sophist-第7部分

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fancying　that　we　are　quite　clear　about　them。

　　Theaet。　Say　more　distinctly　what　you　mean。

　　Str。　I　think　that　Parmenides；　and　all　ever　yet　undertook　to

determine　the　number　and　nature　of　existences；　talked　to　us　in

rather　a　light　and　easy　strain。

　　Theaet。　How？

　　Str。　As　if　we　had　been　children；　to　whom　they　repeated　each　his

own　mythus　or　story；…one　said　that　there　were　three　principles；　and

that　at　one　time　there　was　war　between　certain　of　them；　and　

then　again

there　was　peace；　and　they　were　married　and　begat　children；　

and　brought

them　up；　and　another　spoke　of　two　principles；…a　moist　and　a　dry；　or

a　hot　and　a　cold；　and　made　them　marry　and　cohabit。　The　Eleatics；

however；　in　our　part　of　the　world；　say　that　things　are　many　in　name；

but　in　nature　one；　this　is　their　mythus；　which　goes　back　to

Xenophanes；　and　is　even　older。　Then　there　are　Ionian；　and　in　more

recent　times　Sicilian　muses；　who　have　arrived　at　the　conclusion　that

to　unite　the　two　principles　is　safer；　and　to　say　that　being　

is　one　and

many；　and　that　these　are　held　together　by　enmity　and　friendship；

ever　parting；　ever　meeting；　as　the…severer　Muses　assert；　while　the

gentler　ones　do　not　insist　on　the　perpetual　strife　and　peace；　but

admit　a　relaxation　and　alternation　of　them；　peace　and　unity

sometimes　prevailing　under　the　sway　of　Aphrodite；　and　then　again

plurality　and　war；　by　reason　of　a　principle　of　strife。　Whether　any

of　them　spoke　the　truth　in　all　this　is　hard　to　determine；　besides；

antiquity　and　famous　men　should　have　reverence；　and　not　be　liable　to

accusations；　so　serious；　Yet　one　thing　may　be　said　of　them　without

offence…

　　Theaet。　What　thing？

　　Str。　That　they　went　on　their　several　ways　disdaining　to　notice

people　like　ourselves；　they　did　not　care　whether　they　took　us　with

them；　or　left　us　behind　them。

　　Theaet。　How　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　I　mean　to　say；　that　when　they　talk　of　one；　two；　or　more

elements；　which　are　or　have　become　or　are　becoming；　or　again　of　heat

mingling　with　cold；　assuming　in　some　other　part　of　their　works

separations　and　mixtures；…tell　me；　Theaetetus；　do　you　understand

what　they　mean　by　these　expressions？　When　I　was　a　younger　man；　I

used　to　fancy　that　I　understood　quite　well　what　was　meant　by　the

term　〃not…being；〃　which　is　our　present　subject　of　dispute；　

and　now　you

see　in　what　a　fix　we　are　about　it。

　　Theaet。　I　see。

　　Str。　And　very　likely　we　have　been　getting　into　the　same　perplexity

about　〃being；〃　and　yet　may　fancy　that　when　anybody　utters　

the　word；　we

understand　him　quite　easily；　although　we　do　not　know　about

not…being。　But　we　may　be；　equally　ignorant　of　both。

　　Theaet。　I　dare　say。

　　Str。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　all　the　terms　just　mentioned。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　The　consideration　of　most　of　them　may　be　deferred；　but　we　had

better　now　discuss　the　chief　captain　and　leader　of　them。

　　Theaet。　Of　what　are　you　speaking？　You　clearly　think　that　we　must

first　investigate　what　people　mean　by　the　word　〃being。〃

　　Str。　You　follow　close　at　heels；　Theaetetus。　For　the　right　method；

I　conceive；　will　be　to　call　into　our　presence　the　dualistic

philosophers　and　to　interrogate　them。　〃Come；〃　we　will　say；　〃Ye；　who

affirm　that　hot　and　cold　or　any　other　two　principles　are　the　

universe；

what　is　this　term　which　you　apply　to　both　of　them；　and　what　do　you

mean　when　you　say　that　both　and　each　of　them　'are'？　How　are　we　to

understand　the　word　'are'？　Upon　your　view；　are　we　to　suppose　that

there　is　a　third　principle　over　and　above　the　other　two…three　in

all；　and　not　two？　For　clearly　you　cannot　say　that　one　of　the　two

principles　is　being；　and　yet　attribute　being　equally　to　both　of

them；　for；　if　you　did；　whichever　of　the　two　is　identified　with

being；　will　comprehend　the　other；　and　so　they　will　be　one　and　not

two。〃

　　Theaet。　Very　true。

　　Str。　But　perhaps　you　mean　to　give　the　name　of　〃being〃　to　both　of

them　together？

　　Theaet。　Quite　likely。

　　Str。　〃Then；　friends；〃　we　shall　reply　to　them；　〃the　answer　

is　plainly

that　the　two　will　still　be　resolved　into　one。〃

　　Theaet。　Most　true。

　　Str。　〃Since　then；　we　are　in　a　difficulty；　please　to　tell　

us　what　you

mean；　when　you　speak　of　being；　for　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　you

always　from　the　first　understood　your　own　meaning；　whereas　we　once

thought　that　we　understood　you；　but　now　we　are　in　a　great　strait。

Please　to　begin　by　explaining　this　matter　to　us；　and　let　us　no

longer　fancy　that　we　understand　you；　when　we　entirely　misunderstand

you。〃　There　will　be　no　impropriety　in　our　demanding　an　answer　to

this　question；　either　of　the　dualists　or　of　the　pluralists？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　not。

　　Str。　And　what　about　the　assertors　of　the　oneness　of　the　all…must

we　not　endeavour　to　ascertain　from　them　what　they　mean　by　〃being〃？

　　Theaet。　By　all　means。

　　Str。　Then　let　them　answer　this　question：　One；　you　say；　alone　is？

〃Yes；〃　they　will　reply。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　there　is　something　which　you　call　〃being〃？

　　Theaet。　〃Yes。〃

　　Str。　And　is　being　the　same　as　one；　and　do　you　apply　two　

names　to　the

same　thing？

　　Theaet。　What　will　be　their　answer；　Stranger？

　　Str。　It　is　clear；　Theaetetus；　that　he　who　asserts　the　

unity　of　being

will　find　a　difficulty　in　answering　this　or　any　other　question。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　To　admit　of　two　names；　and　to　affirm　that　there　is　nothing

but　unity；　is　surely　ridiculous？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　equally　irrational　to　admit　that　a　name　is　anything？

　　Theaet。　How　so？

　　Str。　To　distinguish　the　name　from　the　thing；　implies　duality。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　yet　he　who　identifies　the　name　with　the　thing　will　be

compelled　to　say　that　it　is　the　name　of　nothing；　or　if　he　

says　that　it

is　the　name　of　something；　even　then　the　name　will　only　be　the　name

of　a　name；　and　of　nothing　else。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　the　one　will　turn　out　to　be　only　one　of　one；　and　being

absolute　unity；　will　represent　a　mere　name。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　would　they　say　that　the　whole　is　other　than　the　one　that

is；　or　the　same　with　it？

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure　they　would；　and　they　actually　say　so。

　　Str。　If　being　is　a　whole；　as　Parmenides　sings；…



　　Every　way　like　unto　the　fullness　of　a　well…rounded　sphere；

　　Evenly　balanced　from　the　centre　on　every　side；

　　And　must　needs　be　neither　greater　nor　less　in　any　way；

　　Neither　on　this　side　nor　on　that…



then　being　has　a　centre　and　extremes；　and；　having　these；　must　also

have　parts。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Yet　that　which　has　parts　may　have　the　attribute　of　

unity　in　all

the　parts；　and　in　this　way　being　all　and　a　whole；　may　be　one？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　But　that　of　which　this　is　the　condition　cannot　be　absolute

unity？

　　Theaet。　Why　not？

　　Str。　Because；　according　to　right　reason；　that　which　is　truly　one

must　be　affirmed　to　be　absolutely　indivisible。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　But　this　indivisible；　if　made　up　of　many　parts；　will　

contradict

reason。

　　Theaet。　I　understand。

　　Str。　Shall　we　say　that　being　is　one　and　a　whole；　because　it　has

the　attribute　of　unity？　Or　shall　we　say　that　being　is　not　a　whole　at

all？

　　Theaet。　That　is　a　hard　alternative　to　offer。

　　Str。　Most　true；　for　being；　having　in　a　certain　sense　the　attribute

of　one；　is　yet　proved　not　to　be　the　same　as　one；　and　the　all　is

therefore　more　than　one。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　yet　if　being　be　not　a　whole；　through　having　the　attribute

of　unity；　and　there　be　such　a　thing　as　an　absolute　whole；　being

lacks　something　of　its　own　nature？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　Upon　this　view；　again；　being；　having　a　defect　of　being；　will

become　not…being？

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And；　again；　the　all　becomes　more　than　one；　for　being　and　the

whole　will　each　have　their　separate　nature。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　But　if　the　whole　does　not　exist　at　all；　all　the　previous

difficulties　remain　the　same；　and　there　will　be　the　further

difficulty；　that　besides　having　no　being；　being　can　never　have　come

into　being。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　Because　that　which　comes　into　being　always　comes　into　being

as　a　whole；　so　that　he　who　does　not　give　whole　a　place　among　beings；

cannot　speak　either　of　essence　or　generation　as　existing。

　　Theaet。　Yes；　that　certainly　appears　to　be　true。

　　Str。　Again；　how　can　that　which　is　not　a　whole　have　any　

quantity？　For

that　which　is　of　a　certain　quantity　must　necessarily　be　the　whole　of

that　quantity。

　　Theaet。　Exactly。

　　Str。　And　there　will　be　innumerable　other　points；　each　of　them

causing　infinite　trouble　to　him　who　says　that　being　is　either；　one

or　two。

　　Theaet。　The　difficulties　which　are　dawning　upon　us　prove　this；　for

one　objection　connects　with　another；　and　they　are　always　involving

what　has　preceded　in　a　greater　and　worse　perplexity。

　　Str。　We　are　far　from　having　exhausted　the　more　exact　thinkers　who

treat　of　being　and　not…being。　But　let　us　be　content　to　leave　

them；　and

proceed　to　view　those　who　speak　less　precisely；　and　we　shall　find　as

the　result　of　all；　that　the　nature　of　being　is　quite　as　difficult　to

comprehend　as　that　of　not…being。

　　Theaet。　Then　now　we　will　go　to　the　others。

　　Str。　There　appears　to　be　a　sort　of　war　of　Giants　and　Gods　going　on

amongst　them；　they　are　fighting　with　one　another　about　the　nature　of

essence。

　　Theaet。　How　is　that？

　　Str。　Some　of　them　are　dragging　down　all　things　from　heaven　and

from　the　unseen　to　earth；　and　they　literally　grasp　in　their　hands

rocks　and　oaks；　of　these　they　lay　hold；　and　obstinately　

maintain；　that

the　things　only　which　can　be　touched　or　handled　have　being　

or　essence；

because　they　define　being　and　body　as　one；　and　if　any　one　else　says

that　what　is　not　a　body　exists　they　altogether　despise　him；　and　will

hear　of　nothing　but　body。

　　Theaet。　I　have　often　met　with　such　men；　and　terrible　fellows　they

are。

　　Str。　And　that　is　the　reason　why　their　opponents　cautiously　defend

themselves　from　above；　out　of　an　unseen　world；　mightily　contending

that　true　essence　consists　of　certain　intelligible　and　incorporeal

ideas；　the　bodies　of　the　materialists；　which　by　them　are　

maintained　to

be　the　very　truth；　they　brea