the ethics(part iii)-第13部分

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definition　（cf。　also　III。　xiii。　note）。







VIII。　〃Inclination〃　is　pleasure；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of



something　which　is　accidentally　a　cause　of　pleasure。







IX。　〃Aversion〃　is　pain；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　something



which　is　accidentally　the　cause　of　pain　（cf。　III。　xv。　note）。







X。　〃Devotion〃　is　love　towards　one　whom　we　admire。







^^^^^ExplanationWonder　（admiratio）　arises　（as　we　have



shown；　III。　lii。）　from　the　novelty　of　a　thing。　　If；　therefore；　it



happens　that　the　object　of　our　wonder　is　often　conceived



by　us；　we　shall　cease　to　wonder　at　it；　thus　we　see；　that　the



emotion　of　devotion　readily　degenerates　into　simple　love。







XI。　〃Derision〃　is　pleasure　arising　from　our　conceiving　the



presence　of　a　quality；　which　we　despise；　in　an　object　which



we　hate。







^^^^^ExplanationIn　so　far　as　we　despise　a　thing　which　we



hate；　we　deny　existence　thereof　（III。　lii。　note）；　and　to　that



extent　rejoice　（III。　xx。）。　　But　since　we　assume　that　man　hates



that　which　he　derides；　it　follows　that　the　pleasure　in　question



is　not　without　alloy　（cf。　III。　xlvii。　note）。







XII。　〃Hope〃　is　an　inconstant　pleasure；　arising　from　the　idea



of　something　past　or　future；　whereof　we　to　a　certain　extent



doubt　the　issue。







XIII。　〃Fear〃　is　an　inconstant　pain　arising　from　the　idea　of



something　past　or　future；　whereof　we　to　a　certain　extent



doubt　the　issue　（cf。　III。　xviii。　note）。







^^^^^ExplanationFrom　these　definitions　it　follows；　that



there　is　no　hope　unmingled　with　fear；　and　no　fear　unmingled



with　hope。　　For　he；　who　depends　on　hope　and　doubts



concerning　the　issue　of　anything；　is　assumed　to　conceive



something；　which　excludes　the　existence　of　the　said　thing



in　the　future；　therefore　he；　to　this　extent；　feels　pain　（cf。　III。



xix。）；　consequently；　while　dependent　on　hope；　he　fears



for　the　issue。　　Contrariwise　he；　who　fears；　in　other　words



doubts；　concerning　the　issue　of　something　which　he　hates；



also　conceives　something　which　excludes　the　existence　of



the　thing　in　question；　to　this　extent　he　feels　pleasure；　and



consequently　to　this　extent　he　hopes　that　it　will　turn　out　as



he　desires　（III。　xx。）。







XIV。　　〃Confidence〃　is　pleasure　arising　from　the　idea　of



something　past　or　future；　wherefrom　all　cause　of　doubt　has



been　removed。







XV。　〃Despair〃　is　pain　arising　from　the　idea　of　something　past



or　future；　wherefrom　all　cause　of　doubt　has　been　removed。







^^^^^ExplanationThus　confidence　springs　from　hope；　and



despair　from　fear；　when　all　cause　for　doubt　as　to　the　issue



of　an　event　has　been　removed：　　this　comes　to　pass；　because



man　conceives　something　past　or　future　as　present　and



regards　it　as　such；　or　else　because　he　conceives　other　things；



which　exclude　the　existence　of　the　causes　of　his　doubt。　　For；



although　we　can　never　be　absolutely　certain　of　the　issue



of　any　particular　event　（II。　xxxi。　Cor。）；　it　may　nevertheless



happen　that　we　feel　no　doubt　concerning　it。　　For　we　have



shown；　that　to　feel　no　doubt　concerning　a　thing　is　not　the



same　as　to　be　quite　certain　of　it　（II。　xlix。　note）。　　Thus　it



may　happen　that　we　are　affected　by　the　same　emotion



of　pleasure　or　pain　concerning　a　thing　past　or　future；　as



concerning　the　conception　of　a　thing　present；　this　I　have



already　shown　in　III。　xviii。；　to　which；　with　its　note；　I　refer



the　reader。







XVI。　〃Joy〃　is　pleasure　accompanied　by　the　idea　of



something　past；　which　has　had　an　issue　beyond　our　hope。







XVII。　〃Disappointment〃　is　pain　accompanied　by　the　idea



of　something　past；　which　has　had　an　issue　contrary　to　our



hope。







XVIII。　〃Pity〃　is　pain　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　evil；　which



has　befallen　someone　else　whom　we　conceive　to　be　like



ourselves　（cf。　III。　xxii。　note；　and　III。　xxvii。　note）。







^^^^^ExplanationBetween　pity　and　sympathy　（misericordia）



there　seems　to　be　no　difference；　unless　perhaps　that　the　former



term　is　used　in　reference　to　a　particular　action；　and　the　latter



in　reference　to　a　disposition。







XIX。　〃Approval〃　is　love　towards　one　who　has　done　good　to



another。







XX。　〃Indignation〃　is　hatred　towards　one　who　has　done　evil　to



another。







^^^^^ExplanationI　am　aware　that　these　terms　are　employed



in　senses　somewhat　different　from　those　usually　assigned。　　But



my　purpose　is　to　explain；　not　the　meaning　of　words；　but　the



nature　of　things。　　I　therefore　make　use　of　such　terms；　as　may



convey　my　meaning　without　any　violent　departure　from　their



ordinary　signification。　　One　statement　of　my　method　will　suffice。



As　for　the　cause　of　the　above…named　emotions　see　III。　xxvii。



Cor。　i。；　and　III。　xxii。　note。







XXI。　〃Partiality〃　is　thinking　too　highly　of　anyone　because　of



the　love　we　bear　him。







^^^^^ExplanationThus　partiality　is　an　effect　of　love；　and



disparagement　an　effect　of　hatred：　　so　that　〃partiality〃　may



also　be　defined　as　〃love；　in　so　far　as　it　induces　a　man　to



think　too　highly　of　a　beloved　object。〃　　Contrariwise；



〃disparagement〃　may　be　defined　as　〃hatred；　in　so　far　as



it　induces　a　man　to　think　too　meanly　of　a　hated　object。〃



Cf。　III。　xxvi。　note。







XXIII。　〃Envy〃　is　hatred；　in　so　far　as　it　induces　a　man　to　be



pained　by　another's　good　fortune；　and　to　rejoice　in　another's



evil　fortune。







^^^^^ExplanationEnvy　is　generally　opposed　to　sympathy；



which；　by　doing　some　violence　to　the　meaning　of　the　word；



may　therefore　be　thus　defined：







XXIV。　〃Sympathy〃　（misericordia）　is　love；　in　so　far　as　it



induces　a　man　to　feel　pleasure　at　another's　good　fortune；



and　pain　at　another's　evil　fortune。







^^^^^ExplanationConcerning　envy　see　the　notes　to　II。



xxiv。　and　xxxii。　　These　emotions　also　arise　from　pleasure



or　pain　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　something　external；　as



cause　either　in　itself　or　accidentally。　　I　now　pass　on　to　other



emotions；　which　are　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　something



within　as　a　cause。







XXV。　〃Self…approval〃　is　pleasure　arising　from　a　man's



contemplation　of　himself　and　his　own　power　of　action。







XXVI。　〃Humility〃　is　pain　arising　from　a　man's　contemplation



of　his　own　weakness　of　body　or　mind。







^^^^^ExplanationSelf…complacency　is　opposed　to



humility；　in　so　far　as　we　thereby　mean　pleasure　arising　from



a　contemplation　of　our　own　power　of　action；　but；　in　so　far



as　we　mean　thereby　pleasure　accompanied　by　the　idea　of



any　action　which　we　believe　we　have　performed　by　the　free



decision　of　our　mind；　it　is　opposed　to　repentance；　which　we



may　thus　define：







XXVII。　〃Repentance〃　is　pain　accompanied　by　the　idea　of



some　action；　which　we　believe　we　have　performed　by　the



free　decision　of　our　mind。







^^^^^ExplanationThe　causes　of　these　emotions　we　have



set　forth　in　III。　li。　note；　and　in　III。　liii。；　liv。；　lv。　and　note。



Concerning　the　free　decision　of　the　mind　see　II。　xxxv。　note。



This　is　perhaps　the　place　to　call　attention　to　the　fact；　that　it　is



nothing　wonderful　that　all　those　actions；　which　are　commonly



called　〃wrong；〃　are　followed　by　pain；　and　all　those；　which　are



called　〃right；〃　are　followed　by　pleasure。　　We　can　easily　gather



from　what　has　been　said；　that　this　depends　in　great　measure



on　education。　　Parents；　by　reprobating　the　former　class　of



actions；　and　by　frequently　chiding　their　children　because　of



them；　and　also　by　persuading　to　and　praising　the　latter　class；



have　brought　it　about；　that　the　former　should　be　associated



with　pain　and　the　latter　with　pleasure。　　This　is　confirmed　by



experience。　　For　custom　and　religion　are　not　the　same



among　all　men；　but　that　which　some　consider　sacred　others



consider　profane；　and　what　some　consider　honourable　others



consider　disgraceful。　　According　as　each　man　has　been



educated；　he　feels　repentance　for　a　given　action　or　glories



therein。







XXVIII。　〃Pride〃　is　thinking　too　highly　of　one's　self　from



self…love。







^^^^^ExplanationThus　pride　is　different　from　partiality；



for　the　latter　term　is　used　in　reference　to　an　external　object；



but　pride　is　used　of　a　man　thinking　too　highly　of　himself。



However；　as　partiality　is　the　effect　of　love；　so　is　pride　the



effect　or　property　of　〃self…love；〃　which　may　therefore　be



thus　defined；　〃love　of　self　or　self…approval；　in　so　far　as　it



leads　a　man　to　think　too　highly　of　himself。〃　　To　this　emotion



there　is　no　contrary。　　For　no　one　thinks　too　meanly　of



himself　because　of　self…hatred；　I　say　that　no　one　thinks　too



meanly　of　himself；　in　so　far　as　he　conceives　that　he　is



incapable　of　doing　this　or　that。　　For　whatsoever　a　man



imagines　that　he　is　incapable　of　doing；　he　imagines　this　of



necessity；　and　by　that　notion　he　is　so　disposed；　that　he



really　cannot　do　that　which　he　conceives　that　he　cannot　do。



For；　so　long　as　he　conceives　that　he　cannot　do　it；　so　long



is　he　not　determined　to　do　it；　and　consequently　so　long　is



it　impossible　for　him　to　do　it。　　However；　if　we　consider



such　matters　as　only　depend　on　opinion；　we　shall　find　it



conceivable　that　a　man　may　think　too　meanly　of　himself；



for　it　may　happen；　that　a　man；　sorrowfully　regarding　his



own　weakness；　should　imagine　that　he　is　despised　by　all



men；　while　the　rest　of　the　world　are　thinking　of　nothing　less



than　of　despising　him。　　Again；　a　man　may　think　too　meanly



of　himself；　if　he　deny　of　himself　in　the　present　something



in　relation　to　a　future　time　of　which　he　is　uncer