the path of the law-第4部分

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ready　to　be　stated　in　words。　　

At　present；　in　very　many　cases；　if　we　want　to　know　why　a　rule　of　law　has　
taken　its　particular　shape；　and　more　or　less　if　we　want　to　know　why　it　
exists　at　all；　we　go　to　tradition。　　We　follow　it　into　the　Year　Books；　
and　perhaps　beyond　them　to　the　customs　of　the　Salian　Franks；　and　
somewhere　in　the　past；　in　the　German　forests；　in　the　needs　of　Norman　
kings；　in　the　assumptions　of　a　dominant　class；　in　the　absence　of　
generalized　ideas；　we　find　out　the　practical　motive　for　what　now　best　is　
justified　by　the　mere　fact　of　its　acceptance　and　that　men　are　accustomed　
to　it。　　The　rational　study　of　law　is　still　to　a　large　extent　the　study　
of　history。　　History　must　be　a　part　of　the　study；　because　without　it　we　
cannot　know　the　precise　scope　of　rules　which　it　is　our　business　to　know。　　
It　is　a　part　of　the　rational　study；　because　it　is　the　first　step　toward　
an　enlightened　scepticism；　that　is；　towards　a　deliberate　reconsideration　
of　the　worth　of　those　rules。　　When　you　get　the　dragon　out　of　his　cave　on　
to　the　plain　and　in　the　daylight；　you　can　count　his　teeth　and　claws；　and　
see　just　what　is　his　strength。　　But　to　get　him　out　is　only　the　first　
step。　　The　next　is　either　to　kill　him；　or　to　tame　him　and　make　him　a　
useful　animal。　　For　the　rational　study　of　the　law　the　blackletter　man　
may　be　the　man　of　the　present；　but　the　man　of　the　future　is　the　man　of　
statistics　and　the　master　of　economics。　　It　is　revolting　to　have　no　
better　reason　for　a　rule　of　law　than　that　so　it　was　laid　down　in　the　
time　of　Henry　IV。　　It　is　still　more　revolting　if　the　grounds　upon　which　
it　was　laid　down　have　vanished　long　since；　and　the　rule　simply　persists　
from　blind　imitation　of　the　past。　　I　am　thinking　of　the　technical　rule　
as　to　trespass　ab　initio；　as　it　is　called；　which　I　attempted　to　explain　
in　a　recent　Massachusetts　case。　　

Let　me　take　an　illustration；　which　can　be　stated　in　a　few　words；　to　show　
how　the　social　end　which　is　aimed　at　by　a　rule　of　law　is　obscured　and　
only　partially　attained　in　consequence　of　the　fact　that　the　rule　owes　
its　form　to　a　gradual　historical　development；　instead　of　being　reshaped　
as　a　whole；　with　conscious　articulate　reference　to　the　end　in　view。　　We　
think　it　desirable　to　prevent　one　man's　property　being　misappropriated　
by　another；　and　so　we　make　larceny　a　crime。　　The　evil　is　the　same　
whether　the　misappropriation　is　made　by　a　man　into　whose　hands　the　owner　
has　put　the　property；　or　by　one　who　wrongfully　takes　it　away。　　But　
primitive　law　in　its　weakness　did　not　get　much　beyond　an　effort　to　
prevent　violence；　and　very　naturally　made　a　wrongful　taking；　a　trespass；　
part　of　its　definition　of　the　crime。　　In　modem　times　the　judges　enlarged　
the　definition　a　little　by　holding　that；　if　the　wrong…doer　gets　
possession　by　a　trick　or　device；　the　crime　is　committed。　　This　really　
was　giving　up　the　requirement　of　trespass；　and　it　would　have　been　more　
logical；　as　well　as　truer　to　the　present　object　of　the　law；　to　abandon　
the　requirement　altogether。　　That；　however；　would　have　seemed　too　bold；　
and　was　left　to　statute。　　Statutes　were　passed　making　embezzlement　a　
crime。　　But　the　force　of　tradition　caused　the　crime　of　embezzlement　to　
be　regarded　as　so　far　distinct　from　larceny　that　to　this　day；　in　some　
jurisdictions　at　least；　a　slip　corner　is　kept　open　for　thieves　to　
contend；　if　indicted　for　larceny；　that　they　should　have　been　indicted　
for　embezzlement；　and　if　indicted　for　embezzlement；　that　they　should　
have　been　indicted　for　larceny；　and　to　escape　on　that　ground。　　

Far　more　fundamental　questions　still　await　a　better　answer　than　that　we　
do　as　our　fathers　have　done。　　What　have　we　better　than　a　blind　guess　to　
show　that　the　criminal　law　in　its　present　form　does　more　good　than　harm？　　
I　do　not　stop　to　refer　to　the　effect　which　it　has　had　in　degrading　
prisoners　and　in　plunging　them　further　into　crime；　or　to　the　question　
whether　fine　and　imprisonment　do　not　fall　more　heavily　on　a　criminal's　
wife　and　children　than　on　himself。　　I　have　in　mind　more　far…reaching　
questions。　　Does　punishment　deter？　　Do　we　deal　with　criminals　on　proper　
principles？　　A　modern　school　of　Continental　criminalists　plumes　itself　
on　the　formula；　first　suggested；　it　is　said；　by　Gall；　that　we　must　
consider　the　criminal　rather　than　the　crime。　　The　formula　does　not　carry　
us　very　far；　but　the　inquiries　which　have　been　started　look　toward　an　
answer　of　my　questions　based　on　science　for　the　first　time。　　If　the　
typical　criminal　is　a　degenerate；　bound　to　swindle　or　to　murder　by　as　
deep　seated　an　organic　necessity　as　that　which　makes　the　rattlesnake　
bite；　it　is　idle　to　talk　of　deterring　him　by　the　classical　method　of　
imprisonment。　　He　must　be　got　rid　of；　he　cannot　be　improved；　or　
frightened　out　of　his　structural　reaction。　　If；　on　the　other　hand；　
crime；　like　normal　human　conduct；　is　mainly　a　matter　of　imitation；　
punishment　fairly　may　be　expected　to　help　to　keep　it　out　of　fashion。　　
The　study　of　criminals　has　been　thought　by　some　well　known　men　of　
science　to　sustain　the　former　hypothesis。　　The　statistics　of　the　
relative　increase　of　crime　in　crowded　places　like　large　cities；　where　
example　has　the　greatest　chance　to　work；　and　in　less　populated　parts；　
where　the　contagion　spreads　more　slowly；　have　been　used　with　great　force　
in　favor　of　the　latter　view。　　But　there　is　weighty　authority　for　the　
belief　that；　however　this　may　be；　〃not　the　nature　of　the　crime；　but　the　
dangerousness　of　the　criminal；　constitutes　the　only　reasonable　legal　
criterion　to　guide　the　inevitable　social　reaction　against　the　criminal。〃

The　impediments　to　rational　generalization；　which　I　illustrated　from　the　
law　of　larceny；　are　shown　in　the　other　branches　of　the　law；　as　well　as　
in　that　of　crime。　　Take　the　law　of　tort　or　civil　liability　for　damages　
apart　from　contract　and　the　like。　　Is　there　any　general　theory　of　such　
liability；　or　are　the　cases　in　which　it　exists　simply　to　be　enumerated；　
and　to　be　explained　each　on　its　special　ground；　as　is　easy　to　believe　
from　the　fact　that　the　right　of　action　for　certain　well　known　classes　of　
wrongs　like　trespass　or　slander　has　its　special　history　for　each　class？　　
I　think　that　the　law　regards　the　infliction　of　temporal　damage　by　a　
responsible　person　as　actionable；　if　under　the　circumstances　known　to　
him　the　danger　of　his　act　is　manifest　according　to　common　experience；　or　
according　to　his　own　experience　if　it　is　more　than　common；　except　in　
cases　where　upon　special　grounds　of　policy　the　law　refuses　to　protect　
the　plaintiff　or　grants　a　privilege　to　the　defendant。　　I　think　that　
commonly　malice；　intent；　and　negligence　mean　only　that　the　danger　was　
manifest　to　a　greater　or　less　degree；　under　the　circumstances　known　to　
the　actor；　although　in　some　cases　of　privilege　malice　may　mean　an　actual　
malevolent　motive；　and　such　a　motive　may　take　away　a　permission　
knowingly　to　inflict　harm；　which　otherwise　would　be　granted　on　this　or　
that　ground　of　dominant　public　good。　　But　when　I　stated　my　view　to　a　
very　eminent　English　judge　the　other　day；　he　said；　〃You　are　discussing　
what　the　law　ought　to　be；　as　the　law　is；　you　must　show　a　right。　　A　man　
is　not　liable　for　negligence　unless　he　is　subject　to　a　duty。〃　　If　our　
difference　was　more　than　a　difference　in　words；　or　with　regard　to　the　
proportion　between　the　exceptions　and　the　rule；　then；　in　his　opinion；　
liability　for　an　act　cannot　be　referred　to　the　manifest　tendency　of　the　
act　to　cause　temporal　damage　in　general　as　a　sufficient　explanation；　but　
must　be　referred　to　the　special　nature　of　the　damage；　or　must　be　derived　
from　some　special　circumstances　outside　of　the　tendency　of　the　act；　for　
which　no　generalized　explanation　exists。　　I　think　that　such　a　view　is　
wrong；　but　it　is　familiar；　and　I　dare　say　generally　is　accepted　in　
England。　　

Everywhere　the　basis　of　principle　is　tradition；　to　such　an　extent　that　
we　even　are　in　danger　of　making　the　role　of　history　more　important　than　
it　is。　　The　other　day　Professor　Ames　wrote　a　learned　article　to　show；　
among　other　things；　that　the　common　law　did　not　recognize　the　defence　of　
fraud　in　actions　upon　specialties；　and　the　moral　might　seem　to　be　that　
the　personal　character　of　that　defence　is　due　to　its　equitable　origin。　　
But　if；　as　I　said；　all　contracts　are　formal；　the　difference　is　not　
merely　historical；　but　theoretic；　between　defects　of　form　which　prevent　
a　contract　from　being　made；　and　mistaken　motives　which　manifestly　could　
not　be　considered　in　any　system　that　we　should　call　rational　except　
against　one　who　was　privy　to　those　motives。　　It　is　not　confined　to　
specialties；　but　is　of　universal　application。　　I　ought　to　add　that　I　do　
not　suppose　that　Mr。　Ames　would　disagree　with　what　I　suggest。　　

However；　if　we　consider　the　law　of　contract；　we　find　it　full　of　history。　　
The　distinctions　between　debt；　covenant；　and　assumpsit　are　merely　
historical。　　The　classification　of　certain　obligations　to　pay　money；　
imposed　by　the　law　irrespective　of　any　bargain　as　quasi　contracts；　is　
merely　historical。　　The　doctrine　of　consideration　is　merely　historical。　　
The　effect　given　to　a　seal　is　to　be　explained　by　history　alone。　　
Consideration　is　a　mere　form。　　Is　it　a　useful　form？　　If　so；　why　should　
it　not　be　required　in　all　contracts？　　A　seal　is　a　mere　form；　and　is　
vanishing　in　the　scroll　and　in　enactments　that　a　consideration　must　be　
given；　seal　or　no　seal。　　Why　should　any　merely　historical　distinction　be　
allowed　to　affect　the　rights　and　obligations　of　business　men？　　

Since　I　wrote　this　discourse　I　have　come　on　a　very　good　example　of　the　
way　in　which　tradition　not　only　overrides　rational　policy；　but　overrides　
it　after　first　having　been　misunderstood　and　having　been　given　a　new　and　
broader　scope　than　it　had　when　it　had　a　meaning。　　It　is　the　settled　law　
of　England　that　a　material　alteration　of　a　written　contract　by　a　party　
avoids　it　as　against　him。　　The　doctrine　is　contrary　to　the　general　
tendency　of　the　law。　　We　do　not　tell　a　jury　that　if　a　man　ever　has　lied　
in　one　particular　he　is　to　be　presumed　to　lie　in　all。　　Even　if　a　man　has　
tried　to　defraud；　it　seems　no　sufficient　reason　for　preventing　him　fro