posterior analytics-第18部分

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the　aggressors。　Hence　here　too　the　cause…in　this　case　the　efficient



cause…is　the　middle　term。　（d）　This　is　no　less　true　where　the　cause



is　the　final　cause。　E。g。　why　does　one　take　a　walk　after　supper？　For



the　sake　of　one's　health。　Why　does　a　house　exist？　For　the　preservation



of　one's　goods。　The　end　in　view　is　in　the　one　case　health；　in　the



other　preservation。　To　ask　the　reason　why　one　must　walk　after　supper



is　precisely　to　ask　to　what　end　one　must　do　it。　Let　C　be　walking　after



supper；　B　the　non…regurgitation　of　food；　A　health。　Then　let　walking



after　supper　possess　the　property　of　preventing　food　from　rising　to



the　orifice　of　the　stomach；　and　let　this　condition　be　healthy；　since



it　seems　that　B；　the　non…regurgitation　of　food；　is　attributable　to



C；　taking　a　walk；　and　that　A；　health；　is　attributable　to　B。　What；



then；　is　the　cause　through　which　A；　the　final　cause；　inheres　in　C？



It　is　B；　the　non…regurgitation　of　food；　but　B　is　a　kind　of



definition　of　A；　for　A　will　be　explained　by　it。　Why　is　B　the　cause



of　A's　belonging　to　C？　Because　to　be　in　a　condition　such　as　B　is　to　be



in　health。　The　definitions　must　be　transposed；　and　then　the　detail



will　become　clearer。　Incidentally；　here　the　order　of　coming　to　be　is



the　reverse　of　what　it　is　in　proof　through　the　efficient　cause：　in　the



efficient　order　the　middle　term　must　come　to　be　first；　whereas　in



the　teleological　order　the　minor；　C；　must　first　take　place；　and　the



end　in　view　comes　last　in　time。



　　The　same　thing　may　exist　for　an　end　and　be　necessitated　as　well。　For



example；　light　shines　through　a　lantern　（1）　because　that　which　consists



of　relatively　small　particles　necessarily　passes　through　pores　larger



than　those　particles…assuming　that　light　does　issue　by　penetration…



and　（2）　for　an　end；　namely　to　save　us　from　stumbling。　If　then；　a



thing　can　exist　through　two　causes；　can　it　come　to　be　through　two



causes…as　for　instance　if　thunder　be　a　hiss　and　a　roar　necessarily



produced　by　the　quenching　of　fire；　and　also　designed；　as　the



Pythagoreans　say；　for　a　threat　to　terrify　those　that　lie　in　Tartarus？



Indeed；　there　are　very　many　such　cases；　mostly　among　the　processes



and　products　of　the　natural　world；　for　nature；　in　different　senses



of　the　term　'nature'；　produces　now　for　an　end；　now　by　necessity。



　　Necessity　too　is　of　two　kinds。　It　may　work　in　accordance　with　a



thing's　natural　tendency；　or　by　constraint　and　in　opposition　to　it；



as；　for　instance；　by　necessity　a　stone　is　borne　both　upwards　and



downwards；　but　not　by　the　same　necessity。



　　Of　the　products　of　man's　intelligence　some　are　never　due　to　chance



or　necessity　but　always　to　an　end；　as　for　example　a　house　or　a　statue；



others；　such　as　health　or　safety；　may　result　from　chance　as　well。



　　It　is　mostly　in　cases　where　the　issue　is　indeterminate　（though



only　where　the　production　does　not　originate　in　chance；　and　the　end　is



consequently　good）；　that　a　result　is　due　to　an　end；　and　this　is　true



alike　in　nature　or　in　art。　By　chance；　on　the　other　hand；　nothing　comes



to　be　for　an　end。



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　The　effect　may　be　still　coming　to　be；　or　its　occurrence　may　be　past



or　future；　yet　the　cause　will　be　the　same　as　when　it　is　actually



existent…for　it　is　the　middle　which　is　the　cause…except　that　if　the



effect　actually　exists　the　cause　is　actually　existent；　if　it　is　coming



to　be　so　is　the　cause；　if　its　occurrence　is　past　the　cause　is　past；　if



future　the　cause　is　future。　For　example；　the　moon　was　eclipsed　because



the　earth　intervened；　is　becoming　eclipsed　because　the　earth　is　in



process　of　intervening；　will　be　eclipsed　because　the　earth　will



intervene；　is　eclipsed　because　the　earth　intervenes。



　　To　take　a　second　example：　assuming　that　the　definition　of　ice　is



solidified　water；　let　C　be　water；　A　solidified；　B　the　middle；　which　is



the　cause；　namely　total　failure　of　heat。　Then　B　is　attributed　to　C；



and　A；　solidification；　to　B：　ice　when　B　is　occurring；　has　formed



when　B　has　occurred；　and　will　form　when　B　shall　occur。



　　This　sort　of　cause；　then；　and　its　effect　come　to　be　simultaneously



when　they　are　in　process　of　becoming；　and　exist　simultaneously　when



they　actually　exist；　and　the　same　holds　good　when　they　are　past　and



when　they　are　future。　But　what　of　cases　where　they　are　not



simultaneous？　Can　causes　and　effects　different　from　one　another



form；　as　they　seem　to　us　to　form；　a　continuous　succession；　a　past



effect　resulting　from　a　past　cause　different　from　itself；　a　future



effect　from　a　future　cause　different　from　it；　and　an　effect　which　is



coming…to…be　from　a　cause　different　from　and　prior　to　it？　Now　on



this　theory　it　is　from　the　posterior　event　that　we　reason　（and　this



though　these　later　events　actually　have　their　source　of　origin　in



previous　eventsa　fact　which　shows　that　also　when　the　effect　is



coming…to…be　we　still　reason　from　the　posterior　event）；　and　from　the



event　we　cannot　reason　（we　cannot　argue　that　because　an　event　A　has



occurred；　therefore　an　event　B　has　occurred　subsequently　to　A　but



still　in　the　past…and　the　same　holds　good　if　the　occurrence　is



future）…cannot　reason　because；　be　the　time　interval　definite　or



indefinite；　it　will　never　be　possible　to　infer　that　because　it　is　true



to　say　that　A　occurred；　therefore　it　is　true　to　say　that　B；　the



subsequent　event；　occurred；　for　in　the　interval　between　the　events；



though　A　has　already　occurred；　the　latter　statement　will　be　false。　And



the　same　argument　applies　also　to　future　events；　i。e。　one　cannot　infer



from　an　event　which　occurred　in　the　past　that　a　future　event　will



occur。　The　reason　of　this　is　that　the　middle　must　be　homogeneous；　past



when　the　extremes　are　past；　future　when　they　are　future；　coming　to



be　when　they　are　coming…to…be；　actually　existent　when　they　are



actually　existent；　and　there　cannot　be　a　middle　term　homogeneous



with　extremes　respectively　past　and　future。　And　it　is　a　further



difficulty　in　this　theory　that　the　time　interval　can　be　neither



indefinite　nor　definite；　since　during　it　the　inference　will　be



false。　We　have　also　to　inquire　what　it　is　that　holds　events　together



so　that　the　coming…to…be　now　occurring　in　actual　things　follows　upon　a



past　event。　It　is　evident；　we　may　suggest；　that　a　past　event　and　a



present　process　cannot　be　'contiguous'；　for　not　even　two　past　events



can　be　'contiguous'。　For　past　events　are　limits　and　atomic；　so　just　as



points　are　not　'contiguous'　neither　are　past　events；　since　both　are



indivisible。　For　the　same　reason　a　past　event　and　a　present　process



cannot　be　'contiguous'；　for　the　process　is　divisible；　the　event



indivisible。　Thus　the　relation　of　present　process　to　past　event　is



analogous　to　that　of　line　to　point；　since　a　process　contains　an



infinity　of　past　events。　These　questions；　however；　must　receive　a　more



explicit　treatment　in　our　general　theory　of　change。



　　The　following　must　suffice　as　an　account　of　the　manner　in　which



the　middle　would　be　identical　with　the　cause　on　the　supposition　that



coming…to…be　is　a　series　of　consecutive　events：　for　in　the　terms　of



such　a　series　too　the　middle　and　major　terms　must　form　an　immediate



premiss；　e。g。　we　argue　that；　since　C　has　occurred；　therefore　A



occurred：　and　C's　occurrence　was　posterior；　A's　prior；　but　C　is　the



source　of　the　inference　because　it　is　nearer　to　the　present　moment；



and　the　starting…point　of　time　is　the　present。　We　next　argue　that；



since　D　has　occurred；　therefore　C　occurred。　Then　we　conclude　that；



since　D　has　occurred；　therefore　A　must　have　occurred；　and　the　cause　is



C；　for　since　D　has　occurred　C　must　have　occurred；　and　since　C　has



occurred　A　must　previously　have　occurred。



　　If　we　get　our　middle　term　in　this　way；　will　the　series　terminate



in　an　immediate　premiss；　or　since；　as　we　said；　no　two　events　are



'contiguous'；　will　a　fresh　middle　term　always　intervene　because



there　is　an　infinity　of　middles？　No：　though　no　two　events　are



'contiguous'；　yet　we　must　start　from　a　premiss　consisting　of　a



middle　and　the　present　event　as　major。　The　like　is　true　of　future



events　too；　since　if　it　is　true　to　say　that　D　will　exist；　it　must　be　a



prior　truth　to　say　that　A　will　exist；　and　the　cause　of　this　conclusion



is　C；　for　if　D　will　exist；　C　will　exist　prior　to　D；　and　if　C　will



exist；　A　will　exist　prior　to　it。　And　here　too　the　same　infinite



divisibility　might　be　urged；　since　future　events　are　not　'contiguous'。



But　here　too　an　immediate　basic　premiss　must　be　assumed。　And　in　the



world　of　fact　this　is　so：　if　a　house　has　been　built；　then　blocks



must　have　been　quarried　and　shaped。　The　reason　is　that　a　house



having　been　built　necessitates　a　foundation　having　been　laid；　and　if　a



foundation　has　been　laid　blocks　must　have　been　shaped　beforehand。



Again；　if　a　house　will　be　built；　blocks　will　similarly　be　shaped



beforehand；　and　proof　is　through　the　middle　in　the　same　way；　for　the



foundation　will　exist　before　the　house。



　　Now　we　observe　in　Nature　a　certain　kind　of　circular　process　of



coming…to…be；　and　this　is　possible　only　if　the　middle　and　extreme



terms　are　reciprocal；　since　conversion　is　conditioned　by　reciprocity



in　the　terms　of　the　proof。　This…the　convertibility　of　conclusions



and　premisses…has　been　proved　in　our　early　chapters；　and　the



circular　process　is　an　instance　of　this。　In　actual　fact　it　is



exemplified　thus：　when　the　earth　had　been　moistened　an　exhalation



was　bound　to　rise；　and　when　an　exhalation　had　risen　cloud　was　bound　to



form；　and　from　the　formation　o