fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第11部分

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　　*This　proposition　is　here　stated　as　a　postulate。　The　ground　of　it

will　be　found　in　the　concluding　section。



　　To　abide　by　the　previous　examples：

　　Firstly；　under　the　head　of　necessary　duty　to　oneself：　He　who

contemplates　suicide　should　ask　himself　whether　his　action　can　be

consistent　with　the　idea　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself。　If　he

destroys　himself　in　order　to　escape　from　painful　circumstances；　he

uses　a　person　merely　as　a　mean　to　maintain　a　tolerable　condition　up　to

the　end　of　life。　But　a　man　is　not　a　thing；　that　is　to　say；　something

which　can　be　used　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　all　his　actions　be

always　considered　as　an　end　in　himself。　I　cannot；　therefore；　dispose

in　any　way　of　a　man　in　my　own　person　so　as　to　mutilate　him；　to

damage　or　kill　him。　（It　belongs　to　ethics　proper　to　define　this

principle　more　precisely；　so　as　to　avoid　all　misunderstanding；　e。

g。；　as　to　the　amputation　of　the　limbs　in　order　to　preserve　myself；

as　to　exposing　my　life　to　danger　with　a　view　to　preserve　it；　etc。　This

question　is　therefore　omitted　here。）

　　Secondly；　as　regards　necessary　duties；　or　those　of　strict

obligation；　towards　others：　He　who　is　thinking　of　making　a　lying

promise　to　others　will　see　at　once　that　he　would　be　using　another

man　merely　as　a　mean；　without　the　latter　containing　at　the　same　time

the　end　in　himself。　For　he　whom　I　propose　by　such　a　promise　to　use　for

my　own　purposes　cannot　possibly　assent　to　my　mode　of　acting　towards

him　and；　therefore；　cannot　himself　contain　the　end　of　this　action。

This　violation　of　the　principle　of　humanity　in　other　men　is　more

obvious　if　we　take　in　examples　of　attacks　on　the　freedom　and

property　of　others。　For　then　it　is　clear　that　he　who　transgresses

the　rights　of　men　intends　to　use　the　person　of　others　merely　as　a

means；　without　considering　that　as　rational　beings　they　ought　always

to　be　esteemed　also　as　ends；　that　is；　as　beings　who　must　be　capable　of

containing　in　themselves　the　end　of　the　very　same　action。*



　　*Let　it　not　be　thought　that　the　common　〃quod　tibi　non　vis　fieri；

etc。〃　could　serve　here　as　the　rule　or　principle。　For　it　is　only　a

deduction　from　the　former；　though　with　several　limitations；　it

cannot　be　a　universal　law；　for　it　does　not　contain　the　principle　of

duties　to　oneself；　nor　of　the　duties　of　benevolence　to　others　（for

many　a　one　would　gladly　consent　that　others　should　not　benefit　him；

provided　only　that　he　might　be　excused　from　showing　benevolence　to

them）；　nor　finally　that　of　duties　of　strict　obligation　to　one　another；

for　on　this　principle　the　criminal　might　argue　against　the　judge　who

punishes　him；　and　so　on。



　　Thirdly；　as　regards　contingent　（meritorious）　duties　to　oneself：　It

is　not　enough　that　the　action　does　not　violate　humanity　in　our　own

person　as　an　end　in　itself；　it　must　also　harmonize　with　it。　Now

there　are　in　humanity　capacities　of　greater　perfection；　which　belong

to　the　end　that　nature　has　in　view　in　regard　to　humanity　in

ourselves　as　the　subject：　to　neglect　these　might　perhaps　be　consistent

with　the　maintenance　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　but　not　with　the

advancement　of　this　end。

　　Fourthly；　as　regards　meritorious　duties　towards　others：　The

natural　end　which　all　men　have　is　their　own　happiness。　Now　humanity

might　indeed　subsist；　although　no　one　should　contribute　anything　to

the　happiness　of　others；　provided　he　did　not　intentionally　withdraw

anything　from　it；　but　after　all　this　would　only　harmonize　negatively

not　positively　with　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　if　every　one　does

not　also　endeavour；　as　far　as　in　him　lies；　to　forward　the　ends　of

others。　For　the　ends　of　any　subject　which　is　an　end　in　himself　ought

as　far　as　possible　to　be　my　ends　also；　if　that　conception　is　to　have

its　full　effect　with　me。

　　This　principle；　that　humanity　and　generally　every　rational　nature　is

an　end　in　itself　（which　is　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　every

man's　freedom　of　action）；　is　not　borrowed　from　experience；　firstly；

because　it　is　universal；　applying　as　it　does　to　all　rational　beings

whatever；　and　experience　is　not　capable　of　determining　anything

about　them；　secondly；　because　it　does　not　present　humanity　as　an　end

to　men　（subjectively）；　that　is　as　an　object　which　men　do　of　themselves

actually　adopt　as　an　end；　but　as　an　objective　end；　which　must　as　a　law

constitute　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　all　our　subjective

ends；　let　them　be　what　we　will；　it　must　therefore　spring　from　pure

reason。　In　fact　the　objective　principle　of　all　practical　legislation

lies　（according　to　the　first　principle）　in　the　rule　and　its　form　of

universality　which　makes　it　capable　of　being　a　law　（say；　e。　g。；　a

law　of　nature）；　but　the　subjective　principle　is　in　the　end；　now　by　the

second　principle　the　subject　of　all　ends　is　each　rational　being；

inasmuch　as　it　is　an　end　in　itself。　Hence　follows　the　third

practical　principle　of　the　will；　which　is　the　ultimate　condition　of

its　harmony　with　universal　practical　reason；　viz。：　the　idea　of　the

will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally　legislative　will。

　　On　this　principle　all　maxims　are　rejected　which　are　inconsistent

with　the　will　being　itself　universal　legislator。　Thus　the　will　is

not　subject　simply　to　the　law；　but　so　subject　that　it　must　be　regarded

as　itself　giving　the　law　and；　on　this　ground　only；　subject　to　the

law　（of　which　it　can　regard　itself　as　the　author）。

　　In　the　previous　imperatives；　namely；　that　based　on　the　conception　of

the　conformity　of　actions　to　general　laws；　as　in　a　physical　system

of　nature；　and　that　based　on　the　universal　prerogative　of　rational

beings　as　ends　in　themselves…　these　imperatives；　just　because　they

were　conceived　as　categorical；　excluded　from　any　share　in　their

authority　all　admixture　of　any　interest　as　a　spring　of　action；　they

were；　however；　only　assumed　to　be　categorical；　because　such　an

assumption　was　necessary　to　explain　the　conception　of　duty。　But　we

could　not　prove　independently　that　there　are　practical　propositions

which　command　categorically；　nor　can　it　be　proved　in　this　section；　one

thing；　however；　could　be　done；　namely；　to　indicate　in　the　imperative

itself；　by　some　determinate　expression；　that　in　the　case　of　volition

from　duty　all　interest　is　renounced；　which　is　the　specific　criterion

of　categorical　as　distinguished　from　hypothetical　imperatives。　This　is

done　in　the　present　（third）　formula　of　the　principle；　namely；　in　the

idea　of　the　will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally

legislating　will。

　　For　although　a　will　which　is　subject　to　laws　may　be　attached　to　this

law　by　means　of　an　interest；　yet　a　will　which　is　itself　a　supreme

lawgiver　so　far　as　it　is　such　cannot　possibly　depend　on　any

interest；　since　a　will　so　dependent　would　itself　still　need　another

law　restricting　the　interest　of　its　self…love　by　the　condition　that　it

should　be　valid　as　universal　law。

　　Thus　the　principle　that　every　human　will　is　a　will　which　in　all

its　maxims　gives　universal　laws；*　provided　it　be　otherwise

justified；　would　be　very　well　adapted　to　be　the　categorical

imperative；　in　this　respect；　namely；　that　just　because　of　the　idea

of　universal　legislation　it　is　not　based　on　interest；　and　therefore　it

alone　among　all　possible　imperatives　can　be　unconditional。　Or　still

better；　converting　the　proposition；　if　there　is　a　categorical

imperative　（i。e。；　a　law　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being）；　it

can　only　command　that　everything　be　done　from　maxims　of　one's　will

regarded　as　a　will　which　could　at　the　same　time　will　that　it　should

itself　give　universal　laws；　for　in　that　case　only　the　practical

principle　and　the　imperative　which　it　obeys　are　unconditional；　since

they　cannot　be　based　on　any　interest。



　　*I　may　be　excused　from　adducing　examples　to　elucidate　this

principle；　as　those　which　have　already　been　used　to　elucidate　the

categorical　imperative　and　its　formula　would　all　serve　for　the　like

purpose　here。



　　Looking　back　now　on　all　previous　attempts　to　discover　the

principle　of　morality；　we　need　not　wonder　why　they　all　failed。　It

was　seen　that　man　was　bound　to　laws　by　duty；　but　it　was　not　observed

that　the　laws　to　which　he　is　subject　are　only　those　of　his　own　giving；

though　at　the　same　time　they　are　universal；　and　that　he　is　only

bound　to　act　in　conformity　with　his　own　will；　a　will；　however；　which

is　designed　by　nature　to　give　universal　laws。　For　when　one　has

conceived　man　only　as　subject　to　a　law　（no　matter　what）；　then　this　law

required　some　interest；　either　by　way　of　attraction　or　constraint；

since　it　did　not　originate　as　a　law　from　his　own　will；　but　this　will

was　according　to　a　law　obliged　by　something　else　to　act　in　a　certain

manner。　Now　by　this　necessary　consequence　all　the　labour　spent　in

finding　a　supreme　principle　of　duty　was　irrevocably　lost。　For　men

never　elicited　duty；　but　only　a　necessity　of　acting　from　a　certain

interest。　Whether　this　interest　was　private　or　otherwise；　in　any

case　the　imperative　must　be　conditional　and　could　not　by　any　means

be　capable　of　being　a　moral　command。　I　will　therefore　call　this　the

principle　of　autonomy　of　the　will；　in　contrast　with　every　other

which　I　accordingly　reckon　as　heteronomy。

　　The　conception　of　the　will　of　every　rational　being　as　one　which　must

consider　itself　as　giving　in　all　the　maxims　of　its　will　universal

laws；　so　as　to　judge　itself　and　its　actions　from　this　point　of　view…

this　conception　leads　to　another　which　depends　on　it　and　is　very

fruitful；　namely　that　of　a　kingdom　of　ends。

　　By　a　kingdom　I　understand　the　union　of　different　rational　beings

in　a　system　by　common　laws。　Now　since　it　is　by　laws　that　ends　are

determined　as　regards　their　universal　validity；　hence；　if　we

abstract　from　the　personal　differences　of　rational　beings　and　likewise

from　all　the　content　of　their　private　ends；　we　shall　be　able　to

conceive　all　ends　combined　in　a　systematic　whole　（including　both

rational　beings　as　ends　in　themselves；　and　also　the　special　ends　which