the ethics(part iv)-第6部分

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Note。…　This　is　also　self…evident；　for；　if　we　say　that　white　and　black　only　



agree　in　the　fact　that　neither　is　red；　we　absolutely　affirm　that　the　do　not　



agree　in　any　respect。　So；　if　we　say　that　a　man　and　a　stone　only　agree　in　the　



fact　that　both　are　finite　…　wanting　in　power；　not　existing　by　the　necessity　



of　their　own　nature；　or；　lastly；　indefinitely　surpassed　by　the　power　of　



external　causes　…　we　should　certainly　affirm　that　a　man　and　a　stone　are　in　



no　respect　alike；　therefore；　things　which　agree　only　in　negation；　or　in　



qualities　which　neither　possess；　really　agree　in　no　respect。















Prop。　XXXIII。　Men　can　differ　in　nature；　



in　so　far　as　they　are　assailed　by　those　



emotions；　which　are　passions；　or　passive　



states；　and　to　this　extent　one　and　the　



same　man　is　variable　and　inconstant。







Proof。…　The　nature　or　essence　of　the　emotions　cannot　be　explained　solely　



through　our　essence　or　nature　（III：Def。i。&ii。）；　but　it　must　be　defined　by　



the　power；　that　is　（III：vii。）；　by　the　nature　of　external　causes　in　



comparison　with　our　own；　hence　it　follows；　that　there　are　as　many　kinds　of　



each　emotion　as　there　are　external　objects　whereby　we　are　affected　



（III：lvi。）；　and　that　men　may　be　differently　affected　by　one　and　the　same　



object　（III：li）；　and　to　this　extent　differ　in　nature；　lastly；　that　one　and　



the　same　man　may　be　differently　affected　towards　the　same　object；　and　may　



therefore　be　variable　and　inconstant。　Q。E。D。















Prop。　XXXIV。　In　so　far　as　men　are　assailed　



by　emotions　which　are　passions；　they　can　be　



contrary　one　to　another。







Proof。…　A　man；　for　instance　Peter；　can　be　the　cause　of　Paul's　feeling　pain；　



because　he　（Peter）　possesses　something　similar　to　that　which　Paul　hates　



（III：xvi。）；　or　because　Peter　has　sole　possession　of　a　thing　which　Paul　also　



loves　（III：xxxii。&Note）；　or　for　other　causes　（of　which　the　chief　are　



enumerated　in　III：lv。Note）　；　it　may　therefore　happen　that　Paul　should　hate　



Peter　（Def。　of　Emotions：　vii。）；　consequently　it　may　easily　happen　also；　that　



Peter　should　hate　Paul　in　return；　and　that　each　should　endeavour　to　do　the　



other　an　injury；　（III：xxxix。）；　that　is　（IV：xxx。）；　that　they　should　be　



contrary　one　to　another。　But　the　emotion　of　pain　is　always　a　passion　



or　passive　state　（III：lix。）；　hence　men；　in　so　far　as　they　are　assailed　by　



emotions　which　are　passions；　can　be　contrary　one　to　another。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　I　said　that　Paul　may　hate　Peter；　because　he　conceives　that　Peter　



possesses　something　which　he　（Paul）　also　loves；　from　this　it　seems；　at　first　



sight；　to　follow；　that　these　two　men；　through　both　loving　the　same　thing；　



and；　consequently；　through　agreement　of　their　respective　natures；　stand　in　



one　another's　way；　if　this　were　so；　II：xxx。　and　II：xxxi。　would　be　untrue。　



But　if　we　give　the　matter　our　unbiased　attention；　we　shall　see　that　the　



discrepancy　vanishes。　For　the　two　men　are　not　in　one　another's　way　in　



virtue　of　the　agreement　of　their　natures；　that　is；　through　both　loving　the　



same　thing；　but　in　virtue　of　one　differing　from　the　other。　For；　in　so　far　



as　each　loves　the　same　thing；　the　love　of　each　is　fostered　thereby　



（III：xxxi。）；　that　is　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：　vi。）　the　pleasure　of　each　is　



fostered　thereby。　Wherefore　it　is　far　from　being　the　case；　that　they　are　



at　variance　through　both　loving　the　same　thing；　and　through　the　agreement　



in　their　natures。　The　cause　for　their　opposition　lies；　as　I　have　said；　



solely　in　the　fact　that　they　are　assumed　to　differ。　For　we　assume　that　



Peter　has　the　idea　of　the　loved　object　as　already　in　his　possession；　while　



Paul　has　the　idea　of　the　loved　object　as　lost。　Hence　the　one　man　will　be　



affected　with　pleasure；　the　other　will　be　affected　with　pain；　and　thus　they　



will　be　at　variance　one　with　another。　We　can　easily　show　in　like　manner；　



that　all　other　causes　of　hatred　depend　solely　on　differences；　and　not　on　



the　agreement　between　men's　natures。















Prop。　XXXV。　In　so　far　only　as　men　live　



in　obedience　to　reason；　do　they　always　



necessarily　agree　in　nature。







Proof。…　In　so　far　as　men　are　assailed　by　emotions　that　are　passions；　they　



can　be　different　in　nature　（IV：xxxiii。）；　and　at　variance　one　with　another。　



But　men　are　only　said　to　be　active；　in　so　far　as　they　act　in　obedience　to　



reason　（III：iii。）；　therefore；　what　so　ever　follows　from　human　nature　in　so　



far　as　it　is　defined　by　reason　must　（III：Def。ii。）　be　understood　solely　



through　human　nature　as　its　proximate　cause。　But；　since　every　man　by　the　



laws　of　his　nature　desires　that　which　he　deems　good；　and　endeavours　to　



remove　that　which　he　deems　bad　（IV：xix。）；　and　further；　since　that　which　we；　



in　accordance　with　reason；　deem　good　or　bad；　necessarily　is　good　



or　bad　（II：xli。）；　it　follows　that　men；　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　



to　reason；　necessarily　do　only　such　things　as　are　necessarily　good　for　



human　nature；　and　consequently　for　each　individual　man　（IV：xxxi。Coroll。）；　



in　other　words；　such　things　as　are　in　harmony　with　each　man's　nature。　



Therefore；　men　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　necessarily　



live　always　in　harmony　one　with　another。　Q。E。D。







Corollary　I　…　There　is　no　individual　thing　in　nature；　which　is　



more　useful　to　man；　than　a　man　who　lives　in　obedience　to　reason。　For　that　



thing　is　to　man　most　useful；　which　is　most　in　harmony　with　his　nature　



（IV：xxxi。Coroll。）；　that　is；　obviously；　man。　But　man　acts　absolutely　



according　to　the　laws　of　his　nature；　when　he　lives　in　obedience　to　reason　



（III：Def。ii。）；　and　to　this　extent　only　is　always　necessarily　in　harmony　



with　the　nature　of　another　man　（by　the　last　Prop。）；　wherefore　among　



individual　things　nothing　is　more　useful　to　man；　than　a　man　who　lives　in　



obedience　to　reason。　Q。E。D。







Corollary　II。…　As　every　man　seeks　most　that　which　is　useful　to　him；　so　are　



men　most　useful　one　to　another。　For　the　more　a　man　seeks　what　is　useful　to　



him　and　endeavours　to　preserve　himself；　the　more　is　he　endowed　with　virtue　



（IV：xx。）；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing　（IV：Def。viii。）；　the　more　is　he　endowed　



with　power　to　act　according　to　the　laws　of　his　own　nature；　that　is　to　live　



in　obedience　to　reason。　But　men　are　most　in　natural　harmony；　when　they　live　



in　obedience　to　reason　（by　the　last　Prop。）；　therefore　（by　the　foregoing　



Coroll。）　men　will　be　most　useful　one　to　another；　when　each　seeks　most　that　



which　is　useful　to　him。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　What　we　have　just　shown　is　attested　by　experience　so　conspicuously；　



that　it　is　in　the　mouth　of　nearly　everyone：　〃Man　is　to　man　a　God。〃　Yet　it　



rarely　happens　that　men　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　for　things　are　so　



ordered　among　them；　that　they　are　generally　envious　and　troublesome　one　to　



another。　Nevertheless　they　are　scarcely　able　to　lead　a　solitary　life；　



so　that　the　definition　of　man　as　a　social　animal　has　met　with　general　



assent；　in　fact；　men　do　derive　from　social　life　much　more　convenience　than　



injury。　Let　satirists　then　laugh　their　fill　at　human　affairs；　let　



theologians　rail；　and　let　misanthropes　praise　to　their　utmost　the　life　of　



untutored　rusticity；　let　them　heap　contempt　on　men　and　praises　on　beasts；　



when　all　is　said；　they　will　find　that　men　can　provide　for　their　wants　much　



more　easily　by　mutual　help；　and　that　only　by　uniting　their　forces　can　they　



escape　from　the　dangers　that　on　every　side　beset　them：　not　to　say　how　much　



more　excellent　and　worthy　of　our　knowledge　it　is；　to　study　the　actions　of　



men　than　the　actions　of　beasts。　But　I　will　treat　of　this　more　at　



length　elsewhere。















Prop。　XXXVI。　The　highest　good　of　those　



who　follow　virtue　is　common　to　all；　



and　therefore　all　can　equally　rejoice　



therein。







Proof。…　To　act　virtuously　is　to　act　in　obedience　with　reason　（IV：xxiv。）；　



and　whatsoever　we　endeavour　to　do　in　obedience　to　reason　is　to　understand　



（IV：xxvi。）；　therefore　（IV：xxviii。）　the　highest　good　for　those　who　follow　



after　virtue　is　to　know　God；　that　is　（II：xlvii。&Note）　a　good　which　is　



common　to　all　and　can　be　possessed。　by　all　men　equally；　in　so　far　as　they　



are　of　the　same　nature。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　Someone　may　ask　how　it　would　be；　if　the　highest　good　of　those　who　



follow　after　virtue　were　not　common　to　all？　Would　it　not　then　follow；　as　



above　（IV：xxxiv。）；　that　men　living　in　obedience　to　reason；　that　is　



（IV：xxxv。）；　men　in　so　far　as　they　agree　in　nature；　would　be　at　variance　



one　with　another？　To　such　an　inquiry；　I　make　answer；　that　it　follows　not　



accidentally　but　from　the　very　nature　of　reason；　that　main's　highest　good　



is　common　to　all；　inasmuch　as　it　is　deduced　from　the　very　essence　of　man；　



in　so　far　as　defined　by　reason；　and　that　a　man　could　neither　be；　nor　be　



conceived　without　the　power　of　taking　pleasure　in　this　highest　good。　For　



it　belongs　to　the　essence　of　the　human　mind　（II：xlvii。）；　to　have　an　



adequate　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God。















Prop。　XXXVII。　The　good　which　every　man；　



who　follows　after　virtue；　desires　for　



himself　he　will　also　desire　for　other　



men；　and　so　much　the　more；　in　proportion　



as　he　has　a　greater　knowledge　of　God。







Proof。…　Men；　in　so　far　as　they　live　in　obedience　to　reason；　are　most　



useful　to　their　fellow　men　（IV：xxxv；Coroll。i。）；　therefore　（IV：xix。）；　



we　shall　in　obedience　to　reason　necessarily　endeavour　to　bring　about　that　



men　should　live　in　obedience　to　reason。　But　the　good　which　every　man；　in　



so　far　as　he　is　guided　by　reason；　or；　in　other　words；　follows　after　virtue；　



desires　for　himself；　is　to　understand　（IV：xxvi。）；　wherefore　the　good；　which　



each　follower　of　virtue　seeks　for　himself；　he　will　desire　also　for　others。　



Again；　desire；　in　so　fa