fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第16部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


between　a　world　of　sense　and　the　world　of　understanding；　of　which

the　former　may　be　different　according　to　the　difference　of　the

sensuous　impressions　in　various　observers；　while　the　second　which　is

its　basis　always　remains　the　same；　Even　as　to　himself；　a　man　cannot

pretend　to　know　what　he　is　in　himself　from　the　knowledge　he　has　by

internal　sensation。　For　as　he　does　not　as　it　were　create　himself；

and　does　not　come　by　the　conception　of　himself　a　priori　but

empirically；　it　naturally　follows　that　he　can　obtain　his　knowledge

even　of　himself　only　by　the　inner　sense　and；　consequently；　only

through　the　appearances　of　his　nature　and　the　way　in　which　his

consciousness　is　affected。　At　the　same　time　beyond　these

characteristics　of　his　own　subject；　made　up　of　mere　appearances；　he

must　necessarily　suppose　something　else　as　their　basis；　namely；　his

ego；　whatever　its　characteristics　in　itself　may　be。　Thus　in　respect　to

mere　perception　and　receptivity　of　sensations　he　must　reckon　himself

as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　but　in　respect　of　whatever　there

may　be　of　pure　activity　in　him　（that　which　reaches　consciousness

immediately　and　not　through　affecting　the　senses）；　he　must　reckon

himself　as　belonging　to　the　intellectual　world；　of　which；　however；

he　has　no　further　knowledge。　To　such　a　conclusion　the　reflecting　man

must　come　with　respect　to　all　the　things　which　can　be　presented　to

him：　it　is　probably　to　be　met　with　even　in　persons　of　the　commonest

understanding；　who；　as　is　well　known；　are　very　much　inclined　to

suppose　behind　the　objects　of　the　senses　something　else　invisible

and　acting　of　itself。　They　spoil　it；　however；　by　presently

sensualizing　this　invisible　again；　that　is　to　say；　wanting　to　make

it　an　object　of　intuition；　so　that　they　do　not　become　a　whit　the

wiser。

　　Now　man　really　finds　in　himself　a　faculty　by　which　he

distinguishes　himself　from　everything　else；　even　from　himself　as

affected　by　objects；　and　that　is　reason。　This　being　pure　spontaneity

is　even　elevated　above　the　understanding。　For　although　the　latter　is　a

spontaneity　and　does　not；　like　sense；　merely　contain　intuitions　that

arise　when　we　are　affected　by　things　（and　are　therefore　passive）；

yet　it　cannot　produce　from　its　activity　any　other　conceptions　than

those　which　merely　serve　to　bring　the　intuitions　of　sense　under

rules　and；　thereby；　to　unite　them　in　one　consciousness；　and　without

this　use　of　the　sensibility　it　could　not　think　at　all；　whereas；　on　the

contrary；　reason　shows　so　pure　a　spontaneity　in　the　case　of　what　I

call　ideas　＇ideal　conceptions＇　that　it　thereby　far　transcends

everything　that　the　sensibility　can　give　it；　and　exhibits　its　most

important　function　in　distinguishing　the　world　of　sense　from　that　of

understanding；　and　thereby　prescribing　the　limits　of　the　understanding

itself。

　　For　this　reason　a　rational　being　must　regard　himself　qua

intelligence　（not　from　the　side　of　his　lower　faculties）　as　belonging

not　to　the　world　of　sense；　but　to　that　of　understanding；　hence　he

has　two　points　of　view　from　which　he　can　regard　himself；　and　recognise

laws　of　the　exercise　of　his　faculties；　and　consequently　of　all　his

actions：　first；　so　far　as　he　belongs　to　the　world　of　sense；　he　finds

himself　subject　to　laws　of　nature　（heteronomy）；　secondly；　as　belonging

to　the　intelligible　world；　under　laws　which　being　independent　of

nature　have　their　foundation　not　in　experience　but　in　reason　alone。

　　As　a　rational　being；　and　consequently　belonging　to　the

intelligible　world；　man　can　never　conceive　the　causality　of　his　own

will　otherwise　than　on　condition　of　the　idea　of　freedom；　for

independence　of　the　determinate　causes　of　the　sensible　world　（an

independence　which　reason　must　always　ascribe　to　itself）　is　freedom。

Now　the　idea　of　freedom　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　conception

of　autonomy；　and　this　again　with　the　universal　principle　of　morality

which　is　ideally　the　foundation　of　all　actions　of　rational　beings；

just　as　the　law　of　nature　is　of　all　phenomena。

　　Now　the　suspicion　is　removed　which　we　raised　above；　that　there　was　a

latent　circle　involved　in　our　reasoning　from　freedom　to　autonomy；

and　from　this　to　the　moral　law；　viz。：　that　we　laid　down　the　idea　of

freedom　because　of　the　moral　law　only　that　we　might　afterwards　in　turn

infer　the　latter　from　freedom；　and　that　consequently　we　could　assign

no　reason　at　all　for　this　law；　but　could　only　＇present＇　it　as　a

petitio　principii　which　well　disposed　minds　would　gladly　concede　to

us；　but　which　we　could　never　put　forward　as　a　provable　proposition。

For　now　we　see　that；　when　we　conceive　ourselves　as　free；　we　transfer

ourselves　into　the　world　of　understanding　as　members　of　it　and

recognise　the　autonomy　of　the　will　with　its　consequence；　morality；

whereas；　if　we　conceive　ourselves　as　under　obligation；　we　consider

ourselves　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense　and　at　the　same　time　to

the　world　of　understanding。



　　　　　　　　　　　How　is　a　Categorical　Imperative　Possible？



　　Every　rational　being　reckons　himself　qua　intelligence　as　belonging

to　the　world　of　understanding；　and　it　is　simply　as　an　efficient

cause　belonging　to　that　world　that　he　calls　his　causality　a　will。　On

the　other　side　he　is　also　conscious　of　himself　as　a　part　of　the

world　of　sense　in　which　his　actions；　which　are　mere　appearances

＇phenomena＇　of　that　causality；　are　displayed；　we　cannot；　however；

discern　how　they　are　possible　from　this　causality　which　we　do　not

know；　but　instead　of　that；　these　actions　as　belonging　to　the

sensible　world　must　be　viewed　as　determined　by　other　phenomena；

namely；　desires　and　inclinations。　If　therefore　I　were　only　a　member　of

the　world　of　understanding；　then　all　my　actions　would　perfectly

conform　to　the　principle　of　autonomy　of　the　pure　will；　if　I　were

only　a　part　of　the　world　of　sense；　they　would　necessarily　be　assumed

to　conform　wholly　to　the　natural　law　of　desires　and　inclinations；　in

other　words；　to　the　heteronomy　of　nature。　（The　former　would　rest　on

morality　as　the　supreme　principle；　the　latter　on　happiness。）　Since；

however；　the　world　of　understanding　contains　the　foundation　of　the

world　of　sense；　and　consequently　of　its　laws　also；　and　accordingly

gives　the　law　to　my　will　（which　belongs　wholly　to　the　world　of

understanding）　directly；　and　must　be　conceived　as　doing　so；　it　follows

that；　although　on　the　one　side　I　must　regard　myself　as　a　being

belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　yet　on　the　other　side　I　must

recognize　myself　as　subject　as　an　intelligence　to　the　law　of　the　world

of　understanding；　i。e。；　to　reason；　which　contains　this　law　in　the　idea

of　freedom；　and　therefore　as　subject　to　the　autonomy　of　the　will：

consequently　I　must　regard　the　laws　of　the　world　of　understanding　as

imperatives　for　me　and　the　actions　which　conform　to　them　as　duties。

　　And　thus　what　makes　categorical　imperatives　possible　is　this；　that

the　idea　of　freedom　makes　me　a　member　of　an　intelligible　world；　in

consequence　of　which；　if　I　were　nothing　else；　all　my　actions　would

always　conform　to　the　autonomy　of　the　will；　but　as　I　at　the　same

time　intuite　myself　as　a　member　of　the　world　of　sense；　they　ought　so

to　conform；　and　this　categorical　〃ought〃　implies　a　synthetic　a

priori　proposition；　inasmuch　as　besides　my　will　as　affected　by

sensible　desires　there　is　added　further　the　idea　of　the　same　will

but　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　the　understanding；　pure　and　practical

of　itself；　which　contains　the　supreme　condition　according　to　reason　of

the　former　will；　precisely　as　to　the　intuitions　of　sense　there　are

added　concepts　of　the　understanding　which　of　themselves　signify

nothing　but　regular　form　in　general　and　in　this　way　synthetic　a　priori

propositions　become　possible；　on　which　all　knowledge　of　physical

nature　rests。

　　The　practical　use　of　common　human　reason　confirms　this　reasoning。

There　is　no　one；　not　even　the　most　consummate　villain；　provided　only

that　be　is　otherwise　accustomed　to　the　use　of　reason；　who；　when　we　set

before　him　examples　of　honesty　of　purpose；　of　steadfastness　in

following　good　maxims；　of　sympathy　and　general　benevolence　（even

combined　with　great　sacrifices　of　advantages　and　comfort）；　does　not

wish　that　he　might　also　possess　these　qualities。　Only　on　account　of

his　inclinations　and　impulses　he　cannot　attain　this　in　himself；　but　at

the　same　time　he　wishes　to　be　free　from　such　inclinations　which　are

burdensome　to　himself。　He　proves　by　this　that　he　transfers　himself

in　thought　with　a　will　free　from　the　impulses　of　the　sensibility

into　an　order　of　things　wholly　different　from　that　of　his　desires　in

the　field　of　the　sensibility；　since　he　cannot　expect　to　obtain　by　that

wish　any　gratification　of　his　desires；　nor　any　position　which　would

satisfy　any　of　his　actual　or　supposable　inclinations　（for　this　would

destroy　the　pre…eminence　of　the　very　idea　which　wrests　that　wish

from　him）：　he　can　only　expect　a　greater　intrinsic　worth　of　his　own

person。　This　better　person；　however；　he　imagines　himself　to　be　when　be

transfers　himself　to　the　point　of　view　of　a　member　of　the　world　of　the

understanding；　to　which　he　is　involuntarily　forced　by　the　idea　of

freedom；　i。e。；　of　independence　on　determining　causes　of　the　world　of

sense；　and　from　this　point　of　view　he　is　conscious　of　a　good　will；

which　by　his　own　confession　constitutes　the　law　for　the　bad　will

that　he　possesses　as　a　member　of　the　world　of　sense…　a　law　whose

authority　he　recognizes　while　transgressing　it。　What　he　morally

〃ought〃　is　then　what　he　necessarily　〃would；〃　as　a　member　of　the

world　of　the　understanding；　and　is　conceived　by　him　as　an　〃ought〃　only

inasmuch　as　he　likewise　considers　himself　as　a　member　of　the　world

of　sense。



　　　　　　　Of　the　Extreme　Limits　of　all　Practical　Philosophy。



　　All　men　attribute　to　themselves　freedom　of　will。　Hence　come　all

judgements　upon　actions　as　being　such　as　ought　to　have　been　done；

although　they　have　not　been　done。　However；　this　freedom　is　not　a

conception　of　experience；　n