sophist-第11部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


not…being　has　been　found　to　be　and　is　not…being；　and　is　to　

be　reckoned

one　among　the　many　classes　of　being。　Do　you；　Theaetetus；　still　feel

any　doubt　of　this？

　　Theaet。　None　whatever。

　　Str。　Do　you　observe　that　our　scepticism　has　carried　us　beyond　the

range　of　Parmenides'　prohibition？

　　Theaet。　In　what？

　　Str。　We　have　advanced　to　a　further　point；　and　shown　him　

more　than　he

for　bad　us　to　investigate。

　　Theaet。　How　is　that？

　　Str。　Why；　because　he　says…



　　　Not…being　never　is；　and　do　thou　keep　thy　thoughts　from　this　way

of　enquiry。



　　Theaet。　Yes；　he　says　so。

　　Str。　Whereas；　we　have　not　only　proved　that　things　which　

are　not　are；

but　we　have　shown　what　form　of　being　not…being　is；　for　we　have　shown

that　the　nature　of　the　other　is；　and　is　distributed　over　all　

things　in

their　relations　to　one　another；　and　whatever　part　of　the　other　is

contrasted　with　being；　this　is　precisely　what　we　have　

ventured　to　call

not…being。

　　Theaet。　And　surely；　Stranger；　we　were　quite　right。

　　Str。　Let　not　any　one　say；　then；　that　while　affirming　the

opposition　of　not…being　to　being；　we　still　assert　the　being　of

not…being；　for　as　to　whether　there　is　an　opposite　of　being；　to　that

enquiry　we　have　long　said　good…bye…it　may　or　may　not　be；　and　may　or

may　not　be　capable　of　definition。　But　as　touching　our　present

account　of　not…being；　let　a　man　either　convince　us　of　error；　or；　so

long　as　he　cannot；　he　too　must　say；　as　we　are　saying；　that　there　is

a　communion　of　classes；　and　that　being；　and　difference　or　other；

traverse　all　things　and　mutually　interpenetrate；　so　that　the　other

partakes　of　being；　and　by　reason　of　this　participation　is；　and　yet

is　not　that　of　which　it　partakes；　but　other；　and　being　other　than

being；　it　is　clearly　a　necessity　that　not…being　should　be。　again；

being；　through　partaking　of　the　other；　becomes　a　class　other　than

the　remaining　classes；　and　being　other　than　all　of　them；　is　not　each

one　of　them；　and　is　not　all　the　rest；　so　that　undoubtedly　there　are

thousands　upon　thousands　of　cases　in　which　being　is　not；　and　

all　other

things；　whether　regarded　individually　or　collectively；　in　many

respects　are；　and　in　many　respects　are　not。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　he　who　is　sceptical　of　this　contradiction；　must　think　how

he　can　find　something　better　to　say；　or　if。　he　sees　a　puzzle；　and

his　pleasure　is　to　drag　words　this　way　and　that；　the　argument　will

prove　to　him；　that　he　is　not　making　a　worthy　use　of　his　

faculties；　for

there　is　no　charm　in　such　puzzles；　and　there　is　no　difficulty　in

detecting　them；　but　we　can　tell　him　of　something　else　the　pursuit　of

which　is　noble　and　also　difficult。

　　Theaet。　What　is　it？

　　Str。　A　thing　of　which　I　have　already　spoken；…letting　alone　these

puzzles　as　involving　no　difficulty；　he　should　be　able　to　follow；　and

criticize　in　detail　every　argument；　and　when　a　man　says　that　the

same　is　in　a　manner　other；　or　that　other　is　the　same；　to　understand

and　refute　him　from　his　own　point　of　view；　and　in　the　same　respect

in　which　he　asserts　either　of　these　affections。　But　to　show　that

somehow　and　in　some　sense　the　same　is　other；　or　the　other　

same；　or　the

great　small；　or　the　like　unlike；　and　to　delight　in　always　bringing

forward　such　contradictions；　is　no　real　refutation；　but　is　

clearly　the

new…born　babe　of　some　one　who　is　only　beginning　to　approach　the

problem　of　being。

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure。

　　Str。　For　certainly；　my　friend；　the　attempt　to　separate　all

existences　from　one　another　is　a　barbarism　and　utterly　unworthy　of

an　educated　or　philosophical　mind。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　The　attempt　at　universal　separation　is　the　final　annihilation

of　all　reasoning；　for　only　by　the　union　of　conceptions　with　one

another　do　we　attain　to　discourse　of　reason。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And；　observe　that　we　were　only　just　in　time　in　making　a

resistance　to　such　separatists；　and　compelling　them　to　admit　that

one　thing　mingles　with　another。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　Why；　that　we　might　be　able　to　assert　discourse　to　be　a　kind

of　being；　for　if　we　could　not；　the　worst　of　all　consequences　would

follow；　we　should　have　no　philosophy。　Moreover；　the　necessity　for

determining　the　nature　of　discourse　presses　upon　us　at　this　

moment；　if

utterly　deprived　of　it；　we　could　no　more　hold　discourse；　and

deprived　of　it　we　should　be　if　we　admitted　that　there　was　no　

admixture

of　natures　at　all。

　　Theaet。　Very　true。　But　I　do　not　understand　why　at　this　moment　we

must　determine　the　nature　of　discourse。

　　Str。　Perhaps　you　will　see　more　clearly　by　the　help　of　the

following　explanation。

　　Theaet。　What　explanation？

　　Str。　Not…being　has　been　acknowledged　by　us　to　be　one　among　many

classes　diffused　over　all　being。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　thence　arises　the　question；　whether　not…being　mingles

with　opinion　and　language。

　　Theaet。　How　so？

　　Str。　If　not…being　has　no　part　in　the　proposition；　then　all　things

must　be　true；　but　if　not…being　has　a　part；　then　false　opinion　and

false　speech　are　possible；　for。　think　or　to　say　what　is　not…is

falsehood；　which　thus　arises　in　the　region　of　thought　and　in　speech。

　　Theaet。　That　is　quite　true。

　　Str。　And　where　there　is　falsehood　surely　there　must　be　deceit。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　if　there　is　deceit；　then　all　things　must　be　full　of　idols

and　images　and　fancies。

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure。

　　Str。　Into　that　region　the　Sophist；　as　we　said；　made　his　

escape；　and；

when　he　had　got　there；　denied　the　very　possibility　of　falsehood；　no

one；　he　argued；　either　conceived　or　uttered　falsehood；　inasmuch　as

not…being　did　not　in　any　way　partake　of　being。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　now；　not…being　has　been　shown　to　partake　of　being；　and

therefore　he　will　not　continue　fighting　in　this　direction；　

but　he　will

probably　say　that　some　ideas　partake　of　not…being；　and　some　not；　and

that　language　and　opinion　are　of　the　non…partaking　class；　and　he

will　still　fight　to　the　death　against　the　existence　of　the

image…making　and　phantastic　art；　in　which　we　have　placed　

him；　because；

as　he　will　say；　opinion　and　language　do　not　partake　of　not…being；

and　unless　this　participation　exists；　there　can　be　no　such　thing　as

falsehood。　And；　with　the　view　of　meeting　this　evasion；　we　must　begin

by　enquiring　into　the　nature　of　language；　opinion；　and　

imagination；　in

order　that　when　we　find　them　we　may　find　also　that　they　have　

communion

with　not…being；　and；　having　made　out　the　connection　of　them；　may

thus　prove　that　falsehood　exists；　and　therein　we　will　imprison　the

Sophist；　if　he　deserves　it；　or；　if　not；　we　will　let　him　go　again　and

look　for　him　in　another　class。

　　Theaet。　Certainly；　Stranger；　there　appears　to　be　truth　in　what　was

said　about　the　Sophist　at　first；　that　he　was　of　a　class　not　easily

caught；　for　he　seems　to　have　abundance　of　defences；　which　he　throws

up；　and　which　must　every　one　of　them　be　stormed　before　we　can　reach

the　man　himself。　And　even　now；　we　have　with　difficulty　got　

through　his

first　defence；　which　is　the　not…being　of　not…being；　and　lo！　here　is

another；　for　we　have　still　to　show　that　falsehood　exists　in　

the　sphere

of　language　and　opinion；　and　there　will　be　another　and　

another　line　of

defence　without　end。

　　Str。　Any　one；　Theaetetus；　who　is　able　to　advance　even　a　

little　ought

to　be　of　good　cheer；　for　what　would　he　who　is　dispirited　at　a　little

progress　do；　if　he　were　making　none　at　all；　or　even　undergoing　a

repulse？　Such　a　faint　heart；　as　the　proverb　says；　will　never　take　a

city：　but　now　that　we　have　succeeded　thus　far；　the　citadel　is　ours；

and　what　remains　is　easier。

　　Theaet。　Very　true。

　　Str。　Then；　as　I　was　saying；　let　us　first　of　all　obtain　a

conception　of　language　and　opinion；　in　order　that　we　may　have

clearer　grounds　for　determining；　whether　not…being　has　any　concern

with　them；　or　whether　they　are　both　always　true；　and　neither　of　them

ever　false。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Then；　now；　let　us　speak　of　names；　as　before　we　were　

speaking　of

ideas　and　letters；　for　that　is　the　direction　in　which　the　answer　may

be　expected。

　　Theaet。　And　what　is　the　question　at　issue　about　names？

　　Str。　The　question　at　issue　is　whether　all　names　may　be　connected

with　one　another；　or　none；　or　only　some　of　them。

　　Theaet。　Clearly　the　last　is　true。

　　Str。　I　understand　you　to　say　that　words　which　have　a　

meaning　when　in

sequence　may　be　connected；　but　that　words　which　have　no　meaning　when

in　sequence　cannot　be　connected？

　　Theaet。　What　are　you　saying？

　　Str。　What　I　thought　that　you　intended　when　you　gave　your　

assent；　for

there　are　two　sorts　of　intimation　of　being　which　are　given　by　the

voice。

　　Theaet。　What　are　they？

　　Str。　One　of　them　is　called　nouns；　and　the　other　verbs。

　　Theaet。　Describe　them。

　　Str。　That　which　denotes　action　we　call　a　verb。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　the　other；　which　is　an　articulate　mark　set　on　those　who

do　the　actions；　we　call　a　noun。

　　Theaet。　Quite　true。

　　Str。　A　succession　of　nouns　only　is　not　a　sentence　any　more　than　of

verbs　without　nouns。

　　Theaet。　I　do　not　understand　you。

　　Str。　I　see　that　when　you　gave　your　assent　you　had　something　else

in　your　mind。　But　what　I　intended　to　say　was；　that　a　mere　succession

of　nouns　or　of　verbs　is　not　discourse。

　　Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　I　mean　that　words　like　〃walks；〃　〃runs；〃　〃sleeps；〃　or　any

other　words　which　denote　action；　however　many　of　them　you　string

together；　do　not　make　discourse。

　　Theaet。　How　can　they？

　　Str。　Or；　again；　when　you　say　〃lion；〃　〃stag；〃　〃horse；〃　or　any　other

words　which　denote　agents　…neither　in　this　way　of　stringing　words

together　do　you　attain　to　discourse；　for　there　is　no　expression　of

action　or　inaction；　or　of　the　existence　of　existence　or

non…existence　indicated　by　the　sounds；　until　verbs　are　mingled　with

nouns；　then　the　words　fit；　and　the　smallest　combination　of　them

forms　language；　and　is　the　simplest　and　least　form　of　discourse。

　　Theaet。　Again　I　ask；　What　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　When　any　one　says　〃A　man　learns；〃　should　you　not　call　this

the　simplest　and　least　of　sentences？

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　Yes；　for　he　now