utilitarianism-第3部分

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peal　to　which　was　with　the　Stoics　one　of　the　most　effective　means　for　the　inculcation　of　it；　to　the　love　of　power；　or　to　the　love　of　excitement；　both　of　which　do　really　enter　into　and　contribute　to　it：　but　its　most　appropriate　appellation　is　a　sense　of　dignity；　which　all　human　beings　possess　in　one　form　or　other；　and　in　some；　though　by　no　means　in　exact；　proportion　to　their　higher　faculties；　and　which　is　so　essential　a　part　of　the　happiness　of　those　in　whom　it　is　strong；　that　nothing　which　conflicts　with　it　could　be；　otherwise　than　momentarily；　an　object　of　desire　to　them。　　　Whoever　supposes　that　this　preference　takes　place　at　a　sacrifice　of　happiness…　that　the　superior　being；　in　anything　like　equal　circumstances；　is　not　happier　than　the　inferior…　confounds　the　two　very　different　ideas；　of　happiness；　and　content。　It　is　indisputable　that　the　being　whose　capacities　of　enjoyment　are　low；　has　the　greatest　chance　of　having　them　fully　satisfied；　and　a　highly　endowed　being　will　always　feel　that　any　happiness　which　he　can　look　for；　as　the　world　is　constituted；　is　imperfect。　But　he　can　learn　to　bear　its　imperfections；　if　they　are　at　all　bearable；　and　they　will　not　make　him　envy　the　being　who　is　indeed　unconscious　of　the　imperfections；　but　only　because　he　feels　not　at　all　the　good　which　those　imperfections　qualify。　It　is　better　to　be　a　human　being　dissatisfied　than　a　pig　satisfied；　better　to　be　Socrates　dissatisfied　than　a　fool　satisfied。　And　if　the　fool；　or　the　pig；　are　a　different　opinion；　it　is　because　they　only　know　their　own　side　of　the　question。　The　other　party　to　the　comparison　knows　both　sides。　　　It　may　be　objected；　that　many　who　are　capable　of　the　higher　pleasures；　occasionally；　under　the　influence　of　temptation；　postpone　them　to　the　lower。　But　this　is　quite　compatible　with　a　full　appreciation　of　the　intrinsic　superiority　of　the　higher。　Men　often；　from　infirmity　of　character；　make　their　election　for　the　nearer　good；　though　they　know　it　to　be　the　less　valuable；　and　this　no　less　when　the　choice　is　between　two　bodily　pleasures；　than　when　it　is　between　bodily　and　mental。　They　pursue　sensual　indulgences　to　the　injury　of　health；　though　perfectly　aware　that　health　is　the　greater　good。　　　It　may　be　further　objected；　that　many　who　begin　with　youthful　enthusiasm　for　everything　noble；　as　they　advance　in　years　sink　into　indolence　and　selfishness。　But　I　do　not　believe　that　those　who　undergo　this　very　common　change；　voluntarily　choose　the　lower　description　of　pleasures　in　preference　to　the　higher。　I　believe　that　before　they　devote　themselves　exclusively　to　the　one；　they　have　already　become　incapable　of　the　other。　Capacity　for　the　nobler　feelings　is　in　most　natures　a　very　tender　plant；　easily　killed；　not　only　by　hostile　influences；　but　by　mere　want　of　sustenance；　and　in　the　majority　of　young　persons　it　speedily　dies　away　if　the　occupations　to　which　their　position　in　life　has　devoted　them；　and　the　society　into　which　it　has　thrown　them；　are　not　favourable　to　keeping　that　higher　capacity　in　exercise。　Men　lose　their　high　aspirations　as　they　lose　their　intellectual　tastes；　because　they　have　not　time　or　opportunity　for　indulging　them；　and　they　addict　themselves　to　inferior　pleasures；　not　because　they　deliberately　prefer　them；　but　because　they　are　either　the　only　ones　to　which　they　have　access；　or　the　only　ones　which　they　are　any　longer　capable　of　enjoying。　It　may　be　questioned　whether　any　one　who　has　remained　equally　susceptible　to　both　classes　of　pleasures；　ever　knowingly　and　calmly　preferred　the　lower；　though　many；　in　all　ages；　have　broken　down　in　an　ineffectual　attempt　to　combine　both。　　　From　this　verdict　of　the　only　competent　judges；　I　apprehend　there　can　be　no　appeal。　On　a　question　which　is　the　best　worth　having　of　two　pleasures；　or　which　of　two　modes　of　existence　is　the　most　grateful　to　the　feelings；　apart　from　its　moral　attributes　and　from　its　consequences；　the　judgment　of　those　who　are　qualified　by　knowledge　of　both；　or；　if　they　differ；　that　of　the　majority　among　them；　must　be　admitted　as　final。　And　there　needs　be　the　less　hesitation　to　accept　this　judgment　respecting　the　quality　of　pleasures；　since　there　is　no　other　tribunal　to　be　referred　to　even　on　the　question　of　quantity。　What　means　are　there　of　determining　which　is　the　acutest　of　two　pains；　or　the　intensest　of　two　pleasurable　sensations；　except　the　general　suffrage　of　those　who　are　familiar　with　both？　Neither　pains　nor　pleasures　are　homogeneous；　and　pain　is　always　heterogeneous　with　pleasure。　What　is　there　to　decide　whether　a　particular　pleasure　is　worth　purchasing　at　the　cost　of　a　particular　pain；　except　the　feelings　and　judgment　of　the　experienced？　When；　therefore；　those　feelings　and　judgment　declare　the　pleasures　derived　from　the　higher　faculties　to　be　preferable　in　kind；　apart　from　the　question　of　intensity；　to　those　of　which　the　animal　nature；　disjoined　from　the　higher　faculties；　is　suspectible；　they　are　entitled　on　this　subject　to　the　same　regard。　　　I　have　dwelt　on　this　point；　as　being　a　necessary　part　of　a　perfectly　just　conception　of　Utility　or　Happiness；　considered　as　the　directive　rule　of　human　conduct。　But　it　is　by　no　means　an　indispensable　condition　to　the　acceptance　of　the　utilitarian　standard；　for　that　standard　is　not　the　agent's　own　greatest　happiness；　but　the　greatest　amount　of　happiness　altogether；　and　if　it　may　possibly　be　doubted　whether　a　noble　character　is　always　the　happier　for　its　nobleness；　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　it　makes　other　people　happier；　and　that　the　world　in　general　is　immensely　a　gainer　by　it。　Utilitarianism；　therefore；　could　only　attain　its　end　by　the　general　cultivation　of　nobleness　of　character；　even　if　each　individual　were　only　benefited　by　the　nobleness　of　others；　and　his　own；　so　far　as　happiness　is　concerned；　were　a　sheer　deduction　from　the　benefit。　But　the　bare　enunciation　of　such　an　absurdity　as　this　last；　renders　refutation　superfluous。

　　According　to　the　Greatest　Happiness　Principle；　as　above　explained；　the　ultimate　end；　with　reference　to　and　for　the　sake　of　which　all　other　things　are　desirable　（whether　we　are　considering　our　own　good　or　that　of　other　people）；　is　an　existence　exempt　as　far　as　possible　from　pain；　and　as　rich　as　possible　in　enjoyments；　both　in　point　of　quantity　and　quality；　the　test　of　quality；　and　the　rule　for　measuring　it　against　quantity；　being　the　preference　felt　by　those　who　in　their　opportunities　of　experience；　to　which　must　be　added　their　habits　of　self…consciousness　and　self…observation；　are　best　furnished　with　the　means　of　comparison。　This；　being；　according　to　the　utilitarian　opinion；　the　end　of　human　action；　is　necessarily　also　the　standard　of　morality；　which　may　accordingly　be　defined；　the　rules　and　precepts　for　human　conduct；　by　the　observance　of　which　an　existence　such　as　has　been　described　might　be；　to　the　greatest　extent　possible；　secured　to　all　mankind；　and　not　to　them　only；　but；　so　far　as　the　nature　of　things　admits；　to　the　whole　sentient　creation。　　　Against　this　doctrine；　however；　arises　another　class　of　objectors；　who　say　that　happiness；　in　any　form；　cannot　be　the　rational　purpose　of　human　life　and　action；　because；　in　the　first　place；　it　is　unattainable：　and　they　contemptuously　ask；　what　right　hast　thou　to　be　happy？　a　question　which　Mr。　Carlyle　clenches　by　the　addition；　What　right；　a　short　time　ago；　hadst　thou　even　to　be？　Next；　they　say；　that　men　can　do　without　happiness；　that　all　noble　human　beings　have　felt　this；　and　could　not　have　become　noble　but　by　learning　the　lesson　of　Entsagen；　or　renunciation；　which　lesson；　thoroughly　learnt　and　submitted　to；　they　affirm　to　be　the　beginning　and　necessary　condition　of　all　virtue。　　　The　first　of　these　objections　would　go　to　the　root　of　the　matter　were　it　well　founded；　for　if　no　happiness　is　to　be　had　at　all　by　human　beings；　the　attainment　of　it　cannot　be　the　end　of　morality；　or　of　any　rational　conduct。　Though；　even　in　that　case；　something　might　still　be　said　for　the　utilitarian　theory；　since　utility　includes　not　solely　the　pursuit　of　happiness；　but　the　prevention　or　mitigation　of　unhappiness；　and　if　the　former　aim　be　chimerical；　there　will　be　all　the　greater　scope　and　more　imperative　need　for　the　latter；　so　long　at　least　as　mankind　think　fit　to　live；　and　do　not　take　refuge　in　the　simultaneous　act　of　suicide　recommended　under　certain　conditions　by　Novalis。　When；　however；　it　is　thus　positively　asserted　to　be　impossible　that　human　life　should　be　happy；　the　assertion；　if　not　something　like　a　verbal　quibble；　is　at　least　an　exaggeration。　If　by　happiness　be　meant　a　continuity　of　highly　pleasurable　excitement；　it　is　evident　enough　that　this　is　impossible。　A　state　of　exalted　pleasure　lasts　only　moments；　or　in　some　cases；　and　with　some　intermissions；　hours　or　days；　and　is　the　occasional　brilliant　flash　of　enjoyment；　not　its　permanent　and　steady　flame。　Of　this　the　philosophers　who　have　taught　that　happiness　is　the　end　of　life　were　as　fully　aware　as　those　who　taunt　them。　The　happiness　which　they　meant　was　not　a　life　of　rapture；　but　moments　of　such；　in　an　existence　made　up　of　few　and　transitory　pains；　many　and　various　pleasures；　with　a　decided　predominance　of　the　active　over　the　passive；　and　having　as　the　foundation　of　the　whole；　not　to　expect　more　from　life　than　it　is　capable　of　bestowing。　A　life　thus　composed；　to　those　who　have　been　fortunate　enough　to　obtain　it；　has　always　appeared　worthy　of　the　name　of　happiness。　And　such　an　existence　is　even　now　the　lot　of　many；　during　some　considerable　portion　of　their　lives。　The　present　wretched　education；　and　wretched　social　arrangements；　are　the　only　real　hindrance　to　its　being　attainable　by　almost　all。　　　The　objectors　perhaps　may　doubt　whether　human　beings；　if　taught　to　consider　happiness　as　the　end　of　life；　would　be　satisfied　with　such　a　moderate　share　of　it。　But　great　numbers　of　mankind　have　been　satisfied　with　much　less。　The　main　constituents　of　a　satisfied　life　appear　to　be　two；　either　of　which　by　itself　is　often　found　sufficient　for　the　purpose：　tranquillity；　and　excitement。　With　much　tranquillity；　many　find　that　they　can　be　content　with　very　little　pleasure：　with　much　excitement；　many　can　reconcile　themselves　to　a　considerable　quantity　of　pain。　There　is　assuredly　no　inherent　impossibility　in　enabling　even　the　mass　of　mankind　to　unite　both；　sin