utilitarianism-第12部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


ice；　are　the　courts　and　the　administration　of　law。　La　justice；　in　French；　is　the　established　term　for　judicature。　I　am　not　committing　the　fallacy　imputed　with　some　show　of　truth　to　Horne　Tooke；　of　assuming　that　a　word　must　still　continue　to　mean　what　it　originally　meant。　Etymology　is　slight　evidence　of　what　the　idea　now　signified　is；　but　the　very　best　evidence　of　how　it　sprang　up。　There　can；　I　think；　be　no　doubt　that　the　idee　mere；　the　primitive　element；　in　the　formation　of　the　notion　of　justice；　was　conformity　to　law。　It　constituted　the　entire　idea　among　the　Hebrews；　up　to　the　birth　of　Christianity；　as　might　be　expected　in　the　case　of　a　people　whose　laws　attempted　to　embrace　all　subjects　on　which　precepts　were　required；　and　who　believed　those　laws　to　be　a　direct　emanation　from　the　Supreme　Being。　But　other　nations；　and　in　particular　the　Greeks　and　Romans；　who　knew　that　their　laws　had　been　made　originally；　and　still　continued　to　be　made；　by　men；　were　not　afraid　to　admit　that　those　men　might　make　bad　laws；　might　do；　by　law；　the　same　things；　and　from　the　same　motives；　which　if　done　by　individuals　without　the　sanction　of　law；　would　be　called　unjust。　And　hence　the　sentiment　of　injustice　came　to　be　attached；　not　to　all　violations　of　law；　but　only　to　violations　of　such　laws　as　ought　to　exist；　including　such　as　ought　to　exist；　but　do　not；　and　to　laws　themselves；　if　supposed　to　be　contrary　to　what　ought　to　be　law。　In　this　manner　the　idea　of　law　and　of　its　injunctions　was　still　predominant　in　the　notion　of　justice；　even　when　the　laws　actually　in　force　ceased　to　be　accepted　as　the　standard　of　it。　　　It　is　true　that　mankind　consider　the　idea　of　justice　and　its　obligations　as　applicable　to　many　things　which　neither　are；　nor　is　it　desired　that　they　should　be；　regulated　by　law。　Nobody　desires　that　laws　should　interfere　with　the　whole　detail　of　private　life；　yet　every　one　allows　that　in　all　daily　conduct　a　person　may　and　does　show　himself　to　be　either　just　or　unjust。　But　even　here；　the　idea　of　the　breach　of　what　ought　to　be　law；　still　lingers　in　a　modified　shape。　It　would　always　give　us　pleasure；　and　chime　in　with　our　feelings　of　fitness；　that　acts　which　we　deem　unjust　should　be　punished；　though　we　do　not　always　think　it　expedient　that　this　should　be　done　by　the　tribunals。　We　forego　that　gratification　on　account　of　incidental　inconveniences。　We　should　be　glad　to　see　just　conduct　enforced　and　injustice　repressed；　even　in　the　minutest　details；　if　we　were　not；　with　reason；　afraid　of　trusting　the　magistrate　with　so　unlimited　an　amount　of　power　over　individuals。　When　we　think　that　a　person　is　bound　in　justice　to　do　a　thing；　it　is　an　ordinary　form　of　language　to　say；　that　he　ought　to　be　compelled　to　do　it。　We　should　be　gratified　to　see　the　obligation　enforced　by　anybody　who　had　the　power。　If　we　see　that　its　enforcement　by　law　would　be　inexpedient；　we　lament　the　impossibility；　we　consider　the　impunity　given　to　injustice　as　an　evil；　and　strive　to　make　amends　for　it　by　bringing　a　strong　expression　of　our　own　and　the　public　disapprobation　to　bear　upon　the　offender。　Thus　the　idea　of　legal　constraint　is　still　the　generating　idea　of　the　notion　of　justice；　though　undergoing　several　transformations　before　that　notion；　as　it　exists　in　an　advanced　state　of　society；　becomes　complete。　　　The　above　is；　I　think；　a　true　account；　as　far　as　it　goes；　of　the　origin　and　progressive　growth　of　the　idea　of　justice。　But　we　must　observe；　that　it　contains；　as　yet；　nothing　to　distinguish　that　obligation　from　moral　obligation　in　general。　For　the　truth　is；　that　the　idea　of　penal　sanction；　which　is　the　essence　of　law；　enters　not　only　into　the　conception　of　injustice；　but　into　that　of　any　kind　of　wrong。　We　do　not　call　anything　wrong；　unless　we　mean　to　imply　that　a　person　ought　to　be　punished　in　some　way　or　other　for　doing　it；　if　not　by　law；　by　the　opinion　of　his　fellow…creatures；　if　not　by　opinion；　by　the　reproaches　of　his　own　conscience。　This　seems　the　real　turning　point　of　the　distinction　between　morality　and　simple　expediency。　It　is　a　part　of　the　notion　of　Duty　in　every　one　of　its　forms；　that　a　person　may　rightfully　be　compelled　to　fulfil　it。　Duty　is　a　thing　which　may　be　exacted　from　a　person；　as　one　exacts　a　debt。　Unless　we　think　that　it　may　be　exacted　from　him；　we　do　not　call　it　his　duty。　Reasons　of　prudence；　or　the　interest　of　other　people；　may　militate　against　actually　exacting　it；　but　the　person　himself；　it　is　clearly　understood；　would　not　be　entitled　to　complain。　There　are　other　things；　on　the　contrary；　which　we　wish　that　people　should　do；　which　we　like　or　admire　them　for　doing；　perhaps　dislike　or　despise　them　for　not　doing；　but　yet　admit　that　they　are　not　bound　to　do；　it　is　not　a　case　of　moral　obligation；　we　do　not　blame　them；　that　is；　we　do　not　think　that　they　are　proper　objects　of　punishment。　How　we　come　by　these　ideas　of　deserving　and　not　deserving　punishment；　will　appear；　perhaps；　in　the　sequel；　but　I　think　there　is　no　doubt　that　this　distinction　lies　at　the　bottom　of　the　notions　of　right　and　wrong；　that　we　call　any　conduct　wrong；　or　employ；　instead；　some　other　term　of　dislike　or　disparagement；　according　as　we　think　that　the　person　ought；　or　ought　not；　to　be　punished　for　it；　and　we　say；　it　would　be　right；　to　do　so　and　so；　or　merely　that　it　would　be　desirable　or　laudable；　according　as　we　would　wish　to　see　the　person　whom　it　concerns；　compelled；　or　only　persuaded　and　exhorted；　to　act　in　that　manner。*

　　*　See　this　point　enforced　and　illustrated　by　Professor　Bain；　in　an　admirable　chapter　（entitled　〃The　Ethical　Emotions；　or　the　Moral　Sense〃）；　of　the　second　of　the　two　treatises　composing　his　elaborate　and　profound　work　on　the　Mind。

　　This；　therefore；　being　the　characteristic　difference　which　marks　off；　not　justice；　but　morality　in　general；　from　the　remaining　provinces　of　Expediency　and　Worthiness；　the　character　is　still　to　be　sought　which　distinguishes　justice　from　other　branches　of　morality。　Now　it　is　known　that　ethical　writers　divide　moral　duties　into　two　classes；　denoted　by　the　ill…chosen　expressions；　duties　of　perfect　and　of　imperfect　obligation；　the　latter　being　those　in　which；　though　the　act　is　obligatory；　the　particular　occasions　of　performing　it　are　left　to　our　choice；　as　in　the　case　of　charity　or　beneficence；　which　we　are　indeed　bound　to　practise；　but　not　towards　any　definite　person；　nor　at　any　prescribed　time。　In　the　more　precise　language　of　philosophic　jurists；　duties　of　perfect　obligation　are　those　duties　in　virtue　of　which　a　correlative　right　resides　in　some　person　or　persons；　duties　of　imperfect　obligation　are　those　moral　obligations　which　do　not　give　birth　to　any　right。　I　think　it　will　be　found　that　this　distinction　exactly　coincides　with　that　which　exists　between　justice　and　the　other　obligations　of　morality。　In　our　survey　of　the　various　popular　acceptations　of　justice；　the　term　appeared　generally　to　involve　the　idea　of　a　personal　right…　a　claim　on　the　part　of　one　or　more　individuals；　like　that　which　the　law　gives　when　it　confers　a　proprietary　or　other　legal　right。　Whether　the　injustice　consists　in　depriving　a　person　of　a　possession；　or　in　breaking　faith　with　him；　or　in　treating　him　worse　than　he　deserves；　or　worse　than　other　people　who　have　no　greater　claims；　in　each　case　the　supposition　implies　two　things…　a　wrong　done；　and　some　assignable　person　who　is　wronged。　Injustice　may　also　be　done　by　treating　a　person　better　than　others；　but　the　wrong　in　this　case　is　to　his　competitors；　who　are　also　assignable　persons。　　　It　seems　to　me　that　this　feature　in　the　case…　a　right　in　some　person；　correlative　to　the　moral　obligation…　constitutes　the　specific　difference　between　justice；　and　generosity　or　beneficence。　Justice　implies　something　which　it　is　not　only　right　to　do；　and　wrong　not　to　do；　but　which　some　individual　person　can　claim　from　us　as　his　moral　right。　No　one　has　a　moral　right　to　our　generosity　or　beneficence；　because　we　are　not　morally　bound　to　practise　those　virtues　towards　any　given　individual。　And　it　will　be　found　with　respect　to　this；　as　to　every　correct　definition；　that　the　instances　which　seem　to　conflict　with　it　are　those　which　most　confirm　it。　For　if　a　moralist　attempts；　as　some　have　done；　to　make　out　that　mankind　generally；　though　not　any　given　individual；　have　a　right　to　all　the　good　we　can　do　them；　he　at　once；　by　that　thesis；　includes　generosity　and　beneficence　within　the　category　of　justice。　He　is　obliged　to　say；　that　our　utmost　exertions　are　due　to　our　fellow　creatures；　thus　assimilating　them　to　a　debt；　or　that　nothing　less　can　be　a　sufficient　return　for　what　society　does　for　us；　thus　classing　the　case　as　one　of　gratitute；　both　of　which　are　acknowledged　cases　of　justice。　Wherever　there　is　right；　the　case　is　one　of　justice；　and　not　of　the　virtue　of　beneficence：　and　whoever　does　not　place　the　distinction　between　justice　and　morality　in　general；　where　we　have　now　placed　it；　will　be　found　to　make　no　distinction　between　them　at　all；　but　to　merge　all　morality　in　justice。

　　Having　thus　endeavoured　to　determine　the　distinctive　elements　which　enter　into　the　composition　of　the　idea　of　justice；　we　are　ready　to　enter　on　the　inquiry；　whether　the　feeling；　which　accompanies　the　idea；　is　attached　to　it　by　a　special　dispensation　of　nature；　or　whether　it　could　have　grown　up；　by　any　known　laws；　out　of　the　idea　itself；　and　in　particular；　whether　it　can　have　originated　in　considerations　of　general　expediency。　　　I　conceive　that　the　sentiment　itself　does　not　arise　from　anything　which　would　commonly；　or　correctly；　be　termed　an　idea　of　expediency；　but　that　though　the　sentiment　does　not；　whatever　is　moral　in　it　does。　　　We　have　seen　that　the　two　essential　ingredients　in　the　sentiment　of　justice　are；　the　desire　to　punish　a　person　who　has　done　harm；　and　the　knowledge　or　belief　that　there　is　some　definite　individual　or　individuals　to　whom　harm　has　been　done。　　　Now　it　appears　to　me；　that　the　desire　to　punish　a　person　who　has　done　harm　to　some　individual　is　a　spontaneous　outgrowth　from　two　sentiments；　both　in　the　highest　degree　natural；　and　which　either　are　or　resemble　instincts；　the　impulse　of　self…defence；　and　the　feeling　of　sympathy。　　　It　is　natural　to　resent；　and　to　repel　or　retaliate；　any　harm　done　or　attempted　against　ourselves；　or　against　those　with　whom　we　sympathise。　The　orig