lect12-第4部分

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completely　exemplified　in　facts；　not　only；　as　it　seems　to　me；　do


the　chief　difficulties　felt　by　the　student　of　Austin　disappear；


but　some　of　the　assertions　made　by　him　at　which　the　beginner　is


most　apt　to　stumble　have　rather　the　air　of　self…evident


propositions。　I　dare　say　you　are　sufficiently　acquainted　with　his


treatise　to　make　it　enough　for　me　to　mention　some　of　these


propositions；　without　the　amplifications　which　are　necessary　for


their　perfectly　accurate　statement。　Jurisprudence　is　the　science


of　Positive　Law。　Positive　Laws　are　Commands；　addressed　by


Sovereigns　to　their　Subjects；　imposing　a　Duty；　or　condition　of


obligedness；　or　obligation；　on　those　Subjects；　and　threatening　a


Sanction；　or　Penalty；　in　the　event　of　disobedience　to　the


Command。　A　Right　is　the　faculty　or　power　conferred　by　the


Sovereign　on　certain　members　of　the　community　to　draw　down　the


sanction　on　a　fellow…subject　violating　a　Duty。　Now　all　these


conceptions　of　Law；　Right；　Duty　and　Punishment　depend　upon　the


primary　conception　of　Sovereignty；　just　as　the　lower　links　of　a


chain　hanging　down　depend　upon　the　highest　link。　But　Sovereignty；


for　the　purposes　of　Austin's　system；　has　no　attribute　but　force；


and　consequently　the　view　here　taken　of　'law'　'obligation'　and


'right'　is　a　view　of　them　regarded　exclusively　as　products　of


coercive　force。　The　'sanction'　thus　becomes　the　primary　and　most


important　member　of　the　series　of　notions　and　gives　its　colour　to


all　the　others。　Probably　nobody　ever　found　a　difficulty　in


allowing　that　laws　have　the　character　given　to　them　by　Austin；　so


far　as　such　laws　have　proceeded　from　formal　Legislatures。　But


many　persons；　and　among　them　some　men　of　powerful　mind；　have


struggled　against　the　position　that　the　great　mass　of　legal　rules


which　have　never　been　prescribed　by　the　organ　of　State；


conventionally　known　as　the　Legislature；　are　commands　of　the


Sovereign。　The　customary　law　of　all　countries　which　have　not


included　their　law　in　Codes；　and　specially　the　English　Common


law；　have　often　had　an　origin　claimed　for　them　independently　of


the　Sovereign；　and　theories　have　been　propounded　on　the　subject


which　Austin　scouts　as　mysterious　and　unintelligible。　The　way　in


which　Hobbes　and　he　bring　such　bodies　of　rules　as　the　Common　law


under　their　system　is　by　insisting　on　a　maxim　which　is　of　vital


importance　to　it　　'Whatever　the　Sovereign　permits；　he


commands。'　Until　customs　are　enforced　by　Courts　of　Justice；　they


are　merely　'positive　morality；'　rules　enforced　by　opinion；　but；


as　soon　as　Courts　of　Justice　enforce　them；　they　become　commands


of　the　Sovereign；　conveyed　through　the　Judges　who　are　his


delegates　or　deputies。　It　is　a　better　answer　to　this　theory　than


Austin　would　perhaps　have　admitted　that　it　is　founded　on　a　mere


artifice　of　speech；　and　that　it　assumes　Courts　of　Justice　to　act


in　a　way　and　from　motives　of　which　they　are　quite　unconscious。


But；　when　it　is　clearly　comprehended　that；　in　this　system；　there


are　no　associations　with　the　Sovereign　but　force　or　power；　the


position　that　what　Sovereigns　permit　they　command　becomes　more


easily　intelligible。　They　command　because；　being　by　the


assumption　possessed　of　uncontrollable　force；　they　could　innovate


without　limit　at　any　moment。　The　Common　law　consists　of　their


commands　because　they　can　repeal　or　alter　or　re…state　it　at


pleasure。　The　theory　is　perfectly　defensible　as　a　theory；　but　its


practical　value　and　the　degree　in　which　it　approximates　to　truth


differ　greatly　in　different　ages　and　countries。　There　have　been


independent　political　communities；　and　indeed　there　would　still


prove　to　be　some　of　them　if　the　world　were　thoroughly　searched；


in　which　the　Sovereign；　though　possessed　of　irresistible　power；


never　dreams　of　innovation；　and　believes　the　persons　or　groups；


by　whom　laws　are　declared　and　applied；　to　be　as　much　part　of　the


necessary　constitution　of　society　as　he　is　himself。　There　have


again　been　independent　political　societies　in　which　the　Sovereign


has　enjoyed　irresistible　coercive　power　and　has　carried


innovation　to　the　farthest　point；　but　in　which　every　single


association　connected　with　law　would　have　violence　done　to　it　if


laws　were　regarded　as　his　commands。　The　Tyrant　of　a　Greek　city


often　satisfied　every　one　of　Austin's　tests　of　Sovereignty；　yet


it　was　part　of　the　accepted　definition　of　a　Tyrant　that　'he


subverted　the　laws。'　Let　it　be　understood　that　it　is　quite


possible　to　make　the　theory　fit　in　with　such　cases；　but　the


process　is　a　mere　straining　of　language。　It　is　carried　on　by


taking　words　and　propositions　altogether　out　of　the　sphere　of　the


ideas　habitually　associated　with　them。


　　　　Before　proceeding　to　speak　at　some　length　in　my　next　Lecture


of　these　historical　limitations　on　the　practical　value　of


Austin's　theories；　let　me　repeat　my　opinion　that　if　the　method　of


discussion　which　seems　to　me　correct　had　been　followed　in　his


treatise；　and　if　the　examination　of　Sovereignty　had　preceded　the


examination　of　the　conceptions　dependent　on　it；　a　considerable


number　of　the　statements　which　he　has　made　respecting　these


latter　conceptions　would　have　appeared　not　merely　innocent　but


self…evident。　Law　is　here　regarded　as　regulated　force；　simply


because　force　is　the　one　element　which　has　been　allowed　to　enter


into　the　primary　notion　upon　which　all　the　others　depend。　The　one


doctrine　of　this　school　of　jurists　which　is　repugnant　to　lawyers


would　lose　its　air　of　paradox　if　an　assumption　were　made　which；


in　itself　theoretically　unobjectionable；　manifestly　approximates


to　practical　truth　as　the　course　of　history　proceeds　　the


assumption　that　what　the　Sovereign　might　alter；　but　does　not


alter；　he　commands。　The　same　arrangement　would　have　a　further


advantage；　as　it　seems　to　me；　through　the　modifications　it　would


necessitate　in　Austin's　manner　of　discussing　Morality；　though　the


subject　is　not　one　which　can　be　here　treated　with　completeness。


The　position　at　which　many　readers　have　stumbled　　I　do　not


affect　to　do　more　than　state　it　in　popular　language　　is　that


the　sanction　of　moral　rules；　as　such；　is　the　disapprobation　which


one's　fellow…men　manifest　at　their　violation。　It　is　sometimes


construed　to　mean　that　the　only　motive　for　obeying　moral　rules　is


the　fear　of　such　disapprobation。　Such　a　construction　of　Austin's


language　is　an　entire　misconception　of　his　meaning；　but；　if　the


order　of　discussion　which　I　advocate　had　been　followed；　I　do　not


think　it　could　ever　possibly　occur　to　any　mind。　Let　us　suppose


Austin　to　have　completed　his　analysis　of　Sovereignty　and　of　the


conceptions　immediately　dependent　on　it；　law；　legal　right；　and


legal　obligation。　He　would　then　have　to　examine　that　great　mass


of　rules；　which　men　in　fact　obey；　which　have　some　of　the


characteristics　of　laws；　but　which　are　not　（as　such）　imposed　by


Sovereigns　on　subjects；　and　which　are　not　（as　such）　enforced　by


the　sanction　supplied　by　Sovereign　power。　It　would　be；　of　course；


incumbent　on　the　philosophical　jurist　to　examine　these　rules；


because　Sovereigns　being　by　his　hypothesis　human　superiors　are；


as　human　beings；　subject　to　them。　Austin　has；　in　fact；　examined


them　from　this　point　of　view　in　some　of　his　most　interesting


passages。　While　insisting　that　Sovereignty　is　from　the　nature　of


the　case　incapable　of　legal　limitation；　he　fully　admits　that


Sovereigns　are　restrained　from　issuing　some　commands　and


determined　to　issue　others　by　rules　which；　though　they　are　not


laws；　are　of　extreme　cogency。　The　Crown　and　Parliament　of　Great


Britain　are　in　his　view　Sovereign　　a　sovereign　aristocracy；　as


he　would　call　it　　but；　though　this　aristocracy　could　for


purposes　of　argument　do　anything　it　pleased；　it　would　be　out


raging　all　experience　to　assert　that　it　does　this。　That　great


body　of　rules　which　is　embodied　in　constitutional　maxims　keeps　it


from　doing　some　things；　that　great　body　of　rules　which　in


ordinary　usage　are　called　moral　keeps　it　from　doing　others。　What


common　characteristics　has　this　aggregate　of　rules　which　operate


on　men　and　on　Sovereigns；　like　other　men？　Austin；　as　you　know；


names　it　'positive　morality'；　and　says　that　its　sanction　is


opinion；　or　the　disapproval　of　the　bulk　of　the　community


following　on　its　violation。　Properly　understood；　this　last　is　an


obviously　true　proposition；　for　what　is　meant　is　that　public


disapprobation　is　the　one　sanction　which　all　these　rules　have　in


common。　The　rule　which　keeps　the　Crown　and　Parliament　from


declaring　murder　legal；　and　the　rule　which　keeps　them　from


allowing　the　Queen　to　govern　without　Ministers；　are　connected


together　through　the　penalty　attendant　on　a　breach　of　them；　which


is　the　strong　disapprobation　of　a　majority　of　Englishmen；　and　it


is　their　having　a　sanction　of　some　kind　which　principally


connects　both　rules　with　laws　proper。　But；　though　fear　of　opinion


be　a　motive　for　obedience　to　both　rules；　it　does　not　at　all


follow　that　the　sole　motive　for　obedience　to　both　rules　is　fear


of　opinion。　This　fear　would　be　allowed　by　most　people　to　be　the


chief；　if　not　the　exclusive；　motive　for　obedience　to


constitutional　rules；　but　such　an　admission　involves　no　necessary


assertion　whatever　as　to　the　complete　sanction　of　moral　rules。


The　truth　is　that　Austin's　system　is　consistent　with　any　ethical


theory；　and；　if　Austin　seems　to　assert　the　contrary；　I　think　the


cause　is　to　be　sought　in　his　firm　conviction　of　the　truth　of　his


own　ethical　creed；　which；　I　need　not　say；　was　Utilitarianism　in


its　earlier　shape　I　do　not；　indeed；　for　a　moment　intend　to　deny


that　the　careful　study　of　Austin　would　probably　modify　the


student's　view　of　morals。　The　discussion　of　ethics；　like　many