the ethics(part iii)-第2部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！



a　variety　of　actions　depending　solely　on　the　mind's　will



or　the　exercise　of　thought。　　However；　no　one　has　hitherto



laid　down　the　limits　to　the　powers　of　the　body；　that　is；　no



one　has　as　yet　been　taught　by　experience　what　the　body



can　accomplish　solely　by　the　laws　of　nature；　in　so　far　as



she　is　regarded　as　extension。　　No　one　hitherto　has　gained



such　an　accurate　knowledge　of　the　bodily　mechanism；　that



he　can　explain　all　its　functions；　nor　need　I　call　attention



to　the　fact　that　many　actions　are　observed　in　the　lower



animals；　which　far　transcend　human　sagacity；　and



that　somnambulists　do　many　things　in　their　sleep；　which



they　would　not　venture　to　do　when　awake：　　these　instances



are　enough　to　show；　that　the　body　can　by　the　sole　laws



of　its　nature　do　many　things　which　the　mind　wonders　at。







Again；　no　one　knows　how　or　by　what　means　the　mind



moves　the　body；　nor　how　many　various　degrees　of　motion



it　can　impart　to　the　body；　nor　how　quickly　it　can　move　it。



Thus；　when　men　say　that　this　or　that　physical　action　has



its　origin　in　the　mind；　which　latter　has　dominion　over　the



body；　they　are　using　words　without　meaning；　or　are



confessing　in　specious　phraseology　that　they　are　ignorant



of　the　cause　of　the　said　action；　and　do　not　wonder　at　it。







But；　they　will　say；　whether　we　know　or　do　not　know　the



means　whereby　the　mind　acts　on　the　body；　we　have；　at



any　rate；　experience　of　the　fact　that　unless　the　human　mind



is　in　a　fit　state　to　think；　the　body　remains　inert。　　Moreover；



we　have　experience；　that　the　mind　alone　can　determine



whether　we　speak　or　are　silent；　and　a　variety　of　similar



states　which；　accordingly；　we　say　depend　on　the　mind's



decree。　　But；　as　to　the　first　point；　I　ask　such　objectors；



whether　experience　does　not　also　teach；　that　if　the　body



be　inactive　the　mind　is　simultaneously　unfitted　for



thinking？　　For　when　the　body　is　at　rest　in　sleep；　the　mind



simultaneously　is　in　a　state　of　torpor　also；　and　has　no



power　of　thinking；　such　as　it　possesses　when　the　body



is　awake。　　Again；　I　think　everyone's　experience　will



confirm　the　statement；　that　the　mind　is　not　at　all　times



equally　fit　for　thinking　on　a　given　subject；　but　according



as　the　body　is　more　or　less　fitted　for　being　stimulated　by



the　image　of　this　or　that　object；　so　also　is　the　mind　more



or　less　fitted　for　contemplating　the　said　object。







But；　it　will　be　urged；　it　is　impossible　that　solely　from



the　laws　of　nature　considered　as　extended　substance；



we　should　be　able　to　deduce　the　causes　of　buildings；



pictures；　and　things　of　that　kind；　which　are　produced



only　by　human　art；　nor　would　the　human　body；　unless



it　were　determined　and　led　by　the　mind；　be　capable　of



building　a　single　temple。　　However；　I　have　just　pointed



out　that　the　objectors　cannot　fix　the　limits　of　the　body's



power；　or　say　what　can　be　concluded　from　a　consideration



of　its　sole　nature；　whereas　they　have　experience　of　many



things　being　accomplished　solely　by　the　laws　of　nature；



which　they　would　never　have　believed　possible　except



under　the　direction　of　mind：　　such　are　the　actions　performed



by　somnambulists　while　asleep；　and　wondered　at　by　their



performers　when　awake。　　I　would　further　call　attention



to　the　mechanism　of　the　human　body；　which　far　surpasses



in　complexity　all　that　has　been　put　together　by　human　art；



not　to　repeat　what　I　have　already　shown；　namely；　that



from　nature；　under　whatever　attribute　she　be　considered；



infinite　results　follow。　　As　for　the　second　objection；　I



submit　that　the　world　would　be　much　happier；　if　men　were



as　fully　able　to　keep　silence　as　they　are　to　speak。



Experience　abundantly　shows　that　men　can　govern　anything



more　easily　than　their　tongues；　and　restrain　anything　more



easily　than　their　appetites；　when　it　comes　about　that　many



　believe；　that　we　are　only　free　in　respect　to　objects　which



we　moderately　desire；　because　our　desire　for　such　can



easily　be　controlled　by　the　thought　of　something　else



frequently　remembered；　but　that　we　are　by　no　means　free



in　respect　to　what　we　seek　with　violent　emotion；　for　our



desire　cannot　then　be　allayed　with　the　remembrance　of



anything　else。　　However；　unless　such　persons　had　proved



by　experience　that　we　do　many　things　which　we　afterwards



repent　of；　and　again　that　we　often；　when　assailed　by　contrary



emotions；　see　the　better　and　follow　the　worse；　there　would



be　nothing　to　prevent　their　believing　that　we　are　free　in　all



things。　　Thus　an　infant　believes　that　of　its　own　free　will　it



desires　milk；　an　angry　child　believes　that　it　freely　desires



to　run　away；　further；　a　drunken　man　believes　that　he　utters



from　the　free　decision　of　his　mind　words　which；　when　he



is　sober；　he　would　willingly　have　withheld：　　thus；　too；　a



delirious　man；　a　garrulous　woman；　a　child；　and　others



of　like　complexion；　believe　that　they　speak　from　the　free



decision　of　their　mind；　when　they　are　in　reality　unable　to



restrain　their　impulse　to　talk。　　Experience　teaches　us　no



less　clearly　than　reason；　that　men　believe　themselves　to　be



free；　simply　because　they　are　conscious　of　their　actions；



and　unconscious　of　the　causes　whereby　those　actions　are



determined；　and；　further；　it　is　plain　that　the　dictates　of　the



mind　are　but　another　name　for　the　appetites；　and　therefore



vary　according　to　the　varying　state　of　the　body。　　Everyone



shapes　his　actions　according　to　his　emotion；　those　who　are



assailed　by　conflicting　emotions　know　not　what　they　wish；



those　who　are　not　attacked　by　any　emotion　are　readily　swayed



this　way　or　that。　　All　these　considerations　clearly　show　that



a　mental　decision　and　a　bodily　appetite；　or　determined　state；



are　simultaneous；　or　rather　are　one　and　the　same　thing；　which



we　call　decision；　when　it　is　regarded　under　and　explained



through　the　attribute　of　thought；　and　a　conditioned　state；　when



it　is　regarded　under　the　attribute　of　extension；　and　deduced



from　the　laws　of　motion　and　rest。　　This　will　appear　yet　more



plainly　in　the　sequel。　　For　the　present　I　wish　to　call　attention



to　another　point；　namely；　that　we　cannot　act　by　the　decision



of　the　mind；　unless　we　have　a　remembrance　of　having　done



so。　　For　instance；　we　cannot　say　a　word　without　remembering



that　we　have　done　so。　　Again；　it　is　not　within　the　free　power



of　the　mind　to　remember　or　forget　a　thing　at　will。　　Therefore



the　freedom　of　the　mind　must　in　any　case　be　limited　to　the



power　of　uttering　or　not　uttering　something　which　it　remembers。



But　when　we　dream　that　we　speak；　we　believe　that　we　speak



from　a　free　decision　of　the　mind；　yet　we　do　not　speak；　or；　if　we



do；　it　is　by　a　spontaneous　motion　of　the　body。　　Again；　we



dream　that　we　are　concealing　something；　and　we　seem　to　act



from　the　same　decision　of　the　mind　as　that；　whereby　we　keep



silence　when　awake　concerning　something　we　know。　　Lastly；



we　dream　that　from　the　free　decision　of　our　mind　we　do



something；　which　we　should　not　dare　to　do　when　awake。







Now　I　should　like　to　know　whether　there　be　in　the　mind　two



sorts　of　decisions；　one　sort　illusive；　and　the　other　sort　free？



If　our　folly　does　not　carry　us　so　far　as　this；　we　must　necessarily



admit；　that　the　decision　of　the　mind；　which　is　believed　to　be



free；　is　not　distinguishable　from　the　imagination　or　memory；



and　is　nothing　more　than　the　affirmation；　which　an　idea；　by



virtue　of　being　an　idea；　necessarily　involves　（II。　xlix。）。



Wherefore　these　decisions　of　the　mind　arise　in　the　mind　by



the　same　necessity；　as　the　ideas　of　things　actually　existing。



Therefore　those　who　believe；　that　they　speak　or　keep　silence



or　act　in　any　way　from　the　free　decision　of　their　mind；　do



but　dream　with　their　eyes　open。







III。　The　activities　of　the　mind　arise　solely　from　adequate



ideas；　the　passive　states　of　the　mind　depend　solely



on　inadequate　ideas。







》》》》》ProofThe　first　element；　which　constitutes　the　essence



of　the　mind；　is　nothing　else　but　the　idea　of　the　actually　existent



body　（II。　xi。　and　xiii。）；　which　（II。　xv。）　is　compounded　of　many



other　ideas；　whereof　some　are　adequate　and　some　inadequate



（II。　xxix。　Cor。；　II。　xxxviii。　Cor。）。　　Whatsoever　therefore　follows



from　the　nature　of　mind；　and　has　mind　for　its　proximate　cause；



through　which　it　must　be　understood；　must　necessarily　follow



either　from　an　adequate　or　from　an　inadequate　idea。　　But　in



so　far　as　the　mind　（III。　i。）　has　inadequate　ideas；　it　is　necessarily



passive：　　wherefore　the　activities　of　the　mind　follow　solely　from



adequate　ideas；　and　accordingly　the　mind　is　only　passive　in　so



far　as　it　has　inadequate　ideas。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteThus　we　see；　that　passive　states　are　not



attributed　to　the　mind；　except　in　so　far　as　it　contains　something



involving　negation；　or　in　so　far　as　it　is　regarded　as　a　part　of



nature；　which　cannot　be　clearly　and　distinctly　perceived



through　itself　without　other　parts：　　I　could　thus　show；　that



passive　states　are　attributed　to　individual　things　in　the　same



way　that　they　are　attributed　to　the　mind；　and　that　they　cannot



otherwise　be　perceived；　but　my　purpose　is　solely　to　treat



of　the　human　mind。







IV。　Nothing　can　be　destroyed；　except　by　a　cause　external　to



itself。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　is　self…evident；　for　the



definition　of　anything　affirms　the　essence　of　that　thing；　but



does　not　negative　it；　in　other　words；　it　postulates　the　essence



of　the　thing；　but　does　not　take　it　away。　　S