meno-第3部分

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the　possession　of　gold　and　silver；　and　having　office　and　honour　in　the



state…those　are　what　you　would　call　goods？



　　Men。　Yes；　I　should　include　all　those。



　　Soc。　Then；　according　to　Meno；　who　is　the　hereditary　friend　of　the



great　king；　virtue　is　the　power　of　getting　silver　and　gold；　and



would　you　add　that　they　must　be　gained　piously；　justly；　or　do　you　deem



this　to　be　of　no　consequence？　And　is　any　mode　of　acquisition；　even



if　unjust　and　dishonest；　equally　to　be　deemed　virtue？



　　Men。　Not　virtue；　Socrates；　but　vice。



　　Soc。　Then　justice　or　temperance　or　holiness；　or　some　other　part　of



virtue；　as　would　appear；　must　accompany　the　acquisition；　and　without



them　the　mere　acquisition　of　good　will　not　be　virtue。



　　Men。　Why；　how　can　there　be　virtue　without　these？



　　Soc。　And　the　non…acquisition　of　gold　and　silver　in　a　dishonest



manner　for　oneself　or　another；　or　in　other　words　the　want　of　them；　may



be　equally　virtue？



　　Men。　True。



　　Soc。　Then　the　acquisition　of　such　goods　is　no　more　virtue　than　the



non…acquisition　and　want　of　them；　but　whatever　is　accompanied　by



justice　or　honesty　is　virtue；　and　whatever　is　devoid　of　justice　is



vice。



　　Men。　It　cannot　be　otherwise；　in　my　judgment。



　　Soc。　And　were　we　not　saying　just　now　that　justice；　temperance；　and



the　like；　were　each　of　them　a　part　of　virtue？



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　so；　Meno；　this　is　the　way　in　which　you　mock　me。



　　Men。　Why　do　you　say　that；　Socrates？



　　Soc。　Why；　because　I　asked　you　to　deliver　virtue　into　my　hands



whole　and　unbroken；　and　I　gave　you　a　pattern　according　to　which　you



were　to　frame　your　answer；　and　you　have　forgotten　already；　and　tell　me



that　virtue　is　the　power　of　attaining　good　justly；　or　with　justice；



and　justice　you　acknowledge　to　be　a　part　of　virtue。



　　Men。　Yes。



　　Soc。　Then　it　follows　from　your　own　admissions；　that　virtue　is



doing　what　you　do　with　a　part　of　virtue；　for　justice　and　the　like



are　said　by　you　to　be　parts　of　virtue。



　　Men。　What　of　that？



　　Soc。　What　of　that！　Why；　did　not　I　ask　you　to　tell　me　the　nature　of



virtue　as　a　whole？　And　you　are　very　far　from　telling　me　this；　but



declare　every　action　to　be　virtue　which　is　done　with　a　part　of　virtue；



as　though　you　had　told　me　and　I　must　already　know　the　whole　of　virtue；



and　this　too　when　frittered　away　into　little　pieces。　And；　therefore；



my　dear　I　fear　that　I　must　begin　again　and　repeat　the　same　question：



What　is　virtue？　for　otherwise；　I　can　only　say；　that　every　action



done　with　a　part　of　virtue　is　virtue；　what　else　is　the　meaning　of



saying　that　every　action　done　with　justice　is　virtue？　Ought　I　not　to



ask　the　question　over　again；　for　can　any　one　who　does　not　know



virtue　know　a　part　of　virtue？



　　　Men。　No；　I　do　not　say　that　he　can。



　　　Soc。　Do　you　remember　how；　in　the　example　of　figure；　we　rejected　any



answer　given　in　terms　which　were　as　yet　unexplained　or　unadmitted？



　　　Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　and　we　were　quite　right　in　doing　so。



　　　Soc。　But　then；　my　friend；　do　not　suppose　that　we　can　explain　to　any



one　the　nature　of　virtue　as　a　whole　through　some　unexplained　portion



of　virtue；　or　anything　at　all　in　that　fashion；　we　should　only　have



to　ask　over　again　the　old　question；　What　is　virtue？　Am　I　not　right？



　　　Men。　I　believe　that　you　are。



　　　Soc。　Then　begin　again；　and　answer　me；　What；　according　to　you　and



your　friend　Gorgias；　is　the　definition　of　virtue？



　　　Men。　O　Socrates；　I　used　to　be　told；　before　I　knew　you；　that　you



were　always　doubting　yourself　and　making　others　doubt；　and　now　you　are



casting　your　spells　over　me；　and　I　am　simply　getting　bewitched　and



enchanted；　and　am　at　my　wits'　end。　And　if　I　may　venture　to　make　a　jest



upon　you；　you　seem　to　me　both　in　your　appearance　and　in　your　power



over　others　to　be　very　like　the　flat　torpedo　fish；　who　torpifies　those



who　come　near　him　and　touch　him；　as　you　have　now　torpified　me；　I



think。　For　my　soul　and　my　tongue　are　really　torpid；　and　I　do　not



know　how　to　answer　you；　and　though　I　have　been　delivered　of　an



infinite　variety　of　speeches　about　virtue　before　now；　and　to　many



persons…and　very　good　ones　they　were；　as　I　thought…at　this　moment　I



cannot　even　say　what　virtue　is。　And　I　think　that。　you　are　very　wise　in



not　voyaging　and　going　away　from　home；　for　if　you　did　in　other



places　as　do　in　Athens；　you　would　be　cast　into　prison　as　a　magician。



　　Soc。　You　are　a　rogue；　Meno；　and　had　all　but　caught　me。



　　Men。　What　do　you　mean；　Socrates？



　　Soc。　I　can　tell　why　you　made　a　simile　about　me。



　　Men。　Why？



　　Soc。　In　order　that　I　might　make　another　simile　about　you。　For　I　know



that　all　pretty　young　gentlemen　like　to　have　pretty　similes　made　about



them…as　well　they　may…but　I　shall　not　return　the　compliment。　As　to



my　being　a　torpedo；　if　the　torpedo　is　torpid　as　well　as　the　cause　of



torpidity　in　others；　then　indeed　I　am　a　torpedo；　but　not　otherwise；



for　I　perplex　others；　not　because　I　am　clear；　but　because　I　am　utterly



perplexed　myself。　And　now　I　know　not　what　virtue　is；　and　you　seem　to



be　in　the　same　case；　although　you　did　once　perhaps　know　before　you



touched　me。　However；　I　have　no　objection　to　join　with　you　in　the



enquiry。



　　Men。　And　how　will　you　enquire；　Socrates；　into　that　which　you　do



not　know？　What　will　you　put　forth　as　the　subject　of　enquiry？　And　if



you　find　what　you　want；　how　will　you　ever　know　that　this　is　the



thing　which　you　did　not　know？



　　Soc。　I　know；　Meno；　what　you　mean；　but　just　see　what　a　tiresome



dispute　you　are　introducing。　You　argue　that　man　cannot　enquire



either　about　that　which　he　knows；　or　about　that　which　he　does　not



know；　for　if　he　knows；　he　has　no　need　to　enquire；　and　if　not；　he



cannot；　for　he　does　not　know　the；　very　subject　about　which　he　is　to



enquire。



　　Men。　Well；　Socrates；　and　is　not　the　argument　sound？



　　Soc。　I　think　not。



　　Men。　Why　not？



　　Soc。　I　will　tell　you　why：　I　have　heard　from　certain　wise　men　and



women　who　spoke　of　things　divine　that…



　　Men。　What　did　they　say？



　　Soc。　They　spoke　of　a　glorious　truth；　as　I　conceive。



　　Men。　What　was　it？　and　who　were　they？



　　Soc。　Some　of　them　were　priests　and　priestesses；　who　had　studied



how　they　might　be　able　to　give　a　reason　of　their　profession：　there；



have　been　poets　also；　who　spoke　of　these　things　by　inspiration；　like



Pindar；　and　many　others　who　were　inspired。　And　they　say…mark；　now；　and



see　whether　their　words　are　true…they　say　that　the　soul　of　man　is



immortal；　and　at　one　time　has　an　end；　which　is　termed　dying；　and　at



another　time　is　born　again；　but　is　never　destroyed。　And　the　moral



is；　that　a　man　ought　to　live　always　in　perfect　holiness。　〃For　in　the



ninth　year　Persephone　sends　the　souls　of　those　from　whom　she　has



received　the　penalty　of　ancient　crime　back　again　from　beneath　into　the



light　of　the　sun　above；　and　these　are　they　who　become　noble　kings



and　mighty　men　and　great　in　wisdom　and　are　called　saintly　heroes　in



after　ages。〃　The　soul；　then；　as　being　immortal；　and　having　been　born



again　many　times；　rand　having　seen　all　things　that　exist；　whether　in



this　world　or　in　the　world　below；　has　knowledge　of　them　all；　and　it　is



no　wonder　that　she　should　be　able　to　call　to　remembrance　all　that



she　ever　knew　about　virtue；　and　about　everything；　for　as　all　nature　is



akin；　and　the　soul　has　learned　all　things；　there　is　no　difficulty　in



her　eliciting　or　as　men　say　learning；　out　of　a　single　recollection



…all　the　rest；　if　a　man　is　strenuous　and　does　not　faint；　for　all



enquiry　and　all　learning　is　but　recollection。　And　therefore　we　ought



not　to　listen　to　this　sophistical　argument　about　the　impossibility



of　enquiry：　for　it　will　make　us　idle；　and　is　sweet　only　to　the



sluggard；　but　the　other　saying　will　make　us　active　and　inquisitive。　In



that　confiding；　I　will　gladly　enquire　with　you　into　the　nature　of



virtue。



　　Men。　Yes；　Socrates；　but　what　do　you　mean　by　saying　that　we　do　not



learn；　and　that　what　we　call　learning　is　only　a　process　of



recollection？　Can　you　teach　me　how　this　is？



　　Soc。　I　told　you；　Meno；　just　now　that　you　were　a　rogue；　and　now　you



ask　whether　I　can　teach　you；　when　I　am　saying　that　there　is　no



teaching；　but　only　recollection；　and　thus　you　imagine　that　you　will



involve　me　in　a　contradiction。



　　Men。　Indeed；　Socrates；　I　protest　that　I　had　no　such　intention。　I



only　asked　the　question　from　habit；　but　if　you　can　prove　to　me　that



what　you　say　is　true；　I　wish　that　you　would。



　　Soc。　It　will　be　no　easy　matter；　but　I　will　try　to　please　you　to



the　utmost　of　my　power。　Suppose　that　you　call　one　of　your　numerous



attendants；　that　I　may　demonstrate　on　him。



　　Men。　Certainly。　Come　hither；　boy。



　　Soc。　He　is　Greek；　and　speaks　Greek；　does　he　not？



　　Men。　Yes；　indeed；　he　was　born　in　the　house。



　　Soc。　Attend　now　to　the　questions　which　I　ask　him；　and　observe



whether　he　learns　of　me　or　only　remembers。



　　Men。　I　will。



　　Soc。　Tell　me；　boy；　do　you　know　that　a　figure　like　this　is　a　square？



　　Boy。　I　do。



　　Soc。　And　you　know　that　a　square　figure　has　these　four　lines　equal？



　　Boy。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　these　lines　which　I　have　drawn　through　the　middle　of　the



square　are　also　equal？



　　Boy。　Yes。



　　Soc。　A　square　may　be　of　any　size？



　　Boy。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　if　one　side　of　the　figure　be　of　two　feet；　and　the　other



side　be　of　two　feet；　how　much　will　the　whole　be？　Let　me　explain：　if　in



one　direction　the　space　was　of　two　feet；　and　in　other　direction　of　one



foot；　the　whole　would　be　of　two　feet　taken　once？



　　Boy。　Yes。



　　Soc。　But　since　this　side　is　also　of　two　feet；　there　are　twice　two



feet？



　　Boy。　There　are。



　　Soc。　Then　the　square　is　of　twice　two　feet？



　　Boy。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　how　many　are　twice　two　feet？　count　and　tell　me。



　　Boy。　Four；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　And　might　there　not　be　ano