meditations on first philosophy-第4部分

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gine　that　they　have　an　earthenware　head　or　are　nothing　but　pumpkins　or　are　made　of　glass。　　But　they　are　mad；　and　I　should　not　be　any　the　less　insane　were　I　to　follow　examples　so　extravagant。　　　　　　At　the　same　time　I　must　remember　that　I　am　a　man；　and　that　consequently　I　am　in　the　habit　of　sleeping；　and　in　my　dreams　representing　to　myself　the　same　things　or　sometimes　even　less　probable　things；　than　do　those　who　are　insane　in　their　waking　moments。　　How　often　has　it　happened　to　me　that　in　the　night　I　dreamt　that　I　found　myself　in　this　particular　place；　that　I　was　dressed　and　seated　near　the　fire；　whilst　in　reality　I　was　lying　undressed　in　bed！　　At　this　moment　it　does　indeed　seem　to　me　that　it　is　with　eyes　awake　that　I　am　looking　at　this　paper；　that　this　head　which　I　move　is　not　asleep；　that　it　is　deliberately　and　of　set　purpose　that　I　extend　my　hand　and　perceive　it；　what　happens　in　sleep　does　not　appear　so　clear　nor　so　distinct　as　does　all　this。　　But　in　thinking　over　this　I　remind　myself　that　on　many　occasions　I　have　in　sleep　been　deceived　by　similar　illusions；　and　in　dwelling　carefully　on　this　reflection　I　see　so　manifestly　that　there　are　no　certain　indications　by　which　we　may　clearly　distinguish　wakefulness　from　sleep　that　I　am　lost　in　astonishment。　　And　my　astonishment　is　such　that　it　is　almost　capable　of　persuading　me　that　I　now　dream。　　　　　　Now　let　us　assume　that　we　are　asleep　and　that　all　these　particulars；　e。g。　that　we　open　our　eyes；　shake　our　head；　extend　our　hands；　and　so　on；　are　but　false　delusions；　and　let　us　reflect　that　possibly　neither　our　hands　nor　our　whole　body　are　such　as　they　appear　to　us　to　be。　　At　the　same　time　we　must　at　least　confess　that　the　things　which　are　represented　to　us　in　sleep　are　like　painted　representations　which　can　only　have　been　formed　as　the　counterparts　of　something　real　and　true；　and　that　in　this　way　those　general　things　at　least；　i。e。　eyes；　a　head；　hands；　and　a　whole　body；　are　not　imaginary　things；　but　things　really　existent。　　For；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　painters；　even　when　they　study　with　the　greatest　skill　to　represent　sirens　and　satyrs　by　forms　the　most　strange　and　extraordinary；　cannot　give　them　natures　which　are　entirely　new；　but　merely　make　a　certain　medley　of　the　members　of　different　animals；　or　if　their　imagination　is　extravagant　enough　to　invent　something　so　novel　that　nothing　similar　has　ever　before　been　seen；　and　that　then　their　work　represents　a　thing　purely　fictitious　and　absolutely　false；　it　is　certain　all　the　same　that　the　colours　of　which　　this　is　composed　are　necessarily　real。　　And　for　the　same　reason；　although　these　general　things；　to　with；　＇a　body＇；　eyes；　a　head；　hands；　and　such　like；　may　be　imaginary；　we　are　bound　at　the　same　time　to　confess　that　there　are　at　least　some　other　objects　yet　more　simple　and　more　universal；　which　are　real　and　true；　and　of　these　just　in　the　same　way　as　with　certain　real　colours；　all　these　images　of　things　which　dwell　in　our　thoughts；　whether　true　and　real　or　false　and　fantastic；　are　formed。　　　　　　To　such　a　class　of　things　pertains　corporeal　nature　in　general；　and　its　extension；　the　figure　of　extended　things；　their　quantity　or　magnitude　and　number；　as　also　the　place　in　which　they　are；　the　time　which　measures　their　duration；　and　so　on。　　　　　　That　is　possibly　why　our　reasoning　is　not　unjust　when　we　conclude　from　this　that　Physics；　Astronomy；　Medicine　and　all　other　sciences　which　have　as　their　end　the　consideration　of　composite　things；　are　very　dubious　and　uncertain；　but　that　Arithmetic；　Geometry　and　other　sciences　of　that　kind　which　only　treat　of　things　that　are　very　simple　and　very　general；　without　taking　great　trouble　to　ascertain　whether　they　are　actually　existent　or　not；　contain　some　measure　of　certainty　and　an　element　of　the　indubitable。　　For　whether　I　am　awake　or　asleep；　two　and　three　together　always　form　five；　and　the　square　can　never　have　more　than　four　sides；　and　it　does　not　seem　possible　that　truths　so　clear　and　apparent　can　be　suspected　of　any　falsity　＇or　uncertainty＇。　　　　　　Nevertheless　I　have　long　had　fixed　in　my　mind　the　belief　that　an　all…powerful　God　existed　by　whom　I　have　been　created　such　as　I　am。　　But　how　do　I　know　that　He　has　not　brought　it　to　pass　that　there　is　no　earth；　no　heaven；　no　extended　body；　no　magnitude；　no　place；　and　that　nevertheless　＇I　possess　the　perceptions　of　all　these　things　and　that＇　they　seem　to　me　to　exist　just　exactly　as　I　now　see　them？　　And；　besides；　as　I　sometimes　imagine　that　others　deceive　themselves　in　the　things　which　they　think　they　know　best；　how　do　I　know　that　I　am　not　deceived　every　time　that　I　add　two　and　three；　or　count　the　sides　of　a　square；　or　judge　of　things　yet　simpler；　if　anything　simpler　can　be　imagined？　　But　possibly　God　has　not　desired　that　I　should　be　thus　deceived；　for　He　is　said　to　be　supremely　good。　　If；　however；　it　is　contrary　to　His　goodness　to　have　made　me　such　that　I　constantly　deceive　myself；　it　would　also　appear　to　be　contrary　to　His　goodness　to　permit　me　to　be　sometimes　deceived；　and　nevertheless　I　cannot　doubt　that　He　does　permit　this。　　　　　　There　may　indeed　be　those　who　would　prefer　to　deny　the　existence　of　a　God　so　powerful；　rather　than　believe　that　all　other　things　are　uncertain。　　But　let　us　not　oppose　them　for　the　present；　and　grant　that　all　that　is　here　said　of　a　God　is　a　fable；　nevertheless　in　whatever　way　they　suppose　that　I　have　arrived　at　the　state　of　being　that　I　have　reached￥whether　they　attribute　it　to　fate　or　to　accident；　or　make　out　that　it　is　by　a　continual　succession　of　antecedents；　or　by　some　other　method￥since　to　err　and　deceive　oneself　is　a　defect；　it　is　clear　that　the　greater　will　be　the　probability　of　my　being　so　imperfect　as　to　deceive　myself　ever；　as　is　the　Author　to　whom　they　assign　my　origin　the　less　powerful。　　To　these　reasons　I　have　certainly　nothing　to　reply；　but　at　the　end　I　feel　constrained　to　confess　that　there　is　nothing　in　all　that　I　formerly　believed　to　be　true；　of　which　I　cannot　in　some　measure　doubt；　and　that　not　merely　through　want　of　thought　or　through　levity；　but　for　reasons　which　are　very　powerful　and　maturely　considered；　so　that　henceforth　I　ought　not　the　less　carefully　to　refrain　from　giving　credence　to　these　opinions　than　to　that　which　is　manifestly　false；　if　I　desire　to　arrive　at　any　certainty　＇in　the　sciences＇。　　　　　　But　it　is　not　sufficient　to　have　made　these　remarks；　we　must　also　be　careful　to　keep　them　in　mind。　　For　these　ancient　and　commonly　held　opinions　still　revert　frequently　to　my　mind；　long　and　familiar　custom　having　given　them　the　right　to　occupy　my　mind　against　my　inclination　and　rendered　them　almost　masters　of　my　belief；　nor　will　I　ever　lose　the　habit　of　deferring　to　them　or　of　placing　my　confidence　in　them；　so　long　as　I　consider　them　as　they　really　are；　i。e。　opinions　in　some　measure　doubtful；　as　I　have　just　shown；　and　at　the　same　time　highly　probable；　so　that　there　is　much　more　reason　to　believe　in　than　to　deny　them。　　That　is　why　I　consider　that　I　shall　not　be　acting　amiss；　if；　taking　of　set　purpose　a　contrary　belief；　I　allow　myself　to　be　deceived；　and　for　a　certain　time　pretend　that　all　these　opinions　are　entirely　false　and　imaginary；　until　at　last；　having　thus　balanced　my　former　prejudices　with　my　latter　＇so　that　they　cannot　divert　my　opinions　more　to　one　side　than　to　the　other＇；　my　judgment　will　no　longer　be　dominated　by　bad　usage　or　turned　away　from　the　right　knowledge　of　the　truth。　　For　I　am　assured　that　there　can　be　neither　peril　nor　error　in　this　course；　and　that　I　cannot　at　present　yield　too　much　to　distrust；　since　I　am　not　considering　the　question　of　action；　but　only　of　knowledge。　　　　　　I　shall　then　suppose；　not　that　God　who　is　supremely　good　and　the　fountain　of　truth；　but　some　evil　genius　not　less　powerful　than　deceitful；　has　employed　his　whole　energies　in　deceiving　me；　I　shall　consider　that　the　heavens；　the　earth；　colours；　figures；　sound；　and　all　other　external　things　are　nought　but　the　illusions　and　dreams　of　which　this　genius　has　availed　himself　in　order　to　lay　traps　for　my　credulity；　I　shall　consider　myself　as　having　no　hands；　no　eyes；　no　flesh；　no　blood；　nor　any　senses；　yet　falsely　believing　myself　to　possess　all　these　things；　I　shall　remain　obstinately　attached　to　this　idea；　and　if　by　this　means　it　is　not　in　my　power　to　arrive　at　the　knowledge　of　any　truth；　I　may　at　least　do　what　is　in　my　power　＇i。e。　suspend　my　judgment＇；　and　with　firm　purpose　avoid　giving　credence　to　any　false　thing；　or　being　imposed　upon　by　this　arch　deceiver；　however　powerful　and　deceptive　he　may　be。　　But　this　task　is　a　laborious　one；　and　insensibly　a　certain　lassitude　leads　me　into　the　course　of　my　ordinary　life。　　And　just　as　a　captive　who　in　sleep　enjoys　an　imaginary　liberty；　when　he　begins　to　suspect　that　his　liberty　is　but　a　dream；　fears　to　awaken；　and　conspires　with　these　agreeable　illusions　that　the　deception　may　be　prolonged；　so　insensibly　of　my　own　accord　I　fall　back　into　my　former　opinions；　and　I　dread　awakening　from　this　slumber；　lest　the　laborious　wakefulness　which　would　follow　the　tranquillity　of　this　repose　should　have　to　be　spent　not　in　daylight；　but　in　the　excessive　darkness　of　the　difficulties　which　have　just　been　discussed。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　II　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Nature　of　the　Human　Mind；　and　that　it　is　more　easily　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　known　than　the　Body。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Meditation　of　yesterday　filled　my　mind　with　so　many　doubts　that　it　is　no　longer　in　my　power　to　forget　them。　　And　yet　I　do　not　see　in　what　manner　I　can　resolve　them；　and；　just　as　if　I　had　all　of　a　sudden　fallen　into　very　deep　water；　I　am　so　disconcerted　that　I　can　neither　make　certain　of　setting　my　feet　on　the　bottom；　nor　can　I　swim　and　so　support　myself　on　the　surface。　　I　shall　nevertheless　make　an　effort　and　follow　anew　the　same　path　as　that　on　which　I　yesterday　entered；　i。e。　I　shall　proceed　by　setting　aside　all　that　in　which　the　least　doubt　could　be　supposed　to　exist；　just　as　if　I　had　discovered　that　it　was　absolutely　false；　and　I　shall　ever　follow　in　this　road　until　I　have　met　with　something　which　is　certain；　or　at　least；　if　I　can　do　nothing　else；　until　I　have　learned　for　certain　that　there　is　nothing　in　the　world　that　is　certain。　Archimedes；　in　order　that　he　might　draw　the　terrestrial　globe　out　of