utilitarianism-第7部分

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mined；　as　they　generally　are；　by　the　unacknowledged　influence　of　considerations　of　utility；　afford　a　free　scope　for　the　action　of　personal　desires　and　partialities。　We　must　remember　that　only　in　these　cases　of　conflict　between　secondary　principles　is　it　requisite　that　first　principles　should　be　appealed　to。　There　is　no　case　of　moral　obligation　in　which　some　secondary　principle　is　not　involved；　and　if　only　one；　there　can　seldom　be　any　real　doubt　which　one　it　is；　in　the　mind　of　any　person　by　whom　the　principle　itself　is　recognised。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　3　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Ultimate　Sanction　of　the　Principle　of　Utility。

　　THE　QUESTION　is　often　asked；　and　properly　so；　in　regard　to　any　supposed　moral　standard…　What　is　its　sanction？　what　are　the　motives　to　obey　it？　or　more　specifically；　what　is　the　source　of　its　obligation？　whence　does　it　derive　its　binding　force？　It　is　a　necessary　part　of　moral　philosophy　to　provide　the　answer　to　this　question；　which；　though　frequently　assuming　the　shape　of　an　objection　to　the　utilitarian　morality；　as　if　it　had　some　special　applicability　to　that　above　others；　really　arises　in　regard　to　all　standards。　It　arises；　in　fact；　whenever　a　person　is　called　on　to　adopt　a　standard；　or　refer　morality　to　any　basis　on　which　he　has　not　been　accustomed　to　rest　it。　For　the　customary　morality；　that　which　education　and　opinion　have　consecrated；　is　the　only　one　which　presents　itself　to　the　mind　with　the　feeling　of　being　in　itself　obligatory；　and　when　a　person　is　asked　to　believe　that　this　morality　derives　its　obligation　from　some　general　principle　round　which　custom　has　not　thrown　the　same　halo；　the　assertion　is　to　him　a　paradox；　the　supposed　corollaries　seem　to　have　a　more　binding　force　than　the　original　theorem；　the　superstructure　seems　to　stand　better　without；　than　with；　what　is　represented　as　its　foundation。　He　says　to　himself；　I　feel　that　I　am　bound　not　to　rob　or　murder；　betray　or　deceive；　but　why　am　I　bound　to　promote　the　general　happiness？　If　my　own　happiness　lies　in　something　else；　why　may　I　not　give　that　the　preference？　　　If　the　view　adopted　by　the　utilitarian　philosophy　of　the　nature　of　the　moral　sense　be　correct；　this　difficulty　will　always　present　itself；　until　the　influences　which　form　moral　character　have　taken　the　same　hold　of　the　principle　which　they　have　taken　of　some　of　the　consequences…　until；　by　the　improvement　of　education；　the　feeling　of　unity　with　our　fellow…creatures　shall　be　（what　it　cannot　be　denied　that　Christ　intended　it　to　be）　as　deeply　rooted　in　our　character；　and　to　our　own　consciousness　as　completely　a　part　of　our　nature；　as　the　horror　of　crime　is　in　an　ordinarily　well　brought　up　young　person。　In　the　meantime；　however；　the　difficulty　has　no　peculiar　application　to　the　doctrine　of　utility；　but　is　inherent　in　every　attempt　to　analyse　morality　and　reduce　it　to　principles；　which；　unless　the　principle　is　already　in　men's　minds　invested　with　as　much　sacredness　as　any　of　its　applications；　always　seems　to　divest　them　of　a　part　of　their　sanctity。　　　The　principle　of　utility　either　has；　or　there　is　no　reason　why　it　might　not　have；　all　the　sanctions　which　belong　to　any　other　system　of　morals。　Those　sanctions　are　either　external　or　internal。　Of　the　external　sanctions　it　is　not　necessary　to　speak　at　any　length。　They　are；　the　hope　of　favour　and　the　fear　of　displeasure；　from　our　fellow　creatures　or　from　the　Ruler　of　the　Universe；　along　with　whatever　we　may　have　of　sympathy　or　affection　for　them；　or　of　love　and　awe　of　Him；　inclining　us　to　do　his　will　independently　of　selfish　consequences。　There　is　evidently　no　reason　why　all　these　motives　for　observance　should　not　attach　themselves　to　the　utilitarian　morality；　as　completely　and　as　powerfully　as　to　any　other。　Indeed；　those　of　them　which　refer　to　our　fellow　creatures　are　sure　to　do　so；　in　proportion　to　the　amount　of　general　intelligence；　for　whether　there　be　any　other　ground　of　moral　obligation　than　the　general　happiness　or　not；　men　do　desire　happiness；　and　however　imperfect　may　be　their　own　practice；　they　desire　and　commend　all　conduct　in　others　towards　themselves；　by　which　they　think　their　happiness　is　promoted。　With　regard　to　the　religious　motive；　if　men　believe；　as　most　profess　to　do；　in　the　goodness　of　God；　those　who　think　that　conduciveness　to　the　general　happiness　is　the　essence；　or　even　only　the　criterion　of　good；　must　necessarily　believe　that　it　is　also　that　which　God　approves。　The　whole　force　therefore　of　external　reward　and　punishment；　whether　physical　or　moral；　and　whether　proceeding　from　God　or　from　our　fellow　men；　together　with　all　that　the　capacities　of　human　nature　admit　of　disinterested　devotion　to　either；　become　available　to　enforce　the　utilitarian　morality；　in　proportion　as　that　morality　is　recognised；　and　the　more　powerfully；　the　more　the　appliances　of　education　and　general　cultivation　are　bent　to　the　purpose。　　　So　far　as　to　external　sanctions。　The　internal　sanction　of　duty；　whatever　our　standard　of　duty　may　be；　is　one　and　the　same…　a　feeling　in　our　own　mind；　a　pain；　more　or　less　intense；　attendant　on　violation　of　duty；　which　in　properly　cultivated　moral　natures　rises；　in　the　more　serious　cases；　into　shrinking　from　it　as　an　impossibility。　This　feeling；　when　disinterested；　and　connecting　itself　with　the　pure　idea　of　duty；　and　not　with　some　particular　form　of　it；　or　with　any　of　the　merely　accessory　circumstances；　is　the　essence　of　Conscience；　though　in　that　complex　phenomenon　as　it　actually　exists；　the　simple　fact　is　in　general　all　encrusted　over　with　collateral　associations；　derived　from　sympathy；　from　love；　and　still　more　from　fear；　from　all　the　forms　of　religious　feeling；　from　the　recollections　of　childhood　and　of　all　our　past　life；　from　self…esteem；　desire　of　the　esteem　of　others；　and　occasionally　even　self…abasement。　This　extreme　complication　is；　I　apprehend；　the　origin　of　the　sort　of　mystical　character　which；　by　a　tendency　of　the　human　mind　of　which　there　are　many　other　examples；　is　apt　to　be　attributed　to　the　idea　of　moral　obligation；　and　which　leads　people　to　believe　that　the　idea　cannot　possibly　attach　itself　to　any　other　objects　than　those　which；　by　a　supposed　mysterious　law；　are　found　in　our　present　experience　to　excite　it。　Its　binding　force；　however；　consists　in　the　existence　of　a　mass　of　feeling　which　must　be　broken　through　in　order　to　do　what　violates　our　standard　of　right；　and　which；　if　we　do　nevertheless　violate　that　standard；　will　probably　have　to　be　encountered　afterwards　in　the　form　of　remorse。　Whatever　theory　we　have　of　the　nature　or　origin　of　conscience；　this　is　what　essentially　constitutes　it。　　　The　ultimate　sanction；　therefore；　of　all　morality　（external　motives　apart）　being　a　subjective　feeling　in　our　own　minds；　I　see　nothing　embarrassing　to　those　whose　standard　is　utility；　in　the　question；　what　is　the　sanction　of　that　particular　standard？　We　may　answer；　the　same　as　of　all　other　moral　standards…　the　conscientious　feelings　of　mankind。　Undoubtedly　this　sanction　has　no　binding　efficacy　on　those　who　do　not　possess　the　feelings　it　appeals　to；　but　neither　will　these　persons　be　more　obedient　to　any　other　moral　principle　than　to　the　utilitarian　one。　On　them　morality　of　any　kind　has　no　hold　but　through　the　external　sanctions。　Meanwhile　the　feelings　exist；　a　fact　in　human　nature；　the　reality　of　which；　and　the　great　power　with　which　they　are　capable　of　acting　on　those　in　whom　they　have　been　duly　cultivated；　are　proved　by　experience。　No　reason　has　ever　been　shown　why　they　may　not　be　cultivated　to　as　great　intensity　in　connection　with　the　utilitarian；　as　with　any　other　rule　of　morals。　　　There　is；　I　am　aware；　a　disposition　to　believe　that　a　person　who　sees　in　moral　obligation　a　transcendental　fact；　an　objective　reality　belonging　to　the　province　of　〃Things　in　themselves；〃　is　likely　to　be　more　obedient　to　it　than　one　who　believes　it　to　be　entirely　subjective；　having　its　seat　in　human　consciousness　only。　But　whatever　a　person's　opinion　may　be　on　this　point　of　Ontology；　the　force　he　is　really　urged　by　is　his　own　subjective　feeling；　and　is　exactly　measured　by　its　strength。　No　one's　belief　that　duty　is　an　objective　reality　is　stronger　than　the　belief　that　God　is　so；　yet　the　belief　in　God；　apart　from　the　expectation　of　actual　reward　and　punishment；　only　operates　on　conduct　through；　and　in　proportion　to；　the　subjective　religious　feeling。　The　sanction；　so　far　as　it　is　disinterested；　is　always　in　the　mind　itself；　and　the　notion　therefore　of　the　transcendental　moralists　must　be；　that　this　sanction　will　not　exist　in　the　mind　unless　it　is　believed　to　have　its　root　out　of　the　mind；　and　that　if　a　person　is　able　to　say　to　himself；　This　which　is　restraining　me；　and　which　is　called　my　conscience；　is　only　a　feeling　in　my　own　mind；　he　may　possibly　draw　the　conclusion　that　when　the　feeling　ceases　the　obligation　ceases；　and　that　if　he　find　the　feeling　inconvenient；　he　may　disregard　it；　and　endeavour　to　get　rid　of　it。　But　is　this　danger　confined　to　the　utilitarian　morality？　Does　the　belief　that　moral　obligation　has　its　seat　outside　the　mind　make　the　feeling　of　it　too　strong　to　be　got　rid　of？　The　fact　is　so　far　otherwise；　that　all　moralists　admit　and　lament　the　ease　with　which；　in　the　generality　of　minds；　conscience　can　be　silenced　or　stifled。　The　question；　Need　I　obey　my　conscience？　is　quite　as　often　put　to　themselves　by　persons　who　never　heard　of　the　principle　of　utility；　as　by　its　adherents。　Those　whose　conscientious　feelings　are　so　weak　as　to　allow　of　their　asking　this　question；　if　they　answer　it　affirmatively；　will　not　do　so　because　they　believe　in　the　transcendental　theory；　but　because　of　the　external　sanctions。　　　It　is　not　necessary；　for　the　present　purpose；　to　decide　whether　the　feeling　of　duty　is　innate　or　implanted。　Assuming　it　to　be　innate；　it　is　an　open　question　to　what　objects　it　naturally　attaches　itself；　for　the　philosophic　supporters　of　that　theory　are　now　agreed　that　the　intuitive　perception　is　of　principles　of　morality　and　not　of　the　details。　If　there　be　anything　innate　in　the　matter；　I　see　no　reason　why　the　feeling　which　is　innate　should　not　be　that　of　regard　to　the　pleasures　and　pains　of　others。　If　there　is　any　principle　of　morals　which　is　intuitively　obligatory；　I　should　say　it　must　be　that。　If　so；　the　intuitive　ethics　would　coincide