the ethics(part iii)-第1部分

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The　Ethics　＇Part　III＇







（Ethica　Ordine　Geometrico　Demonstrata）







by　Benedict　de　Spinoza







Translated　by　R。　H。　M。　Elwes



















PART　III：　　ON　THE　ORIGIN　AND　NATURE　OF　THE　EMOTIONS











Most　writers　on　the　emotions　and　on　human　conduct　seem



to　be　treating　rather　of　matters　outside　nature　than　of　natural



phenomena　following　nature's　general　laws。　　They　appear　to



conceive　man　to　be　situated　in　nature　as　a　kingdom　within　a



kingdom：　　for　they　believe　that　he　disturbs　rather　than　follows



nature's　order；　that　he　has　absolute　control　over　his　actions；



and　that　he　is　determined　solely　by　himself。　　They　attribute



human　infirmities　and　fickleness；　not　to　the　power　of　nature



in　general；　but　to　some　mysterious　flaw　in　the　nature　of　man；



which　accordingly　they　bemoan；　deride；　despise；　or；　as



usually　happens；　abuse：　　he；　who　succeeds　in　hitting　off



the　weakness　of　the　human　mind　more　eloquently　or　more



acutely　than　his　fellows；　is　looked　upon　as　a　seer。　　Still　there



has　been　no　lack　of　very　excellent　men　（to　whose　toil　and



industry　I　confess　myself　much　indebted）；　who　have　written



many　noteworthy　things　concerning　the　right　way　of　life；



and　have　given　much　sage　advice　to　mankind。　　But　no　one；



so　far　as　I　know；　has　defined　the　nature　and　strength　of　the



emotions；　and　the　power　of　the　mind　against　them　for　their



restraint。







I　do　not　forget；　that　the　illustrious　Descartes；　though　he



believed；　that　the　mind　has　absolute　power　over　its　actions；



strove　to　explain　human　emotions　by　their　primary　causes；



and；　at　the　same　time；　to　point　out　a　way；　by　which　the　mind



might　attain　to　absolute　dominion　over　them。　　However；



in　my　opinion；　he　accomplishes　nothing　beyond　a　display



of　the　acuteness　of　his　own　great　intellect；　as　I　will　show



in　the　proper　place。　　For　the　present　I　wish　to　revert　to



those；　who　would　rather　abuse　or　deride　human　emotions



than　understand　them。　　Such　persons　will；　doubtless　think



it　strange　that　I　should　attempt　to　treat　of　human　vice　and



folly　geometrically；　and　should　wish　to　set　forth　with　rigid



reasoning　those　matters　which　they　cry　out　against　as



repugnant　to　reason；　frivolous；　absurd；　and　dreadful。



However；　such　is　my　plan。　　Nothing　comes　to　pass　in　nature；



which　can　be　set　down　to　a　flaw　therein；　for　nature　is　always



the　same；　and　everywhere　one　and　the　same　in　her　efficacy



and　power　of　action；　that　is；　nature's　laws　and　ordinances；



whereby　all　things　come　to　pass　and　change　from　one　form



to　another；　are　everywhere　and　always　the　same；　so　that



there　should　be　one　and　the　same　method　of　understanding



the　nature　of　all　things　whatsoever；　namely；　through　nature's



universal　laws　and　rules。　　Thus　the　passions　of　hatred；　anger；



envy；　and　so　on；　considered　in　themselves；　follow　from　this



same　necessity　and　efficacy　of　nature；　they　answer　to　certain



definite　causes；　through　which　they　are　understood；　and



possess　certain　properties　as　worthy　of　being　known　as



the　properties　of　anything　else；　whereof　the　contemplation



in　itself　affords　us　delight。　　I　shall；　therefore；　treat　of　the



nature　and　strength　of　the　emotions　according　to　the　same



method；　as　I　employed　heretofore　in　my　investigations



concerning　God　and　the　mind。　　I　shall　consider　human



actions　and　desires　in　exactly　the　same　manner；　as　though



I　were　concerned　with　lines；　planes；　and　solids。











DEFINITIONS







I。　By　an　'adequate'　cause；　I　mean　a　cause　through　which



its　effect　can　be　clearly　and　distinctly　perceived。　　By　an



'inadequate'　or　partial　cause；　I　mean　a　cause　through　which；



by　itself；　its　effect　cannot　be　understood。







II。　I　say　that　we　'act'　when　anything　takes　place；　either



within　us　or　externally　to　us；　whereof　we　are　the　adequate



cause；　that　is　（by　the　foregoing　definition）　when　through



our　nature　something　takes　place　within　us　or　externally



to　us；　which　can　through　our　nature　alone　be　clearly　and



distinctly　understood。　　On　the　other　hand；　I　say　that　we



are　passive　as　regards　something　when　that　something



takes　place　within　us；　or　follows　from　our　nature　externally；



we　being　only　the　partial　cause。







III。　By　'emotion'　I　mean　the　modifications　of　the　body；



whereby　the　active　power　of　the　said　body　is　increased



or　diminished；　aided　or　constrained；　and　also　the　ideas



of　such　modifications。







N。B。　If　we　can　be　the　adequate　cause　of　any　of　these



modifications；　I　then　call　the　emotion　an　activity；



otherwise　I　call　it　a　passion；　or　state　wherein　the　mind



is　passive。











POSTULATES







I。　The　human　body　can　be　affected　in　many　ways；　whereby



its　power　of　activity　is　increased　or　diminished；　and　also



in　other　ways　which　do　not　render　its　power　of　activity



either　greater　or　less。







N。B。　This　postulate　or　axiom　rests　on　Postulate　i。　and



Lemmas　v。　and　vii。；　which　see　after　II。　xiii。







II。　The　human　body　can　undergo　many　changes；　and；



nevertheless；　retain　the　impressions　or　traces　of　objects



（cf。　II。　Post。　v。）；　and；　consequently；　the　same　images



of　things　（see　note　II。　xvii。）。











PROPOSITIONS







I。　Our　mind　is　in　certain　cases　active；　and　in　certain　cases



passive。　　In　so　far　as　it　has　adequate　ideas　it　is　necessarily



active；　and　in　so　far　as　it　has　inadequate　ideas；　it　is



necessarily　passive。







》》》》》ProofIn　every　human　mind　there　are　some



adequate　ideas；　and　some　ideas　that　are　fragmentary



and　confused　（II。　xl。　note）。　　Those　ideas　which　are



adequate　in　the　mind　are　adequate　also　in　God；　inasmuch



as　he　constitutes　the　essence　of　the　mind　（II。　xl。　Cor。）；



and　those　which　are　inadequate　in　the　mind　are　likewise



（by　the　same　Cor。）　adequate　in　God；　not　inasmuch　as　he



contains　in　himself　the　essence　of　the　given　mind　alone；



but　as　he；　at　the　same　time；　contains　the　minds　of　other



things。　　Again；　from　any　given　idea　some　effect　must



necessarily　follow　（I。　xxxvi。）；　of　this　effect　God　is　the



adequate　cause　（III。　Def。　i。）；　not　inasmuch　as　he　is



infinite；　but　inasmuch　as　he　is　conceived　as　affected　by



the　given　idea　（II。　ix。）。　　But　of　that　effect　whereof　God



is　the　cause；　inasmuch　as　he　is　affected　by　an　idea　which



is　adequate　in　a　given　mind；　of　that　effect；　I　repeat；　the



mind　in　question　is　the　adequate　cause　（II。　xi。　Cor。）。



Therefore　our　mind；　in　so　far　as　it　has　adequate　ideas



（III。　Def。　ii。）；　is　in　certain　cases　necessarily　active；



this　was　our　first　point。　　Again；　whatsoever　necessarily



follows　from　the　idea　which　is　adequate　in　God；　not　by



virtue　of　his　possessing　in　himself　the　mind　of　one　man



only；　but　by　virtue　of　his　containing；　together　with　the



mind　of　that　one　man；　the　minds　of　other　things　also；



of　such　an　effect　（II。　xi。　Cor。）　the　mind　of　the　given　man



is　not　an　adequate；　but　only　a　partial　cause；　thus



（III。　Def。　ii。）　the　mind；　inasmuch　as　it　has　inadequate



ideas；　is　in　certain　cases　necessarily　passive；　this　was



our　second　point。　　Therefore　our　mind；　&c。　　Q。E。D。







ProofAll　modes　of　thinking　have　for　their　cause



God；　by　virtue　of　his　being　a　thinking　thing；　and　not　by



virtue　of　his　being　displayed　under　any　other　attribute　（II。



vi。）。　　That；　therefore；　which　determines　the　mind　to　thought



is　a　mode　of　thought；　and　not　a　mode　of　extension；　that



is　（II。　Def。　i。）；　it　is　not　body。　　This　was　our　first　point。



Again；　the　motion　and　rest　of　a　body　must　arise　from



another　body；　which　has　also　been　determined　to　a　state



of　motion　or　rest　by　a　third　body；　and　absolutely



everything　which　takes　place　in　a　body　must　spring　from



God；　in　so　far　as　he　is　regarded　as　affected　by　some



mode　of　extension；　and　not　by　some　mode　of　thought



（II。　vi。）；　that　is；　it　cannot　spring　from　the　mind；　which



is　a　mode　of　thought。　　This　was　our　second　point。



Therefore　body　cannot　determine　mind；　&c。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteThis　is　made　more　clear　by　what　was　said



in　the　note　to　II。　vii。；　namely；　that　mind　and　body　are　one



and　the　same　thing；　conceived　first　under　the　attribute　of



thought；　secondly；　under　the　attribute　of　extension。　　Thus



it　follows　that　the　order　or　concatenation　of　things　is　identical；



whether　nature　be　conceived　under　the　one　attribute　or　the



other；　consequently　the　order　of　states　of　activity　and



passivity　in　our　body　is　simultaneous　in　nature　with　the



order　of　states　of　activity　and　passivity　in　the　mind。



The　same　conclusion　is　evident　from　the　manner　in　which



we　proved　II。　xii。







Nevertheless；　though　such　is　the　case；　and　though　there



be　no　further　room　for　doubt；　I　can　scarcely　believe；



until　the　fact　is　proved　by　experience；　that　men　can　be



induced　to　consider　the　question　calmly　and　fairly；　so　firmly



are　they　convinced　that　it　is　merely　at　the　bidding　of　the



mind；　that　the　body　is　set　in　motion　or　at　rest；　or　performs



a　variety　of　actions　depending　solely　on　the　mind's　will



or　the　exercise　of　thought。　　Howeve