the seventh letter-第6部分

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comes　closest　in　kinship　and　likeness　to　the　fifth；　and　the　others　are


farther　distant。


　　The　same　applies　to　straight　as　well　as　to　circular　form；　to


colours；　to　the　good；　the；　beautiful；　the　just；　to　all　bodies


whether　manufactured　or　coming　into　being　in　the　course　of　nature；


to　fire；　water；　and　all　such　things；　to　every　living　being；　to


character　in　souls；　and　to　all　things　done　and　suffered。　For　in　the


case　of　all　these；　no　one；　if　he　has　not　some　how　or　other　got　hold　of


the　four　things　first　mentioned；　can　ever　be　completely　a　partaker


of　knowledge　of　the　fifth。　Further；　on　account　of　the　weakness　of


language；　these　（i。e。；　the　four）　attempt　to　show　what　each　thing　is


like；　not　less　than　what　each　thing　is。　For　this　reason　no　man　of


intelligence　will　venture　to　express　his　philosophical　views　in


language；　especially　not　in　language　that　is　unchangeable；　which　is


true　of　that　which　is　set　down　in　written　characters。


　　Again　you　must　learn　the　point　which　comes　next。　Every　circle；　of


those　which　are　by　the　act　of　man　drawn　or　even　turned　on　a　lathe；


is　full　of　that　which　is　opposite　to　the　fifth　thing。　For　everywhere


it　has　contact　with　the　straight。　But　the　circle　itself；　we　say；　has


nothing　in　either　smaller　or　greater；　of　that　which　is　its　opposite。


We　say　also　that　the　name　is　not　a　thing　of　permanence　for　any　of


them；　and　that　nothing　prevents　the　things　now　called　round　from　being


called　straight；　and　the　straight　things　round；　for　those　who　make


changes　and　call　things　by　opposite　names；　nothing　will　be　less


permanent　（than　a　name）。　Again　with　regard　to　the　definition；　if　it　is


made　up　of　names　and　verbal　forms；　the　same　remark　holds　that　there　is


no　sufficiently　durable　permanence　in　it。　And　there　is　no　end　to　the


instances　of　the　ambiguity　from　which　each　of　the　four　suffers；　but


the　greatest　of　them　is　that　which　we　mentioned　a　little　earlier；


that；　whereas　there　are　two　things；　that　which　has　real　being；　and


that　which　is　only　a　quality；　when　the　soul　is　seeking　to　know；　not


the　quality；　but　the　essence；　each　of　the　four；　presenting　to　the　soul


by　word　and　in　act　that　which　it　is　not　seeking　（i。e。；　the　quality）；　a


thing　open　to　refutation　by　the　senses；　being　merely　the　thing


presented　to　the　soul　in　each　particular　case　whether　by　statement


or　the　act　of　showing；　fills；　one　may　say；　every　man　with　puzzlement


and　perplexity。


　　Now　in　subjects　in　which；　by　reason　of　our　defective　education；　we


have　not　been　accustomed　even　to　search　for　the　truth；　but　are


satisfied　with　whatever　images　are　presented　to　us；　we　are　not　held　up


to　ridicule　by　one　another；　the　questioned　by　questioners；　who　can


pull　to　pieces　and　criticise　the　four　things。　But　in　subjects　where　we


try　to　compel　a　man　to　give　a　clear　answer　about　the　fifth；　any　one　of


those　who　are　capable　of　overthrowing　an　antagonist　gets　the　better　of


us；　and　makes　the　man；　who　gives　an　exposition　in　speech　or　writing　or


in　replies　to　questions；　appear　to　most　of　his　hearers　to　know　nothing


of　the　things　on　which　he　is　attempting　to　write　or　speak；　for　they


are　sometimes　not　aware　that　it　is　not　the　mind　of　the　writer　or


speaker　which　is　proved　to　be　at　fault；　but　the　defective　nature　of


each　of　the　four　instruments。　The　process　however　of　dealing　with


all　of　these；　as　the　mind　moves　up　and　down　to　each　in　turn；　does


after　much　effort　give　birth　in　a　well…constituted　mind　to　knowledge


of　that　which　is　well　constituted。　But　if　a　man　is　ill…constituted


by　nature　（as　the　state　of　the　soul　is　naturally　in　the　majority


both　in　its　capacity　for　learning　and　in　what　is　called　moral


character）…or　it　may　have　become　so　by　deterioration…not　even


Lynceus　could　endow　such　men　with　the　power　of　sight。


　　In　one　word；　the　man　who　has　no　natural　kinship　with　this　matter


cannot　be　made　akin　to　it　by　quickness　of　learning　or　memory；　for　it


cannot　be　engendered　at　all　in　natures　which　are　foreign　to　it。


Therefore；　if　men　are　not　by　nature　kinship　allied　to　justice　and


all　other　things　that　are　honourable；　though　they　may　be　good　at


learning　and　remembering　other　knowledge　of　various　kinds…or　if　they


have　the　kinship　but　are　slow　learners　and　have　no　memory…none　of


all　these　will　ever　learn　to　the　full　the　truth　about　virtue　and　vice。


For　both　must　be　learnt　together；　and　together　also　must　be　learnt；　by


complete　and　long　continued　study；　as　I　said　at　the　beginning；　the


true　and　the　false　about　all　that　has　real　being。　After　much　effort；


as　names；　definitions；　sights；　and　other　data　of　sense；　are　brought


into　contact　and　friction　one　with　another；　in　the　course　of


scrutiny　and　kindly　testing　by　men　who　proceed　by　question　and


answer　without　ill　will；　with　a　sudden　flash　there　shines　forth


understanding　about　every　problem；　and　an　intelligence　whose　efforts


reach　the　furthest　limits　of　human　powers。　Therefore　every　man　of


worth；　when　dealing　with　matters　of　worth；　will　be　far　from　exposing


them　to　ill　feeling　and　misunderstanding　among　men　by　committing


them　to　writing。　In　one　word；　then；　it　may　be　known　from　this　that；　if


one　sees　written　treatises　composed　by　anyone；　either　the　laws　of　a


lawgiver；　or　in　any　other　form　whatever；　these　are　not　for　that　man


the　things　of　most　worth；　if　he　is　a　man　of　worth；　but　that　his


treasures　are　laid　up　in　the　fairest　spot　that　he　possesses。　But　if


these　things　were　worked　at　by　him　as　things　of　real　worth；　and


committed　to　writing；　then　surely；　not　gods；　but　men　〃have


themselves　bereft　him　of　his　wits。〃


　　Anyone　who　has　followed　this　discourse　and　digression　will　know　well


that；　if　Dionysios　or　anyone　else；　great　or　small；　has　written　a


treatise　on　the　highest　matters　and　the　first　principles　of　things；　he


has；　so　I　say；　neither　heard　nor　learnt　any　sound　teaching　about　the


subject　of　his　treatise；　otherwise；　he　would　have　had　the　same


reverence　for　it；　which　I　have；　and　would　have　shrunk　from　putting


it　forth　into　a　world　of　discord　and　uncomeliness。　For　he　wrote　it；


not　as　an　aid　to　memory…since　there　is　no　risk　of　forgetting　it；　if


a　man's　soul　has　once　laid　hold　of　it；　for　it　is　expressed　in　the


shortest　of　statements…but　if　he　wrote　it　at　all；　it　was　from　a　mean


craving　for　honour；　either　putting　it　forth　as　his　own　invention；　or


to　figure　as　a　man　possessed　of　culture；　of　which　he　was　not　worthy；


if　his　heart　was　set　on　the　credit　of　possessing　it。　If　then　Dionysios


gained　this　culture　from　the　one　lesson　which　he　had　from　me；　we　may


perhaps　grant　him　the　possession　of　it；　though　how　he　acquired


it…God　wot；　as　the　Theban　says；　for　I　gave　him　the　teaching；　which　I


have　described；　on　that　one　occasion　and　never　again。


　　The　next　point　which　requires　to　be　made　clear　to　anyone　who


wishes　to　discover　how　things　really　happened；　is　the　reason　why　it


came　about　that　I　did　not　continue　my　teaching　in　a　second　and　third


lesson　and　yet　oftener。　Does　Dionysios；　after　a　single　lesson；　believe


himself　to　know　the　matter；　and　has　he　an　adequate　knowledge　of　it；


either　as　having　discovered　it　for　himself　or　learnt　it　before　from


others；　or　does　he　believe　my　teaching　to　be　worthless；　or；　thirdly；


to　be　beyond　his　range　and　too　great　for　him；　and　himself　to　be　really


unable　to　live　as　one　who　gives　his　mind　to　wisdom　and　virtue？　For


if　he　thinks　it　worthless；　he　will　have　to　contend　with　many　who　say


the　opposite；　and　who　would　be　held　in　far　higher　repute　as　judges


than　Dionysios；　if　on　the　other　hand；　he　thinks　he　has　discovered　or


learnt　the　things　and　that　they　are　worth　having　as　part　of　a


liberal　education；　how　could　he；　unless　he　is　an　extraordinary　person；


have　so　recklessly　dishonoured　the　master　who　has　led　the　way　in　these


subjects？　How　he　dishonoured　him；　I　will　now　state。


　　Up　to　this　time　he　had　allowed　Dion　to　remain　in　possession　of　his


property　and　to　receive　the　income　from　it。　But　not　long　after　the


foregoing　events；　as　if　he　had　entirely　forgotten　his　letter　to　that


effect；　he　no　longer　allowed　Dion's　trustees　to　send　him　remittances


to　the　Peloponnese；　on　the　pretence　that　the　owner　of　the　property　was


not　Dion　but　Dion's　son；　his　own　nephew；　of　whom　he　himself　was


legally　the　trustee。　These　were　the　actual　facts　which　occurred　up


to　the　point　which　we　have　reached。　They　had　opened　my　eyes　as　to


the　value　of　Dionysios'　desire　for　philosophy；　and　I　had　every　right


to　complain；　whether　I　wished　to　do　so　or　not。　Now　by　this　time　it　was


summer　and　the　season　for　sea　voyages；　therefore　I　decided　that　I　must


not　be　vexed　with　Dionysios　rather　than　with　myself　and　those　who


had　forced　me　to　come　for　the　third　time　into　the　strait　of　Scylla；





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　that　once　again　I　might


　　　　　　　　　To　fell　Charybdis　measure　back　my　course；





but　must　tell　Dionysios　that　it　was　impossible　for　me　to　remain


after　this　outrage　had　been　put　upon　Dion。　He　tried　to　soothe　me　and


begged　me　to　remain；　not　thinking　it　desirable　for　himself　that　I


should　arrive　post　haste　in　person　as　the　bearer　of　such　tidings。　When


his　entreaties　produced　no　effect；　he　promised　that　he　himself　would


provide　me　with　transport。　For　my　intention　was　to　embark　on　one　of


the　trading　ships　and　sail　away；　being　indignant　and　thinking　it　my


duty　to　face　all　dangers；　in　case　I　was　prevented　from　going…since


plainly　and　obviously　I　was　doing　no　wrong；　but　was　the　party　wronged。


　　Seeing　me　not　at　all　inclined　to　stay；　he　devised　the　following


scheme　to　make　me　stay　during　that　sading　season。　On　the　next　day　he


came　to　me　and　made　a　plausible　proposal：　〃Let　us　put　an　end；〃　he


said；　〃to　these　constant　quarrels　between　you　and　me　about　Dion　and


his　affairs。　For　your　sake　I　will　do　this　for　Dion。　I　require　him　to


take　his　own　property　and　reside　in　the　Peloponnese；　not　as　an


exile；　but　on　the　understanding　that　it　is　open　for　him　to　migrate


here；　when　this　step　has　the　joint　approval　of　himself；　me；　and　you


his　friends；　and　this　shall　be　open　to　him　on　the　underst