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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　MENO



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Plato



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　translated　by　Benjamin　Jowett



MENO







　　PERSONS　OF　THE　DIALOGUE　MENO；　SOCRATES；　A　SLAVE　OF　MENO；



ANYTUS







　　Meno。　Can　you　tell　me；　Socrates；　whether　virtue　is　acquired　by



teaching　or　by　practice；　or　if　neither　by　teaching　nor　practice；



then　whether　it　comes　to　man　by　nature；　or　in　what　other　way？



　　Socrates。　O　Meno；　there　was　a　time　when　the　Thessalians　were



famous　among　the　other　Hellenes　only　for　their　riches　and　their



riding；　but　now；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　they　are　equally　famous　for



their　wisdom；　especially　at　Larisa；　which　is　the　native　city　of　your



friend　Aristippus。　And　this　is　Gorgias'　doing；　for　when　he　came　there；



the　flower　of　the　Aleuadae；　among　them　your　admirer　Aristippus；　and



the　other　chiefs　of　the　Thessalians；　fell　in　love　with　his　wisdom。　And



he　has　taught　you　the　habit　of　answering　questions　in　a　grand　and　bold



style；　which　becomes　those　who　know；　and　is　the　style　in　which　he



himself　answers　all　comers；　and　any　Hellene　who　likes　may　ask　him



anything。　How　different　is　our　lot！　my　dear　Meno。　Here　at　Athens　there



is　a　dearth　of　the　commodity；　and　all　wisdom　seems　to　have　emigrated



from　us　to　you。　I　am　certain　that　if　you　were　to　ask　any　Athenian



whether　virtue　was　natural　or　acquired；　he　would　laugh　in　your　face；



and　say：　〃Stranger；　you　have　far　too　good　an　opinion　of　me；　if　you



think　that　I　can　answer　your　question。　For　I　literally　do　not　know



what　virtue　is；　and　much　less　whether　it　is　acquired　by　teaching　or



not。〃　And　I　myself；　Meno；　living　as　I　do　in　this　region　of　poverty；　am



as　poor　as　the　rest　of　the　world；　and　I　confess　with　shame　that　I　know



literally　nothing　about　virtue；　and　when　I　do　not　know　the　〃quid〃　of



anything　how　can　I　know　the　〃quale〃？　How；　if　I　knew　nothing　at　all



of　Meno；　could　I　tell　if　he　was　fair；　or　the　opposite　of　fair；　rich



and　noble；　or　the　reverse　of　rich　and　noble？　Do　you　think　that　I



could？



　　Men。　No；　Indeed。　But　are　you　in　earnest；　Socrates；　in　saying　that



you　do　not　know　what　virtue　is？　And　am　I　to　carry　back　this　report



of　you　to　Thessaly？



　　Soc。　Not　only　that；　my　dear　boy；　but　you　may　say　further　that　I　have



never　known　of　any　one　else　who　did；　in　my　judgment。



　　Men。　Then　you　have　never　met　Gorgias　when　he　was　at　Athens？



　　Soc。　Yes；　I　have。



　　Men。　And　did　you　not　think　that　he　knew？



　　Soc。　I　have　not　a　good　memory；　Meno；　and　therefore　I　cannot　now　tell



what　I　thought　of　him　at　the　time。　And　I　dare　say　that　he　did　know；



and　that　you　know　what　he　said：　please；　therefore；　to　remind　me　of



what　he　said；　or；　if　you　would　rather；　tell　me　your　own　view；　for　I



suspect　that　you　and　he　think　much　alike。



　　Men。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　Then　as　he　is　not　here；　never　mind　him；　and　do　you　tell　me：



By　the　gods；　Meno；　be　generous；　and　tell　me　what　you　say　that　virtue



is；　for　I　shall　be　truly　delighted　to　find　that　I　have　been



mistaken；　and　that　you　and　Gorgias　do　really　have　this　knowledge；



although　I　have　been　just　saying　that　I　have　never　found　anybody　who



had。



　　Men。　There　will　be　no　difficulty；　Socrates；　in　answering　your



question。　Let　us　take　first　the　virtue　of　a　man…he　should　know　how



to　administer　the　state；　and　in　the　administration　of　it　to　benefit



his　friends　and　harm　his　enemies；　and　he　must　also　be　careful　not　to



suffer　harm　himself。　A　woman's　virtue；　if　you　wish　to　know　about　that；



may　also　be　easily　described：　her　duty　is　to　order　her　house；　and　keep



what　is　indoors；　and　obey　her　husband。　Every　age；　every　condition　of



life；　young　or　old；　male　or　female；　bond　or　free；　has　a　different



virtue：　there　are　virtues　numberless；　and　no　lack　of　definitions　of



them；　for　virtue　is　relative　to　the　actions　and　ages　of　each　of　us



in　all　that　we　do。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　vice；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　How　fortunate　I　am；　Meno！　When　I　ask　you　for　one　virtue；　you



present　me　with　a　swarm　of　them；　which　are　in　your　keeping。　Suppose



that　I　carry　on　the　figure　of　the　swarm；　and　ask　of　you；　What　is　the



nature　of　the　bee？　and　you　answer　that　there　are　many　kinds　of　bees；



and　I　reply：　But　do　bees　differ　as　bees；　because　there　are　many　and



different　kinds　of　them；　or　are　they　not　rather　to　be　distinguished　by



some　other　quality；　as　for　example　beauty；　size；　or　shape？　How　would



you　answer　me？



　　Men。　I　should　answer　that　bees　do　not　differ　from　one　another；　as



bees。



　　Soc。　And　if　I　went　on　to　say：　That　is　what　I　desire　to　know；　Meno；



tell　me　what　is　the　quality　in　which　they　do　not　differ；　but　are　all



alike；…would　you　be　able　to　answer？



　　Men。　I　should。



　　Soc。　And　so　of　the　virtues；　however　many　and　different　they　may



be；　they　have　all　a　common　nature　which　makes　them　virtues；　and　on



this　he　who　would　answer　the　question；　〃What　is　virtue？〃　would　do　well



to　have　his　eye　fixed：　Do　you　understand？



　　Men。　I　am　beginning　to　understand；　but　I　do　not　as　yet　take　hold



of　the　question　as　I　could　wish。



　　Soc。　When　you　say；　Meno；　that　there　is　one　virtue　of　a　man；



another　of　a　woman；　another　of　a　child；　and　so　on；　does　this　apply



only　to　virtue；　or　would　you　say　the　same　of　health；　and　size；　and



strength？　Or　is　the　nature　of　health　always　the　same；　whether　in　man



or　woman？



　　Men。　I　should　say　that　health　is　the　same；　both　in　man　and　woman。



　　Soc。　And　is　not　this　true　of　size　and　strength？　If　a　woman　is



strong；　she　will　be　strong　by　reason　of　the　same　form　and　of　the



same　strength　subsisting　in　her　which　there　is　in　the　man。　I　mean　to



say　that　strength；　as　strength；　whether　of　man　or　woman；　is　the



same。　Is　there　any　difference？



　　Men。　I　think　not。



　　Soc。　And　will　not　virtue；　as　virtue；　be　the　same；　whether　in　a　child



or　in　a　grown…up　person；　in　a　woman　or　in　a　man？



　　Men。　I　cannot　help　feeling；　Socrates；　that　this　case　is　different



from　the　others。



　　Soc。　But　why？　Were　you　not　saying　that　the　virtue　of　a　man　was　to



order　a　state；　and　the　virtue　of　a　woman　was　to　order　a　house？



　　Men。　I　did　say　so。



　　Soc。　And　can　either　house　or　state　or　anything　be　well　ordered



without　temperance　and　without　justice？



　　Men。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　Then　they　who　order　a　state　or　a　house　temperately　or　justly



order　them　with　temperance　and　justice？



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then　both　men　and　women；　if　they　are　to　be　good　men　and



women；　must　have　the　same　virtues　of　temperance　and　justice？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　And　can　either　a　young　man　or　an　elder　one　be　good；　if　they　are



intemperate　and　unjust？



　　Men。　They　cannot。



　　Soc。　They　must　be　temperate　and　just？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　Then　all　men　are　good　in　the　same　way；　and　by　participation



in　the　same　virtues？



　　Men。　Such　is　the　inference。



　　Soc。　And　they　surely　would　not　have　been　good　in　the　same　way；



unless　their　virtue　had　been　the　same？



　　Men。　They　would　not。



　　Soc。　Then　now　that　the　sameness　of　all　virtue　has　been　proven；　try



and　remember　what　you　and　Gorgias　say　that　virtue　is。



　　Men。　Will　you　have　one　definition　of　them　all？



　　Soc。　That　is　what　I　am　seeking。



　　Men。　If　you　want　to　have　one　definition　of　them　all；　I　know　not　what



to　say；　but　that　virtue　is　the　power　of　governing　mankind。



　　Soc。　And　does　this　definition　of　virtue　include　all　virtue？　Is



virtue　the　same　in　a　child　and　in　a　slave；　Meno？　Can　the　child



govern　his　father；　or　the　slave　his　master；　and　would　he　who



governed　be　any　longer　a　slave？



　　Men。　I　think　not；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　No；　indeed；　there　would　be　small　reason　in　that。　Yet　once　more；



fair　friend；　according　to　you；　virtue　is　〃the　power　of　governing〃；　but



do　you　not　add　〃justly　and　not　unjustly〃？



　　Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　I　agree　there；　for　justice　is　virtue。



　　Soc。　Would　you　say　〃virtue；〃　Meno；　or　〃a　virtue〃？



　　Men。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　I　mean　as　I　might　say　about　anything；　that　a　round；　for



example；　is　〃a　figure〃　and　not　simply　〃figure；〃　and　I　should　adopt



this　mode　of　speaking；　because　there　are　other　figures。



　　Men。　Quite　right；　and　that　is　just　what　I　am　saying　about



virtue…that　there　are　other　virtues　as　well　as　justice。



　　Soc。　What　are　they？　tell　me　the　names　of　them；　as　I　would　tell　you



the　names　of　the　other　figures　if　you　asked　me。



　　Men。　Courage　and　temperance　and　wisdom　and　magnanimity　are



virtues；　and　there　are　many　others。



　　Soc。　Yes；　Meno；　and　again　we　are　in　the　same　case：　in　searching



after　one　virtue　we　have　found　many；　though　not　in　the　same　way　as



before；　but　we　have　been　unable　to　find　the　common　virtue　which　runs



through　them　all。



　　Men。　Why；　Socrates；　even　now　I　am　not　able　to　follow　you　in　the



attempt　to　get　at　one　common　notion　of　virtue　as　of　other　things。



　　Soc。　No　wonder；　but　I　will　try　to　get　nearer　if　I　can；　for　you



know　that　all　things　have　a　common　notion。　Suppose　now　that　some　one



asked　you　the　question　which　I　asked　before：　Meno；　he　would　say；



what　is　figure？　And　if　you　answered　〃roundness；〃　he　would　reply　to



you；　in　my　way　of　speaking；　by　asking　whether　you　would　say　that



roundness　is　〃figure〃　or　〃a　figure〃；　and　you　would　answer　〃a　figure。〃



　　Men。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　for　this　reason…that　there　are　other　figures？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　if　he　proceeded　to　ask；　What　other　figures　are　there？　you



would　have　told　him。



　　Men。　I　should。



　　Soc。　And　if　he　similarly　asked　what　colour　is；　and　you　answered



whiteness；　and　the　questioner　rejoined；　Would　you　say　that　whiteness



is　colour　or　a　colour？　you　would　reply；　A　colour；　because　there　are



other　colours　as　well。



　　Men。　I　should。



　　Soc。　And　if　he　had　said；　Tell　me　what　they　are？…you　would　have



told　h