bentham-第8部分

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e　were　wanted　his　indefatigable　perseverance；　his　firm　self…reliance；　needing　no　support　from　other　men's　opinion；　his　intensely　practical　turn　of　mind；　his　synthetical　habits　　above　all；　his　peculiar　method。　Metaphysicians；　armed　with　vague　generalities；　had　often　tried　their　hands　at　the　subject；　and　left　it　no　more　advanced　than　they　found　it。　Law　is　a　matter　of　business；　means　and　ends　are　the　things　to　be　considered　in　it；　not　abstractions：　vagueness　was　not　to　be　met　by　vagueness；　but　by　definiteness　and　precision：　details　were　not　to　be　encountered　with　generalities；　but　with　details。　Nor　could　any　progress　be　made；　on　such　a　subject；　by　merely　showing　that　existing　things　were　bad；　it　was　necessary　also　to　show　how　they　might　be　made　better。　No　great　man　whom　we　read　of　was　qualified　to　do　this　thing　except　Bentham。　He　has　done　it；　once　and　for　ever。　　　　　Into　the　particulars　of　what　Bentham　has　done　we　cannot　enter。　many　hundred　pages　would　be　required　to　give　a　tolerable　abstract　of　it。　To　sum　up　our　estimate　under　a　few　heads。　First：　he　has　expelled　mysticism　from　the　philosophy　of　law；　and　set　the　example　of　viewing　laws　in　a　practical　light；　as　means　to　certain　definite　and　precise　ends。　Secondly。　he　has　cleared　up　the　confusion　and　vagueness　attaching　to　the　idea　of　law　in　general；　to　the　idea　of　a　body　of　laws；　and　the　various　general　ideas　therein　involved。　Thirdly：　he　demonstrated　the　necessity　and　practicability　of　codification；　or　the　conversion　of　all　law　into　a　written　and　systematically　arranged　Code：　not　like　the　code　Napoleon；　a　code　without　a　single　definition；　requiring　a　constant　reference　to　anterior　precedent　for　the　meaning　of　its　technical　terms；　but　one　containing　within　itself　all　that　is　necessary　for　its　own　interpretation；　together　with　a　perpetual　provision　for　its　own　emendation　and　improvement。　He　has　shown　of　what　parts　such　a　code　would　consist；　the　relation　of　those　parts　to　one　another；　and　by　his　distinctions　and　classifications　has　done　very　much　towards　showing　what　should　be；　or　might　be；　its　nomenclature　and　arrangement。　What　he　has　left　undone；　he　had　made　it　comparatively　easy　for　others　to　do。　Fourthly：　he　has　taken　a　systematic　view（1*）　of　the　exigencies　of　society　for　which　the　civil　code　is　intended　to　provide；　and　of　the　principles　of　human　nature　by　which　its　provisions　are　to　be　tested：　and　this　view；　defective　（as　we　have　already　intimated）　wherever　spiritual　interests　require　to　be　taken　into　account；　is　excellent　for　that　large　portion　of　the　laws　of　any　country　which　are　designed　for　the　protection　of　material　interests。　Fifthly：　（to　say　nothing　of　the　subject　of　punishment；　for　which　something　considerable　had　been　done　before）　he　found　the　philosophy　of　judicial　procedure；　including　that　of　judicial　establishments　and　of　evidence；　in　a　more　wretched　state　than　even　any　other　part　of　the　philosophy　of　law；　he　carried　it　at　once　almost　to　perfection。　He　left　it　with　every　one　of　its　principles　established；　and　little　remaining　to　be　done　even　in　the　suggestion　of　practical　arrangements。　　　　　These　assertions　in　behalf　of　Bentham　may　be　left；　without　fear　for　the　result；　in　the　hands　of　those　who　are　competent　to　judge　of　them。　There　are　now　even　in　the　highest　seats　of　justice；　men　to　whom　the　claims　made　for　him　will　not　appear　extravagant。　Principle　after　principle　of　those　propounded　by　him　is　moreover　making　its　way　by　infiltration　into　the　understandings　most　shut　against　his　influence；　and　driving　nonsense　and　prejudice　from　one　corner　of　them　to　another。　The　reform　of　the　laws　of　any　country　according　to　his　principles；　can　only　be　gradual；　and　may　be　long　ere　it　is　accomplished；　but　the　work　is　in　process；　and　both　parliament　and　the　judges　are　every　year　doing　something；　and　often　something　not　inconsiderable；　towards　the　forwarding　of　it。　　　　　It　seems　proper　here　to　take　notice　of　an　accusation　sometimes　made　both　against　Bentham　and　against　the　principle　of　codification　　as　if　they　required　one　uniform　suit　of　ready…made　laws　for　all　times　and　all　states　of　society。　The　doctrine　of　codification；　as　the　word　imports；　relates　to　the　form　only　of　the　laws；　not　their　substance；　it　does　not　concern　itself　with　what　the　laws　should　be；　but　declares　that　whatever　they　are；　they　ought　to　be　systematically　arranged；　and　fixed　down　to　a　determinate　form　of　words。　To　the　accusation；　so　far　as　it　affects　Bentham；　one　of　the　essays　in　the　collection　of　his　works　（then　for　the　first　time　published　in　English）　is　a　complete　answer：　that　'On　the　Influence　of　Time　and　Place　in　Matters　of　Legislation'。　It　may　there　be　seen　that　the　different　exigencies　of　different　nations　with　respect　to　law；　occupied　his　attention　as　systematically　as　any　other　portion　of　the　wants　which　render　laws　necessary：　with　the　limitations；　it　is　true；　which　were　set　to　all　his　speculations　by　the　imperfections　of　his　theory　of　human　nature。　For；　taking；　as　we　have　seen；　next　to　no　account　of　national　character　and　the　causes　which　form　and　maintain　it；　he　was　precluded　from　considering；　except　to　a　very　limited　extent；　the　laws　of　a　country　as　an　instrument　of　national　culture：　one　of　their　most　important　aspects；　and　in　which　they　must　of　course　vary　according　to　the　degree　and　kind　of　culture　already　attained；　as　a　tutor　gives　his　pupil　different　lessons　according　to　the　process　already　made　in　his　education。　The　same　laws　would　not　have　suited　our　wild　ancestors；　accustomed　to　rude　independence；　and　a　people　of　Asiatics　bowed　down　by　military　despotism：　the　slave　needs　to　be　trained　to　govern　himself；　the　savage　to　submit　to　the　government　of　others。　The　same　laws　will　not　suit　the　English；　who　distrust　everything　which　emanates　from　general　principles；　and　the　French；　who　distrust　whatever　does　not　so　emanate。　Very　different　institutions　are　needed　to　train　to　the　perfection　of　their　nature；　or　to　constitute　into　a　united　nation　and　social　polity；　an　essentially　subjective　people　like　the　Germans；　and　an　essentially　objective　people　like　those　of　Northern　and　Central　Italy。　the　one　affectionate　and　dreamy；　the　other　passionate　and　worldly。　the　one　truthful　and　loyal；　the　other　calculating　and　suspicious；　the　one　not　practical　enough；　the　other　overmuch；　the　one　wanting　individuality；　the　other　fellow…feeling；　the　one　failing　for　want　of　exacting　enough　for　itself；　the　other　for　want　of　conceding　enough　to　others。　Bentham　was　little　accustomed　to　look　at　institutions　in　their　relation　to　these　topics。　The　effects　of　this　oversight　must　of　course　be　perceptible　throughout　his　speculations；　but　we　do　not　think　the　errors　into　which　it　led　him　very　material　in　the　greater　part　of　civil　and　penal　law：　it　is　in　the　department　of　constitutional　legislation　that　they　were　fundamental。　　　　　The　Benthamic　theory　of　government　has　made　so　much　noise　in　the　world　of　late　years；　it　has　held　such　a　conspicuous　place　among　Radical　philosophies；　and　Radical　modes　of　thinking　have　participated　so　much　more　largely　than　any　others　in　its　spirit；　that　many　worthy　persons　imagine　there　is　no　other　Radical　philosophy　extant。　Leaving　such　people　to　discover　their　mistake　as　they　may；　we　shall　expend　a　few　words　in　attempting　to　discriminate　between　the　truth　and　error　of　this　celebrated　theory。　　　　　There　are　three　great　questions　in　government。　First；　to　what　authority　is　it　for　the　good　of　the　people　that　they　should　be　subject？　Secondly；　how　are　they　to　be　induced　to　obey　that　authority？　The　answers　to　these　two　questions　vary　indefinitely；　according　to　the　degree　and　kind　of　civilization　and　cultivation　already　attained　by　a　people；　and　their　peculiar　aptitudes　for　receiving　more。　Comes　next　a　third　question；　not　liable　to　so　much　variation；　namely；　by　what　means　are　the　abuses　of　this　authority　to　be　checked？　This　third　question　is　the　only　one　of　the　three　to　which　Bentham　seriously　applies　himself；　and　he　gives　it　the　only　answer　it　admits　of　Responsibility：　responsibility　to　persons　whose　interest；　whose　obvious　and　recognizable　interest；　accords　with　the　end　in　view　　good　government。　This　being　granted；　it　is　next　to　be　asked；　in　what　body　of　persons　this　identity　of　interest　with　good　government；　that　is；　with　the　interest　of　the　whole　community；　is　to　be　found？　In　nothing　less；　says　Bentham；　than　the　numerical　majority：　nor；　say　we；　even　in　the　numerical　majority　itself；　of　no　portion　of　the　community　less　than　all；　will　the　interest　coincide；　at　all　times　and　in　all　respects；　with　the　interest　of　all。　But　since　power　given　to　all；　by　a　representative　government；　is　in　fact　given　to　a　majority；　we　are　obliged　to　fall　back　upon　the　first　of　our　three　questions；　namely；　under　what　authority　is　it　for　the　good　of　the　people　that　they　be　placed？　And　if　to　this　the　answer　be；　under　that　of　a　majority　among　themselves；　Bentham's　system　cannot　be　questioned。　This　one　assumption　being　made；　his　'Constitutional　Code'　is　admirable。　That　extraordinary　power　which　he　possessed；　of　at　once　seizing　comprehensive　principles；　and　scheming　out　minute　details；　is　brought　into　play　with　surpassing　vigour　in　devising　means　for　preventing　rulers　from　escaping　from　the　control　of　the　majority；　for　enabling　and　inducing　the　majority　to　exercise　that　control　unremittingly；　and　for　providing　them　with　servants　of　every　desirable　endowment；　moral　and　intellectual；　compatible　with　entire　subservience　to　their　will。　　　　　But　is　this　fundamental　doctrine　of　Bentham's　political　philosophy　an　universal　truth？　Is　it；　at　all　times　and　places；　good　for　mankind　to　be　under　the　absolute　authority　of　the　majority　of　themselves？　We　say　the　authority；　not　the　political　authority　merely；　because　it　is　chimerical　to　suppose　that　whatever　has　absolute　power　over　men's　bodies　will　not　arrogate　it　over　their　minds　　will　not　seek　to　control　（not　perhaps　by　legal　penalties；　but　by　the　persecutions　of　society）　opinions　and　feelings　which　depart　from　its　standard；　will　not　attempt　to　shape　the　eduction　of　the　young　by　its　model；　and　to　extinguish　all　books；　all　schools；　all　combinations　of　individuals　for　joint　action　upon　society；　which　may　be　attempted　for　the　purpose　of　keeping　alive　a　spirit　at　variance　with　its　own。　Is　it；　we　say；　the　proper　condition　of　man；　in　all