meditations on first philosophy-第13部分

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er　held　the　truths　of　mathematics　（which　concern　only　numbers　and　figures）　to　be。　　　　　　This　indeed　is　not　at　first　manifest；　since　it　would　seem　to　present　some　appearance　of　being　a　sophism。　　For　being　accustomed　in　all　other　things　to　make　a　distinction　between　existence　and　essence；　I　easily　persuade　myself　that　the　existence　can　be　separated　from　the　essence　of　God；　and　that　we　can　thus　conceive　God　as　not　actually　existing。　　But；　nevertheless；　when　I　think　of　it　with　more　attention；　I　clearly　see　that　existence　can　no　more　be　separated　from　the　essence　of　God　than　can　its　having　its　three　angles　equal　to　two　right　angles　be　separated　from　the　essence　of　a　＇rectilinear＇　triangle；　or　the　idea　of　a　mountain　from　the　idea　of　a　valley；　and　so　there　is　not　any　less　repugnance　to　our　conceiving　a　God　（that　is；　a　Being　supremely　perfect）　to　whom　existence　is　lacking　（that　is　to　say；　to　whom　a　certain　perfection　is　lacking）；　than　to　conceive　of　a　mountain　which　has　no　valley。　　　　　　But　although　I　cannot　really　conceive　of　a　God　without　existence　any　more　than　a　mountain　without　a　valley；　still　from　the　fact　that　I　conceive　of　a　mountain　with　a　valley；　it　does　not　follow　that　there　is　such　a　mountain　in　the　world；　similarly　although　I　conceive　of　God　as　possessing　existence；　it　would　seem　that　it　does　not　follow　that　there　is　a　God　which　exists；　for　my　thought　does　not　impose　any　necessity　upon　things；　and　just　as　I　may　imagine　a　winged　horse；　although　no　horse　with　wings　exists；　so　I　could　perhaps　attribute　existence　to　God；　although　no　God　existed。　　　　　　But　a　sophism　is　concealed　in　this　objection；　for　from　the　fact　that　I　cannot　conceive　a　mountain　without　a　valley；　it　does　not　follow　that　there　is　any　mountain　or　any　valley　in　existence；　but　only　that　the　mountain　and　the　valley；　whether　they　exist　or　do　not　exist；　cannot　in　any　way　be　separated　one　from　the　other。　　While　from　the　fact　that　I　cannot　conceive　God　without　existence；　it　follows　that　existence　is　inseparable　from　Him；　and　hence　that　He　really　exists；　not　that　my　thought　can　bring　this　to　pass；　or　impose　any　necessity　on　things；　but；　on　the　contrary；　because　the　necessity　which　lies　in　the　thing　itself；　i。e。　the　necessity　of　the　existence　of　God　determines　me　to　think　in　this　way。　For　it　is　not　within　my　power　to　think　of　God　without　existence　（that　is　of　a　supremely　perfect　Being　devoid　of　a　supreme　perfection）　though　it　is　in　my　power　to　imagine　a　horse　either　with　wings　or　without　wings。　　　　　　And　we　must　not　here　object　that　it　is　in　truth　necessary　for　me　to　assert　that　God　exists　after　having　presupposed　that　He　possesses　every　sort　of　perfection；　since　existence　is　one　of　these；　but　that　as　a　matter　of　fact　my　original　supposition　was　not　necessary；　just　as　it　is　not　necessary　to　consider　that　all　quadrilateral　figures　can　be　inscribed　in　the　circle；　for　supposing　I　thought　this；　I　should　be　constrained　to　admit　that　the　rhombus　might　be　inscribed　in　the　circle　since　it　is　a　quadrilateral　figure；　which；　however；　is　manifestly　false。　＇We　must　not；　I　say；　make　any　such　allegations　because＇　although　it　is　not　necessary　that　I　should　at　any　time　entertain　the　notion　of　God；　nevertheless　whenever　it　happens　that　I　think　of　a　first　and　a　sovereign　Being；　and；　so　to　speak；　derive　the　idea　of　Him　from　the　storehouse　of　my　mind；　it　is　necessary　that　I　should　attribute　to　Him　every　sort　of　perfection；　although　I　do　not　get　so　far　as　to　enumerate　them　all；　or　to　apply　my　mind　to　each　one　in　particular。　　And　this　necessity　suffices　to　make　me　conclude　（after　having　recognised　that　existence　is　a　perfection）　that　this　first　and　sovereign　Being　really　exists；　just　as　though　it　is　not　necessary　for　me　ever　to　imagine　any　triangle；　yet；　whenever　I　wish　to　consider　a　rectilinear　figure　composed　only　of　three　angles；　it　is　absolutely　essential　that　I　should　attribute　to　it　all　those　properties　which　serve　to　bring　about　the　conclusion　that　its　three　angles　are　not　greater　than　two　right　angles；　even　although　I　may　not　then　be　considering　this　point　in　particular。　　But　when　I　consider　which　figures　are　capable　of　being　inscribed　in　the　circle；　it　is　in　no　wise　necessary　that　I　should　think　that　all　quadrilateral　figures　are　of　this　number；　on　the　contrary；　I　cannot　even　pretend　that　this　is　the　case；　so　long　as　I　do　not　desire　to　accept　anything　which　I　cannot　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly。　　And　in　consequence　there　is　a　great　difference　between　the　false　suppositions　such　as　this；　and　the　true　ideas　born　within　me；　the　first　and　principal　of　which　is　that　of　God。　　For　really　I　discern　in　many　ways　that　this　idea　is　not　something　factitious；　and　depending　solely　on　my　thought；　but　that　it　is　the　image　of　a　true　and　immutable　nature；　first　of　all；　because　I　cannot　conceive　anything　but　God　himself　to　whose　essence　existence　＇necessarily＇　pertains；　in　the　second　place　because　it　is　not　possible　for　me　to　conceive　two　or　more　Gods　in　this　same　position；　and；　granted　that　there　is　one　such　God　who　now　exists；　I　see　clearly　that　it　is　necessary　that　He　should　have　existed　from　all　eternity；　and　that　He　must　exist　eternally；　and　finally；　because　I　know　an　infinitude　of　other　properties　in　God；　none　of　which　I　can　either　diminish　or　change。　　　　　　For　the　rest；　whatever　proof　or　argument　I　avail　myself　of；　we　must　always　return　to　the　point　that　it　is　only　those　things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　that　have　the　power　of　persuading　me　entirely。　　And　although　amongst　the　matters　which　I　conceive　of　in　this　way；　some　indeed　are　manifestly　obvious　to　all；　while　others　only　manifest　themselves　to　those　who　consider　them　closely　and　examine　them　attentively；　still；　after　they　have　once　been　discovered；　the　latter　are　not　esteemed　as　any　less　certain　than　the　former。　For　example；　in　the　case　of　every　right…angled　triangle；　although　it　does　not　so　manifestly　appear　that　the　square　of　the　base　is　equal　to　the　squares　of　the　two　other　sides　as　that　this　base　is　opposite　to　the　greatest　angle；　still；　when　this　has　once　been　apprehended；　we　are　just　as　certain　of　its　truth　as　of　the　truth　of　the　other。　　And　as　regards　God；　if　my　mind　were　not　pre…occupied　with　prejudices；　and　if　my　thought　did　not　find　itself　on　all　hands　diverted　by　the　continual　pressure　of　sensible　things；　there　would　be　nothing　which　I　could　know　more　immediately　and　more　easily　than　Him。　　For　is　there　anything　more　manifest　than　that　there　is　a　God；　that　is　to　say；　a　Supreme　Being；　to　whose　essence　alone　existence　pertains？21　　　　　　And　although　for　a　firm　grasp　of　this　truth　I　have　need　of　a　strenuous　application　of　mind；　at　present　I　not　only　feel　myself　to　be　as　assured　of　it　as　of　all　that　I　hold　as　most　certain；　but　I　also　remark　that　the　certainty　of　all　other　things　depends　on　it　so　absolutely；　that　without　this　knowledge　it　is　impossible　ever　to　know　anything　perfectly。　　　　　　For　although　I　am　of　such　a　nature　that　as　long　as22　I　understand　anything　very　clearly　and　distinctly；　I　am　naturally　impelled　to　believe　it　to　be　true；　yet　because　I　am　also　of　such　a　nature　that　I　cannot　have　my　mind　constantly　fixed　on　the　same　object　in　order　to　perceive　it　clearly；　and　as　I　often　recollect　having　formed　a　past　judgment　without　at　the　same　time　properly　recollecting　the　reasons　that　led　me　to　make　it；　it　may　happen　meanwhile　that　other　reasons　present　themselves　to　me；　which　would　easily　cause　me　to　change　my　opinion；　if　I　were　ignorant　of　the　facts　of　the　existence　of　God；　and　thus　I　should　have　no　true　and　certain　knowledge；　but　only　vague　and　vacillating　opinions。　　Thus；　for　example；　when　I　consider　the　nature　of　a　＇rectilinear＇　triangle；　I　who　have　some　little　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　geometry　recognise　quite　clearly　that　the　three　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles；　and　it　is　not　possible　for　me　not　to　believe　this　so　long　as　I　apply　my　mind　to　its　demonstration；　but　so　soon　as　I　abstain　from　attending　to　the　proof；　although　I　still　recollect　having　clearly　comprehended　it；　it　may　easily　occur　that　I　come　to　doubt　its　truth；　if　I　am　ignorant　of　there　being　a　God。　　For　I　can　persuade　myself　of　having　been　so　constituted　by　nature　that　I　can　easily　deceive　myself　even　in　those　matters　which　I　believe　myself　to　apprehend　with　the　greatest　evidence　and　certainty；　especially　when　I　recollect　that　I　have　frequently　judged　matters　to　be　true　and　certain　which　other　reasons　have　afterwards　impelled　me　to　judge　to　be　altogether　false。　　　　　　But　after　I　have　recognised　that　there　is　a　God￥because　at　the　same　time　I　have　also　recognised　that　all　things　depend　upon　Him；　and　that　He　is　not　a　deceiver；　and　from　that　have　inferred　that　what　I　perceive　clearly　and　distinctly　cannot　fail　to　be　true￥although　I　no　longer　pay　attention　to　the　reasons　for　which　I　have　judged　this　to　be　true；　provided　that　I　recollect　having　clearly　and　distinctly　perceived　it　no　contrary　reason　can　be　brought　forward　which　could　ever　cause　me　to　doubt　of　its　truth；　and　thus　I　have　a　true　and　certain　knowledge　of　it。　　And　this　same　knowledge　extends　likewise　to　all　other　things　which　I　recollect　having　formerly　demonstrated；　such　as　the　truths　of　geometry　and　the　like；　for　what　can　be　alleged　against　them　to　cause　me　to　place　them　in　doubt？　　Will　it　be　said　that　my　nature　is　such　as　to　cause　me　to　be　frequently　deceived？　　But　I　already　know　that　I　cannot　be　deceived　in　the　judgment　whose　grounds　I　know　clearly。　Will　it　be　said　that　I　formerly　held　many　things　to　be　true　and　certain　which　I　have　afterwards　recognised　to　be　false？　But　I　had　not　had　any　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　of　these　things；　and　not　as　yet　knowing　the　rule　whereby　I　assure　myself　of　the　truth；　I　had　been　impelled　to　give　my　assent　from　reasons　which　I　have　since　recognised　to　be　less　strong　than　I　had　at　the　time　imagined　them　to　be。　　What　further　objection　can　then　be　raised？　　That　possibly　I　am　dreaming　（an　objection　I　myself　made　a　little　while　ago）；　or　that　all　the　thoughts　which　I　now　have　are　no　more　true　than　the　phantasies　of　my　dreams？　　But　even　though　I　slept　the　case　would　be　the　same；　for　all　that　is　clearly　present　to　my　mind　is　absolutely　true。　　　　　　And　so　I　very　clearly　recognise　that　the　certainty　and　truth　of　all　knowledge　depends　alone　on　the　knowledge　of　the　true　God；