meditations on first philosophy-第16部分

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odies　which　surround　it。　　　　　　But　there　are　many　other　things　which　nature　seems　to　have　taught　me；　but　which　at　the　same　time　I　have　never　really　received　from　her；　but　which　have　been　brought　about　in　my　mind　by　a　certain　habit　which　I　have　of　forming　inconsiderate　judgments　on　things；　and　thus　it　may　easily　happen　that　these　judgments　contain　some　error。　　Take；　for　example；　the　opinion　which　I　hold　that　all　space　in　which　there　is　nothing　that　affects　＇or　makes　an　impression　on＇　my　senses　is　void；　that　in　a　body　which　is　warm　there　is　something　entirely　similar　to　the　idea　of　heat　which　is　in　me；　that　in　a　white　or　green　body　there　is　the　same　whiteness　or　greenness　that　I　perceive；　that　in　a　bitter　or　sweet　body　there　is　the　same　taste；　and　so　on　in　other　instances；　that　the　stars；　the　towers；　and　all　other　distant　bodies　are　of　the　same　figure　and　size　as　they　appear　from　far　off　to　our　eyes；　etc。　　But　in　order　that　in　this　there　should　be　nothing　which　I　do　not　conceive　distinctly；　I　should　define　exactly　what　I　really　understand　when　I　say　that　I　am　taught　somewhat　by　nature。　　For　here　I　take　nature　in　a　more　limited　signification　than　when　I　term　it　the　sum　of　all　the　things　given　me　by　God；　since　in　this　sum　many　things　are　comprehended　which　only　pertain　to　mind　（and　to　these　I　do　not　refer　in　speaking　of　nature）　such　as　the　notion　which　I　have　of　the　fact　that　what　has　once　been　done　cannot　ever　be　undone　and　an　infinitude　of　such　things　which　I　know　by　the　light　of　nature　＇without　the　help　of　the　body＇；　and　seeing　that　it　comprehends　many　other　matters　besides　which　only　pertain　to　body；　and　are　no　longer　here　contained　under　the　name　of　nature；　such　as　the　quality　of　weight　which　it　possesses　and　the　like；　with　which　I　also　do　not　deal；　for　in　talking　of　nature　I　only　treat　of　those　things　given　by　God　to　me　as　a　being　composed　of　mind　and　body。　　But　the　nature　here　described　truly　teaches　me　to　flee　from　things　which　cause　the　sensation　of　pain；　and　seek　after　the　things　which　communicate　to　me　the　sentiment　of　pleasure　and　so　forth；　but　I　do　not　see　that　beyond　this　it　teaches　me　that　from　those　diverse　sense…　perceptions　we　should　ever　form　any　conclusion　regarding　things　outside　of　us；　without　having　＇carefully　and　maturely＇　mentally　examined　them　beforehand。　　For　it　seems　to　me　that　it　is　mind　alone；　and　not　mind　and　body　in　conjunction；　that　is　requisite　to　a　knowledge　of　the　truth　in　regard　to　such　things。　　Thus；　although　a　star　makes　no　larger　an　impression　on　my　eye　than　the　flame　of　a　little　candle　there　is　yet　in　me　no　real　or　positive　propensity　impelling　me　to　believe　that　it　is　not　greater　than　that　flame；　but　I　have　judged　it　to　be　so　from　my　earliest　years；　without　any　rational　foundation。　　And　although　in　approaching　fire　I　feel　heat；　and　in　approaching　it　a　little　too　near　I　even　feel　pain；　there　is　at　the　same　time　no　reason　in　this　which　could　persuade　me　that　there　is　in　the　fire　something　resembling　this　heat　any　more　than　there　is　in　it　something　resembling　the　pain；　all　that　I　have　any　reason　to　believe　from　this　is；　that　there　is　something　in　it；　whatever　it　may　be；　which　excites　in　me　these　sensations　of　heat　or　of　pain。　　So　also；　although　there　are　spaces　in　which　I　find　nothing　which　excites　my　senses；　I　must　not　from　that　conclude　that　these　spaces　contain　no　body；　for　I　see　in　this；　as　in　other　similar　things；　that　I　have　been　in　the　habit　of　perverting　the　order　of　nature；　because　these　perceptions　of　sense　having　bee　placed　within　me　by　nature　merely　for　the　purpose　of　signifying　to　my　mind　what　things　are　beneficial　or　hurtful　to　the　composite　whole　of　which　it　forms　a　part；　and　being　up　to　that　point　sufficiently　clear　and　distinct；　I　yet　avail　myself　of　them　as　though　they　were　absolute　rules　by　which　I　might　immediately　determine　the　essence　of　the　bodies　which　are　outside　me；　as　to　which；　in　fact；　they　can　teach　me　nothing　but　what　is　most　obscure　and　confused。　　　　　　But　I　have　already　sufficiently　considered　how；　notwithstanding　the　supreme　goodness　of　God；　falsity　enters　into　the　judgments　I　make。　　Only　here　a　new　difficulty　is　presented￥one　respecting　those　things　the　pursuit　or　avoidance　of　which　is　taught　me　by　nature；　and　also　respecting　the　internal　sensations　which　I　possess；　and　in　which　I　seem　to　have　sometimes　detected　error　＇and　thus　to　be　directly　deceived　by　my　own　nature＇。　　To　take　an　example；　the　agreeable　taste　of　some　food　in　which　poison　has　been　intermingled　may　induce　me　to　partake　of　the　poison；　and　thus　deceive　me。　　It　is　true；　at　the　same　time；　that　in　this　case　nature　may　be　excused；　for　it　only　induces　me　to　desire　food　in　which　I　find　a　pleasant　taste；　and　not　to　desire　the　poison　which　is　unknown　to　it；　and　thus　I　can　infer　nothing　from　this　fact；　except　that　my　nature　is　not　omniscient；　at　which　there　is　certainly　no　reason　to　be　astonished；　since　man；　being　finite　in　nature；　can　only　have　knowledge　the　perfectness　of　which　is　limited。　　　　　　But　we　not　unfrequently　deceive　ourselves　even　in　those　things　to　which　we　are　directly　impelled　by　nature；　as　happens　with　those　who　when　they　are　sick　desire　to　drink　or　eat　things　hurtful　to　them。　　It　will　perhaps　be　said　here　that　the　cause　of　their　deceptiveness　is　that　their　nature　is　corrupt；　but　that　does　not　remove　the　difficulty；　because　a　sick　man　is　none　the　less　truly　God's　creature　than　he　who　is　in　health；　and　it　is　therefore　as　repugnant　to　God's　goodness　for　the　one　to　have　a　deceitful　nature　as　it　is　for　the　other。　　And　as　a　clock　composed　of　wheels　and　counter…weights　no　less　exactly　observes　the　laws　of　nature　when　it　is　badly　made；　and　does　not　show　the　time　properly；　than　when　it　entirely　satisfies　the　wishes　of　its　maker；　and　as；　if　I　consider　the　body　of　a　man　as　being　a　sort　of　machine　so　built　up　and　composed　of　nerves；　muscles；　veins；　blood　and　skin；　that　though　there　were　no　mind　in　it　at　all；　it　would　not　cease　to　have　the　same　motions　as　at　present；　exception　being　made　of　those　movements　which　are　due　to　the　direction　of　the　will；　and　in　consequence　depend　upon　the　mind　＇as　apposed　to　those　which　operate　by　the　disposition　of　its　organs＇；　I　easily　recognise　that　it　would　be　as　natural　to　this　body；　supposing　it　to　be；　for　example；　dropsical；　to　suffer　the　parchedness　of　the　throat　which　usually　signifies　to　the　mind　the　feeling　of　thirst；　and　to　be　disposed　by　this　parched　feeling　to　move　the　nerves　and　other　parts　in　the　way　requisite　for　drinking；　and　thus　to　augment　its　malady　and　do　harm　to　itself；　as　it　is　natural　to　it；　when　it　has　no　indisposition；　to　be　impelled　to　drink　for　its　good　by　a　similar　cause。　　And　although；　considering　the　use　to　which　the　clock　has　been　destined　by　its　maker；　I　may　say　that　it　deflects　from　the　order　of　its　nature　when　it　does　not　indicate　the　hours　correctly；　and　as；　in　the　same　way；　considering　the　machine　of　the　human　body　as　having　been　formed　by　God　in　order　to　have　in　itself　all　the　movements　usually　manifested　there；　I　have　reason　for　thinking　that　it　does　not　follow　the　order　of　nature　when；　if　the　throat　is　dry；　drinking　does　harm　to　the　conservation　of　health；　nevertheless　I　recognise　at　the　same　time　that　this　last　mode　of　explaining　nature　is　very　different　from　the　other。　　For　this　is　but　a　purely　verbal　characterisation　depending　entirely　on　my　thought；　which　compares　a　sick　man　and　a　badly　constructed　clock　with　the　idea　which　I　have　of　a　healthy　man　and　a　well　made　clock；　and　it　is　hence　extrinsic　to　the　things　to　which　it　is　applied；　but　according　to　the　other　interpretation　of　the　term　nature　I　understand　something　which　is　truly　found　in　things　and　which　is　therefore　not　without　some　truth。　　　　　　But　certainly　although　in　regard　to　the　dropsical　body　it　is　only　so　to　speak　to　apply　an　extrinsic　term　when　we　say　that　its　nature　is　corrupted；　inasmuch　as　apart　from　the　need　to　drink；　the　throat　is　parched；　yet　in　regard　to　the　composite　whole；　that　is　to　say；　to　the　mind　or　soul　united　to　this　body；　it　is　not　a　purely　verbal　predicate；　but　a　real　error　of　nature；　for　it　to　have　thirst　when　drinking　would　be　hurtful　to　it。　　And　thus　it　still　remains　to　inquire　how　the　goodness　of　God　does　not　prevent　the　nature　of　man　so　regarded　from　being　fallacious。　　　　　　In　order　to　begin　this　examination；　then；　I　here　say；　in　the　first　place；　that　there　is　a　great　difference　between　mind　and　body；　inasmuch　as　body　is　by　nature　always　divisible；　and　the　mind　is　entirely　indivisible。　　For；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　when　I　consider　the　mind；　that　is　to　say；　myself　inasmuch　as　I　am　only　a　thinking　thing；　I　cannot　distinguish　in　myself　any　parts；　but　apprehend　myself　to　be　clearly　one　and　entire；　and　although　the　whole　mind　seems　to　be　united　to　the　whole　body；　yet　if　a　foot；　or　an　arm；　or　some　other　part；　is　separated　from　my　body；　I　am　aware　that　nothing　has　been　taken　away　from　my　mind。　　And　the　faculties　of　willing；　feeling；　conceiving；　etc。　cannot　be　properly　speaking　said　to　be　its　parts；　for　it　is　one　and　the　same　mind　which　employs　itself　in　willing　and　in　feeling　and　understanding。　　But　it　is　quite　otherwise　with　corporeal　or　extended　objects；　for　there　is　not　one　of　these　imaginable　by　me　which　my　mind　cannot　easily　divide　into　parts；　and　which　consequently　I　do　not　recognise　as　being　divisible；　this　would　be　sufficient　to　teach　me　that　the　mind　or　soul　of　man　is　entirely　different　from　the　body；　if　I　had　not　already　learned　it　from　other　sources。　　　　　　I　further　notice　that　the　mind　does　not　receive　the　impressions　from　all　parts　of　the　body　immediately；　but　only　from　the　brain；　or　perhaps　even　from　one　of　its　smallest　parts；　to　wit；　from　that　in　which　the　common　sense27　is　said　to　reside；　which；　whenever　it　is　disposed　in　the　same　particular　way；　conveys　the　same　thing　to　the　mind；　although　meanwhile　the　other　portions　of　the　body　may　be　differently　disposed；　as　is　testified　by　innumerable　experiments　which　it　is　unnecessary　here　to　recount。　　　　　　I　notice；　also；　that　the　nature　of　body　is　such　that　none　of　its　parts　can　be　moved　by　another　part　a　little　way　off　which　cannot　also　be　moved　in　the　same　way　by　each　one　of　the　parts　which　are　between　the　two；　although　this　more　remote　part　does　not　act　at　all。　　As；　for　example；　in　the　cord　ABCD　＇which　is　in　tensio