fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第17部分

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although　they　have　not　been　done。　However；　this　freedom　is　not　a

conception　of　experience；　nor　can　it　be　so；　since　it　still　remains；

even　though　experience　shows　the　contrary　of　what　on　supposition　of

freedom　are　conceived　as　its　necessary　consequences。　On　the　other　side

it　is　equally　necessary　that　everything　that　takes　place　should　be

fixedly　determined　according　to　laws　of　nature。　This　necessity　of

nature　is　likewise　not　an　empirical　conception；　just　for　this

reason；　that　it　involves　the　motion　of　necessity　and　consequently　of　a

priori　cognition。　But　this　conception　of　a　system　of　nature　is

confirmed　by　experience；　and　it　must　even　be　inevitably　presupposed　if

experience　itself　is　to　be　possible；　that　is；　a　connected　knowledge　of

the　objects　of　sense　resting　on　general　laws。　Therefore　freedom　is

only　an　idea　of　reason；　and　its　objective　reality　in　itself　is

doubtful；　while　nature　is　a　concept　of　the　understanding　which　proves；

and　must　necessarily　prove；　its　reality　in　examples　of　experience。

　　There　arises　from　this　a　dialectic　of　reason；　since　the　freedom

attributed　to　the　will　appears　to　contradict　the　necessity　of

nature；　and　placed　between　these　two　ways　reason　for　speculative

purposes　finds　the　road　of　physical　necessity　much　more　beaten　and

more　appropriate　than　that　of　freedom；　yet　for　practical　purposes

the　narrow　footpath　of　freedom　is　the　only　one　on　which　it　is　possible

to　make　use　of　reason　in　our　conduct；　hence　it　is　just　as　impossible

for　the　subtlest　philosophy　as　for　the　commonest　reason　of　men　to

argue　away　freedom。　Philosophy　must　then　assume　that　no　real

contradiction　will　be　found　between　freedom　and　physical　necessity

of　the　same　human　actions；　for　it　cannot　give　up　the　conception　of

nature　any　more　than　that　of　freedom。

　　Nevertheless；　even　though　we　should　never　be　able　to　comprehend

how　freedom　is　possible；　we　must　at　least　remove　this　apparent

contradiction　in　a　convincing　manner。　For　if　the　thought　of　freedom

contradicts　either　itself　or　nature；　which　is　equally　necessary；　it

must　in　competition　with　physical　necessity　be　entirely　given　up。

　　It　would；　however；　be　impossible　to　escape　this　contradiction　if　the

thinking　subject；　which　seems　to　itself　free；　conceived　itself　in

the　same　sense　or　in　the　very　same　relation　when　it　calls　itself

free　as　when　in　respect　of　the　same　action　it　assumes　itself　to　be

subject　to　the　law　of　nature。　Hence　it　is　an　indispensable　problem

of　speculative　philosophy　to　show　that　its　illusion　respecting　the

contradiction　rests　on　this；　that　we　think　of　man　in　a　different　sense

and　relation　when　we　call　him　free　and　when　we　regard　him　as　subject

to　the　laws　of　nature　as　being　part　and　parcel　of　nature。　It　must

therefore　show　that　not　only　can　both　these　very　well　co…exist；　but

that　both　must　be　thought　as　necessarily　united　in　the　same　subject；

since　otherwise　no　reason　could　be　given　why　we　should　burden　reason

with　an　idea　which；　though　it　may　possibly　without　contradiction　be

reconciled　with　another　that　is　sufficiently　established；　yet

entangles　us　in　a　perplexity　which　sorely　embarrasses　reason　in　its

theoretic　employment。　This　duty；　however；　belongs　only　to

speculative　philosophy。　The　philosopher　then　has　no　option　whether

he　will　remove　the　apparent　contradiction　or　leave　it　untouched；　for

in　the　latter　case　the　theory　respecting　this　would　be　bonum　vacans；

into　the　possession　of　which　the　fatalist　would　have　a　right　to

enter　and　chase　all　morality　out　of　its　supposed　domain　as　occupying

it　without　title。

　　We　cannot　however　as　yet　say　that　we　are　touching　the　bounds　of

practical　philosophy。　For　the　settlement　of　that　controversy　does

not　belong　to　it；　it　only　demands　from　speculative　reason　that　it

should　put　an　end　to　the　discord　in　which　it　entangles　itself　in

theoretical　questions；　so　that　practical　reason　may　have　rest　and

security　from　external　attacks　which　might　make　the　ground　debatable

on　which　it　desires　to　build。

　　The　claims　to　freedom　of　will　made　even　by　common　reason　are　founded

on　the　consciousness　and　the　admitted　supposition　that　reason　is

independent　of　merely　subjectively　determined　causes　which　together

constitute　what　belongs　to　sensation　only　and　which　consequently

come　under　the　general　designation　of　sensibility。　Man　considering

himself　in　this　way　as　an　intelligence　places　himself　thereby　in　a

different　order　of　things　and　in　a　relation　to　determining　grounds

of　a　wholly　different　kind　when　on　the　one　hand　he　thinks　of　himself

as　an　intelligence　endowed　with　a　will；　and　consequently　with

causality；　and　when　on　the　other　he　perceives　himself　as　a

phenomenon　in　the　world　of　sense　（as　he　really　is　also）；　and　affirms

that　his　causality　is　subject　to　external　determination　according　to

laws　of　nature。　Now　he　soon　becomes　aware　that　both　can　hold　good；

nay；　must　hold　good　at　the　same　time。　For　there　is　not　the　smallest

contradiction　in　saying　that　a　thing　in　appearance　（belonging　to　the

world　of　sense）　is　subject　to　certain　laws；　of　which　the　very　same

as　a　thing　or　being　in　itself　is　independent；　and　that　he　must

conceive　and　think　of　himself　in　this　twofold　way；　rests　as　to　the

first　on　the　consciousness　of　himself　as　an　object　affected　through

the　senses；　and　as　to　the　second　on　the　consciousness　of　himself　as　an

intelligence；　i。e。；　as　independent　on　sensible　impressions　in　the

employment　of　his　reason　（in　other　words　as　belonging　to　the　world

of　understanding）。

　　Hence　it　comes　to　pass　that　man　claims　the　possession　of　a　will

which　takes　no　account　of　anything　that　comes　under　the　head　of

desires　and　inclinations　and；　on　the　contrary；　conceives　actions　as

possible　to　him；　nay；　even　as　necessary　which　can　only　be　done　by

disregarding　all　desires　and　sensible　inclinations。　The　causality　of

such　actions　lies　in　him　as　an　intelligence　and　in　the　laws　of　effects

and　actions　＇which　depend＇　on　the　principles　of　an　intelligible　world；

of　which　indeed　he　knows　nothing　more　than　that　in　it　pure　reason

alone　independent　of　sensibility　gives　the　law；　moreover　since　it　is

only　in　that　world；　as　an　intelligence；　that　he　is　his　proper　self

（being　as　man　only　the　appearance　of　himself）；　those　laws　apply　to　him

directly　and　categorically；　so　that　the　incitements　of　inclinations

and　appetites　（in　other　words　the　whole　nature　of　the　world　of

sense）　cannot　impair　the　laws　of　his　volition　as　an　intelligence。　Nay；

he　does　not　even　hold　himself　responsible　for　the　former　or　ascribe

them　to　his　proper　self；　i。e。；　his　will：　he　only　ascribes　to　his

will　any　indulgence　which　he　might　yield　them　if　he　allowed　them　to

influence　his　maxims　to　the　prejudice　of　the　rational　laws　of　the

will。

　　When　practical　reason　thinks　itself　into　a　world　of　understanding；

it　does　not　thereby　transcend　its　own　limits；　as　it　would　if　it

tried　to　enter　it　by　intuition　or　sensation。　The　former　is　only　a

negative　thought　in　respect　of　the　world　of　sense；　which　does　not　give

any　laws　to　reason　in　determining　the　will　and　is　positive　only　in

this　single　point　that　this　freedom　as　a　negative　characteristic　is　at

the　same　time　conjoined　with　a　（positive）　faculty　and　even　with　a

causality　of　reason；　which　we　designate　a　will；　namely　a　faculty　of　so

acting　that　the　principle　of　the　actions　shall　conform　to　the

essential　character　of　a　rational　motive；　i。e。；　the　condition　that　the

maxim　have　universal　validity　as　a　law。　But　were　it　to　borrow　an

object　of　will；　that　is；　a　motive；　from　the　world　of　understanding；

then　it　would　overstep　its　bounds　and　pretend　to　be　acquainted　with

something　of　which　it　knows　nothing。　The　conception　of　a　world　of

the　understanding　is　then　only　a　point　of　view　which　reason　finds

itself　compelled　to　take　outside　the　appearances　in　order　to

conceive　itself　as　practical；　which　would　not　be　possible　if　the

influences　of　the　sensibility　had　a　determining　power　on　man；　but

which　is　necessary　unless　he　is　to　be　denied　the　consciousness　of

himself　as　an　intelligence　and；　consequently；　as　a　rational　cause；

energizing　by　reason；　that　is；　operating　freely。　This　thought

certainly　involves　the　idea　of　an　order　and　a　system　of　laws　different

from　that　of　the　mechanism　of　nature　which　belongs　to　the　sensible

world；　and　it　makes　the　conception　of　an　intelligible　world

necessary　（that　is　to　say；　the　whole　system　of　rational　beings　as

things　in　themselves）。　But　it　does　not　in　the　least　authorize　us　to

think　of　it　further　than　as　to　its　formal　condition　only；　that　is；　the

universality　of　the　maxims　of　the　will　as　laws；　and　consequently　the

autonomy　of　the　latter；　which　alone　is　consistent　with　its　freedom；

whereas；　on　the　contrary；　all　laws　that　refer　to　a　definite　object

give　heteronomy；　which　only　belongs　to　laws　of　nature　and　can　only

apply　to　the　sensible　world。

　　But　reason　would　overstep　all　its　bounds　if　it　undertook　to

explain　how　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　which　would　be　exactly　the

same　problem　as　to　explain　how　freedom　is　possible。

　　For　we　can　explain　nothing　but　that　which　we　can　reduce　to　laws；　the

object　of　which　can　be　given　in　some　possible　experience。　But

freedom　is　a　mere　idea；　the　objective　reality　of　which　can　in　no

wise　be　shown　according　to　laws　of　nature；　and　consequently　not　in　any

possible　experience；　and　for　this　reason　it　can　never　be

comprehended　or　understood；　because　we　cannot　support　it　by　any　sort

of　example　or　analogy。　It　holds　good　only　as　a　necessary　hypothesis　of

reason　in　a　being　that　believes　itself　conscious　of　a　will；　that　is；

of　a　faculty　distinct　from　mere　desire　（namely；　a　faculty　of

determining　itself　to　action　as　an　intelligence；　in　other　words；　by

laws　of　reason　independently　on　natural　instincts）。　Now　where

determination　according　to　laws　of　nature　ceases；　there　all

explanation　ceases　also；　and　nothing　remains　but　defence；　i。e。；　the

removal　of　the　objections　of　those　who　pretend　to　have　seen　deeper

in