a discourse on method-第6部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


nd　fall　into　paralogisms；　even　on　the　simplest　matters　of　geometry；　I；　convinced　that　I　was　as　open　to　error　as　any　other；　rejected　as　false　all　the　reasonings　I　had　hitherto　taken　for　demonstrations；　and　finally；　when　I　considered　that　the　very　same　thoughts　（presentations）　which　we　experience　when　awake　may　also　be　experienced　when　we　are　asleep；　while　there　is　at　that　time　not　one　of　them　true；　I　supposed　that　all　the　objects　（presentations）　that　had　ever　entered　into　my　mind　when　awake；　had　in　them　no　more　truth　than　the　illusions　of　my　dreams。　　But　immediately　upon　this　I　observed　that；　whilst　I　thus　wished　to　think　that　all　was　false；　it　was　absolutely　necessary　that　I；　who　thus　thought；　should　be　somewhat；　and　as　I　observed　that　this　truth；　I　think；　therefore　I　am　（COGITO　ERGO　SUM）；　was　so　certain　and　of　such　evidence　that　no　ground　of　doubt；　however　extravagant；　could　be　alleged　by　the　sceptics　capable　of　shaking　it；　I　concluded　that　I　might；　without　scruple；　accept　it　as　the　first　principle　of　the　philosophy　of　which　I　was　in　search

In　the　next　place；　I　attentively　examined　what　I　was　and　as　I　observed　that　I　could　suppose　that　I　had　no　body；　and　that　there　was　no　world　nor　any　place　in　which　I　might　be；　but　that　I　could　not　therefore　suppose　that　I　was　not；　and　that；　on　the　contrary；　from　the　very　circumstance　that　I　thought　to　doubt　of　the　truth　of　other　things；　it　most　clearly　and　certainly　followed　that　I　was；　while；　on　the　other　hand；　if　I　had　only　ceased　to　think；　although　all　the　other　objects　which　I　had　ever　imagined　had　been　in　reality　existent；　I　would　have　had　no　reason　to　believe　that　I　existed；　I　thence　concluded　that　I　was　a　substance　whose　whole　essence　or　nature　consists　only　in　thinking；　and　which；　that　it　may　exist；　has　need　of　no　place；　nor　is　dependent　on　any　material　thing；　so　that　〃　I；〃　that　is　to　say；　the　mind　by　which　I　am　what　I　am；　is　wholly　distinct　from　the　body；　and　is　　even　more　easily　known　than　the　latter；　and　is　such；　that　although　the　latter　were　not；　it　would　still　continue　to　be　all　that　it　is。

After　this　I　inquired　in　general　into　what　is　essential　I　to　the　truth　and　certainty　of　a　proposition；　for　since　I　had　discovered　one　which　I　knew　to　be　true；　I　thought　that　I　must　likewise　be　able　to　discover　the　ground　of　this　certitude。　　And　as　I　observed　that　in　the　words　I　think；　therefore　I　am；　there　is　nothing　at　all　which　gives　me　assurance　of　their　truth　beyond　this；　that　I　see　very　clearly　that　in　order　to　think　it　is　necessary　to　exist；　I　concluded　that　I　might　take；　as　a　general　rule；　the　principle；　that　all　the　things　which　we　very　clearly　and　distinctly　conceive　are　true；　only　observing；　however；　that　there　is　some　difficulty　in　rightly　determining　the　objects　which　we　distinctly　conceive。

In　the　next　place；　from　reflecting　on　the　circumstance　that　I　doubted；　and　that　consequently　my　being　was　not　wholly　perfect　（for　I　clearly　saw　that　it　was　a　greater　perfection　to　know　than　to　doubt）；　I　was　led　to　inquire　whence　I　had　learned　to　think　of　something　more　perfect　than　myself；　and　I　clearly　recognized　that　I　must　hold　this　notion　from　some　nature　which　in　reality　was　more　perfect。　　As　for　the　thoughts　of　many　other　objects　external　to　me；　as　of　the　sky；　the　earth；　light；　heat；　and　a　thousand　more；　I　was　less　at　a　loss　to　know　whence　these　came；　for　since　I　remarked　in　them　nothing　which　seemed　to　render　them　superior　to　myself；　I　could　believe　that；　if　these　were　true；　they　were　dependencies　on　my　own　nature；　in　so　far　as　it　possessed　a　certain　perfection；　and；　if　they　were　false；　that　I　held　them　from　nothing；　that　is　to　say；　that　they　were　in　me　because　of　a　certain　imperfection　of　my　nature。　　But　this　could　not　be　the　case　with…the　idea　of　a　nature　more　perfect　than　myself；　for　to　receive　it　from　nothing　was　a　thing　manifestly　impossible；　and；　because　it　is　not　less　repugnant　that　the　more　perfect　should　be　an　effect　of；　and　dependence　on　the　less　perfect；　than　that　something　should　proceed　from　nothing；　it　was　equally　impossible　that　I　could　hold　it　from　myself：　accordingly；　it　but　remained　that　it　had　been　placed　in　me　by　a　nature　which　was　in　reality　more　perfect　than　mine；　and　which　even　possessed　within　itself　all　the　perfections　of　which　I　could　form　any　idea；　that　is　to　say；　in　a　single　word；　which　was　God。　　And　to　this　I　added　that；　since　I　knew　some　perfections　which　I　did　not　possess；　I　was　not　the　only　being　in　existence　（I　will　here；　with　your　permission；　freely　use　the　terms　of　the　schools）；　but；　on　the　contrary；　that　there　was　of　necessity　some　other　more　perfect　Being　upon　whom　I　was　dependent；　and　from　whom　I　had　received　all　that　I　possessed；　for　if　I　had　existed　alone；　and　independently　of　every　other　being；　so　as　to　have　had　from　myself　all　the　perfection；　however　little；　which　I　actually　possessed；　I　should　have　been　able；　for　the　same　reason；　to　have　had　from　myself　the　whole　remainder　of　perfection；　of　the　want　of　which　I　was　conscious；　and　thus　could　of　myself　have　become　infinite；　eternal；　immutable；　omniscient；　all…powerful；　and；　in　fine；　have　possessed　all　the　perfections　which　I　could　recognize　in　God。　　For　in　order　to　know　the　nature　of　God　（whose　existence　has　been　established　by　the　preceding　reasonings）；　as　far　as　my　own　nature　permitted；　I　had　only　to　consider　in　reference　to　all　the　properties　of　which　I　found　in　my　　mind　some　idea；　whether　their　possession　was　a　mark　of　perfection；　and　I　was　assured　that　no　one　which　indicated　any　imperfection　was　in　him；　and　that　none　of　the　rest　was　awanting。　　Thus　I　perceived　that　doubt；　inconstancy；　　sadness；　and　such　like；　could　not　be　found　in　God；　since　I　myself　would　have　been　happy　to　be　free　from　them。　Besides；　I　had　ideas　of　many　sensible　and　corporeal　things；　for　although　I　might　suppose　that　I　was　dreaming；　and　that　all　which　I　saw　or　imagined　was　false；　I　could　not；　nevertheless；　deny　that　the　ideas　were　in　reality　in　my　thoughts。　　But；　because　I　had　already　very　clearly　recognized　in　myself　that　the　intelligent　nature　is　distinct　from　the　corporeal；　and　as　I　observed　that　all　composition　is　an　evidence　of　dependency；　and　that　a　state　of　dependency　is　manifestly　a　state　of　imperfection；　I　therefore　determined　that　it　could　not　be　a　perfection　in　God　to　be　compounded　of　these　two　natures　and　that　consequently　he　was　not　so　compounded；　but　that　if　there　were　any　bodies　in　the　world；　or　even　any　intelligences；　or　other　natures　that　were　not　wholly　perfect；　their　existence　depended　on　his　power　in　such　a　way　that　they　could　not　subsist　without　him　for　a　single　moment。

I　was　disposed　straightway　to　search　for　other　truths　and　when　I　had　represented　to　myself　the　object　of　the　geometers；　which　I　conceived　to　be　a　continuous　body　or　a　space　indefinitely　extended　in　length；　breadth；　and　height　or　depth；　divisible　into　divers　parts　which　admit　of　different　figures　and　sizes；　and　of　being　moved　or　transposed　in　all　manner　of　ways　（for　all　this　the　geometers　suppose　to　be　in　the　object　they　contemplate）；　I　went　over　some　of　their　simplest　demonstrations。　　And；　in　the　first　place；　I　observed；　that　the　great　certitude　which　by　common　consent　is　accorded　to　these　demonstrations；　is　founded　solely　upon　this；　that　they　are　clearly　conceived　in　accordance　with　the　rules　I　have　already　laid　down　In　the　next　place；　I　perceived　that　there　was　nothing　at　all　in　these　demonstrations　which　could　assure　me　of　the　existence　of　their　object：　thus；　for　example；　supposing　a　triangle　to　be　given；　I　distinctly　perceived　that　its　three　angles　were　necessarily　equal　to　two　right　angles；　but　I　did　not　on　that　account　perceive　anything　which　could　assure　me　that　any　triangle　existed：　　while；　on　the　contrary；　recurring　to　the　examination　of　the　idea　of　a　Perfect　Being；　I　found　that　the　existence　of　the　Being　was　comprised　in　the　idea　in　the　same　way　that　the　equality　of　its　three　angles　to　two　right　angles　is　comprised　in　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　or　as　in　the　idea　of　a　sphere；　the　equidistance　of　all　points　on　its　surface　from　the　center；　or　even　still　more　clearly；　and　that　consequently　it　is　at　least　as　certain　that　God；　who　is　this　Perfect　Being；　is；　or　exists；　as　any　demonstration　of　geometry　can　be。

But　the　reason　which　leads　many　to　persuade　them　selves　that　there　is　a　difficulty　in　knowing　this　truth；　and　even　also　in　knowing　what　their　mind　really　is；　is　that　they　never　raise　their　thoughts　above　sensible　objects；　and　are　so　accustomed　to　consider　nothing　except　by　way　of　imagination；　which　is　a　mode　of　thinking　limited　to　material　objects；　that　all　that　is　not　imaginable　seems　to　them　not　intelligible。　　The　truth　of　this　is　sufficiently　manifest　from　the　single　circumstance；　that　the　philosophers　of　the　schools　accept　as　a　maxim　that　there　is　nothing　in　the　understanding　which　was　not　previously　in　the　senses；　in　which　however　it　is　certain　that　the　ideas　of　God　and　of　the　soul　have　never　been；　and　it　appears　to　me　that　they　who　make　use　of　their　imagination　to　comprehend　these　ideas　do　exactly　the　some　thing　as　if；　in　order　to　hear　sounds　or　smell　odors；　they　strove　to　avail　themselves　of　their　eyes；　unless　indeed　that　there　is　this　difference；　that　the　sense　of　sight　does　not　afford　us　an　inferior　assurance　to　those　of　smell　or　hearing；　in　place　of　which；　neither　our　imagination　nor　our　senses　can　give　us　assurance　of　anything　unless　our　understanding　intervene。

Finally；　if　there　be　still　persons　who　are　not　sufficiently　persuaded　of　the　existence　of　God　and　of　the　soul；　by　the　reasons　I　have　adduced；　I　am　desirous　that　they　should　know　that　all　the　other　propositions；　of　the　truth　of　which　they　deem　themselves　perhaps　more　assured；　as　that　we　have　a　body；　and　that　there　exist　stars　and　an　earth；　and　such　like；　are　less　certain；　for；　although　we　have　a　moral　assurance　of　these　things；　which　is　so　strong　that　there　is　an　appearance　of　extravagance　in　doubting　of　their　existence；　yet　at　the　same　time　no　one；　unless　his　intellect　is　impaired；　can　deny；　when　the　question　relates　to　a　metaphysical　certitude；　that　there　is　sufficient　reason　to　exclude　entire　assurance；　in　the　observation　that　when　asleep　we　can　in　the　same　way　imagine　ourselves　possessed　of　another　body　and　that　we　see　other　stars　and　another　earth；　when　the