utilitarianism-第2部分

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believe　that　the　very　imperfect　notion　ordinarily　formed　of　its　meaning；　is　the　chief　obstacle　which　impedes　its　reception；　and　that　could　it　be　cleared；　even　from　only　the　grosser　misconceptions；　the　question　would　be　greatly　simplified；　and　a　large　proportion　of　its　difficulties　removed。　Before；　therefore；　I　attempt　to　enter　into　the　philosophical　grounds　which　can　be　given　for　assenting　to　the　utilitarian　standard；　I　shall　offer　some　illustrations　of　the　doctrine　itself；　with　the　view　of　showing　more　clearly　what　it　is；　distinguishing　it　from　what　it　is　not；　and　disposing　of　such　of　the　practical　objections　to　it　as　either　originate　in；　or　are　closely　connected　with；　mistaken　interpretations　of　its　meaning。　Having　thus　prepared　the　ground；　I　shall　afterwards　endeavour　to　throw　such　light　as　I　can　upon　the　question；　considered　as　one　of　philosophical　theory。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　2　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　What　Utilitarianism　Is。

　　A　PASSING　remark　is　all　that　needs　be　given　to　the　ignorant　blunder　of　supposing　that　those　who　stand　up　for　utility　as　the　test　of　right　and　wrong；　use　the　term　in　that　restricted　and　merely　colloquial　sense　in　which　utility　is　opposed　to　pleasure。　An　apology　is　due　to　the　philosophical　opponents　of　utilitarianism；　for　even　the　momentary　appearance　of　confounding　them　with　any　one　capable　of　so　absurd　a　misconception；　which　is　the　more　extraordinary；　inasmuch　as　the　contrary　accusation；　of　referring　everything　to　pleasure；　and　that　too　in　its　grossest　form；　is　another　of　the　common　charges　against　utilitarianism：　and；　as　has　been　pointedly　remarked　by　an　able　writer；　the　same　sort　of　persons；　and　often　the　very　same　persons；　denounce　the　theory　〃as　impracticably　dry　when　the　word　utility　precedes　the　word　pleasure；　and　as　too　practicably　voluptuous　when　the　word　pleasure　precedes　the　word　utility。〃　Those　who　know　anything　about　the　matter　are　aware　that　every　writer；　from　Epicurus　to　Bentham；　who　maintained　the　theory　of　utility；　meant　by　it；　not　something　to　be　contradistinguished　from　pleasure；　but　pleasure　itself；　together　with　exemption　from　pain；　and　instead　of　opposing　the　useful　to　the　agreeable　or　the　ornamental；　have　always　declared　that　the　useful　means　these；　among　other　things。　Yet　the　common　herd；　including　the　herd　of　writers；　not　only　in　newspapers　and　periodicals；　but　in　books　of　weight　and　pretension；　are　perpetually　falling　into　this　shallow　mistake。　Having　caught　up　the　word　utilitarian；　while　knowing　nothing　whatever　about　it　but　its　sound；　they　habitually　express　by　it　the　rejection；　or　the　neglect；　of　pleasure　in　some　of　its　forms；　of　beauty；　of　ornament；　or　of　amusement。　Nor　is　the　term　thus　ignorantly　misapplied　solely　in　disparagement；　but　occasionally　in　compliment；　as　though　it　implied　superiority　to　frivolity　and　the　mere　pleasures　of　the　moment。　And　this　perverted　use　is　the　only　one　in　which　the　word　is　popularly　known；　and　the　one　from　which　the　new　generation　are　acquiring　their　sole　notion　of　its　meaning。　Those　who　introduced　the　word；　but　who　had　for　many　years　discontinued　it　as　a　distinctive　appellation；　may　well　feel　themselves　called　upon　to　resume　it；　if　by　doing　so　they　can　hope　to　contribute　anything　towards　rescuing　it　from　this　utter　degradation。*

　　*　The　author　of　this　essay　has　reason　for　believing　himself　to　be　the　first　person　who　brought　the　word　utilitarian　into　use。　He　did　not　invent　it；　but　adopted　it　from　a　passing　expression　in　Mr。　Galt's　Annals　of　the　Parish。　After　using　it　as　a　designation　for　several　years；　he　and　others　abandoned　it　from　a　growing　dislike　to　anything　resembling　a　badge　or　watchword　of　sectarian　distinction。　But　as　a　name　for　one　single　opinion；　not　a　set　of　opinions…　to　denote　the　recognition　of　utility　as　a　standard；　not　any　particular　way　of　applying　it…　the　term　supplies　a　want　in　the　language；　and　offers；　in　many　cases；　a　convenient　mode　of　avoiding　tiresome　circumlocution。

　　The　creed　which　accepts　as　the　foundation　of　morals；　Utility；　or　the　Greatest　Happiness　Principle；　holds　that　actions　are　right　in　proportion　as　they　tend　to　promote　happiness；　wrong　as　they　tend　to　produce　the　reverse　of　happiness。　By　happiness　is　intended　pleasure；　and　the　absence　of　pain；　by　unhappiness；　pain；　and　the　privation　of　pleasure。　To　give　a　clear　view　of　the　moral　standard　set　up　by　the　theory；　much　more　requires　to　be　said；　in　particular；　what　things　it　includes　in　the　ideas　of　pain　and　pleasure；　and　to　what　extent　this　is　left　an　open　question。　But　these　supplementary　explanations　do　not　affect　the　theory　of　life　on　which　this　theory　of　morality　is　grounded…　namely；　that　pleasure；　and　freedom　from　pain；　are　the　only　things　desirable　as　ends；　and　that　all　desirable　things　（which　are　as　numerous　in　the　utilitarian　as　in　any　other　scheme）　are　desirable　either　for　the　pleasure　inherent　in　themselves；　or　as　means　to　the　promotion　of　pleasure　and　the　prevention　of　pain。　　　Now；　such　a　theory　of　life　excites　in　many　minds；　and　among　them　in　some　of　the　most　estimable　in　feeling　and　purpose；　inveterate　dislike。　To　suppose　that　life　has　（as　they　express　it）　no　higher　end　than　pleasure…　no　better　and　nobler　object　of　desire　and　pursuit…　they　designate　as　utterly　mean　and　grovelling；　as　a　doctrine　worthy　only　of　swine；　to　whom　the　followers　of　Epicurus　were；　at　a　very　early　period；　contemptuously　likened；　and　modern　holders　of　the　doctrine　are　occasionally　made　the　subject　of　equally　polite　comparisons　by　its　German；　French；　and　English　assailants。　　　When　thus　attacked；　the　Epicureans　have　always　answered；　that　it　is　not　they；　but　their　accusers；　who　represent　human　nature　in　a　degrading　light；　since　the　accusation　supposes　human　beings　to　be　capable　of　no　pleasures　except　those　of　which　swine　are　capable。　If　this　supposition　were　true；　the　charge　could　not　be　gainsaid；　but　would　then　be　no　longer　an　imputation；　for　if　the　sources　of　pleasure　were　precisely　the　same　to　human　beings　and　to　swine；　the　rule　of　life　which　is　good　enough　for　the　one　would　be　good　enough　for　the　other。　The　comparison　of　the　Epicurean　life　to　that　of　beasts　is　felt　as　degrading；　precisely　because　a　beast's　pleasures　do　not　satisfy　a　human　being's　conceptions　of　happiness。　Human　beings　have　faculties　more　elevated　than　the　animal　appetites；　and　when　once　made　conscious　of　them；　do　not　regard　anything　as　happiness　which　does　not　include　their　gratification。　I　do　not；　indeed；　consider　the　Epicureans　to　have　been　by　any　means　faultless　in　drawing　out　their　scheme　of　consequences　from　the　utilitarian　principle。　To　do　this　in　any　sufficient　manner；　many　Stoic；　as　well　as　Christian　elements　require　to　be　included。　But　there　is　no　known　Epicurean　theory　of　life　which　does　not　assign　to　the　pleasures　of　the　intellect；　of　the　feelings　and　imagination；　and　of　the　moral　sentiments；　a　much　higher　value　as　pleasures　than　to　those　of　mere　sensation。　It　must　be　admitted；　however；　that　utilitarian　writers　in　general　have　placed　the　superiority　of　mental　over　bodily　pleasures　chiefly　in　the　greater　permanency；　safety；　uncostliness；　etc。；　of　the　former…　that　is；　in　their　circumstantial　advantages　rather　than　in　their　intrinsic　nature。　And　on　all　these　points　utilitarians　have　fully　proved　their　case；　but　they　might　have　taken　the　other；　and；　as　it　may　be　called；　higher　ground；　with　entire　consistency。　It　is　quite　compatible　with　the　principle　of　utility　to　recognise　the　fact；　that　some　kinds　of　pleasure　are　more　desirable　and　more　valuable　than　others。　It　would　be　absurd　that　while；　in　estimating　all　other　things；　quality　is　considered　as　well　as　quantity；　the　estimation　of　pleasures　should　be　supposed　to　depend　on　quantity　alone。　　　If　I　am　asked；　what　I　mean　by　difference　of　quality　in　pleasures；　or　what　makes　one　pleasure　more　valuable　than　another；　merely　as　a　pleasure；　except　its　being　greater　in　amount；　there　is　but　one　possible　answer。　Of　two　pleasures；　if　there　be　one　to　which　all　or　almost　all　who　have　experience　of　both　give　a　decided　preference；　irrespective　of　any　feeling　of　moral　obligation　to　prefer　it；　that　is　the　more　desirable　pleasure。　If　one　of　the　two　is；　by　those　who　are　competently　acquainted　with　both；　placed　so　far　above　the　other　that　they　prefer　it；　even　though　knowing　it　to　be　attended　with　a　greater　amount　of　discontent；　and　would　not　resign　it　for　any　quantity　of　the　other　pleasure　which　their　nature　is　capable　of；　we　are　justified　in　ascribing　to　the　preferred　enjoyment　a　superiority　in　quality；　so　far　outweighing　quantity　as　to　render　it；　in　comparison；　of　small　account。　　　Now　it　is　an　unquestionable　fact　that　those　who　are　equally　acquainted　with；　and　equally　capable　of　appreciating　and　enjoying；　both；　do　give　a　most　marked　preference　to　the　manner　of　existence　which　employs　their　higher　faculties。　Few　human　creatures　would　consent　to　be　changed　into　any　of　the　lower　animals；　for　a　promise　of　the　fullest　allowance　of　a　beast's　pleasures；　no　intelligent　human　being　would　consent　to　be　a　fool；　no　instructed　person　would　be　an　ignoramus；　no　person　of　feeling　and　conscience　would　be　selfish　and　base；　even　though　they　should　be　persuaded　that　the　fool；　the　dunce；　or　the　rascal　is　better　satisfied　with　his　lot　than　they　are　with　theirs。　They　would　not　resign　what　they　possess　more　than　he　for　the　most　complete　satisfaction　of　all　the　desires　which　they　have　in　common　with　him。　If　they　ever　fancy　they　would；　it　is　only　in　cases　of　unhappiness　so　extreme；　that　to　escape　from　it　they　would　exchange　their　lot　for　almost　any　other；　however　undesirable　in　their　own　eyes。　A　being　of　higher　faculties　requires　more　to　make　him　happy；　is　capable　probably　of　more　acute　suffering；　and　certainly　accessible　to　it　at　more　points；　than　one　of　an　inferior　type；　but　in　spite　of　these　liabilities；　he　can　never　really　wish　to　sink　into　what　he　feels　to　be　a　lower　grade　of　existence。　We　may　give　what　explanation　we　please　of　this　unwillingness；　we　may　attribute　it　to　pride；　a　name　which　is　given　indiscriminately　to　some　of　the　most　and　to　some　of　the　least　estimable　feelings　of　which　mankind　are　capable：　we　may　refer　it　to　the　love　of　liberty　and　personal　independence；　an　appeal　to　which　was　with　the　Stoics　one　of　the　most　effective　means　for　the　inculcation　of　it；　to　the