sophist-第5部分

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closest　attention。　Suppose　that　a　person　were　to　profess；　not　that

he　could　speak　or　dispute；　but　that　he　knew　how　to　make　and　do　all

things；　by　a　single　art。

　　Theaet。　All　things？

　　Str。　I　see　that　you　do　not　understand　the　first　word　that　I　utter；

for　you　do　not　understand　the　meaning　of　〃all。〃

　　Theaet。　No；　I　do　not。

　　Str。　Under　all　things；　I　include　you　and　me；　and　also　animals　and

trees。

　　Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　Suppose　a　person　to　say　that　he　will　make　you　and　me；　and　all

creatures。

　　Theaet。　What　would　he　mean　by　〃making〃？　He　cannot　be　a

husbandman；…for　you　said　that　he　is　a　maker　of　animals。

　　Str。　Yes；　and　I　say　that　he　is　also　the　maker　of　the　sea；　and　the

earth；　and　the　heavens；　and　the　gods；　and　of　all　other　things；　and；

further；　that　he　can　make　them　in　no　time；　and　sell　them　for　a　few

pence。

　　Theaet。　That　must　be　a　jest。

　　Str。　And　when　a　man　says　that　he　knows　all　things；　and　can　teach

them　to　another　at　a　small　cost；　and　in　a　short　time；　is　not　that　a

jest？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　is　there　any　more　artistic　or　graceful　form　of　jest　than

imitation？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　not；　and　imitation　is　a　very　comprehensive　term；

which　includes　under　one　class　the　most　diverse　sorts　of　things。

　　Str。　We　know；　of　course；　that　he　who　professes　by　one　art　to　make

all　things　is　really　a　painter；　and　by　the　painter's　art　makes

resemblances　of　real　things　which　have　the　same　name　with　

them；　and　he

can　deceive　the　less　intelligent　sort　of　young　children；　to　whom　he

shows　his　pictures　at　a　distance；　into　the　belief　that　he　has　the

absolute　power　of　making　whatever　he　likes。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　may　there　not　be　supposed　to　be　an　imitative　art　of

reasoning？　Is　it　not　possible　to　enchant　the　hearts　of　young　men　by

words　poured　through　their　ears；　when　they　are　still　at　a　distance

from　the　truth　of　facts；　by　exhibiting　to　them　fictitious　arguments；

and　making　them　think　that　they　are　true；　and　that　the　speaker　is

the　wisest　of　men　in　all　things？

　　Theaet。　Yes；　why　should　there　not　be　another　such　art？

　　Str。　But　as　time　goes　on；　and　their　hearers　advance　in　years；　and

come　into　closer　contact　with　realities；　and　have　learnt　by　sad

experience　to　see　and　feel　the　truth　of　things；　are　not　the　greater

part　of　them　compelled　to　change　many　opinions　which　they　formerly

entertained；　so　that　the　great　appears　small　to　them；　and　the　easy

difficult；　and　all　their　dreamy　speculations　are　overturned　by　the

facts　of　life？

　　Theaet。　That　is　my　view；　as　far　as　I　can　judge；　although；　

at　my　age；

I　may　be　one　of　those　who　see　things　at　a　distance　only。

　　Str。　And　the　wish　of　all　of　us；　who　are　your　friends；　is　and

always　will　be　to　bring　you　as　near　to　the　truth　as　we　can　

without　the

sad　reality。　And　now　I　should　like　you　to　tell　me；　whether　

the　Sophist

is　not　visibly　a　magician　and　imitator　of　true　being；　or　are　we

still　disposed　to　think　that　he　may　have　a　true　knowledge　of　the

various　matters　about　which　he　disputes？

　　Theaet。　But　how　can　he；　Stranger？　Is　there　any　doubt；　

after　what　has

been　said；　that　he　is　to　be　located　in　one　of　the　divisions　of

children's　play？

　　Str。　Then　we　must　place　him　in　the　class　of　magicians　and　mimics。

　　Theaet。　Certainly　we　must。

　　Str。　And　now　our　business　is　not　to　let　the　animal　out；　for　we

have　got　him　in　a　sort　of　dialectical　net；　and　there　is　one　thing

which　he　decidedly　will　not　escape。

　　Theaet。　What　is　that？

　　Str。　The　inference　that　he　is　a　juggler。

　　Theaet。　Precisely　my　own　opinion　of　him。

　　Str。　Then；　clearly；　we　ought　as　soon　as　possible　to　divide　the

image…making　art；　and　go　down　into　the　net；　and；　if　the　Sophist　does

not　run　away　from　us；　to　seize　him　according　to　orders　and　

deliver　him

over　to　reason；　who　is　the　lord　of　the　hunt；　and　proclaim　the

capture　of　him；　and　if　he　creeps　into　the　recesses　of　the　imitative

art；　and　secretes　himself　in　one　of　them；　to　divide　again　and　follow

him　up　until　in　some　sub…section　of　imitation　he　is　caught。　For　our

method　of　tackling　each　and　all　is　one　which　neither　he　nor　any

other　creature　will　ever　escape　in　triumph。

　　Theaet。　Well　said；　and　let　us　do　as　you　propose。

　　Str。　Well；　then；　pursuing　the　same　analytic　method　as　before；　I

think　that　I　can　discern　two　divisions　of　the　imitative　art；　but　I

am　not　as　yet　able　to　see　in　which　of　them　the　desired　form　is　to　be

found。

　　Theaet。　Will　you　tell　me　first　what　are　two　divisions　of　which　you

are　speaking？

　　Str。　One　is　the　art　of　likeness…making；…generally　a　likeness　of

anything　is　made　by　producing　a　copy　which　is　executed　according　to

the　proportions　of　the　original；　similar　in　length　and　breadth　and

depth；　each　thing　receiving　also　its　appropriate　colour。

　　Theaet。　Is　not　this　always　the　aim　of　imitation？

　　Str。　Not　always；　in　works　either　of　sculpture　or　of　painting；

which　are　of　any　magnitude；　there　is　a　certain　degree　of　deception；

…for　artists　were　to　give　the　true　proportions　of　their　fair　works；

the　upper　part；　which　is　farther　off；　would　appear　to　be　out　of

proportion　in　comparison　with　the　lower；　which　is　nearer；　and　so

they　give　up　the　truth　in　their　images　and　make　only　the　proportions

which　appear　to　be　beautiful；　disregarding　the　real　ones。

　　Theaet。　Quite　true。

　　Str。　And　that　which　being　other　is　also　like；　may　we　not　

fairly　call

a　likeness　or　image？

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　may　we　not；　as　I　did　just　now；　call　that　part　of　the

imitative　art　which　is　concerned　with　making　such　images　the　art　of

likeness　making？

　　Theaet。　Let　that　be　the　name。

　　Str。　And　what　shall　we　call　those　resemblances　of　the　beautiful；

which　appear　such　owing　to　the　unfavourable　position　of　the　

spectator；

whereas　if　a　person　had　the　power　of　getting　a　correct　view　of　works

of　such　magnitude；　they　would　appear　not　even　like　that　to　which

they　profess　to　be　like？　May　we　not　call　these　〃appearances；〃　since

they　appear　only　and　are　not　really　like？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　There　is　a　great　deal　of　this　kind　of　thing　in　

painting；　and　in

all　imitation。

　　Theaet。　Of　course。

　　Str。　And　may　we　not　fairly　call　the　sort　of　art；　which　produces　an

appearance　and　not　an　image；　phantastic　art？

　　Theaet。　Most　fairly。

　　Str。　These　then　are　the　two　kinds　of　image　making…the　art　of

making　likenesses；　and　phantastic　or　the　art　of　making　appearances？

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　I　was　doubtful　before　in　which　of　them　I　should　place　the

Sophist；　nor　am　I　even　now　able　to　see　clearly；　verily　he　is　a

wonderful　and　inscrutable　creature。　And　now　in　the　cleverest　

manner　he

has　got　into　an　impossible　place。

　　Theaet。　Yes；　he　has。

　　Str。　Do　you　speak　advisedly；　or　are　you　carried　away　at　the　moment

by　the　habit　of　assenting　into　giving　a　hasty　answer？

　　Theaet。　May　I　ask　to　what　you　are　referring？

　　Str。　My　dear　friend；　we　are　engaged　in　a　very　difficult

speculation…there　can　be　no　doubt　of　that；　for　how　a　thing　can

appear　and　seem；　and　not　be；　or　how　a　man　can　say　a　thing　

which　is　not

true；　has　always　been　and　still　remains　a　very　perplexing　question。

Can　any　one　say　or　think　that　falsehood　really　exists；　and　

avoid　being

caught　in　a　contradiction？　Indeed；　Theaetetus；　the　task　is　a　

difficult

one。

　　Theaet。　Why？

　　Str。　He　who　says　that　falsehood　exists　has　the　audacity　to　assert

the　being　of　not…being；　for　this　is　implied　in　the　possibility　of

falsehood。　But；　my　boy；　in　the　days　when　I　was　a　boy；　the　great

Parmenides　protested　against　this　doctrine；　and　to　the　end　

of　his　life

he　continued　to　inculcate　the　same　lesson…always　repeating　both　in

verse　and　out　of　verse：



　　　Keep　your　mind　from　this　way　of　enquiry；　for　never　will　you　show

that　not…being　is



Such　is　his　testimony；　which　is　confirmed　by　the　very　expression

when　sifted　a　little。　Would　you　object　to　begin　with　the　

consideration

of　the　words　themselves？

　　Theaet。　Never　mind　about　me；　I　am　only　desirous　that　you　should

carry　on　the　argument　in　the　best　way；　and　that　you　should　take　me

with　you。

　　Str。　Very　good；　and　now　say；　do　we　venture　to　utter　the　forbidden

word　〃not…being〃？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　we　do。

　　Str。　Let　us　be　serious　then；　and　consider　the　question　neither　in

strife　nor　play：　suppose　that　one　of　the　hearers　of　Parmenides　was

asked；　〃To　is　the　term　'not…being'　to　be　applied？〃…do　you　know　what

sort　of　object　he　would　single　out　in　reply；　and　what　answer　he

would　make　to　the　enquirer？

　　Theaet。　That　is　a　difficult　question；　and　one　not　to　be　answered

at　all　by　a　person　like　myself。

　　Str。　There　is　at　any　rate　no　difficulty　in　seeing　that　the　

predicate

〃not…being〃　is　not　applicable　to　any　being。

　　Theaet。　None；　certainly。

　　Str。　And　if　not　to　being；　then　not　to　something。

　　Theaet。　Of　course　not。

　　Str。　It　is　also　plain；　that　in　speaking　of　something　we　speak　of

being；　for　to　speak　of　an　abstract　something　naked　and　isolated　from

all　being　is　impossible。

　　Theaet。　Impossible。

　　Str。　You　mean　by　assenting　to　imply　that　he　who　says　something

must　say　some　one　thing？

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　Some　in　the　singular　（ti）　you　would　say　is　the　sign　of　one；

some　in　the　dual　（tine）　of　two；　some　in　the　plural　（tines）　of　many？

　　Theaet。　Exactly。

　　Str。　Then　he　who　says　〃not　something〃　must　say　absolutely　nothing。

　　Theaet。　Most　assuredly。

　　Str。　And　as　we　cannot　admit　that　a　man　speaks　and　says　nothing；　he

who　says　〃not…being〃　does　not　speak　at　all。

　　Theaet。　The　difficulty　of　the　argument　can　no　further　go。

　　Str。　Not　yet；　my　friend；　is　the　time　for　such　a　word；　for　there

still　remains　of　all　perplexities　the　first　and　greatest；　

touching　the

very　foundation　of　the　matter。

　　Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？　Do　not　be　afraid　to　speak。

　　Str。　To　that　which　is；　may　be　attributed　some　other　thing　which　is？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　But　can　anything　which　is；　be　attributed　to　that　which　is　not？

　　Theaet。　Impossible。

　　Str。　And　all　number　is　to　be　reckoned　among　things　which　are？

　　Theaet。　Yes；　surely　number；　if　anything；　has　a　real　existence。

　　Str。　Then　we　must　not　attempt　to　attribut