utilitarianism-第15部分

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t　sublime　contempt　for　the　consequences　of　actions　as　an　element　in　their　morality；　attaches　more　importance　to　the　distinction　than　I　do。　While　I　dispute　the　pretensions　of　any　theory　which　sets　up　an　imaginary　standard　of　justice　not　grounded　on　utility；　I　account　the　justice　which　is　grounded　on　utility　to　be　the　chief　part；　and　incomparably　the　most　sacred　and　binding　part；　of　all　morality。　justice　is　a　name　for　certain　classes　of　moral　rules；　which　concern　the　essentials　of　human　well…being　more　nearly；　and　are　therefore　of　more　absolute　obligation；　than　any　other　rules　for　the　guidance　of　life；　and　the　notion　which　we　have　found　to　be　of　the　essence　of　the　idea　of　justice；　that　of　a　right　residing　in　an　individual　implies　and　testifies　to　this　more　binding　obligation。　　　The　moral　rules　which　forbid　mankind　to　hurt　one　another　（in　which　we　must　never　forget　to　include　wrongful　interference　with　each　other's　freedom）　are　more　vital　to　human　well…being　than　any　maxims；　however　important；　which　only　point　out　the　best　mode　of　managing　some　department　of　human　affairs。　They　have　also　the　peculiarity；　that　they　are　the　main　element　in　determining　the　whole　of　the　social　feelings　of　mankind。　It　is　their　observance　which　alone　preserves　peace　among　human　beings：　if　obedience　to　them　were　not　the　rule；　and　disobedience　the　exception；　every　one　would　see　in　every　one　else　an　enemy；　against　whom　he　must　be　perpetually　guarding　himself。　What　is　hardly　less　important；　these　are　the　precepts　which　mankind　have　the　strongest　and　the　most　direct　inducements　for　impressing　upon　one　another。　By　merely　giving　to　each　other　prudential　instruction　or　exhortation；　they　may　gain；　or　think　they　gain；　nothing：　in　inculcating　on　each　other　the　duty　of　positive　beneficence　they　have　an　unmistakable　interest；　but　far　less　in　degree：　a　person　may　possibly　not　need　the　benefits　of　others；　but　he　always　needs　that　they　should　not　do　him　hurt。　Thus　the　moralities　which　protect　every　individual　from　being　harmed　by　others；　either　directly　or　by　being　hindered　in　his　freedom　of　pursuing　his　own　good；　are　at　once　those　which　he　himself　has　most　at　heart；　and　those　which　he　has　the　strongest　interest　in　publishing　and　enforcing　by　word　and　deed。　It　is　by　a　person's　observance　of　these　that　his　fitness　to　exist　as　one　of　the　fellowship　of　human　beings　is　tested　and　decided；　for　on　that　depends　his　being　a　nuisance　or　not　to　those　with　whom　he　is　in　contact。　Now　it　is　these　moralities　primarily　which　compose　the　obligations　of　justice。　The　most　marked　cases　of　injustice；　and　those　which　give　the　tone　to　the　feeling　of　repugnance　which　characterises　the　sentiment；　are　acts　of　wrongful　aggression；　or　wrongful　exercise　of　power　over　some　one；　the　next　are　those　which　consist　in　wrongfully　withholding　from　him　something　which　is　his　due；　in　both　cases；　inflicting　on　him　a　positive　hurt；　either　in　the　form　of　direct　suffering；　or　of　the　privation　of　some　good　which　he　had　reasonable　ground；　either　of　a　physical　or　of　a　social　kind；　for　counting　upon。　　　The　same　powerful　motives　which　command　the　observance　of　these　primary　moralities；　enjoin　the　punishment　of　those　who　violate　them；　and　as　the　impulses　of　self…defence；　of　defence　of　others；　and　of　vengeance；　are　all　called　forth　against　such　persons；　retribution；　or　evil　for　evil；　becomes　closely　connected　with　the　sentiment　of　justice；　and　is　universally　included　in　the　idea。　Good　for　good　is　also　one　of　the　dictates　of　justice；　and　this；　though　its　social　utility　is　evident；　and　though　it　carries　with　it　a　natural　human　feeling；　has　not　at　first　sight　that　obvious　connection　with　hurt　or　injury；　which；　existing　in　the　most　elementary　cases　of　just　and　unjust；　is　the　source　of　the　characteristic　intensity　of　the　sentiment。　But　the　connection；　though　less　obvious；　is　not　less　real。　He　who　accepts　benefits；　and　denies　a　return　of　them　when　needed；　inflicts　a　real　hurt；　by　disappointing　one　of　the　most　natural　and　reasonable　of　expectations；　and　one　which　he　must　at　least　tacitly　have　encouraged；　otherwise　the　benefits　would　seldom　have　been　conferred。　The　important　rank；　among　human　evils　and　wrongs；　of　the　disappointment　of　expectation；　is　shown　in　the　fact　that　it　constitutes　the　principal　criminality　of　two　such　highly　immoral　acts　as　a　breach　of　friendship　and　a　breach　of　promise。　Few　hurts　which　human　beings　can　sustain　are　greater；　and　none　wound　more；　than　when　that　on　which　they　habitually　and　with　full　assurance　relied；　fails　them　in　the　hour　of　need；　and　few　wrongs　are　greater　than　this　mere　withholding　of　good；　none　excite　more　resentment；　either　in　the　person　suffering；　or　in　a　sympathising　spectator。　The　principle；　therefore；　of　giving　to　each　what　they　deserve；　that　is；　good　for　good　as　well　as　evil　for　evil；　is　not　only　included　within　the　idea　of　justice　as　we　have　defined　it；　but　is　a　proper　object　of　that　intensity　of　sentiment；　which　places　the　just；　in　human　estimation；　above　the　simply　Expedient。　　　Most　of　the　maxims　of　justice　current　in　the　world；　and　commonly　appealed　to　in　its　transactions；　are　simply　instrumental　to　carrying　into　effect　the　principles　of　justice　which　we　have　now　spoken　of。　That　a　person　is　only　responsible　for　what　he　has　done　voluntarily；　or　could　voluntarily　have　avoided；　that　it　is　unjust　to　condemn　any　person　unheard；　that　the　punishment　ought　to　be　proportioned　to　the　offence；　and　the　like；　are　maxims　intended　to　prevent　the　just　principle　of　evil　for　evil　from　being　perverted　to　the　infliction　of　evil　without　that　justification。　The　greater　part　of　these　common　maxims　have　come　into　use　from　the　practice　of　courts　of　justice；　which　have　been　naturally　led　to　a　more　complete　recognition　and　elaboration　than　was　likely　to　suggest　itself　to　others；　of　the　rules　necessary　to　enable　them　to　fulfil　their　double　function；　of　inflicting　punishment　when　due；　and　of　awarding　to　each　person　his　right。　　　That　first　of　judicial　virtues；　impartiality；　is　an　obligation　of　justice；　partly　for　the　reason　last　mentioned；　as　being　a　necessary　condition　of　the　fulfilment　of　the　other　obligations　of　justice。　But　this　is　not　the　only　source　of　the　exalted　rank；　among　human　obligations；　of　those　maxims　of　equality　and　impartiality；　which；　both　in　popular　estimation　and　in　that　of　the　most　enlightened；　are　included　among　the　precepts　of　justice。　In　one　point　of　view；　they　may　be　considered　as　corollaries　from　the　principles　already　laid　down。　If　it　is　a　duty　to　do　to　each　according　to　his　deserts；　returning　good　for　good　as　well　as　repressing　evil　by　evil；　it　necessarily　follows　that　we　should　treat　all　equally　well　（when　no　higher　duty　forbids）　who　have　deserved　equally　well　of　us；　and　that　society　should　treat　all　equally　well　who　have　deserved　equally　well　of　it；　that　is；　who　have　deserved　equally　well　absolutely。　This　is　the　highest　abstract　standard　of　social　and　distributive　justice；　towards　which　all　institutions；　and　the　efforts　of　all　virtuous　citizens；　should　be　made　in　the　utmost　possible　degree　to　converge。　　　But　this　great　moral　duty　rests　upon　a　still　deeper　foundation；　being　a　direct　emanation　from　the　first　principle　of　morals；　and　not　a　mere　logical　corollary　from　secondary　or　derivative　doctrines。　It　is　involved　in　the　very　meaning　of　Utility；　or　the　Greatest　Happiness　Principle。　That　principle　is　a　mere　form　of　words　without　rational　signification；　unless　one　person's　happiness；　supposed　equal　in　degree　（with　the　proper　allowance　made　for　kind）；　is　counted　for　exactly　as　much　as　another's。　Those　conditions　being　supplied；　Bentham's　dictum；　〃everybody　to　count　for　one；　nobody　for　more　than　one；〃　might　be　written　under　the　principle　of　utility　as　an　explanatory　commentary。*　The　equal　claim　of　everybody　to　happiness　in　the　estimation　of　the　moralist　and　the　legislator；　involves　an　equal　claim　to　all　the　means　of　happiness；　except　in　so　far　as　the　inevitable　conditions　of　human　life；　and　the　general　interest；　in　which　that　of　every　individual　is　included；　set　limits　to　the　maxim；　and　those　limits　ought　to　be　strictly　construed。　As　every　other　maxim　of　justice；　so　this　is　by　no　means　applied　or　held　applicable　universally；　on　the　contrary；　as　I　have　already　remarked；　it　bends　to　every　person's　ideas　of　social　expediency。　But　in　whatever　case　it　is　deemed　applicable　at　all；　it　is　held　to　be　the　dictate　of　justice。　All　persons　are　deemed　to　have　a　right　to　equality　of　treatment；　except　when　some　recognised　social　expediency　requires　the　reverse。　And　hence　all　social　inequalities　which　have　ceased　to　be　considered　expedient；　assume　the　character　not　of　simple　inexpediency；　but　of　injustice；　and　appear　so　tyrannical；　that　people　are　apt　to　wonder　how　they　ever　could　have。　been　tolerated；　forgetful　that　they　themselves　perhaps　tolerate　other　inequalities　under　an　equally　mistaken　notion　of　expediency；　the　correction　of　which　would　make　that　which　they　approve　seem　quite　as　monstrous　as　what　they　have　at　last　learnt　to　condemn。　The　entire　history　of　social　improvement　has　been　a　series　of　transitions；　by　which　one　custom　or　institution　after　another；　from　being　a　supposed　primary　necessity　of　social　existence；　has　passed　into　the　rank　of　a　universally　stigmatised　injustice　and　tyranny。　So　it　has　been　with　the　distinctions　of　slaves　and　freemen；　nobles　and　serfs；　patricians　and　plebeians；　and　so　it　will　be；　and　in　part　already　is；　with　the　aristocracies　of　colour；　race；　and　sex。

　　*　This　implication；　in　the　first　principle　of　the　utilitarian　scheme；　of　perfect　impartiality　between　persons；　is　regarded　by　Mr。　Herbert　Spencer　（in　his　Social　Statics）　as　a　disproof　of　the　pretensions　of　utility　to　be　a　sufficient　guide　to　right；　since　（he　says）　the　principle　of　utility　presupposes　the　anterior　principle；　that　everybody　has　an　equal　right　to　happiness。　It　may　be　more　correctly　described　as　supposing　that　equal　amounts　of　happiness　are　equally　desirable；　whether　felt　by　the　same　or　by　different　persons。　This；　however；　is　not　a　pre…supposition；　not　a　premise　needful　to　support　the　principle　of　utility；　but　the　very　principle　itself；　for　what　is　the　principle　of　utility；　if　it　be　not　that　〃happiness〃　and　〃desirable〃　are　synonymous　terms？　If　there　is　any　anterior　principle　implied；　it　can　be　no　other　th