the ethics(part iii)-第5部分

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something　concerning　which　we　have　hoped　or　feared。〃　　Again；



〃Joy〃　is　〃Pleasure　arising　from　the　image　of　something　past　whereof



we　have　doubted　the　issue。〃　　〃Disappointment〃　is　〃the　Pain　opposed



to　Joy。〃







XIX。　He　who　conceives　that　the　object　of　his　love　is　destroyed



will　feel　pain；　if　he　conceives　that　it　is　preserved　he　will　feel　pleasure。







》》》》》ProofThe　mind；　as　far　as　possible；　endeavours　to



conceive　those　things　which　increase　or　help　the　body's　power



of　activity　（III。　xii。）；　in　other　words　（III。　xii。　note）；　those　things



which　it　loves。　　But　conception　is　helped　by　those　things　which



postulate　the　existence　of　a　thing；　and　contrariwise　is　hindered



by　those　which　exclude　the　existence　of　a　thing　（II。　xvii。）；



therefore　the　images　of　things；　which　postulate　the　existence



of　an　object　of　love；　help　the　mind's　endeavour　to　conceive



the　object　of　love；　in　other　words　（III。　xi。　note）；　affect　the　mind



pleasurably；　contrariwise　those　things；　which　exclude　the　existence



of　an　object　of　love；　hinder　the　aforesaid　mental　endeavour；　in



other　words；　affect　the　mind　painfully。　　He；　therefore；　who



conceives　that　the　object　of　his　love　is　destroyed　will　feel　pain；



&c。　　Q。E。D。







XX。　He　who　conceives　that　the　object　of　his　hate　is　destroyed　will



also　feel　pleasure。







》》》》》ProofThe　mind　（III。　xiii。）　endeavours　to　conceive　those



things；　which　exclude　the　existence　of　things　whereby　the　body's



power　of　activity　is　diminished　or　constrained；　that　is　（III。　xiii。



note）；　it　endeavours　to　conceive　such　things　as　exclude　the



existence　of　what　it　hates；　therefore　the　image　of　a　thing；　which



excludes　the　existence　of　what　the　mind　hates；　helps　the　aforesaid



mental　effort；　in　other　words　（III。　xi。　note）；　affects　the　mind



pleasurably。　　Thus　he　who　conceives　that　the　object　of　his　hate



is　destroyed　will　feel　pleasure。　　Q。E。D。







XXI。　He　who　conceives；　that　the　object　of　his　love　is　affected



pleasurably　or　painfully；　will　himself　be　affected　pleasurably　or



painfully；　and　the　one　or　the　other　emotion　will　be　greater　or　less



in　the　lover　according　as　it　is　greater　or　less　in　the　thing　loved。







》》》》》ProofThe　images　of　things　（as　we　showed　in　III。　xix。）



which　postulate　the　existence　of　the　object　of　love；　help　the



mind's　endeavour　to　conceive　the　said　object。　　But　pleasure



postulates　the　existence　of　something　feeling　pleasure；　so　much



the　more　in　proportion　as　the　emotion　of　pleasure　is　greater；



for　it　is　（III。　xi。　note）　a　transition　to　a　greater　perfection；　therefore



the　image　of　pleasure　in　the　object　of　love　helps　the　mental



endeavour　of　the　lover；　that　is；　it　affects　the　lover　pleasurably；



and　so　much　the　more；　in　proportion　as　this　emotion　may　have



been　greater　in　the　object　of　love。　　This　was　our　first　point。



Further；　in　so　far　as　a　thing　is　affected　with　pain；　it　is　to　that



extent　destroyed；　the　extent　being　in　proportion　to　the　amount



of　pain　（III。　xi。　note）；　therefore　（III。　xix。）　he　who　conceives；



that　the　object　of　his　love　is　affected　painfully；　will　himself　be



affected　painfully；　in　proportion　as　the　said　emotion　is　greater



or　less　in　the　object　of　love。　　Q。E。D。







XXII。　If　we　conceive　that　anything　pleasurably　affects　some



object　of　our　love；　we　shall　be　affected　with　love　towards　that



thing。　　Contrariwise；　if　we　conceive　that　it　affects　an　object　of



our　love　painfully；　we　shall　be　affected　with　hatred　towards　it。







》》》》》ProofHe；　who　affects　pleasurably　or　painfully　the　object



of　our　love；　affects　us　also　pleasurably　or　painfullythat　is；　if　we



conceive　the　loved　object　as　affected　with　the　said　pleasure



or　pain　（III。　xxi。）。　But　this　pleasure　or　pain　is　postulated　to　come



to　us　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external　cause；　therefore



（III。　xiii。　note）；　if　we　conceive　that　anyone　affects　an　object　of



our　love　pleasurably　or　painfully；　we　shall　be　affected　with　love



or　hatred　towards　him。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteProp。　xxi。　explains　to　us　the　nature　of　'Pity；'　which



we　may　define　as　'pain　arising　from　another's　hurt。'　　What　term



we　can　use　for　pleasure　arising　from　another's　gain；　I　know　not。







We　will　call　the　'love　towards　him　who　confers　a　benefit　on



another；'　'Approval；'　and　the　'hatred　towards　him　who　injures



another；'　we　will　call　'Indignation。'　　We　must　further　remark；



that　we　not　only　feel　pity　for　a　thing　which　we　have　loved　（as



shown　in　III。　xxi。）；　but　also　for　a　thing　which　we　have　hitherto



regarded　without　emotion；　provided　that　we　deem　that　it　resembles



ourselves　（as　I　will　show　presently）。　　Thus；　we　bestow　approval



on　one　who　has　benefited　anything　resembling　ourselves；　and；



contrariwise；　are　indignant　with　him　who　has　done　it　an　injury。







XXIII。　He　who　conceives；　that　an　object　of　his　hatred　is　painfully



affected；　will　feel　pleasure。　　Contrariwise；　if　he　thinks　that　the　said



object　is　pleasurably　affected；　he　will　feel　pain。　　Each　of　these



emotions　will　be　greater　or　less；　according　as　its　contrary　is　greater



or　less　in　the　object　of　hatred。







》》》》》ProofIn　so　far　as　an　object　of　hatred　is　painfully　affected；



it　is　destroyed；　to　an　extent　proportioned　to　the　strength　of　the



pain　（III。　xi。　note）。　　Therefore；　he　（III。　xx。）　who　conceives；　that



some　object　of　his　hatred　is　painfully　affected；　will　feel　pleasure；



to　an　extent　proportioned　to　the　amount　of　pain　he　conceives



in　the　object　of　his　hatred。　　This　was　our　first　point。　　Again；



pleasure　postulates　the　existence　of　the　pleasurably　affected



thing　（III。　xi。　note）；　in　proportion　as　the　pleasure　is　greater　or



less。　　If　anyone　imagines　that　an　object　of　his　hatred　is　pleasurably



affected；　this　conception　（III。　xiii。）　will　hinder　his　own　endeavour



to　persist；　in　other　words　（III。　xi。　note）；　he　who　hates　will　be



painfully　affected。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteThis　pleasure　can　scarcely　be　felt　unalloyed；　and



without　any　mental　conflict。　　For　（as　I　am　about　to　show　in　Prop。



xxvii。）；　in　so　far　as　a　man　conceives　that　something　similar　to



himself　is　affected　by　pain；　he　will　himself　be　affected　in　like



manner；　and　he　will　have　the　contrary　emotion　in　contrary



circumstances。　　But　here　we　are　regarding　hatred　only。







XXIV。　If　we　conceive　that　anyone　pleasurably　affects　an　object



of　our　hate；　we　shall　feel　hatred　towards　him　also。　　If　we



conceive　that　he　painfully　affects　that　said　object；　we　shall　feel



love　towards　him。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　is　proved　in　the　same　way　as　III。



xxii。；　which　see。







*****NoteThese　and　similar　emotions　of　hatred　are　attributable



to　'envy；'　which；　accordingly；　is　nothing　else　but　'hatred；　in　so　far



as　it　is　regarded　as　disposing　a　man　to　rejoice　in　another's　hurt；



and　to　grieve　at　another's　advantage。'







XXV。　We　endeavour　to　affirm；　concerning　ourselves；　and



concerning　what　we　love；　everything　that　we　can　conceive



to　affect　pleasurably　ourselves；　or　the　loved　object。



Contrariwise；　we　endeavour　to　negative　everything；　which



we　conceive　to　affect　painfully　ourselves　or　the　loved　object。







》》》》》ProofThat；　which　we　conceive　to　affect　an　object



of　our　love　pleasurably　or　painfully；　affects　us　also　pleasurably



or　painfully　（III。　xxi。）。　　But　the　mind　（III。　xii。）　endeavours；　as



far　as　possible；　to　conceive　those　things　which　affect　us



pleasurably；　in　other　words　（II。　xvii。　and　Cor。）；　it　endeavours



to　regard　them　as　present。　　And；　contrariwise　（III。　xiii。）；　it



endeavours　to　exclude　the　existence　of　such　things　as　affect



us　painfully；　therefore；　we　endeavour　to　affirm　concerning



ourselves；　and　concerning　the　loved　object；　whatever　we



conceive　to　affect　ourselves；　or　the　love　object　pleasurably。



Q。E。D。







XXVI。　We　endeavour　to　affirm；　concerning　that　which　we　hate；



everything　which　we　conceive　to　affect　it　painfully；　and；



contrariwise；　we　endeavour　to　deny；　concerning　it；　everything



which　we　conceive　to　affect　it　pleasurably。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　follows　from　III。　xxiii。；　as　the



foregoing　proposition　followed　from　III。　xxi。







*****NoteThus　we　see　that　it　may　readily　happen；　that　a



man　may　easily　think　too　highly　of　himself；　or　a　loved　object；



and；　contrariwise；　too　meanly　of　a　hated　object。　　This　feeling



is　called　'pride；'　in　reference　to　the　man　who　thinks　too　highly



of　himself；　and　is　a　species　of　madness；　wherein　a　man　dreams



with　his　eyes　open；　thinking　that　he　can　accomplish　all　things



that　fall　within　the　scope　of　his　conception；　and　thereupon



accounting　them　real；　and　exulting　in　them；　so　long　as　he　is



unable　to　conceive　anything　which　excludes　their　existence；



and　determines　his　own　power　of　action。　　'Pride；'　therefore；



is　'pleasure　springing　from　a　man　thinking　too　highly　of　himself。'



Again；　the　'pleasure　which　arises　from　a　man　thinking　too



highly　of　another'　is　called　'over…esteem。'　　Whereas　the



'pleasure　which　arises　from　thinking　too　little　of　a　man'　is



called　'disdain。'







XXVII。　By　the　very　fact　that　we　conceive　a　thing；　which　is　like



ourselves；　and　which　we　have　not　regarded　with　any　emotion；



to　be　affected　with　any　emotion；　we　are　ourselves　affected　with



a　like　emotion　（affectus）。







》》》》》ProofThe　images　of　things　are　modifications　of　the



human　body；　whereof　the　ideas　represent　external　bodies　as



present　to　us　（II。　xvii。）；　in　other　words　（II。　x。）；　whereof　the



ideas　involve　the　nature　of　our　body；　a