the ethics(part iii)-第6部分

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ideas　involve　the　nature　of　our　body；　and；　at　the　same　time；



the　nature　of　the　external　bodies　as　present。　　If；　therefore；



the　nature　of　the　external　body　be　similar　to　the　nature　of　our



body；　then　the　idea　which　we　form　of　the　external　body　will



involve　a　modification　of　our　own　body　similar　to　the



modification　of　the　external　body。　　Consequently；　if　we



conceive　anyone　similar　to　ourselves　as　affected　by　any



emotion；　this　conception　will　express　a　modification　of　our



body　similar　to　that　emotion。　　Thus；　from　the　fact　of



conceiving　a　thing　like　ourselves　to　be　affected　with　any



emotion；　we　are　ourselves　affected　with　a　like　emotion。



If；　however；　we　hate　the　said　thing　like　ourselves；　we　shall；



to　that　extent；　be　affected　by　a　contrary；　and　not　similar；



emotion。　　Q。E。D。







*****Note　IThis　imitation　of　emotions；　when　it　is　referred



to　pain；　is　called　〃compassion〃　（cf。　III。　xxii。　note）；　when　it　is



referred　to　desire；　it　is　called　〃emulation；〃　which　is　nothing



else　but　〃the　desire　of　anything；　engendered　in　us　by　the　fact



that　we　conceive　that　others　have　the　like　desire。〃







ProofThis　is　proved　from　the　last　proposition　in　the



same　manner　as　III。　xxii。　is　proved　from　III。　xxi。







ProofIf　we　could　hate　it　for　this　reason；　we　should



rejoice　in　its　pain；　which　is　contrary　to　the　hypothesis。







ProofThat；　which　painfully　affects　the　object　of



our　pity；　affects　us　also　with　similar　pain　（by　the　foregoing



proposition）；　therefore；　we　shall　endeavour　to　recall



everything　which　removes　its　existence；　or　which　destroys



it　（cf。　III。　xiii。）；　in　other　words　（III。　ix。　note）；　we　shall　desire



to　destroy　it；　or　we　shall　be　determined　for　its　destruction；



thus；　we　shall　endeavour　to　free　from　misery　a　thing　which



we　pity。　　Q。E。D。







*****Note　IIThis　will　or　appetite　for　doing　good；　which



arises　from　pity　of　the　thing　whereon　we　would　confer　a



benefit；　is　called　〃benevolence；〃　and　is　nothing　else　but　〃desire



arising　from　compassion。〃　　Concerning　love　or　hate　towards



him　who　has　done　good　or　harm　to　something；　which　we



conceive　to　be　like　ourselves；　see　III。　xxii。　note。







XXVIII。　We　endeavour　to　bring　about　whatsoever　we



conceive　to　conduce　to　pleasure；　but　we　endeavour　to



remove　or　destroy　whatsoever　we　conceive　to　be　truly



repugnant　thereto；　or　to　conduce　to　pain。







》》》》》ProofWe　endeavour；　as　far　as　possible；　to　conceive



that　which　we　imagine　to　conduce　to　pleasure　（III。　xii。）；　in



other　words　（II。　xvii。）　we　shall　endeavour　to　conceive　it　as　far



as　possible　as　present　or　actually　existing。　　But　the　endeavour



of　the　mind；　or　the　mind's　power　of　thought；　is　equal　to；　and



simultaneous　with；　the　endeavour　of　the　body；　or　the　body's





power　of　action。　　（This　is　clear　from　II。　vii。　Cor。　and　II。　xi。



Cor。）。　　Therefore　we　make　an　absolute　endeavour　for　its



existence；　in　other　words　（which　by　III。　ix。；　note；　come　to　the



same　thing）　we　desire　and　strive　for　it；　this　was　our　first　point。



Again；　if　we　conceive　that　something；　which　we　believed　to



be　the　cause　of　pain；　that　is　（III。　xiii。　note）；　which　we　hate；



is　destroyed；　we　shall　rejoice　（III。　xx。）。　　We　shall；　therefore



（by　the　first　part　of　this　proof）；　endeavour　to　destroy　the



same；　or　（III。　xiii。）　to　remove　it　from　us；　so　that　we　may　not



regard　it　as　present；　this　was　our　second　point。　　Wherefore



whatsoever　conduces　to　pleasure；　&c。　　Q。E。D。







XXIX。　We　shall　also　endeavour　to　do　whatsoever　we



conceive　men*　to　regard　with　pleasure；　and　contrariwise　we



shall　shrink　from　doing　that　which　we　conceive　men　to　shrink



from。







＇*N。B。　By　〃men〃　in　this　and　the　following　propositions；　I



mean　men　whom　we　regard　without　any　particular　emotion。＇







》》》》》ProofFrom　the　fact　of　imagining；　that　men　love　or



hate　anything；　we　shall　love　or　hate　the　same　thing　（III。　xxvii。）。



That　is　（III。　xiii。　note）；　from　this　mere　fact　we　shall　feel　pleasure



or　pain　at　the　thing's　presence。　　And　so　we　shall　endeavour　to



do　whatsoever　we　conceive　men　to　love　or　regard　with　pleasure；



etc。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteThis　endeavour　to　do　a　thing　or　leave　it　undone；



solely　in　order　to　please　men；　we　call　〃ambition；〃　especially



when　we　so　eagerly　endeavour　to　please　the　vulgar；　that　we



do　or　omit　certain　things　to　our　own　or　another's　hurt：　　in　other



cases　it　is　generally　called　〃kindliness。〃　　Furthermore　I　give　the



name　of　〃praise〃　to　the　〃pleasure；　with　which　we　conceive　the



action　of　another；　whereby　he　has　endeavoured　to　please　us〃；



but　of　〃blame〃　to　the　〃pain　wherewith　we　feel　aversion　to　his



action。〃







XXX。　If　anyone　has　done　something　which　he　conceives



as　affecting　other　men　pleasurably；　he　will　be　affected　by



pleasure；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　himself　as　cause；　in



other　words；　he　will　regard　himself　with　pleasure。　　On　the



other　hand；　if　he　has　done　anything　which　he　conceives　as



affecting　others　painfully；　he　will　regard　himself　with　pain。







》》》》》ProofHe　who　conceives；　that　he　affects　others



with　pleasure　or　pain；　will；　by　that　very　fact；　himself　be



affected　with　pleasure　or　pain　（III。　xxvii。）；　but；　as　a　man　（II。



xix。　and　xxiii。）　is　conscious　of　himself　through　the　modifications



whereby　he　is　determined　to　action；　it　follows　that　he　who



conceives；　that　he　affects　others　pleasurably；　will　be　affected



with　pleasure　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　himself　as　cause；　in



other　words；　he　will　regard　himself　with　pleasure。　　And　so



〃mutatis　mutandis〃　in　the　case　of　pain。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteAs　love　（III。　xiii。）　is　pleasure　accompanied　by



the　idea　of　an　external　cause；　and　hatred　is　pain　accompanied



by　the　idea　of　an　external　cause；　the　pleasure　and　pain　in



question　will　be　a　species　of　love　and　hatred。　　But；　as　the　terms



love　and　hatred　are　used　in　reference　to　external　objects；　we



will　employ　other　names　for　the　emotions　now　under　discussion：



pleasure　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external　cause　we　will



style　〃Honour；〃　and　the　emotion　contrary　thereto　we　will　style



〃Shame〃：　　I　mean　in　such　cases　as　where　pleasure　or　pain



arises　from　a　man's　belief；　that　he　is　being　praised　or　blamed：



otherwise　pleasure　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external



cause　is　called　〃self…complacency；〃　and　its　contrary　pain　is



called　〃repentance。〃　　Again；　as　it　may　happen　（II。　xvii。　Cor。）



that　the　pleasure；　wherewith　a　man　conceives　that　he　affects



others；　may　exist　solely　in　his　own　imagination；　and　as　（III。



xxv。）　everyone　endeavours　to　conceive　concerning　himself



that　which　he　conceives　will　affect　him　with　pleasure；　it　may



easily　come　to　pass　that　a　vain　man　may　be　proud　and　may



imagine　that　he　is　pleasing　to　all；　when　in　reality　he　may　be



an　annoyance　to　all。







XXXI。　If　we　conceive　that　anyone　loves；　desires；　or　hates



anything　which　we　ourselves　love；　desire；　or　hate；　we　shall



thereupon　regard　the　thing　in　question　with　more　steadfast



love；　&c。　　On　the　contrary；　if　we　think　that　anyone　shrinks



from　something　that　we　love；　we　shall　undergo　vacillations



of　soul。







》》》》》ProofFrom　the　mere　fact　of　conceiving　that　anyone



loves　anything　we　shall　ourselves　love　that　thing　（III。　xxvii。）：



but　we　are　assumed　to　love　it　already；　there　is；　therefore；　a



new　cause　of　love；　whereby　our　former　emotion　is　fostered；



hence　we　shall　thereupon　love　it　more　steadfastly。　　Again；



from　the　mere　fact　of　conceiving　that　anyone　shrinks　from



anything；　we　shall　ourselves　shrink　from　that　thing　（III。　xxvii。）。



If　we　assume　that　we　at　the　same　time　love　it；　we　shall　then



simultaneously　love　it　and　shrink　from　it；　in　other　words；　we



shall　be　subject　to　vacillation　（III。　xvii。　note）。　　Q。E。D。