utilitarianism-第6部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


d；　to　inform　the　hearts　and　minds　of　mankind　with　a　spirit　which　should　enable　them　to　find　for　themselves　what　is　right；　and　incline　them　to　do　it　when　found；　rather　than　to　tell　them；　except　in　a　very　general　way；　what　it　is；　and　that　we　need　a　doctrine　of　ethics；　carefully　followed　out；　to　interpret　to　us　the　will　God。　Whether　this　opinion　is　correct　or　not；　it　is　superfluous　here　to　discuss；　since　whatever　aid　religion；　either　natural　or　revealed；　can　afford　to　ethical　investigation；　is　as　open　to　the　utilitarian　moralist　as　to　any　other。　He　can　use　it　as　the　testimony　of　God　to　the　usefulness　or　hurtfulness　of　any　given　course　of　action；　by　as　good　a　right　as　others　can　use　it　for　the　indication　of　a　transcendental　law；　having　no　connection　with　usefulness　or　with　happiness。　　　Again；　Utility　is　often　summarily　stigmatised　as　an　immoral　doctrine　by　giving　it　the　name　of　Expediency；　and　taking　advantage　of　the　popular　use　of　that　term　to　contrast　it　with　Principle。　But　the　Expedient；　in　the　sense　in　which　it　is　opposed　to　the　Right；　generally　means　that　which　is　expedient　for　the　particular　interest　of　the　agent　himself；　as　when　a　minister　sacrifices　the　interests　of　his　country　to　keep　himself　in　place。　When　it　means　anything　better　than　this；　it　means　that　which　is　expedient　for　some　immediate　object；　some　temporary　purpose；　but　which　violates　a　rule　whose　observance　is　expedient　in　a　much　higher　degree。　The　Expedient；　in　this　sense；　instead　of　being　the　same　thing　with　the　useful；　is　a　branch　of　the　hurtful。　Thus；　it　would　often　be　expedient；　for　the　purpose　of　getting　over　some　momentary　embarrassment；　or　attaining　some　object　immediately　useful　to　ourselves　or　others；　to　tell　a　lie。　But　inasmuch　as　the　cultivation　in　ourselves　of　a　sensitive　feeling　on　the　subject　of　veracity；　is　one　of　the　most　useful；　and　the　enfeeblement　of　that　feeling　one　of　the　most　hurtful；　things　to　which　our　conduct　can　be　instrumental；　and　inasmuch　as　any；　even　unintentional；　deviation　from　truth；　does　that　much　towards　weakening　the　trustworthiness　of　human　assertion；　which　is　not　only　the　principal　support　of　all　present　social　well…being；　but　the　insufficiency　of　which　does　more　than　any　one　thing　that　can　be　named　to　keep　back　civilisation；　virtue；　everything　on　which　human　happiness　on　the　largest　scale　depends；　we　feel　that　the　violation；　for　a　present　advantage；　of　a　rule　of　such　transcendant　expediency；　is　not　expedient；　and　that　he　who；　for　the　sake　of　a　convenience　to　himself　or　to　some　other　individual；　does　what　depends　on　him　to　deprive　mankind　of　the　good；　and　inflict　upon　them　the　evil；　involved　in　the　greater　or　less　reliance　which　they　can　place　in　each　other's　word；　acts　the　part　of　one　of　their　worst　enemies。　Yet　that　even　this　rule；　sacred　as　it　is；　admits　of　possible　exceptions；　is　acknowledged　by　all　moralists；　the　chief　of　which　is　when　the　withholding　of　some　fact　（as　of　information　from　a　malefactor；　or　of　bad　news　from　a　person　dangerously　ill）　would　save　an　individual　（especially　an　individual　other　than　oneself）　from　great　and　unmerited　evil；　and　when　the　withholding　can　only　be　effected　by　denial。　But　in　order　that　the　exception　may　not　extend　itself　beyond　the　need；　and　may　have　the　least　possible　effect　in　weakening　reliance　on　veracity；　it　ought　to　be　recognised；　and；　if　possible；　its　limits　defined；　and　if　the　principle　of　utility　is　good　for　anything；　it　must　be　good　for　weighing　these　conflicting　utilities　against　one　another；　and　marking　out　the　region　within　which　one　or　the　other　preponderates。　　　Again；　defenders　of　utility　often　find　themselves　called　upon　to　reply　to　such　objections　as　this…　that　there　is　not　time；　previous　to　action；　for　calculating　and　weighing　the　effects　of　any　line　of　conduct　on　the　general　happiness。　This　is　exactly　as　if　any　one　were　to　say　that　it　is　impossible　to　guide　our　conduct　by　Christianity；　because　there　is　not　time；　on　every　occasion　on　which　anything　has　to　be　done；　to　read　through　the　Old　and　New　Testaments。　The　answer　to　the　objection　is；　that　there　has　been　ample　time；　namely；　the　whole　past　duration　of　the　human　species。　During　all　that　time；　mankind　have　been　learning　by　experience　the　tendencies　of　actions；　on　which　experience　all　the　prudence；　as　well　as　all　the　morality　of　life；　are　dependent。　People　talk　as　if　the　commencement　of　this　course　of　experience　had　hitherto　been　put　off；　and　as　if；　at　the　moment　when　some　man　feels　tempted　to　meddle　with　the　property　or　life　of　another；　he　had　to　begin　considering　for　the　first　time　whether　murder　and　theft　are　injurious　to　human　happiness。　Even　then　I　do　not　think　that　he　would　find　the　question　very　puzzling；　but；　at　all　events；　the　matter　is　now　done　to　his　hand。　　　It　is　truly　a　whimsical　supposition　that；　if　mankind　were　agreed　in　considering　utility　to　be　the　test　of　morality；　they　would　remain　without　any　agreement　as　to　what　is　useful；　and　would　take　no　measures　for　having　their　notions　on　the　subject　taught　to　the　young；　and　enforced　by　law　and　opinion。　There　is　no　difficulty　in　proving　any　ethical　standard　whatever　to　work　ill；　if　we　suppose　universal　idiocy　to　be　conjoined　with　it；　but　on　any　hypothesis　short　of　that；　mankind　must　by　this　time　have　acquired　positive　beliefs　as　to　the　effects　of　some　actions　on　their　happiness；　and　the　beliefs　which　have　thus　come　down　are　the　rules　of　morality　for　the　multitude；　and　for　the　philosopher　until　he　has　succeeded　in　finding　better。　That　philosophers　might　easily　do　this；　even　now；　on　many　subjects；　that　the　received　code　of　ethics　is　by　no　means　of　divine　right；　and　that　mankind　have　still　much　to　learn　as　to　the　effects　of　actions　on　the　general　happiness；　I　admit；　or　rather；　earnestly　maintain。　The　corollaries　from　the　principle　of　utility；　like　the　precepts　of　every　practical　art；　admit　of　indefinite　improvement；　and；　in　a　progressive　state　of　the　human　mind；　their　improvement　is　perpetually　going　on。　　　But　to　consider　the　rules　of　morality　as　improvable；　is　one　thing；　to　pass　over　the　intermediate　generalisations　entirely；　and　endeavour　to　test　each　individual　action　directly　by　the　first　principle；　is　another。　It　is　a　strange　notion　that　the　acknowledgment　of　a　first　principle　is　inconsistent　with　the　admission　of　secondary　ones。　To　inform　a　traveller　respecting　the　place　of　his。　ultimate　destination；　is　not　to　forbid　the　use　of　landmarks　and　direction…posts　on　the　way。　The　proposition　that　happiness　is　the　end　and　aim　of　morality；　does　not　mean　that　no　road　ought　to　be　laid　down　to　that　goal；　or　that　persons　going　thither　should　not　be　advised　to　take　one　direction　rather　than　another。　Men　really　ought　to　leave　off　talking　a　kind　of　nonsense　on　this　subject；　which　they　would　neither　talk　nor　listen　to　on　other　matters　of　practical　concernment。　Nobody　argues　that　the　art　of　navigation　is　not　founded　on　astronomy；　because　sailors　cannot　wait　to　calculate　the　Nautical　Almanack。　Being　rational　creatures；　they　go　to　sea　with　it　ready　calculated；　and　all　rational　creatures　go　out　upon　the　sea　of　life　with　their　minds　made　up　on　the　common　questions　of　right　and　wrong；　as　well　as　on　many　of　the　far　more　difficult　questions　of　wise　and　foolish。　And　this；　as　long　as　foresight　is　a　human　quality；　it　is　to　be　presumed　they　will　continue　to　do。　Whatever　we　adopt　as　the　fundamental　principle　of　morality；　we　require　subordinate　principles　to　apply　it　by；　the　impossibility　of　doing　without　them；　being　common　to　all　systems；　can　afford　no　argument　against　any　one　in　particular；　but　gravely　to　argue　as　if　no　such　secondary　principles　could　be　had；　and　as　if　mankind　had　remained　till　now；　and　always　must　remain；　without　drawing　any　general　conclusions　from　the　experience　of　human　life；　is　as　high　a　pitch；　I　think；　as　absurdity　has　ever　reached　in　philosophical　controversy。　　　The　remainder　of　the　stock　arguments　against　utilitarianism　mostly　consist　in　laying　to　its　charge　the　common　infirmities　of　human　nature；　and　the　general　difficulties　which　embarrass　conscientious　persons　in　shaping　their　course　through　life。　We　are　told　that　a　utilitarian　will　be　apt　to　make　his　own　particular　case　an　exception　to　moral　rules；　and；　when　under　temptation；　will　see　a　utility　in　the　breach　of　a　rule；　greater　than　he　will　see　in　its　observance。　But　is　utility　the　only　creed　which　is　able　to　furnish　us　with　excuses　for　evil　doing；　and　means　of　cheating　our　own　conscience？　They　are　afforded　in　abundance　by　all　doctrines　which　recognise　as　a　fact　in　morals　the　existence　of　conflicting　considerations；　which　all　doctrines　do；　that　have　been　believed　by　sane　persons。　It　is　not　the　fault　of　any　creed；　but　of　the　complicated　nature　of　human　affairs；　that　rules　of　conduct　cannot　be　so　framed　as　to　require　no　exceptions；　and　that　hardly　any　kind　of　action　can　safely　be　laid　down　as　either　always　obligatory　or　always　condemnable。　There　is　no　ethical　creed　which　does　not　temper　the　rigidity　of　its　laws；　by　giving　a　certain　latitude；　under　the　moral　responsibility　of　the　agent；　for　accommodation　to　peculiarities　of　circumstances；　and　under　every　creed；　at　the　opening　thus　made；　self…deception　and　dishonest　casuistry　get　in。　There　exists　no　moral　system　under　which　there　do　not　arise　unequivocal　cases　of　conflicting　obligation。　These　are　the　real　difficulties；　the　knotty　points　both　in　the　theory　of　ethics；　and　in　the　conscientious　guidance　of　personal　conduct。　They　are　overcome　practically；　with　greater　or　with　less　success；　according　to　the　intellect　and　virtue　of　the　individual；　but　it　can　hardly　be　pretended　that　any　one　will　be　the　less　qualified　for　dealing　with　them；　from　possessing　an　ultimate　standard　to　which　conflicting　rights　and　duties　can　be　referred。　If　utility　is　the　ultimate　source　of　moral　obligations；　utility　may　be　invoked　to　decide　between　them　when　their　demands　are　incompatible。　Though　the　application　of　the　standard　may　be　difficult；　it　is　better　than　none　at　all：　while　in　other　systems；　the　moral　laws　all　claiming　independent　authority；　there　is　no　common　umpire　entitled　to　interfere　between　them；　their　claims　to　precedence　one　over　another　rest　on　little　better　than　sophistry；　and　unless　determined；　as　they　generally　are；　by　the　unacknowledged　influence　of　considerations　of　utility；　afford　a