or　temperance。　　From　the　ethical　notion　of　temperance；　which



is　variously　defined　to　be　quietness；　modesty；　doing　our　own　business；　the



doing　of　good　actions；　the　dialogue　passes　onto　the　intellectual　conception



of　（Greek）；　which　is　declared　also　to　be　the　science　of　self…knowledge；　or



of　the　knowledge　of　what　we　know　and　do　not　know；　or　of　the　knowledge　of



good　and　evil。　　The　dialogue　represents　a　stage　in　the　history　of



philosophy　in　which　knowledge　and　action　were　not　yet　distinguished。　　Hence



the　confusion　between　them；　and　the　easy　transition　from　one　to　the　other。　



The　definitions　which　are　offered　are　all　rejected；　but　it　is　to　be



observed　that　they　all　tend　to　throw　a　light　on　the　nature　of　temperance；



and　that；　unlike　the　distinction　of　Critias　between　（Greek）；　none　of　them



are　merely　verbal　quibbles；　it　is　implied　that　this　question；　although　it



has　not　yet　received　a　solution　in　theory；　has　been　already　answered　by



Charmides　himself；　who　has　learned　to　practise　the　virtue　of　self…knowledge



which　philosophers　are　vainly　trying　to　define　in　words。　　In　a　similar



spirit　we　might　say　to　a　young　man　who　is　disturbed　by　theological



difficulties；　'Do　not　trouble　yourself　about　such　matters；　but　only　lead　a



good　life；'　and　yet　in　either　case　it　is　not　to　be　denied　that　right　ideas



of　truth　may　contribute　greatly　to　the　improvement　of　character。







The　reasons　why　the　Charmides；　Lysis；　Laches　have　been　placed　together　and



first　in　the　series　of　Platonic　dialogues；　are：　　（i）　Their　shortness　and



simplicity。　　The　Charmides　and　the　Lysis；　if　not　the　Laches；　are　of　the



same　'quality'　as　the　Phaedrus　and　Symposium：　　and　it　is　probable；　though



far　from　certain；　that　the　slighter　effort　preceded　the　greater　one。　　（ii）



Their　eristic；　or　rather　Socratic　character；　they　belong　to　the　class



called　dialogues　of　search　（Greek）；　which　have　no　conclusion。　　（iii）　The



absence　in　them　of　certain　favourite　notions　of　Plato；　such　as　the　doctrine



of　recollection　and　of　the　Platonic　ideas；　the　questions；　whether　virtue



can　be　taught；　whether　the　virtues　are　one　or　many。　　（iv）　They　have　a　want



of　depth；　when　compared　with　the　dialogues　of　the　middle　and　later　period；



and　a　youthful　beauty　and　grace　which　is　wanting　in　the　later　ones。　　（v）



Their　resemblance　to　one　another；　in　all　the　three　boyhood　has　a　great



part。　　These　reasons　have　various　degrees　of　weight　in　determining　their



place　in　the　catalogue　of　the　Platonic　writings；　though　they　are　not



conclusive。　　No　arrangement　of　the　Platonic　dialogues　can　be　strictly



chronological。　　The　order　which　has　been　adopted　is　intended　mainly　for　the



convenience　of　the　reader；　at　the　same　time；　indications　of　the　date



supplied　either　by　Plato　himself　or　allusions　found　in　the　dialogues　have



not　been　lost　sight　of。　　Much　may　be　said　about　this　subject；　but　the



results　can　only　be　probable；　there　are　no　materials　which　would　enable　us



to　attain　to　anything　like　certainty。







The　relations　of　knowledge　and　virtue　are　again　brought　forward　in　the



companion　dialogues　of　the　Lysis　and　Laches；　and　also　in　the　Protagoras　and



Euthydemus。　　The　opposition　of　abstract　and　particular　knowledge　in　this



dialogue　may　be　compared　with　a　similar　opposition　of　ideas　and　phenomena



which　occurs　in　the　Prologues　to　the　Parmenides；　but　seems　rather　to　belong



to　a