fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第5部分

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every　case　that　occurs；　what　is　good；　what　bad；　conformably　to　duty　or

inconsistent　with　it；　if；　without　in　the　least　teaching　them

anything　new；　we　only；　like　Socrates；　direct　their　attention　to　the

principle　they　themselves　employ；　and　that；　therefore；　we　do　not

need　science　and　philosophy　to　know　what　we　should　do　to　be　honest　and

good；　yea；　even　wise　and　virtuous。　Indeed　we　might　well　have

conjectured　beforehand　that　the　knowledge　of　what　every　man　is　bound

to　do；　and　therefore　also　to　know；　would　be　within　the　reach　of

every　man；　even　the　commonest。　Here　we　cannot　forbear　admiration

when　we　see　how　great　an　advantage　the　practical　judgement　has　over

the　theoretical　in　the　common　understanding　of　men。　In　the　latter；

if　common　reason　ventures　to　depart　from　the　laws　of　experience　and

from　the　perceptions　of　the　senses；　it　falls　into　mere

inconceivabilities　and　self…contradictions；　at　least　into　a　chaos　of

uncertainty；　obscurity；　and　instability。　But　in　the　practical　sphere

it　is　just　when　the　common　understanding　excludes　all　sensible　springs

from　practical　laws　that　its　power　of　judgement　begins　to　show

itself　to　advantage。　It　then　becomes　even　subtle；　whether　it　be　that

it　chicanes　with　its　own　conscience　or　with　other　claims　respecting

what　is　to　be　called　right；　or　whether　it　desires　for　its　own

instruction　to　determine　honestly　the　worth　of　actions；　and；　in　the

latter　case；　it　may　even　have　as　good　a　hope　of　hitting　the　mark　as

any　philosopher　whatever　can　promise　himself。　Nay；　it　is　almost　more

sure　of　doing　so；　because　the　philosopher　cannot　have　any　other

principle；　while　he　may　easily　perplex　his　judgement　by　a　multitude　of

considerations　foreign　to　the　matter；　and　so　turn　aside　from　the　right

way。　Would　it　not　therefore　be　wiser　in　moral　concerns　to　acquiesce　in

the　judgement　of　common　reason；　or　at　most　only　to　call　in

philosophy　for　the　purpose　of　rendering　the　system　of　morals　more

complete　and　intelligible；　and　its　rules　more　convenient　for　use

（especially　for　disputation）；　but　not　so　as　to　draw　off　the　common

understanding　from　its　happy　simplicity；　or　to　bring　it　by　means　of

philosophy　into　a　new　path　of　inquiry　and　instruction？

　　Innocence　is　indeed　a　glorious　thing；　only；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is

very　sad　that　it　cannot　well　maintain　itself　and　is　easily　seduced。　On

this　account　even　wisdom…　which　otherwise　consists　more　in　conduct

than　in　knowledge…　yet　has　need　of　science；　not　in　order　to　learn　from

it；　but　to　secure　for　its　precepts　admission　and　permanence。　Against

all　the　commands　of　duty　which　reason　represents　to　man　as　so

deserving　of　respect；　he　feels　in　himself　a　powerful　counterpoise　in

his　wants　and　inclinations；　the　entire　satisfaction　of　which　he　sums

up　under　the　name　of　happiness。　Now　reason　issues　its　commands

unyieldingly；　without　promising　anything　to　the　inclinations；　and；

as　it　were；　with　disregard　and　contempt　for　these　claims；　which　are　so

impetuous；　and　at　the　same　time　so　plausible；　and　which　will　not　allow

themselves　to　be　suppressed　by　any　command。　Hence　there　arises　a

natural　dialectic；　i。e。；　a　disposition；　to　argue　against　these

strict　laws　of　duty　and　to　question　their　validity；　or　at　least

their　purity　and　strictness；　and；　if　possible；　to　make　them　more

accordant　with　our　wishes　and　inclinations；　that　is　to　say；　to　corrupt

them　at　their　very　source；　and　entirely　to　destroy　their　worth…　a

thing　which　even　common　practical　reason　cannot　ultimately　call　good。

　　Thus　is　the　common　reason　of　man　compelled　to　go　out　of　its

sphere；　and　to　take　a　step　into　the　field　of　a　practical　philosophy；

not　to　satisfy　any　speculative　want　（which　never　occurs　to　it　as

long　as　it　is　content　to　be　mere　sound　reason）；　but　even　on

practical　grounds；　in　order　to　attain　in　it　information　and　clear

instruction　respecting　the　source　of　its　principle；　and　the　correct

determination　of　it　in　opposition　to　the　maxims　which　are　based　on

wants　and　inclinations；　so　that　it　may　escape　from　the　perplexity　of

opposite　claims　and　not　run　the　risk　of　losing　all　genuine　moral

principles　through　the　equivocation　into　which　it　easily　falls。

Thus；　when　practical　reason　cultivates　itself；　there　insensibly　arises

in　it　a　dialetic　which　forces　it　to　seek　aid　in　philosophy；　just　as

happens　to　it　in　its　theoretic　use；　and　in　this　case；　therefore；　as

well　as　in　the　other；　it　will　find　rest　nowhere　but　in　a　thorough

critical　examination　of　our　reason。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　SECTION



　　　　　　　　　TRANSITION　FROM　POPULAR　MORAL　PHILOSOPHY

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TO　THE　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS



　　If　we　have　hitherto　drawn　our　notion　of　duty　from　the　common　use

of　our　practical　reason；　it　is　by　no　means　to　be　inferred　that　we　have

treated　it　as　an　empirical　notion。　On　the　contrary；　if　we　attend　to

the　experience　of　men's　conduct；　we　meet　frequent　and；　as　we　ourselves

allow；　just　complaints　that　one　cannot　find　a　single　certain　example

of　the　disposition　to　act　from　pure　duty。　Although　many　things　are

done　in　conformity　with　what　duty　prescribes；　it　is　nevertheless

always　doubtful　whether　they　are　done　strictly　from　duty；　so　as　to

have　a　moral　worth。　Hence　there　have　at　all　times　been　philosophers

who　have　altogether　denied　that　this　disposition　actually　exists　at

all　in　human　actions；　and　have　ascribed　everything　to　a　more　or　less

refined　self…love。　Not　that　they　have　on　that　account　questioned　the

soundness　of　the　conception　of　morality；　on　the　contrary；　they　spoke

with　sincere　regret　of　the　frailty　and　corruption　of　human　nature；

which；　though　noble　enough　to　take　its　rule　an　idea　so　worthy　of

respect；　is　yet　weak　to　follow　it　and　employs　reason　which　ought　to

give　it　the　law　only　for　the　purpose　of　providing　for　the　interest

of　the　inclinations；　whether　singly　or　at　the　best　in　the　greatest

possible　harmony　with　one　another。

　　In　fact；　it　is　absolutely　impossible　to　make　out　by　experience

with　complete　certainty　a　single　case　in　which　the　maxim　of　an　action；

however　right　in　itself；　rested　simply　on　moral　grounds　and　on　the

conception　of　duty。　Sometimes　it　happens　that　with　the　sharpest

self…examination　we　can　find　nothing　beside　the　moral　principle　of

duty　which　could　have　been　powerful　enough　to　move　us　to　this　or

that　action　and　to　so　great　a　sacrifice；　yet　we　cannot　from　this　infer

with　certainty　that　it　was　not　really　some　secret　impulse　of

self…love；　under　the　false　appearance　of　duty；　that　was　the　actual

determining　cause　of　the　will。　We　like　them　to　flatter　ourselves　by

falsely　taking　credit　for　a　more　noble　motive；　whereas　in　fact　we

can　never；　even　by　the　strictest　examination；　get　completely　behind

the　secret　springs　of　action；　since；　when　the　question　is　of　moral

worth；　it　is　not　with　the　actions　which　we　see　that　we　are

concerned；　but　with　those　inward　principles　of　them　which　we　do　not

see。

　　Moreover；　we　cannot　better　serve　the　wishes　of　those　who　ridicule

all　morality　as　a　mere　chimera　of　human　imagination　over　stepping

itself　from　vanity；　than　by　conceding　to　them　that　notions　of　duty

must　be　drawn　only　from　experience　（as　from　indolence；　people　are

ready　to　think　is　also　the　case　with　all　other　notions）；　for　or　is

to　prepare　for　them　a　certain　triumph。　I　am　willing　to　admit　out　of

love　of　humanity　that　even　most　of　our　actions　are　correct；　but　if

we　look　closer　at　them　we　everywhere　come　upon　the　dear　self　which

is　always　prominent；　and　it　is　this　they　have　in　view　and　not　the

strict　command　of　duty　which　would　often　require　self…denial。

Without　being　an　enemy　of　virtue；　a　cool　observer；　one　that　does　not

mistake　the　wish　for　good；　however　lively；　for　its　reality；　may

sometimes　doubt　whether　true　virtue　is　actually　found　anywhere　in

the　world；　and　this　especially　as　years　increase　and　the　judgement

is　partly　made　wiser　by　experience　and　partly；　also；　more　acute　in

observation。　This　being　so；　nothing　can　secure　us　from　falling　away

altogether　from　our　ideas　of　duty；　or　maintain　in　the　soul　a

well…grounded　respect　for　its　law；　but　the　clear　conviction　that

although　there　should　never　have　been　actions　which　really　sprang　from

such　pure　sources；　yet　whether　this　or　that　takes　place　is　not　at

all　the　question；　but　that　reason　of　itself；　independent　on　all

experience；　ordains　what　ought　to　take　place；　that　accordingly　actions

of　which　perhaps　the　world　has　hitherto　never　given　an　example；　the

feasibility　even　of　which　might　be　very　much　doubted　by　one　who　founds

everything　on　experience；　are　nevertheless　inflexibly　commanded　by

reason；　that；　e。g。；　even　though　there　might　never　yet　have　been　a

sincere　friend；　yet　not　a　whit　the　less　is　pure　sincerity　in

friendship　required　of　every　man；　because；　prior　to　all　experience；

this　duty　is　involved　as　duty　in　the　idea　of　a　reason　determining

the　will　by　a　priori　principles。

　　When　we　add　further　that；　unless　we　deny　that　the　notion　of　morality

has　any　truth　or　reference　to　any　possible　object；　we　must　admit

that　its　law　must　be　valid；　not　merely　for　men　but　for　all　rational

creatures　generally；　not　merely　under　certain　contingent　conditions　or

with　exceptions　but　with　absolute　necessity；　then　it　is　clear　that

no　experience　could　enable　us　to　infer　even　the　possibility　of　such

apodeictic　laws。　For　with　what　right　could　we　bring　into　unbounded

respect　as　a　universal　precept　for　every　rational　nature　that　which

perhaps　holds　only　under　the　contingent　conditions　of　humanity？　Or　how

could　laws　of　the　determination　of　our　will　be　regarded　as　laws　of　the

determination　of　the　will　of　rational　beings　generally；　and　for　us

only　as　such；　if　they　were　merely　empirical　and　did　not　take　their

origin　wholly　a　priori　from　pure　but　practical　reason？

　　Nor　could　anything　be　more　fatal　to　morality　than　that　we　should

wish　to　derive　it　from　examples。　For　every　example　of　it　that　is　set

before　me　must　be　first　itself　tested　by　principles　of　morality；

whether　it　is　worthy