the ethics(part iii)-第9部分

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thereafter；　he　will　always　desire　to　hate　him。　　For　the　strength　of



love　is　in　proportion　to　the　strength　of　the　hatred；　wherefore　the



man　would　desire；　that　the　hatred　be　continually　increased　more



and　more；　and；　for　a　similar　reason；　he　would　desire　to　become



more　and　more　ill；　in　order　that　he　might　take　a　greater　pleasure



in　being　restored　to　health：　　in　such　a　case　he　would　always



endeavour　to　be　ill；　which　（III。　vi。）　is　absurd。







XLV。　　If　a　man　conceives；　that　anyone　similar　to　himself　hates



anything　also　similar　to　himself；　which　he　loves；　he　will　hate　that



person。







》》》》》ProofThe　beloved　object　feels　reciprocal　hatred　towards



him　who　hates　it　（III。　xl。）；　therefore　the　lover；　in　conceiving　that



anyone　hates　the　beloved　object；　conceives　the　beloved　thing　as



affected　by　hatred；　in　other　words　（III。　xiii。）；　by　pain；　consequently



he　is　himself　affected　by　pain　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　the



hater　of　the　beloved　thing　as　cause；　that　is；　he　will　hate　him　who



hates　anything　which　he　himself　loves　（III。　xiii。　note）。　Q。E。D。







XLVI。　If　a　man　has　been　affected　pleasurably　or　painfully　by



anyone；　of　a　class　or　nation　different　from　his　own；　and　if　the



pleasure　or　pain　has　been　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　the　said



stranger　as　cause；　under　the　general　category　of　the　class　or



nation：　　the　man　will　feel　love　or　hatred；　not　only　to　the　individual



stranger；　but　also　to　the　whole　class　or　nation　whereto　he　belongs。







》》》》》ProofThis　is　evident　from　III。　xvi。







XLVII。　Joy　arising　from　the　fact；　that　anything　we　hate　is



destroyed；　or　suffers　other　injury；　is　never　unaccompanied　by



a　certain　pain　in　us。







》》》》》ProofThis　is　evident　from　III。　xxvii。　　For　in　so　far　as



we　conceive　a　thing　similar　to　ourselves　to　be　affected　with　pain；



we　ourselves　feel　pain。







*****NoteThis　proposition　can　also　be　proved　from　the



Corollary　to　II。　xvii。　　Whenever　we　remember　anything；　even



if　it　does　not　actually　exist；　we　regard　it　only　as　present；　and



the　body　is　affected　in　the　same　manner；　wherefore；　in　so　far



as　the　remembrance　of　the　thing　is　strong；　a　man　is　determined



to　regard　it　with　pain；　this　determination；　while　the　image　of　the



thing　in　question　lasts；　is　indeed　checked　by　the　remembrance



of　other　things　excluding　the　existence　of　the　aforesaid　thing；



but　is　not　destroyed：　　hence；　a　man　only　feels　pleasure　in　so



far　as　the　said　determination　is　checked：　　for　this　reason　the



joy　arising　from　the　injury　done　to　what　we　hate　is　repeated；



every　time　we　remember　that　object　of　hatred。　　For；　as　we



have　said；　when　the　image　of　the　thing　in　question；　is　aroused；



inasmuch　as　it　involves　the　thing's　existence；　it　determines　the



man　to　regard　the　thing　with　the　same　pain　as　he　was　wont　to



do；　when　it　actually　did　exist。　　However；　since　he　has　joined



to　the　image　of　the　thing　other　images；　which　exclude　its



existence；　this　determination　to　pain　is　forthwith　checked；　and



the　man　rejoices　afresh　as　often　as　the　repetition　takes　place。



This　is　the　cause　of　men's　pleasure　in　recalling　past　evils；　and



delight　in　narrating　dangers　from　which　they　have　escaped。



For　when　men　conceive　a　danger；　they　conceive　it　as　still　future；



and　are　determined　to　fear　it；　this　determination　is　checked



afresh　by　the　idea　of　freedom；　which　became　associated　with



the　idea　of　the　danger　when　they　escaped　therefrom：



this　renders　them　secure　afresh：　　therefore　they　rejoice　afresh。







XLVIII。　Love　or　hatred　towards；　for　instance；　Peter　is　destroyed；



if　the　pleasure　involved　in　the　former；　or　the　pain　involved　in　the



latter　emotion；　be　associated　with　the　idea　of　another　cause：　　and



will　be　diminished　in　proportion　as　we　conceive　Peter　not　to　have



been　the　sole　cause　of　either　emotion。







》》》》》ProofThis　Prop。　is　evident　from　the　mere　definition



of　love　and　hatred　（III。　xiii。　note）。　　For　pleasure　is　called　love



towards　Peter；　and　pain　is　called　hatred　towards　Peter；　simply



in　so　far　as　Peter　is　regarded　as　the　cause　of　one　emotion　or　the



other。　　When　this　condition　of　causality　is　either　wholly　or　partly



removed；　the　emotion　towards　Peter　also　wholly　or　in　part



vanishes。　　Q。E。D。







XLIX。　　Love　or　hatred　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive



to　be　free；　must；　other　conditions　being　similar；　be　greater　than



if　it　were　felt　towards　a　thing　acting　by　necessity。







》》》》》ProofA　thing　which　we　conceive　as　free　must　（I。　Def。



vii。）　be　perceived　through　itself　without　anything　else。　　If；　therefore；



we　conceive　it　as　the　cause　of　pleasure　or　pain；　we　shall　therefore



（III。　xiii。　note）　love　it　or　hate　it；　and　shall　do　so　with　the　utmost



love　or　hatred　that　can　arise　from　the　given　emotion。　　But　if　the



thing　which　causes　the　emotion　be　conceived　as　acting　by



necessity；　we　shall　then　（by　the　same　Def。　vii。　Part　I。）　conceive



it　not　as　the　sole　cause；　but　as　one　of　the　causes　of　the　emotion；



and　therefore　our　love　or　hatred　towards　it　will　be　less。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteHence　it　follows；　that　men；　thinking　themselves



to　be　free；　feel　more　love　or　hatred　towards　one　another　than



towards　anything　else：　　to　this　consideration　we　must　add　the



imitation　of　emotions　treated　of　in　III。　xxvii。；　xxxiv。；　xl。　and　xliii。







L。　Anything　whatever　can　be；　accidentally；　a　cause　of　hope　or



fear。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　is　proved　in　the　same　way　as



III。　xv。；　which　see；　together　with　the　note　to　III。　xviii。







*****NoteThings　which　are　accidentally　the　causes　of　hope



or　fear　are　called　good　or　evil　omens。　　Now；　in　so　far　as　such



omens　are　the　cause　of　hope　or　fear；　they　are　（by　the　definitions



of　hope　and　fear　given　in　III。　xviii。　note）　the　causes　also　of



pleasure　and　pain；　consequently　we；　to　this　extent；　regard　them



with　love　or　hatred；　and　endeavour　either　to　invoke　them　as



means　towards　that　which　we　hope　for；　or　to　remove　them　as



obstacles；　or　causes　of　that　which　we　fear。　　It　follows；　further；



from　III。　xxv。；　that　we　are　naturally　so　constituted　as　to　believe



readily　in　that　which　we　hope　for；　and　with　difficulty　in　that　which



we　fear；　moreover；　we　are　apt　to　estimate　such　objects　above



or　below　their　true　value。　　Hence　there　have　arisen　superstitions；



whereby　men　are　everywhere　assailed。　　However；　I　do　not



think　it　worth　while　to　point　out　here　the　vacillations　springing



from　hope　and　fear；　it　follows　from　the　definition　of　these



emotions；　that　there　can　be　no　hope　without　fear；　and　no　fear



without　hope；　as　I　will　duly　explain　in　the　proper　place。　　Further；



in　so　far　as　we　hope　for　or　fear　anything；　we　regard　it　with　love



or　hatred；　thus　everyone　can　apply　by　himself　to　hope　and　fear



what　we　have　said　concerning　love　and　hatred。







LI。　Different　men　may　be　differently　affected　by　the　same　object；



and　the　same　man　may　be　differently　affected　at　different　times



by　the　same　object。







》》》》》ProofThe　human　body　is　affected　by　external　bodies



in　a　variety　of　ways　（II。　Post。　iii。）。　　Two　men　may　therefore　be



differently　affected　at　the　same　time；　and　therefore　（by　Ax。　i。



after　Lemma　iii。　after　II。　xiii。）　may　be　differently　affected　by　one



and　the　same　object。　　Further　（by　the　same　Post。）　the　human



body　can　be　affected　sometimes　in　one　way；　sometimes　in　another；



consequently　（by　the　same　Axiom）　it　may　be　differently　affected



at　different　times　by　one　and　the　same　object。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteWe　thus　see　that　it　is　possible；　that　what　one　man



loves　another　may　hate；　and　that　what　one　man　fears　another　may



not　fear；　or；　again；　that　one　and　the　same　man　may　love　what　he



once　hated；　or　may　be　bold　where　he　once　was　timid；　and　so　on。



Again；　as　everyone　judges　according　to　his　emotions　what　is　good；



what　bad；　what　better；　and　what　worse　（III。　xxxix。　note）；　it　follows



that　men's　judgments　may　vary　no　less　than　their　emotions*；　hence



when　we　compare　some　with　others；　we　distinguish　them　solely



by　the　diversity　of　their　emotions；　and　style　some　intrepid；　others



timid；　others　by　some　other　epithet。　　For　instance；　I　shall　call　a



man　〃intrepid；〃　if　he　despises　an　evil　which　I　am　accustomed　to



fear；　if　I　further　take　into　consideration；　that；　in　his　desire　to　injure



his　enemies　and　to　benefit　those　whom　he　loves；　he　is　not



restrained　by　the　fear　of　an　evil　which　is　sufficient　to　restrain　me；



I　shall　call　him　〃daring。〃　　Again；　a　man　will　appear　〃timid〃　to　me；



if　he　fears　an　evil　which　I　am　accustomed　to　despise；　and　if　I



further　take　into　consideration　that　his　desire　is　restrained　by　the



fear　of　an　evil；　which　is　not　sufficient　to　restrain　me；　I　shall　say



that　he　is　〃cowardly；〃　and　in　like　manner　will　everyone　pass



judgment。



＇*This　is　possible；　though　the　human　mind　is　part　of　the　divine



intellect；　as　I　have　shown　in　II。　xiii。　note。＇







Lastly；　from　this　inconstancy　in　the　nature　of　human　judgment；



inasmuch　as　a　man　often　judges　things　solely　by　his　emotions；



and　inasmuch　as　the　things　which　he　believes　cause　pleasure　or



pain；　and　therefore　endeavours　to　promote　or　prevent；　are　often



purely　imaginary；　not　to　speak　of　the　uncertainty　of　things　alluded



to　in　III。　xxviii。；　we　may　readily　conceive　that　a　man　may　be　at



one　time　affected　with　pleasure；　and　at　another　with　pain；



accompanied　by　the　idea　of　himself　as　cause。　　Thus　we　can　easily



understand　what　are　〃Repentance〃　and　〃Self…complacency。〃



〃Repentance〃　is　〃pain；　accompan