utilitarianism-第11部分

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g　which　men　are　accustomed　to　characterise　as　just　or　unjust；　some　one　common　attribute　or　collection　of　attributes　is　always　present；　we　may　judge　whether　this　particular　attribute　or　combination　of　attributes　would　be　capable　of　gathering　round　it　a　sentiment　of　that　peculiar　character　and　intensity　by　virtue　of　the　general　laws　of　our　emotional　constitution；　or　whether　the　sentiment　is　inexplicable；　and　requires　to　be　regarded　as　a　special　provision　of　Nature。　If　we　find　the　former　to　be　the　case；　we　shall；　in　resolving　this　question；　have　resolved　also　the　main　problem：　if　the　latter；　we　shall　have　to　seek　for　some　other　mode　of　investigating　it。

　　To　find　the　common　attributes　of　a　variety　of　objects；　it　is　necessary　to　begin　by　surveying　the　objects　themselves　in　the　concrete。　Let　us　therefore　advert　successively　to　the　various　modes　of　action；　and　arrangements　of　human　affairs；　which　are　classed；　by　universal　or　widely　spread　opinion；　as　Just　or　as　Unjust。　The　things　well　known　to　excite　the　sentiments　associated　with　those　names　are　of　a　very　multifarious　character。　I　shall　pass　them　rapidly　in　review；　without　studying　any　particular　arrangement。　　　In　the　first　place；　it　is　mostly　considered　unjust　to　deprive　any　one　of　his　personal　liberty；　his　property；　or　any　other　thing　which　belongs　to　him　by　law。　Here；　therefore；　is　one　instance　of　the　application　of　the　terms　just　and　unjust　in　a　perfectly　definite　sense；　namely；　that　it　is　just　to　respect；　unjust　to　violate；　the　legal　rights　of　any　one。　But　this　judgment　admits　of　several　exceptions；　arising　from　the　other　forms　in　which　the　notions　of　justice　and　injustice　present　themselves。　For　example；　the　person　who　suffers　the　deprivation　may　（as　the　phrase　is）　have　forfeited　the　rights　which　he　is　so　deprived　of：　a　case　to　which　we　shall　return　presently。　But　also；　　　Secondly；　the　legal　rights　of　which　he　is　deprived；　may　be　rights　which　ought　not　to　have　belonged　to　him；　in　other　words；　the　law　which　confers　on　him　these　rights；　may　be　a　bad　law。　When　it　is　so；　or　when　（which　is　the　same　thing　for　our　purpose）　it　is　supposed　to　be　so；　opinions　will　differ　as　to　the　justice　or　injustice　of　infringing　it。　Some　maintain　that　no　law；　however　bad；　ought　to　be　disobeyed　by　an　individual　citizen；　that　his　opposition　to　it；　if　shown　at　all；　should　only　be　shown　in　endeavouring　to　get　it　altered　by　competent　authority。　This　opinion　（which　condemns　many　of　the　most　illustrious　benefactors　of　mankind；　and　would　often　protect　pernicious　institutions　against　the　only　weapons　which；　in　the　state　of　things　existing　at　the　time；　have　any　chance　of　succeeding　against　them）　is　defended；　by　those　who　hold　it；　on　grounds　of　expediency；　principally　on　that　of　the　importance；　to　the　common　interest　of　mankind；　of　maintaining　inviolate　the　sentiment　of　submission　to　law。　Other　persons；　again；　hold　the　directly　contrary　opinion；　that　any　law；　judged　to　be　bad；　may　blamelessly　be　disobeyed；　even　though　it　be　not　judged　to　be　unjust；　but　only　inexpedient；　while　others　would　confine　the　licence　of　disobedience　to　the　case　of　unjust　laws：　but　again；　some　say；　that　all　laws　which　are　inexpedient　are　unjust；　since　every　law　imposes　some　restriction　on　the　natural　liberty　of　mankind；　which　restriction　is　an　injustice；　unless　legitimated　by　tending　to　their　good。　Among　these　diversities　of　opinion；　it　seems　to　be　universally　admitted　that　there　may　be　unjust　laws；　and　that　law；　consequently；　is　not　the　ultimate　criterion　of　justice；　but　may　give　to　one　person　a　benefit；　or　impose　on　another　an　evil；　which　justice　condemns。　When；　however；　a　law　is　thought　to　be　unjust；　it　seems　always　to　be　regarded　as　being　so　in　the　same　way　in　which　a　breach　of　law　is　unjust；　namely；　by　infringing　somebody's　right；　which；　as　it　cannot　in　this　case　be　a　legal　right；　receives　a　different　appellation；　and　is　called　a　moral　right。　We　may　say；　therefore；　that　a　second　case　of　injustice　consists　in　taking　or　withholding　from　any　person　that　to　which　he　has　a　moral　right。　　　Thirdly；　it　is　universally　considered　just　that　each　person　should　obtain　that　（whether　good　or　evil）　which　he　deserves；　and　unjust　that　he　should　obtain　a　good；　or　be　made　to　undergo　an　evil；　which　he　does　not　deserve。　This　is；　perhaps；　the　clearest　and　most　emphatic　form　in　which　the　idea　of　justice　is　conceived　by　the　general　mind。　As　it　involves　the　notion　of　desert；　the　question　arises；　what　constitutes　desert？　Speaking　in　a　general　way；　a　person　is　understood　to　deserve　good　if　he　does　right；　evil　if　he　does　wrong；　and　in　a　more　particular　sense；　to　deserve　good　from　those　to　whom　he　does　or　has　done　good；　and　evil　from　those　to　whom　he　does　or　has　done　evil。　The　precept　of　returning　good　for　evil　has　never　been　regarded　as　a　case　of　the　fulfilment　of　justice；　but　as　one　in　which　the　claims　of　justice　are　waived；　in　obedience　to　other　considerations。　　　Fourthly；　it　is　confessedly　unjust　to　break　faith　with　any　one：　to　violate　an　engagement；　either　express　or　implied；　or　disappoint　expectations　raised　by　our　conduct；　at　least　if　we　have　raised　those　expectations　knowingly　and　voluntarily。　Like　the　other　obligations　of　justice　already　spoken　of；　this　one　is　not　regarded　as　absolute；　but　as　capable　of　being　overruled　by　a　stronger　obligation　of　justice　on　the　other　side；　or　by　such　conduct　on　the　part　of　the　person　concerned　as　is　deemed　to　absolve　us　from　our　obligation　to　him；　and　to　constitute　a　forfeiture　of　the　benefit　which　he　has　been　led　to　expect。　　　Fifthly；　it　is；　by　universal　admission；　inconsistent　with　justice　to　be　partial；　to　show　favour　or　preference　to　one　person　over　another；　in　matters　to　which　favour　and　preference　do　not　properly　apply。　Impartiality；　however；　does　not　seem　to　be　regarded　as　a　duty　in　itself；　but　rather　as　instrumental　to　some　other　duty；　for　it　is　admitted　that　favour　and　preference　are　not　always　censurable；　and　indeed　the　cases　in　which　they　are　condemned　are　rather　the　exception　than　the　rule。　A　person　would　be　more　likely　to　be　blamed　than　applauded　for　giving　his　family　or　friends　no　superiority　in　good　offices　over　strangers；　when　he　could　do　so　without　violating　any　other　duty；　and　no　one　thinks　it　unjust　to　seek　one　person　in　preference　to　another　as　a　friend；　connection；　or　companion。　Impartiality　where　rights　are　concerned　is　of　course　obligatory；　but　this　is　involved　in　the　more　general　obligation　of　giving　to　every　one　his　right。　A　tribunal；　for　example；　must　be　impartial；　because　it　is　bound　to　award；　without　regard　to　any　other　consideration；　a　disputed　object　to　the　one　of　two　parties　who　has　the　right　to　it。　There　are　other　cases　in　which　impartiality　means；　being　solely　influenced　by　desert；　as　with　those　who；　in　the　capacity　of　judges；　preceptors；　or　parents；　administer　reward　and　punishment　as　such。　There　are　cases；　again；　in　which　it　means；　being　solely　influenced　by　consideration　for　the　public　interest；　as　in　making　a　selection　among　candidates　for　a　government　employment。　Impartiality；　in　short；　as　an　obligation　of　justice；　may　be　said　to　mean；　being　exclusively　influenced　by　the　considerations　which　it　is　supposed　ought　to　influence　the　particular　case　in　hand；　and　resisting　the　solicitation　of　any　motives　which　prompt　to　conduct　different　from　what　those　considerations　would　dictate。　　　Nearly　allied　to　the　idea　of　impartiality　is　that　of　equality；　which　often　enters　as　a　component　part　both　into　the　conception　of　justice　and　into　the　practice　of　it；　and；　in　the　eyes　of　many　persons；　constitutes　its　essence。　But　in　this；　still　more　than　in　any　other　case；　the　notion　of　justice　varies　in　different　persons；　and　always　conforms　in　its　variations　to　their　notion　of　utility。　Each　person　maintains　that　equality　is　the　dictate　of　justice；　except　where　he　thinks　that　expediency　requires　inequality。　The　justice　of　giving　equal　protection　to　the　rights　of　all；　is　maintained　by　those　who　support　the　most　outrageous　inequality　in　the　rights　themselves。　Even　in　slave　countries　it　is　theoretically　admitted　that　the　rights　of　the　slave；　such　as　they　are；　ought　to　be　as　sacred　as　those　of　the　master；　and　that　a　tribunal　which　fails　to　enforce　them　with　equal　strictness　is　wanting　in　justice；　while；　at　the　same　time；　institutions　which　leave　to　the　slave　scarcely　any　rights　to　enforce；　are　not　deemed　unjust；　because　they　are　not　deemed　inexpedient。　Those　who　think　that　utility　requires　distinctions　of　rank；　do　not　consider　it　unjust　that　riches　and　social　privileges　should　be　unequally　dispensed；　but　those　who　think　this　inequality　inexpedient；　think　it　unjust　also。　Whoever　thinks　that　government　is　necessary；　sees　no　injustice　in　as　much　inequality　as　is　constituted　by　giving　to　the　magistrate　powers　not　granted　to　other　people。　Even　among　those　who　hold　levelling　doctrines；　there　are　as　many　questions　of　justice　as　there　are　differences　of　opinion　about　expediency。　Some　Communists　consider　it　unjust　that　the　produce　of　the　labour　of　the　community　should　be　shared　on　any　other　principle　than　that　of　exact　equality；　others　think　it　just　that　those　should　receive　most　whose　wants　are　greatest；　while　others　hold　that　those　who　work　harder；　or　who　produce　more；　or　whose　services　are　more　valuable　to　the　community；　may　justly　claim　a　larger　quota　in　the　division　of　the　produce。　And　the　sense　of　natural　justice　may　be　plausibly　appealed　to　in　behalf　of　every　one　of　these　opinions。　　　Among　so　many　diverse　applications　of　the　term　justice；　which　yet　is　not　regarded　as　ambiguous；　it　is　a　matter　of　some　difficulty　to　seize　the　mental　link　which　holds　them　together；　and　on　which　the　moral　sentiment　adhering　to　the　term　essentially　depends。　Perhaps；　in　this　embarrassment；　some　help　may　be　derived　from　the　history　of　the　word；　as　indicated　by　its　etymology。　　　In　most；　if　not　in　all；　languages；　the　etymology　of　the　word　which　corresponds　to　Just；　points　distinctly　to　an　origin　connected　with　the　ordinances　of　law。　Justum　is　a　form　of　jussum；　that　which　has　been　ordered。　Dikaion　comes　directly　from　dike；　a　suit　at　law。　Recht；　from　which　came　right　and　righteous；　is　synonymous　with　law。　The　courts　of　justice；　the　administration　of　justice；　are　the　courts　and　the　administration　of　law。　La　justice；　in　French；　is　the　established　term　fo