the ethics(part iii)-第11部分

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no　more　envy　their　possessor；　than　we　envy　trees　for　being　tall；



or　lions　for　being　courageous。







LVI。　There　are　as　many　kinds　of　pleasure；　of　pain；　of　desire；



and　of　every　emotion　compounded　of　these；　such　as　vacillations



of　spirit；　or　derived　from　these；　such　as　love；　hatred；　hope；　fear；



&c。；　as　there　are　kinds　of　objects　whereby　we　are　affected。







》》》》》ProofPleasure　and　pain；　and　consequently　the　emotions



compounded　thereof；　or　derived　therefrom；　are　passions；　or



passive　states　（III。　xi。　note）；　now　we　are　necessarily　passive



（III。　i。）；　in　so　far　as　we　have　inadequate　ideas；　and　only　in　so



far　as　we　have　such　ideas　are　we　passive　（III。　iii。）；　that　is；　we



are　only　necessarily　passive　（II。　xl。　note）；　in　so　far　as　we　conceive；



or　（II。　xvii。　and　note）　in　so　far　as　we　are　affected　by　an　emotion；



which　involves　the　nature　of　our　own　body；　and　the　nature　of　an



external　body。　　Wherefore　the　nature　of　every　passive　state　must



necessarily　be　so　explained；　that　the　nature　of　the　object　whereby



we　are　affected　be　expressed。　　Namely；　the　pleasure；　which



arises　from；　say；　the　object　A；　involves　the　nature　of　that　object



A；　and　the　pleasure；　which　arises　from　the　object　B；　involves



the　nature　of　the　object　B；　different；　inasmuch　as　the　causes



whence　they　arise　are　by　nature　different。　　So　again　the　emotion



of　pain；　which　arises　from　one　object；　is　by　nature　different　from



the　pain　arising　from　another　object；　and；　similarly；　in　the　case



of　love；　hatred；　hope；　fear；　vacillation；　&c。







Thus；　there　are　necessarily　as　many　kinds　of　pleasure；　pain；　love；



hatred；　&c。；　as　there　are　kinds　of　objects　whereby　we　are



affected。　　Now　desire　is　each　man's　essence　or　nature；　in　so　far



as　it　is　conceived　as　determined　to　a　particular　action　by　any



given　modification　of　itself　（III。　ix。　note）；　therefore；　according



as　a　man　is　affected　through　external　causes　by　this　or　that　kind



of　pleasure；　pain；　love；　hatred；　&c。；　in　other　words；　according



as　his　nature　is　disposed　in　this　or　that　manner；　so　will　his　desire



be　of　one　kind　or　another；　and　the　nature　of　one　desire　must



necessarily　differ　from　the　nature　of　another　desire；　as　widely



as　the　emotions　differ；　wherefrom　each　desire　arose。　　Thus　there



are　as　many　kinds　of　desire；　as　there　are　kinds　of　pleasure；



pain；　love；　&c。；　consequently　（by　what　has　been　shown）　there



are　as　many　kinds　of　desire；　as　there　are　kinds　of　objects



whereby　we　are　affected。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteAmong　the　kinds　of　emotions；　which；　by　the　last



proposition；　must　be　very　numerous；　the　chief　are　〃luxury；〃



〃drunkenness；〃　〃lust；〃　〃avarice；〃　and　〃ambition；〃　being　merely



species　of　love　or　desire；　displaying　the　nature　of　those　emotions



in　a　manner　varying　according　to　the　object；　with　which　they　are



concerned。　　For　by　luxury；　drunkenness；　lust；　avarice；　ambition；



&c。；　we　simply　mean　the　immoderate　love　of　feasting；　drinking；



venery；　riches；　and　fame。　　Furthermore；　these　emotions；　in　so



far　as　we　distinguish　them　from　others　merely　by　the　objects



wherewith　they　are　concerned；　have　no　contraries。　　For



〃temperance；〃　〃sobriety；〃　and　〃chastity；〃　which　we　are　wont



to　oppose　to　luxury；　drunkenness；　and　lust；　are　not　emotions



or　passive　states；　but　indicate　a　power　of　the　mind　which



moderates　the　last…named　emotions。　　However；　I　cannot　here



explain　the　remaining　kinds　of　emotions　（seeing　that　they　are



as　numerous　as　the　kinds　of　objects）；　nor；　if　I　could；　would　it



be　necessary。　　It　is　sufficient　for　our　purpose；　namely；　to



determine　the　strength　of　the　emotions；　and　the　mind's　power



over　them；　to　have　a　general　definition　of　each　emotion。　　It　is



sufficient；　I　repeat；　to　understand　the　general　properties　of　the



emotions　and　the　mind；　to　enable　us　to　determine　the　quality



and　extent　of　the　mind's　power　in　moderating　and　checking



the　emotions。　　Thus；　though　there　is　a　great　difference　between



various　emotions　of　love；　hatred；　or　desire；　for　instance



between　love　felt　towards　children；　and　love　felt　towards　a　wife；



there　is　no　need　for　us　to　take　cognizance　of　such　differences；



or　to　track　out　further　the　nature　and　origin　of　the　emotions。







　LVII。　Any　emotion　of　a　given　individual　differs　from　the　emotion



of　another　individual；　only　in　so　far　as　the　essence　of　the　one



individual　differs　from　the　essence　of　the　other。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　is　evident　from　Ax。　i。　（which



see　after　Lemma　iii。　Prop。　xiii。；　Part　II。）。　　Nevertheless；　we　will



prove　it　from　the　nature　of　the　three　primary　emotions。







All　emotions　are　attributable　to　desire；　pleasure；　or　pain；　as



their　definitions　above　given　show。　　But　desire　is　each　man's



nature　or　essence　（III。　ix。　note）；　therefore　desire　in　one　individual



differs　from　desire　in　another　individual；　only　in　so　far　as　the



nature　or　essence　of　the　one　differs　from　the　nature　or　essence



of　the　other。　　Again；　pleasure　and　pain　are　passive　states　or



passions；　whereby　every　man's　power　or　endeavour　to　persist



in　his　being　is　increased　or　diminished；　helped　or　hindered　（III。



xi。　and　note）。　　But　by　the　endeavour　to　persist　in　its　being；　in



so　far　as　it　is　attributable　to　mind　and　body　in　conjunction；　we



mean　appetite　and　desire　（III。　ix。　note）；　therefore　pleasure　and



pain　are　identical　with　desire　or　appetite；　in　so　far　as　by



external　causes　they　are　increased　or　diminished；　helped　or



hindered；　in　other　words；　they　are　every　man's　nature；　wherefore



the　pleasure　and　pain　felt　by　one　man　differ　from　the　pleasure



and　pain　felt　by　another　man；　only　in　so　far　as　the　nature　or



essence　of　the　one　man　differs　from　the　essence　of　the　other；



consequently；　any　emotion　of　one　individual　only　differs；　&c。



Q。E。D。







*****NoteHence　it　follows；　that　the　emotions　of　the　animals



which　are　called　irrational　（for　after　learning　the　origin　of　mind



we　cannot　doubt　that　brutes　feel）　only　differ　from　man's　emotions；



to　the　extent　that　brute　nature　differs　from　human　nature。　　Horse



and　man　are　alike　carried　away　by　the　desire　of　procreation；　but



the　desire　of　the　former　is　equine；　the　desire　of　the　latter　is　human。



So　also　the　lusts　and　appetites　of　insects；　fishes；　and　birds　must



needs　very　according　to　the　several　natures。　　Thus；　although　each



individual　lives　content　and　rejoices　in　that　nature　belonging　to



him　wherein　he　has　his　being；　yet　the　life；　wherein　each　is　content



and　rejoices；　is　nothing　else　but　the　idea；　or　soul；　of　the　said



individual；　and　hence　the　joy　of　one　only　differs　in　nature　from



the　joy　of　another；　to　the　extent　that　the　essence　of　one　differs



from　the　essence　of　another。　　Lastly；　it　follows　from　the　foregoing



proposition；　that　there　is　no　small　difference　between　the　joy



which　actuates；　say；　a　drunkard；　and　the　joy　possessed　by　a



philosopher；　as　I　just　mention　here　by　the　way。　　Thus　far　I



have　treated　of　the　emotions　attributable　to　man；　in　so　far　as



he　is　passive。　　It　remains　to　add　a　few　words　on　those



attributable　to　him　in　so　far　as　he　is　active。







LVIII。　Besides　pleasure　and　desire；　which　are　passivities　or



passions；　there　are　other　emotions　derived　from　pleasure　and



desire；　which　are　attributable　to　us　in　so　far　as　we　are　active。







》》》》》ProofWhen　the　mind　conceives　itself　and　its　power



of　activity；　it　feels　pleasure　（III。　liii。）：　　now　the　mind　necessarily



contemplates　itself；　when　it　conceives　a　true　or　adequate　idea



（II。　xliii）。　　But　the　mind　does　conceive　certain　adequate　ideas



（II。　xl。　note　ii。）。　　Therefore　it　feels　pleasure　in　so　far　as　it　is　active



（III。　i。）。　　Again；　the　mind；　both　in　so　far　as　it　has　clear　and



distinct　ideas；　and　in　so　far　as　it　has　confused　ideas；　endeavours



to　persist　in　its　own　being　（III。　ix。）；　but　by　such　an　endeavour



we　mean　desire　（by　the　note　to　the　same　Prop。）；　therefore；



desire　is　also　attributable　to　us；　in　so　far　as　we　understand；



or　（III。　i。）　in　so　far　as　we　are　active。　　Q。E。D。







LIX。　Among　all　the　emotions　attributable　to　the　mind　as　active；



there　are　none　which　cannot　be　referred　to　pleasure　or　desire。







》》》》》ProofAll　emotions　can　be　referred　to　desire；　pleasure；



or　pain；　as　their　definitions；　already　given；　show。　　Now　by　pain



we　mean　that　the　mind's　power　of　thinking　is　diminished　or



checked　（III。　xi。　and　note）；　therefore；　in　so　far　as　the　mind



feels　pain；　its　power　of　understanding；　that　is；　of　activity；　is



diminished　or　checked　（III。　i。）；　therefore；　no　painful　emotions



can　be　attributed　to　the　mind　in　virtue　of　its　being　active；　but



only　emotions　of　pleasure　and　desire；　which　（by　the　last　Prop。）



are　attributable　to　the　mind　in　that　condition。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteAll　actions　following　from　emotion；　which　are



attributable　to　the　mind　in　virtue　of　its　understanding；　I　set



down　to　〃strength　of　character〃　（〃fortitudo〃）；　which　I　divide



into　〃courage〃　（〃animositas〃）　and　〃highmindedness〃



（〃generositas〃）。　　By　〃courage〃　I　mean　〃the　desire　whereby



every　man　strives　to　preserve　his　own　being　in　accordance



solely　with　the　dictates　of　reason。〃　　By　〃highmindedness〃　I



mean　〃the　desire　whereby　every　man　endeavours；　solely



under　the　dictates　of　reason；　to　aid　other　men　and　to　unite



them　to　himself　in　friendship。〃　　Those　actions；　therefore；



which　have　regard　solely　to　the　good　of　the　agent　I　set



down　to　courage；　those　which　aim　at　the　good　of　others　I



set　down　to　highmindedness。　　Thus　temperance；　sobriety；



and　p