the path of the law-第5部分

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tried　to　defraud；　it　seems　no　sufficient　reason　for　preventing　him　from　
proving　the　truth。　　Objections　of　like　nature　in　general　go　to　the　
weight；　not　to　the　admissibility；　of　evidence。　　Moreover；　this　rule　is　
irrespective　of　fraud；　and　is　not　confined　to　evidence。　　It　is　not　
merely　that　you　cannot　use　the　writing；　but　that　the　contract　is　at　an　
end。　　What　does　this　mean？　　The　existence　of　a　written　contract　depends　
on　the　fact　that　the　offerer　and　offeree　have　interchanged　their　written　
expressions；　not　on　the　continued　existence　of　those　expressions。　　But　
in　the　case　of　a　bond；　the　primitive　notion　was　different。　　The　contract　
was　inseparable　from　the　parchment。　　If　a　stranger　destroyed　it；　or　tore　
off　the　seal；　or　altered　it；　the　obligee　count　not　recover；　however　free　
from　fault；　because　the　defendant's　contract；　that　is；　the　actual　
tangible　bond　which　he　had　sealed；　could　not　be　produced　in　the　form　in　
which　it　bound　him。　　About　a　hundred　years　ago　Lord　Kenyon　undertook　to　
use　his　reason　on　the　tradition；　as　he　sometimes　did　to　the　detriment　of　
the　law；　and；　not　understanding　it；　said　he　could　see　no　reason　why　what　
was　true　of　a　bond　should　not　be　true　of　other　contracts。　　His　decision　
happened　to　be　right；　as　it　concerned　a　promissory　note；　where　again　the　
common　law　regarded　the　contract　as　inseparable　from　the　paper　on　which　
it　was　written；　but　the　reasoning　was　general；　and　soon　was　extended　to　
other　written　contracts；　and　various　absurd　and　unreal　grounds　of　policy　
were　invented　to　account　for　the　enlarged　rule。　　

I　trust　that　no　one　will　understand　me　to　be　speaking　with　disrespect　of　
the　law；　because　I　criticise　it　so　freely。　　I　venerate　the　law；　and　
especially　our　system　of　law；　as　one　of　the　vastest　products　of　the　
human　mind。　　No　one　knows　better　than　I　do　the　countless　number　of　great　
intellects　that　have　spent　themselves　in　making　some　addition　or　
improvement；　the　greatest　of　which　is　trifling　when　compared　with　the　
mighty　whole。　　It　has　the　final　title　to　respect　that　it　exists；　that　it　
is　not　a　Hegelian　dream；　but　a　part　of　the　lives　of　men。　　But　one　may　
criticise　even　what　one　reveres。　　Law　is　the　business　to　which　my　life　
is　devoted；　and　I　should　show　less　than　devotion　if　I　did　not　do　what　in　
me　lies　to　improve　it；　and；　when　I　perceive　what　seems　to　me　the　ideal　
of　its　future；　if　I　hesitated　to　point　it　out　and　to　press　toward　it　
with　all　my　heart。　　

Perhaps　I　have　said　enough　to　show　the　part　which　the　study　of　history　
necessarily　plays　in　the　intelligent　study　of　the　law　as　it　is　today。　　
In　the　teaching　of　this　school　and　at　Cambridge　it　is　in　no　danger　of　
being　undervalued。　　Mr。　Bigelow　here　and　Mr。　Ames　and　Mr。　Thayer　there　
have　made　important　contributions　which　will　not　be　forgotten；　and　in　
England　the　recent　history　of　early　English　law　by　Sir　Frederick　Pollock　
and　Mr。　Maitland　has　lent　the　subject　an　almost　deceptive　charm。　　We　
must　beware　of　the　pitfall　of　antiquarianism；　and　must　remember　that　for　
our　purposes　our　only　interest　in　the　past　is　for　the　light　it　throws　
upon　the　present。　　I　look　forward　to　a　time　when　the　part　played　by　
history　in　the　explanation　of　dogma　shall　be　very　small；　and　instead　of　
ingenious　research　we　shall　spend　our　energy　on　a　study　of　the　ends　
sought　to　be　attained　and　the　reasons　for　desiring　them。　　As　a　step　
toward　that　ideal　it　seems　to　me　that　every　lawyer　ought　to　seek　an　
understanding　of　economics。　　The　present　divorce　between　the　schools　of　
political　economy　and　law　seems　to　me　an　evidence　of　how　much　progress　
in　philosophical　study　still　remains　to　be　made。　　In　the　present　state　
of　political　economy；　indeed；　we　come　again　upon　history　on　a　larger　
scale；　but　there　we　are　called　on　to　consider　and　weigh　the　ends　of　
legislation；　the　means　of　attaining　them；　and　the　cost。　　We　learn　that　
for　everything　we　have　we　give　up　something　else；　and　we　are　taught　to　
set　the　advantage　we　gain　against　the　other　advantage　we　lose；　and　to　
know　what　we　are　doing　when　we　elect。　　

There　is　another　study　which　sometimes　is　undervalued　by　the　practical　
minded；　for　which　I　wish　to　say　a　good　word；　although　I　think　a　good　
deal　of　pretty　poor　stuff　goes　under　that　name。　　I　mean　the　study　of　
what　is　called　jurisprudence。　　Jurisprudence；　as　I　look　at　it；　is　simply　
law　in　its　most　generalized　part。　　Every　effort　to　reduce　a　case　to　a　
rule　is　an　effort　of　jurisprudence；　although　the　name　as　used　in　English　
is　confined　to　the　broadest　rules　and　most　fundamental　conceptions。　　One　
mark　of　a　great　lawyer　is　that　he　sees　the　application　of　the　broadest　
rules。　　There　is　a　story　of　a　Vermont　justice　of　the　peace　before　whom　a　
suit　was　brought　by　one　farmer　against　another　for　breaking　a　churn。　　
The　justice　took　time　to　consider；　and　then　said　that　he　has　looked　
through　the　statutes　and　could　find　nothing　about　churns；　and　gave　
judgment　for　the　defendant。　　The　same　state　of　mind　is　shown　in　all　our　
common　digests　and　textbooks。　　Applications　of　rudimentary　rules　of　
contract　or　tort　are　tucked　away　under　the　head　of　Railroads　or　
Telegraphs　or　go　to　swell　treatises　on　historical　subdivisions；　such　as　
Shipping　or　Equity；　or　are　gathered　under　an　arbitrary　title　which　is　
thought　likely　to　appeal　to　the　practical　mind；　such　as　Mercantile　Law。　　
If　a　man　goes　into　law　it　pays　to　be　a　master　of　it；　and　to　be　a　master　
of　it　means　to　look　straight　through　all　the　dramatic　incidents　and　to　
discern　the　true　basis　for　prophecy。　　Therefore；　it　is　well　to　have　an　
accurate　notion　of　what　you　mean　by　law；　by　a　right；　by　a　duty；　by　
malice；　intent；　and　negligence；　by　ownership；　by　possession；　and　so　
forth。　　I　have　in　my　mind　cases　in　which　the　highest　courts　seem　to　me　
to　have　floundered　because　they　had　no　clear　ideas　on　some　of　these　
themes。　　I　have　illustrated　their　importance　already。　　If　a　further　
illustration　is　wished；　it　may　be　found　by　reading　the　Appendix　to　Sir　
James　Stephen's　Criminal　Law　on　the　subject　of　possession；　and　then　
turning　to　Pollock　and　Wright's　enlightened　book。　　Sir　James　Stephen　is　
not　the　only　writer　whose　attempts　to　analyze　legal　ideas　have　been　
confused　by　striving　for　a　useless　quintessence　of　all　systems；　instead　
of　an　accurate　anatomy　of　one。　　The　trouble　with　Austin　was　that　he　did　
not　know　enough　English　law。　　But　still　it　is　a　practical　advantage　to　
master　Austin；　and　his　predecessors；　Hobbes　and　Bentham；　and　his　worthy　
successors；　Holland　and　Pollock。　　Sir　Frederick　Pollock's　recent　little　
book　is　touched　with　the　felicity　which　marks　all　his　works；　and　is　
wholly　free　from　the　perverting　influence　of　Roman　models。　　

The　advice　of　the　elders　to　young　men　is　very　apt　to　be　as　unreal　as　a　
list　of　the　hundred　best　books。　　At　least　in　my　day　I　had　my　share　of　
such　counsels；　and　high　among　the　unrealities　I　place　the　recommendation　
to　study　the　Roman　law。　　I　assume　that　such　advice　means　more　than　
collecting　a　few　Latin　maxims　with　which　to　ornament　the　discoursethe　
purpose　for　which　Lord　Coke　recommended　Bracton。　　If　that　is　all　that　is　
wanted；　the　title　De　Regulis　Juris　Antiqui　can　be　read　in　an　hour。　　I　
assume　that；　if　it　is　well　to　study　the　Roman　Law；　it　is　well　to　study　
it　as　a　working　system。　　That　means　mastering　a　set　of　technicalities　
more　difficult　and　less　understood　than　our　own；　and　studying　another　
course　of　history　by　which　even　more　than　our　own　the　Roman　law　must　
explained。　　If　any　one　doubts　me；　let　him　read　Keller's　Der　Romische　
Civil　Process　und　die　Actionen；　a　treatise　on　the　praetor's　edict；　
Muirhead's　most　interesting　Historical　Introduction　to　the　Private　Law　
of　Rome；　and；　to　give　him　the　best　chance；　Sohn's　admirable　Institutes。　　
No。　　The　way　to　gain　a　liberal　view　of　your　subject　is　not　to　read　
something　else；　but　to　get　to　the　bottom　of　the　subject　itself。　　The　
means　of　doing　that　are；　in　the　first　place；　to　follow　the　existing　body　
of　dogma　into　its　highest　generalizations　by　the　help　of　jurisprudence；　
next；　to　discover　from　history　how　it　has　come　to　be　what　it　is；　and　
finally；　so　far　as　you　can；　to　consider　the　ends　which　the　several　rules　
seek　to　accomplish；　the　reasons　why　those　ends　are　desired；　what　is　
given　up　to　gain　them；　and　whether　they　are　worth　the　price。　　

We　have　too　little　theory　in　the　law　rather　than　too　much；　especially　on　
this　final　branch　of　study。　　When　I　was　speaking　of　history；　I　mentioned　
larceny　as　an　example　to　show　how　the　law　suffered　from　not　having　
embodied　in　a　clear　form　a　rule　which　will　accomplish　its　manifest　
purpose。　　In　that　case　the　trouble　was　due　to　the　survival　of　forms　
coming　from　a　time　when　a　more　limited　purpose　was　entertained。　　Let　me　
now　give　an　example　to　show　the　practical　importance；　for　the　decision　
of　actual　cases；　of　understanding　the　reasons　of　the　law；　by　taking　an　
example　from　rules　which；　so　far　as　I　know；　never　have　been　explained　or　
theorized　about　in　any　adequate　way。　　I　refer　to　statutes　of　limitation　
and　the　law　of　prescription。　　The　end　of　such　rules　is　obvious；　but　what　
is　the　justification　for　depriving　a　man　of　his　rights；　a　pure　evil　as　
far　as　it　goes；　in　consequence　of　the　lapse　of　time？　　Sometimes　the　loss　
of　evidence　is　referred　to；　but　that　is　a　secondary　matter。　　Sometimes　
the　desirability　of　peace；　but　why　is　peace　more　desirable　after　twenty　
years　than　before？　　It　is　increasingly　likely　to　come　without　the　aid　of　
legislation。　　Sometimes　it　is　said　that；　if　a　man　neglects　to　enforce　
his　rights；　he　cannot　complain　if；　after　a　while；　the　law　follows　his　
example。　　Now　if　this　is　all　that　can　be　said　about　it；　you　probably　
will　decide　a　case　I　am　going　to　put；　for　the　plaintiff；　if　you　take　the　
view　which　I　shall　suggest；　you　possibly　will　decide　it　for　the　
defendant。　　A　man　is　sued　for　trespass　upon　land；　and　justifies　under　a　
right　of　way。　　He　proves　that　he　has　used　the　way　openly　and　adversely　
for　twenty　years；　but　it　turns　out　that　the　plaintiff　had　granted　a　
license　to　a　person　whom　he　reasonably　supposed　to　be　the　defendant's　
agent；　although　not　so　in　fact；　and　therefore　had　assumed　that　the　use　
of　the　way