seven discourses on art-第19部分

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One　can　scarce　state　these　opinions　without　exposing　their　absurdity；　yet　they　are　constantly　in　the　mouths　of　men；　and　particularly　of　artists。　　They　who　have　thought　seriously　on　this　subject；　do　not　carry　the　point　so　far；　yet　I　am　persuaded；　that　even　among　those　few　who　may　be　called　thinkers；　the　prevalent　opinion　gives　less　than　it　ought　to　the　powers　of　reason；　and　considers　the　principles　of　taste；　which　give　all　their　authority　to　the　rules　of　art；　as　more　fluctuating；　and　as　having　less　solid　foundations　than　we　shall　find；　upon　examination；　they　really　have。

The　common　saying；　that　tastes　are　not　to　be　disputed；　owes　its　influence；　and　its　general　reception；　to　the　same　error　which　leads　us　to　imagine　it　of　too　high　original　to　submit　to　the　authority　of　an　earthly　tribunal。　　It　will　likewise　correspond　with　the　notions　of　those　who　consider　it　as　a　mere　phantom　of　the　imagination；　so　devoid　of　substance　as　to　elude　all　criticism。

We　often　appear　to　differ　in　sentiments　from　each　other；　merely　from　the　inaccuracy　of　terms；　as　we　are　not　obliged　to　speak　always　with　critical　exactness。　　Something　of　this　too　may　arise　from　want　of　words　in　the　language　to　express　the　more　nice　discriminations　which　a　deep　investigation　discovers。　　A　great　deal；　however；　of　this　difference　vanishes　when　each　opinion　is　tolerably　explained　and　understood　by　constancy　and　precision　in　the　use　of　terms。

We　apply　the　term　taste　to　that　act　of　the　mind　by　which　we　like　or　dislike；　whatever　be　the　subject。　　Our　judgment　upon　an　airy　nothing；　a　fancy　which　has　no　foundation；　is　called　by　the　same　name　which　we　give　to　our　determination　concerning　those　truths　which　refer　to　the　most　general　and　most　unalterable　principles　of　human　nature；　to　works　which　are　only　to　be　produced　by　the　greatest　efforts　of　the　human　understanding。　　However　inconvenient　this　may　be；　we　are　obliged　to　take　words　as　we　find　them；　all　we　can　do　is　to　distinguish　the　things　to　which　they　are　applied。

We　may　let　pass　those　things　which　are　at　once　subjects　of　taste　and　sense；　and　which　having　as　much　certainty　as　the　senses　themselves；　give　no　occasion　to　inquiry　or　dispute。　　The　natural　appetite　or　taste　of　the　human　mind　is　for　truth；　whether　that　truth　results　from　the　real　agreement　or　equality　of　original　ideas　among　themselves；　from　the　agreement　of　the　representation　of　any　object　with　the　thing　represented；　or　from　the　correspondence　of　the　several　parts　of　any　arrangement　with　each　other。　　It　is　the　very　same　taste　which　relishes　a　demonstration　in　geometry；　that　is　pleased　with　the　resemblance　of　a　picture　to　an　original；　and　touched　with　the　harmony　of　music。

All　these　have　unalterable　and　fixed　foundations　in　nature；　and　are　therefore　equally　investigated　by　reason；　and　known　by　study；　some　with　more；　some　with　less　clearness；　but　all　exactly　in　the　same　way。　　A　picture　that　is　unlike；　is　false。　　Disproportionate　ordinance　of　parts　is　not　right　because　it　cannot　be　true　until　it　ceases　to　be　a　contradiction　to　assert　that　the　parts　have　no　relation　to　the　whole。　　Colouring　is　true　where　it　is　naturally　adapted　to　the　eye；　from　brightness；　from　softness；　from　harmony；　from　resemblance；　because　these　agree　with　their　object；　nature；　and　therefore　are　true：　　as　true　as　mathematical　demonstration；　but　known　to　be　true　only　to　those　who　study　these　things。

But　besides　real；　there　is　also　apparent　truth；　or　opinion；　or　prejudice。　　With　regard　to　real　truth；　when　it　is　known；　the　taste　which　conforms　to　it　is；　and　must　be；　uniform。　　With　regard　to　the　second　sort　of　truth；　which　may　be　called　truth　upon　sufferance；　or　truth　by　courtesy；　it　is　not　fixed；　but　variable。　　However；　whilst　these　opinions　and　prejudices　on　which　it　is　founded　continue；　they　operate　as　truth；　and　the　art；　whose　office　it　is　to　please　the　mind；　as　well　as　instruct　it；　must　direct　itself　according　to　opinion；　or　it　will　not　attain　its　end。

In　proportion　as　these　prejudices　are　known　to　be　generally　diffused；　or　long　received；　the　taste　which　conforms　to　them　approaches　nearer　to　certainty；　and　to　a　sort　of　resemblance　to　real　science；　even　where　opinions　are　found　to　be　no　better　than　prejudices。　　And　since　they　deserve；　on　account　of　their　duration　and　extent；　to　be　considered　as　really　true；　they　become　capable　of　no　small　decree　of　stability　and　determination　by　their　permanent　and　uniform　nature。

As　these　prejudices　become　more　narrow；　more　local；　more　transitory；　this　secondary　taste　becomes　more　and　more　fantastical；　recedes　from　real　science；　is　less　to　be　approved　by　reason；　and　less　followed　in　practice；　though　in　no　case　perhaps　to　be　wholly　neglected；　where　it　does　not　stand；　as　it　sometimes　does；　in　direct　defiance　of　the　most　respectable　opinions　received　amongst　mankind。

Having　laid　down　these　positions；　I　shall　proceed　with　less　method；　because　less　will　serve；　to　explain　and　apply　them。

We　will　take　it　for　granted　that　reason　is　something　invariable　and　fixed　in　the　nature　of　things；　and　without　endeavouring　to　go　back　to　an　account　of　first　principles；　which　for　ever　will　elude　our　search；　we　will　conclude　that　whatever　goes　under　the　name　of　taste；　which　we　can　fairly　bring　under　the　dominion　of　reason；　must　be　considered　as　equally　exempt　from　change。　　If　therefore；　in　the　course　of　this　inquiry；　we　can　show　that　there　are　rules　for　the　conduct　of　the　artist　which　are　fixed　and　invariable；　it　implies；　of　course；　that　the　art　of　the　connoisseur；　or；　in　other　words；　taste；　has　likewise　invariable　principles。

Of　the　judgment　which　we　make　on　the　works　of　art；　and　the　preference　that　we　give　to　one　class　of　art　over　another；　if　a　reason　be　demanded；　the　question　is　perhaps　evaded　by　answering；　〃I　judge　from　my　taste〃；　but　it　does　not　follow　that　a　better　answer　cannot　be　given；　though　for　common　gazers　this　may　be　sufficient。　Every　man　is　not　obliged　to　investigate　the　causes　of　his　approbation　or　dislike。

The　arts　would　lie　open　for　ever　to　caprice　and　casualty；　if　those　who　are　to　judge　of　their　excellences　had　no　settled　principles　by　which　they　are　to　regulate　their　decisions；　and　the　merit　or　defect　of　performances　were　to　be　determined　by　unguided　fancy。　　And　indeed　we　may　venture　to　assert　that　whatever　speculative　knowledge　is　necessary　to　the　artist；　is　equally　and　indispensably　necessary　to　the　connoisseur。

The　first　idea　that　occurs　in　the　consideration　of　what　is　fixed　in　art；　or　in　taste；　is　that　presiding　principle　of　which　I　have　so　frequently　spoken　in　former　discourses；　the　general　idea　of　nature。　The　beginning；　the　middle；　and　the　end　of　everything　that　is　valuable　in　taste；　is　comprised　in　the　knowledge　of　what　is　truly　nature；　for　whatever　ideas　are　not　conformable　to　those　of　nature；　or　universal　opinion；　must　be　considered　as　more　or　less　capricious。

The　idea　of　nature　comprehending　not　only　the　forms　which　nature　produces；　but　also　the　nature　and　internal　fabric　and　organisation；　as　I　may　call　it；　of　the　human　mind　and　imagination：　　general　ideas；　beauty；　or　nature；　are　but　different　ways　of　expressing　the　same　thing；　whether　we　apply　these　terms　to　statues；　poetry；　or　picture。　　Deformity　is　not　nature；　but　an　accidental　deviation　from　her　accustomed　practice。　　This　general　idea　therefore　ought　to　be　called　nature；　and　nothing　else；　correctly　speaking；　has　a　right　to　that　name。　　But　we　are　so　far　from　speaking；　in　common　conversation；　with　any　such　accuracy；　that；　on　the　contrary；　when　we　criticise　Rembrandt　and　other　Dutch　painters；　who　introduced　into　their　historical　pictures　exact　representations　of　individual　objects　with　all　their　imperfections；　we　say；　though　it　is　not　in　a　good　taste；　yet　it　is　nature。

This　misapplication　of　terms　must　be　very　often　perplexing　to　the　young　student。　　Is　not；　he　may　say；　art　an　imitation　of　nature？　Must　he　not；　therefore；　who　imitates　her　with　the　greatest　fidelity　be　the　best　artist？　　By　this　mode　of　reasoning　Rembrandt　has　a　higher　place　than　Raffaelle。　　But　a　very　little　reflection　will　serve　to　show　us　that　these　particularities　cannot　be　nature：　　for　how　can　that　be　the　nature　of　man；　in　which　no　two　individuals　are　the　same？

It　plainly　appears　that　as　a　work　is　conducted　under　the　influence　of　general　ideas　or　partial　it　is　principally　to　be　considered　as　the　effect　of　a　good　or　a　bad　taste。

As　beauty　therefore　does　not　consist　in　taking　what　lies　immediately　before　you；　so　neither；　in　our　pursuit　of　taste；　are　those　opinions　which　we　first　received　and　adopted　the　best　choice；　or　the　most　natural　to　the　mind　and　imagination。

In　the　infancy　of　our　knowledge　we　seize　with　greediness　the　good　that　is　within　our　reach；　it　is　by　after…consideration；　and　in　consequence　of　discipline；　that　we　refuse　the　present　for　a　greater　good　at　a　distance。　　The　nobility　or　elevation　of　all　arts；　like　the　excellence　of　virtue　itself；　consists　in　adopting　this　enlarged　and　comprehensive　idea；　and　all　criticism　built　upon　the　more　confined　view　of　what　is　natural；　may　properly　be　called　shallow　criticism；　rather　than　false；　its　defect　is　that　the　truth　is　not　sufficiently　extensive。

It　has　sometimes　happened　that　some　of　the　greatest　men　in　our　art　have　been　betrayed　into　errors　by　this　confined　mode　of　reasoning。　Poussin；　who；　upon　the　whole；　may　be　produced　as　an　instance　of　attention　to　the　most　enlarged　and　extensive　ideas　of　nature；　from　not　having　settled　principles　on　this　point；　has　in　one　instance　at　least；　I　think；　deserted　truth　for　prejudice。　　He　is　said　to　have　vindicated　the　conduct　of　Julio　Romano；　for　his　inattention　to　the　masses　of　light　and　shade；　or　grouping　the　figures；　in　the　battle　of　Constantine；　as　if　designedly　neglected；　the　better　to　correspond　with　the　hurry　and　confusion　of　a　battle。　　Poussin's　own　conduct　in　his　representations　of　Bacchanalian　triumphs　and　sacrifices；　makes　us　more　easily　give　credit　to　this　report；　since　in　such　subjects；　as　well　indeed　as　in　many　others；　it　was　too　much　his　own　practice。　　The　best　apology　we　can　make　for　this　conduct　is　what　proceeds　from　the　association　of　our　ideas；　the　prejudice　we　have　in　favour　of　antiquity。　　Poussin's　works；　as　I　have　formerly　observed；　have　very　much　the　air　of　the　ancient　manner　of　painting；　i