fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第3部分

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must　admit；　that　the　judgement　of　those　who　would　very　much　lower

the　lofty　eulogies　of　the　advantages　which　reason　gives　us　in　regard

to　the　happiness　and　satisfaction　of　life；　or　who　would　even　reduce

them　below　zero；　is　by　no　means　morose　or　ungrateful　to　the　goodness

with　which　the　world　is　governed；　but　that　there　lies　at　the　root　of

these　judgements　the　idea　that　our　existence　has　a　different　and　far

nobler　end；　for　which；　and　not　for　happiness；　reason　is　properly

intended；　and　which　must；　therefore；　be　regarded　as　the　supreme

condition　to　which　the　private　ends　of　man　must；　for　the　most　part；　be

postponed。

　　For　as　reason　is　not　competent　to　guide　the　will　with　certainty　in

regard　to　its　objects　and　the　satisfaction　of　all　our　wants　（which

it　to　some　extent　even　multiplies）；　this　being　an　end　to　which　an

implanted　instinct　would　have　led　with　much　greater　certainty；　and

since；　nevertheless；　reason　is　imparted　to　us　as　a　practical

faculty；　i。e。；　as　one　which　is　to　have　influence　on　the　will；

therefore；　admitting　that　nature　generally　in　the　distribution　of

her　capacities　has　adapted　the　means　to　the　end；　its　true

destination　must　be　to　produce　a　will；　not　merely　good　as　a　means　to

something　else；　but　good　in　itself；　for　which　reason　was　absolutely

necessary。　This　will　then；　though　not　indeed　the　sole　and　complete

good；　must　be　the　supreme　good　and　the　condition　of　every　other；

even　of　the　desire　of　happiness。　Under　these　circumstances；　there　is

nothing　inconsistent　with　the　wisdom　of　nature　in　the　fact　that　the

cultivation　of　the　reason；　which　is　requisite　for　the　first　and

unconditional　purpose；　does　in　many　ways　interfere；　at　least　in　this

life；　with　the　attainment　of　the　second；　which　is　always

conditional；　namely；　happiness。　Nay；　it　may　even　reduce　it　to　nothing；

without　nature　thereby　failing　of　her　purpose。　For　reason　recognizes

the　establishment　of　a　good　will　as　its　highest　practical　destination；

and　in　attaining　this　purpose　is　capable　only　of　a　satisfaction　of　its

own　proper　kind；　namely　that　from　the　attainment　of　an　end；　which

end　again　is　determined　by　reason　only；　notwithstanding　that　this

may　involve　many　a　disappointment　to　the　ends　of　inclination。

　　We　have　then　to　develop　the　notion　of　a　will　which　deserves　to　be

highly　esteemed　for　itself　and　is　good　without　a　view　to　anything

further；　a　notion　which　exists　already　in　the　sound　natural

understanding；　requiring　rather　to　be　cleared　up　than　to　be　taught；

and　which　in　estimating　the　value　of　our　actions　always　takes　the

first　place　and　constitutes　the　condition　of　all　the　rest。　In　order　to

do　this；　we　will　take　the　notion　of　duty；　which　includes　that　of　a

good　will；　although　implying　certain　subjective　restrictions　and

hindrances。　These；　however；　far　from　concealing　it；　or　rendering　it

unrecognizable；　rather　bring　it　out　by　contrast　and　make　it　shine

forth　so　much　the　brighter。

　　I　omit　here　all　actions　which　are　already　recognized　as　inconsistent

with　duty；　although　they　may　be　useful　for　this　or　that　purpose；　for

with　these　the　question　whether　they　are　done　from　duty　cannot　arise

at　all；　since　they　even　conflict　with　it。　I　also　set　aside　those

actions　which　really　conform　to　duty；　but　to　which　men　have　no

direct　inclination；　performing　them　because　they　are　impelled

thereto　by　some　other　inclination。　For　in　this　case　we　can　readily

distinguish　whether　the　action　which　agrees　with　duty　is　done　from

duty；　or　from　a　selfish　view。　It　is　much　harder　to　make　this

distinction　when　the　action　accords　with　duty　and　the　subject　has

besides　a　direct　inclination　to　it。　For　example；　it　is　always　a　matter

of　duty　that　a　dealer　should　not　over　charge　an　inexperienced

purchaser；　and　wherever　there　is　much　commerce　the　prudent　tradesman

does　not　overcharge；　but　keeps　a　fixed　price　for　everyone；　so　that　a

child　buys　of　him　as　well　as　any　other。　Men　are　thus　honestly

served；　but　this　is　not　enough　to　make　us　believe　that　the　tradesman

has　so　acted　from　duty　and　from　principles　of　honesty：　his　own

advantage　required　it；　it　is　out　of　the　question　in　this　case　to

suppose　that　he　might　besides　have　a　direct　inclination　in　favour　of

the　buyers；　so　that；　as　it　were；　from　love　he　should　give　no　advantage

to　one　over　another。　Accordingly　the　action　was　done　neither　from　duty

nor　from　direct　inclination；　but　merely　with　a　selfish　view。

　　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　a　duty　to　maintain　one's　life；　and；　in

addition；　everyone　has　also　a　direct　inclination　to　do　so。　But　on　this

account　the　of　anxious　care　which　most　men　take　for　it　has　no

intrinsic　worth；　and　their　maxim　has　no　moral　import。　They　preserve

their　life　as　duty　requires；　no　doubt；　but　not　because　duty

requires。　On　the　other　band；　if　adversity　and　hopeless　sorrow　have

completely　taken　away　the　relish　for　life；　if　the　unfortunate　one；

strong　in　mind；　indignant　at　his　fate　rather　than　desponding　or

dejected；　wishes　for　death；　and　yet　preserves　his　life　without

loving　it…　not　from　inclination　or　fear；　but　from　duty…　then　his　maxim

has　a　moral　worth。

　　To　be　beneficent　when　we　can　is　a　duty；　and　besides　this；　there

are　many　minds　so　sympathetically　constituted　that；　without　any

other　motive　of　vanity　or　self…interest；　they　find　a　pleasure　in

spreading　joy　around　them　and　can　take　delight　in　the　satisfaction

of　others　so　far　as　it　is　their　own　work。　But　I　maintain　that　in

such　a　case　an　action　of　this　kind；　however　proper；　however　amiable　it

may　be；　bas　nevertheless　no　true　moral　worth；　but　is　on　a　level　with

other　inclinations；　e。g。；　the　inclination　to　honour；　which；　if　it　is

happily　directed　to　that　which　is　in　fact　of　public　utility　and

accordant　with　duty　and　consequently　honourable；　deserves　praise　and

encouragement；　but　not　esteem。　For　the　maxim　lacks　the　moral　import；

namely；　that　such　actions　be　done　from　duty；　not　from　inclination。　Put

the　case　that　the　mind　of　that　philanthropist　were　clouded　by　sorrow

of　his　own；　extinguishing　all　sympathy　with　the　lot　of　others；　and

that；　while　he　still　has　the　power　to　benefit　others　in　distress；　he

is　not　touched　by　their　trouble　because　he　is　absorbed　with　his　own；

and　now　suppose　that　he　tears　himself　out　of　this　dead

insensibility；　and　performs　the　action　without　any　inclination　to

it；　but　simply　from　duty；　then　first　has　his　action　its　genuine

moral　worth。　Further　still；　if　nature　bas　put　little　sympathy　in　the

heart　of　this　or　that　man；　if　he；　supposed　to　be　an　upright　man；　is　by

temperament　cold　and　indifferent　to　the　sufferings　of　others；

perhaps　because　in　respect　of　his　own　he　is　provided　with　the

special　gift　of　patience　and　fortitude　and　supposes；　or　even　requires；

that　others　should　have　the　same…　and　such　a　man　would　certainly　not

be　the　meanest　product　of　nature…　but　if　nature　had　not　specially

framed　him　for　a　philanthropist；　would　he　not　still　find　in　himself

a　source　from　whence　to　give　himself　a　far　higher　worth　than　that　of　a

good…natured　temperament　could　be？　Unquestionably。　It　is　just　in

this　that　the　moral　worth　of　the　character　is　brought　out　which　is

incomparably　the　highest　of　all；　namely；　that　he　is　beneficent；　not

from　inclination；　but　from　duty。

　　To　secure　one's　own　happiness　is　a　duty；　at　least　indirectly；　for

discontent　with　one's　condition；　under　a　pressure　of　many　anxieties

and　amidst　unsatisfied　wants；　might　easily　become　a　great　temptation

to　transgression　of　duty。　But　here　again；　without　looking　to　duty；　all

men　have　already　the　strongest　and　most　intimate　inclination　to

happiness；　because　it　is　just　in　this　idea　that　all　inclinations　are

combined　in　one　total。　But　the　precept　of　happiness　is　often　of　such　a

sort　that　it　greatly　interferes　with　some　inclinations；　and　yet　a

man　cannot　form　any　definite　and　certain　conception　of　the　sum　of

satisfaction　of　all　of　them　which　is　called　happiness。　It　is　not

then　to　be　wondered　at　that　a　single　inclination；　definite　both　as

to　what　it　promises　and　as　to　the　time　within　which　it　can　be

gratified；　is　often　able　to　overcome　such　a　fluctuating　idea；　and　that

a　gouty　patient；　for　instance；　can　choose　to　enjoy　what　he　likes；

and　to　suffer　what　he　may；　since；　according　to　his　calculation；　on

this　occasion　at　least；　be　has　not　sacrificed　the　enjoyment　of　the

present　moment　to　a　possibly　mistaken　expectation　of　a　happiness　which

is　supposed　to　be　found　in　health。　But　even　in　this　case；　if　the

general　desire　for　happiness　did　not　influence　his　will；　and　supposing

that　in　his　particular　case　health　was　not　a　necessary　element　in　this

calculation；　there　yet　remains　in　this；　as　in　all　other　cases；　this

law；　namely；　that　he　should　promote　his　happiness　not　from　inclination

but　from　duty；　and　by　this　would　his　conduct　first　acquire　true

moral　worth。

　　It　is　in　this　manner；　undoubtedly；　that　we　are　to　understand　those

passages　of　Scripture　also　in　which　we　are　commanded　to　love　our

neighbour；　even　our　enemy。　For　love；　as　an　affection；　cannot　be

commanded；　but　beneficence　for　duty's　sake　may；　even　though　we　are　not

impelled　to　it　by　any　inclination…　nay；　are　even　repelled　by　a　natural

and　unconquerable　aversion。　This　is　practical　love　and　not

pathological…　a　love　which　is　seated　in　the　will；　and　not　in　the

propensions　of　sense…　in　principles　of　action　and　not　of　tender

sympathy；　and　it　is　this　love　alone　which　can　be　commanded。

　　The　second　proposition　is：　That　an　action　done　from　duty　derives　its

moral　worth；　not　from　the　purpose　which　is　to　be　attained　by　it；　but

from　the　maxim　by　which　it　is　determined；　and　therefore　does　not

depend　on　the　realization　of　the　object　of　the　action；　but　merely　on

the　principle　of　volition　by　which　the　action　has　taken　place；　without

regard　to　any　object　of　desire。　It　is　clear　from　what　precedes　that

the　purposes　which　we　may　have　in　view　in　our　actions；　or　their

effects　regarded　as　ends　and　springs　of　the　will；　cannot　give　to

actions　any　unconditional　or　mor