the ethics(part iii)-第12部分

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set　down　to　highmindedness。　　Thus　temperance；　sobriety；



and　presence　of　mind　in　danger；　&c。；　are　varieties　of　courage；



courtesy；　mercy；　&c。；　are　varieties　of　highmindedness。







I　think　I　have　thus　explained；　and　displayed　through　their　primary



causes　the　principal　emotions　and　vacillations　of　spirit；　which



arise　from　the　combination　of　the　three　primary　emotions；　to　wit；



desire；　pleasure；　and　pain。　　It　is　evident　from　what　I　have　said；



that　we　are　in　many　ways　driven　about　by　external　causes；　and



that　like　waves　of　the　sea　driven　by　contrary　winds　we　toss　to



and　fro　unwitting　of　the　issue　and　of　our　fate。　　But　I　have　said；



that　I　have　only　set　forth　the　chief　conflicting　emotions；　not　all



that　might　be　given。　　For；　by　proceeding　in　the　same　way　as



above；　we　can　easily　show　that　love　is　united　to　repentance；



scorn；　shame；　&c。　　I　think　everyone　will　agree　from　what　has



been　said；　that　the　emotions　may　be　compounded　one　with



another　in　so　many　ways；　and　so　many　variations　may　arise



therefrom；　as　to　exceed　all　possibility　of　computation。　　However；



for　my　purpose；　it　is　enough　to　have　enumerated　the　most



important；　to　reckon　up　the　rest　which　I　have　omitted　would　be



more　curious　than　profitable。　　It　remains　to　remark　concerning



love；　that　it　very　often　happens　that　while　we　are　enjoying　a



thing　which　we　longed　for；　the　body；　from　the　act　of　enjoyment；



acquires　a　new　disposition；　whereby　it　is　determined　in　another



way；　other　images　of　things　are　aroused　in　it；　and　the　mind



begins　to　conceive　and　desire　something　fresh。　　For　example；



when　we　conceive　something　which　generally　delights　us　with



its　flavour；　we　desire　to　enjoy；　that　is；　to　eat　it。　　But　whilst　we



are　thus　enjoying　it；　the　stomach　is　filled　and　the　body　is



otherwise　disposed。　　If；　therefore；　when　the　body　is　thus



otherwise　disposed；　the　image　of　the　food　which　is　present



be　stimulated；　and　consequently　the　endeavour　or　desire　to



eat　it　be　stimulated　also；　the　new　disposition　of　the　body



will　feel　repugnance　to　the　desire　or　attempt；　and　consequently



the　presence　of　the　food　which　we　formerly　longed　for　will



become　odious。　　This　revulsion　of　feeling　is　called　〃satiety〃



or　weariness。　　For　the　rest；　I　have　neglected　the　outward



modifications　of　the　body　observable　in　emotions；　such；



for　instance；　as　trembling；　pallor；　sobbing；　laughter；　&c。；



for　these　are　attributable　to　the　body　only；　without　any



reference　to　the　mind。　　Lastly；　the　definitions　of　the　emotions



require　to　be　supplemented　in　a　few　points；　I　will　therefore



repeat　them；　interpolating　such　observations　as　I　think　should



here　and　there　be　added。











DEFINITIONS　OF　THE　EMOTIONS







I。　〃Desire〃　is　the　actual　essence　of　man；　in　so　far　as　it　is　conceived；



as　determined　to　a　particular　activity　by　some　given　modification



of　itself。







^^^^^ExplanationWe　have　said　above；　in　the　note　to



Prop。　ix。　of　this　part；　that　desire　is　appetite；　with　consciousness



thereof；　further；　that　appetite　is　the　essence　of　man；　in　so　far



as　it　is　determined　to　act　in　a　way　tending　to　promote　its　own



persistence。　　But；　in　the　same　note；　I　also　remarked　that；



strictly　speaking；　I　recognize　no　distinction　between　appetite



and　desire。　　For　whether　a　man　be　conscious　of　his　appetite



or　not；　it　remains　one　and　the　same　appetite。　　Thus；　in　order



to　avoid　the　appearance　of　tautology；　I　have　refrained　from



explaining　desire　by　appetite；　but　I　have　take　care　to　define



it　in　such　a　manner；　as　to　comprehend；　under　one　head；　all



those　endeavours　of　human　nature；　which　we　distinguish　by



the　terms　appetite；　will；　desire；　or　impulse。　　I　might；　indeed；



have　said；　that　desire　is　the　essence　of　man；　in　so　far　as　it　is



conceived　as　determined　to　a　particular　activity；　but　from



such　a　definition　（cf。　II。　xxiii。）　it　would　not　follow　that　the



mind　can　be　conscious　of　its　desire　or　appetite。　　Therefore；



in　order　to　imply　the　cause　of　such　consciousness；　it　was



necessary　to　add；　〃in　so　far　as　it　is　determined　by　some　given



modification；〃　&c。　　For；　by　a　modification　of　man's　essence；



we　understand　every　disposition　of　the　said　essence；　whether



such　disposition　be　innate；　or　whether　it　be　conceived　solely



under　the　attribute　of　thought；　or　solely　under　the　attribute



of　extension；　or　whether；　lastly；　it　be　referred　simultaneously



to　both　these　attributes。　　By　the　term　desire；　then；　I　here



mean　all　man's　endeavours；　impulses；　appetites；　and　volitions；



which　vary　according　to　each　man's　disposition；　and　are；



therefore；　not　seldom　opposed　one　to　another；　according



as　a　man　is　drawn　in　different　directions；　and　knows　not



where　to　turn。







II。　〃Pleasure〃　is　the　transition　of　a　man　from　a　less　to　a　greater



perfection。







III。　〃Pain〃　is　the　transition　of　a　man　from　a　greater　to　a　less



perfection。







^^^^^ExplanationI　say　transition：　　for　pleasure　is　not



perfection　itself。　　For；　if　man　were　born　with　the　perfection



to　which　he　passes；　he　would　possess　the　same；　without　the



emotion　of　pleasure。　　This　appears　more　clearly　from　the



consideration　of　the　contrary　emotion；　pain。　　No　one　can



deny；　that　pain　consists　in　the　transition　to　a　less　perfection；



and　not　in　the　less　perfection　itself：　　for　a　man　cannot　be



pained；　in　so　far　as　he　partakes　of　perfection　of　any　degree。



Neither　can　we　say；　that　pain　consists　in　the　absence　of　a



greater　perfection。　　For　absence　is　nothing；　whereas　the



emotion　of　pain　is　an　activity；　wherefore　this　activity　can



only　be　the　activity　of　transition　from　a　greater　to　a　less



perfectionin　other　words；　it　is　an　activity　whereby　a　man's



power　of　action　is　lessened　or　constrained　（cf。　III。　xi。　note）。



I　pass　over　the　definitions　of　merriment；　stimulation；　melancholy；



and　grief；　because　these　terms　are　generally　used　in　reference



to　the　body；　and　are　merely　kinds　of　pleasure　or　pain。







IV。　〃Wonder〃　is　the　conception　（imaginatio）　of　anything；



wherein　the　mind　comes　to　a　stand；　because　the　particular



concept　in　question　has　no　connection　with　other　concepts



（cf。　III。　lii。　and　note）。







^^^^^ExplanationIn　the　note　to　II。　xviii。　we　showed　the



reason；　why　the　mind；　from　the　contemplation　of　one　thing；



straightway　falls　to　the　contemplation　of　another　thing；　namely；



because　the　images　of　the　two　things　are　so　associated　and



arranged；　that　one　follows　the　other。　　This　state　of　association



is　impossible；　if　the　image　of　the　thing　be　new；　the　mind　will



then　be　at　a　stand　in　the　contemplation　thereof；　until　it　is



determined　by　other　causes　to　think　of　something　else。







Thus　the　conception　of　a　new　object；　considered　in　itself；



is　of　the　same　nature　as　other　conceptions；　hence；　I　do　not



include　wonder　among　the　emotions；　nor　do　I　see　why　I



should　so　include　it；　inasmuch　as　this　distraction　of　the　mind



arises　from　no　positive　cause　drawing　away　the　mind　from



other　objects；　but　merely　from　the　absence　of　a　cause；



which　should　determine　the　mind　to　pass　from　the



contemplation　of　one　object　to　the　contemplation　of　another。







I；　therefore；　recognize　only　three　primitive　or　primary　emotions



（as　I　said　in　the　note　to　III。　xi。）；　namely；　pleasure；　pain；　and



desire。　　I　have　spoken　of　wonder　simply　because　it　is　customary



to　speak　of　certain　emotions　springing　from　the　three　primitive



ones　by　different　names；　when　they　are　referred　to　the　objects



of　our　wonder。　　I　am　led　by　the　same　motive　to　add　a　definition



of　contempt。







V。　〃Contempt〃　is　the　conception　of　anything　which　touches



the　mind　so　little；　that　its　presence　leads　the　mind　to　imagine



those　qualities　which　are　not　in　it　rather　than　such　as　are　in　it



（cf。　III。　lii。　note）。







The　definitions　of　veneration　and　scorn　I　here　pass　over；　for



I　am　not　aware　that　any　emotions　are　named　after　them。







VI。　〃Love〃　is　pleasure；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external



cause。







^^^^^ExplanationThis　definition　explains　sufficiently　clearly



the　essence　of　love；　the　definition　given　by　those　authors　who



say　that　love　is　〃the　lover's　wish　to　unite　himself　to　the　loved



object〃　expresses　a　property；　but　not　the　essence　of　love；　and；



as　such　authors　have　not　sufficiently　discerned　love's　essence；



they　have　been　unable　to　acquire　a　true　conception　of　its



properties；　accordingly　their　definition　is　on　all　hands　admitted



to　be　very　obscure。　　It　must；　however；　be　noted；　that　when　I



say　that　it　is　a　property　of　love；　that　the　lover　should　wish　to



unite　himself　to　the　beloved　object；　I　do　not　here　mean　by



〃wish〃　consent；　or　conclusion；　or　a　free　decision　of　the　mind



（for　I　have　shown　such；　in　II。　xlviii。；　to　be　fictitious）；　neither



do　I　mean　a　desire　of　being　united　to　the　loved　object　when



it　is　absent；　or　of　continuing　in　its　presence　when　it　is　at　hand；



for　love　can　be　conceived　without　either　of　these　desires；　but



by　〃wish〃　I　mean　the　contentment；　which　is　in　the　lover；　on



account　of　the　presence　of　the　beloved　object；　whereby　the



pleasure　of　the　lover　is　strengthened；　or　at　least　maintained。







VII。　　〃Hatred〃　is　pain；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external



cause。







^^^^^ExplanationThese　observations　are　easily　grasped



after　what　has　been　said　in　the　explanation　of　the　preceding



definition　（cf。　also　III。　xiii。　note）。







VIII。　〃Inclination〃　is　pleasure；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of