meditations on first philosophy-第7部分

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ts　all　the　images　of　corporeal　things；　or　at　least　（for　that　is　hardly　possible）　I　shall　esteem　them　as　vain　and　false；　and　thus　holding　converse　only　with　myself　and　considering　my　own　nature；　I　shall　try　little　by　little　to　reach　a　better　knowledge　of　and　a　more　familiar　acquaintanceship　with　myself。　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks；　that　is　to　say；　that　doubts；　affirms；　denies；　that　knows　a　few　things；　that　is　ignorant　of　many　＇that　loves；　that　hates＇；　that　wills；　that　desires；　that　also　imagines　and　perceives；　for　as　I　remarked　before；　although　the　things　which　I　perceive　and　imagine　are　perhaps　nothing　at　all　apart　from　me　and　in　themselves；　I　am　nevertheless　assured　that　these　modes　of　thought　that　I　call　perceptions　and　imaginations；　inasmuch　only　as　they　are　modes　of　thought；　certainly　reside　＇and　are　met　with＇　in　me。　　　　　　And　in　the　little　that　I　have　just　said；　I　think　I　have　summed　up　all　that　I　really　know；　or　at　least　all　that　hitherto　I　was　aware　that　I　knew。　　In　order　to　try　to　extend　my　knowledge　further；　I　shall　now　look　around　more　carefully　and　see　whether　I　cannot　still　discover　in　myself　some　other　things　which　I　have　not　hitherto　perceived。　　I　am　certain　that　I　am　a　thing　which　thinks；　but　do　I　not　then　likewise　know　what　is　requisite　to　render　me　certain　of　a　truth？　　Certainly　in　this　first　knowledge　there　is　nothing　that　assures　me　of　its　truth；　excepting　the　clear　and　distinct　perception　of　that　which　I　state；　which　would　not　indeed　suffice　to　assure　me　that　what　I　say　is　true；　if　it　could　ever　happen　that　a　thing　which　I　conceived　so　clearly　and　distinctly　could　be　false；　and　accordingly　it　seems　to　me　that　already　I　can　establish　as　a　general　rule　that　all　things　which　I　perceive15　very　clearly　and　very　distinctly　are　true。　　　　　　At　the　same　time　I　have　before　received　and　admitted　many　things　to　be　very　certain　and　manifest；　which　yet　I　afterwards　recognised　as　being　dubious。　　What　then　were　these　things？　They　were　the　earth；　sky；　stars　and　all　other　objects　which　I　apprehended　by　means　of　the　senses。　　But　what　did　I　clearly　＇and　distinctly＇　perceive　in　them？　　Nothing　more　than　that　the　ideas　or　thoughts　of　these　things　were　presented　to　my　mind。　And　not　even　now　do　I　deny　that　these　ideas　are　met　with　in　me。　　But　there　was　yet　another　thing　which　I　affirmed；　and　which；　owing　to　the　habit　which　I　had　formed　of　believing　it；　I　thought　I　perceived　very　clearly；　although　in　truth　I　did　not　perceive　it　at　all；　to　wit；　that　there　were　objects　outside　of　me　from　which　these　ideas　proceeded；　and　to　which　they　were　entirely　similar。　　And　it　was　in　this　that　I　erred；　or；　if　perchance　my　judgment　was　correct；　this　was　not　due　to　any　knowledge　arising　from　my　perception。　　　　　　But　when　I　took　anything　very　simple　and　easy　in　the　sphere　of　arithmetic　or　geometry　into　consideration；　e。g。　that　two　and　three　together　made　five；　and　other　things　of　the　sort；　were　not　these　present　to　my　mind　so　clearly　as　to　enable　me　to　affirm　that　they　were　true？　　Certainly　if　I　judged　that　since　such　matters　could　be　doubted；　this　would　not　have　been　so　for　any　other　reason　than　that　it　came　into　my　mind　that　perhaps　a　God　might　have　endowed　me　with　such　a　nature　that　I　may　have　been　deceived　even　concerning　things　which　seemed　to　me　most　manifest。　　But　every　time　that　this　preconceived　opinion　of　the　sovereign　power　of　a　God　presents　itself　to　my　thought；　I　am　constrained　to　confess　that　it　is　easy　to　Him；　if　He　wishes　it；　to　cause　me　to　err；　even　in　matters　in　which　I　believe　myself　to　have　the　best　evidence。　And；　on　the　other　hand；　always　when　I　direct　my　attention　to　things　which　I　believe　myself　to　perceive　very　clearly；　I　am　so　persuaded　of　their　truth　that　I　let　myself　break　out　into　words　such　as　these：　　Let　who　will　deceive　me；　He　can　never　cause　me　to　be　nothing　while　I　think　that　I　am；　or　some　day　cause　it　to　be　true　to　say　that　I　have　never　been；　it　being　true　now　to　say　that　I　am；　or　that　two　and　three　make　more　or　less　than　five；　or　any　such　thing　in　which　I　see　a　manifest　contradiction。　　And；　certainly；　since　I　have　no　reason　to　believe　that　there　is　a　God　who　is　a　deceiver；　and　as　I　have　not　yet　satisfied　myself　that　there　is　a　God　at　all；　the　reason　for　doubt　which　depends　on　this　opinion　alone　is　very　slight；　and　so　to　speak　metaphysical。　　But　in　order　to　be　able　altogether　to　remove　it；　I　must　inquire　whether　there　is　a　God　as　soon　as　the　occasion　presents　itself；　and　if　I　find　that　there　is　a　God；　I　must　also　inquire　whether　He　may　be　a　deceiver；　for　without　a　knowledge　of　these　two　truths　I　do　not　see　that　I　can　ever　be　certain　of　anything。　　　　　　And　in　order　that　I　may　have　an　opportunity　of　inquiring　into　this　in　an　orderly　way　＇without　interrupting　the　order　of　meditation　which　I　have　proposed　to　myself；　and　which　is　little　by　little　to　pass　from　the　notions　which　I　find　first　of　all　in　my　mind　to　those　which　I　shall　later　on　discover　in　it＇　it　is　requisite　that　I　should　here　divide　my　thoughts　into　certain　kinds；　and　that　I　should　consider　in　which　of　these　kinds　there　is；　properly　speaking；　truth　or　error　to　be　found。　Of　my　thoughts　some　are；　so　to　speak；　images　of　the　things；　and　to　these　alone　is　the　title　〃idea〃　properly　applied；　examples　are　my　thought　of　a　man　or　of　a　chimera；　of　heaven；　of　an　angel；　or　＇even＇　of　God。　　But　other　thoughts　possess　other　forms　as　well。　　For　example　in　willing；　fearing；　approving；　denying；　though　I　always　perceive　something　as　the　subject　of　the　action　of　my　mind；16　yet　by　this　action　I　always　add　something　else　to　the　idea17　which　I　have　of　that　thing；　and　of　the　thoughts　of　this　kind　some　are　called　volitions　or　affections；　and　others　judgments。　　　　　　Now　as　to　what　concerns　ideas；　if　we　consider　them　only　in　themselves　and　do　not　relate　them　to　anything　else　beyond　themselves；　they　cannot　properly　speaking　be　false；　for　whether　I　imagine　a　goat　or　a　chimera；　it　is　not　less　true　that　I　imagine　the　one　that　the　other。　　We　must　not　fear　likewise　that　falsity　can　enter　into　will　and　into　affections；　for　although　I　may　desire　evil　things；　or　even　things　that　never　existed；　it　is　not　the　less　true　that　I　desire　them。　Thus　there　remains　no　more　than　the　judgments　which　we　make；　in　which　I　must　take　the　greatest　care　not　o　deceive　myself。　But　the　principal　error　and　the　commonest　which　we　may　meet　with　in　them；　consists　in　my　judging　that　the　ideas　which　are　in　me　are　similar　or　conformable　to　the　things　which　are　outside　me；　for　without　doubt　if　I　considered　the　ideas　only　as　certain　modes　of　my　thoughts；　without　trying　to　relate　them　to　anything　beyond；　they　could　scarcely　give　me　material　for　error。　　　　　　But　among　these　ideas；　some　appear　to　me　to　be　innate；　some　adventitious；　and　others　to　be　formed　＇or　invented＇　by　myself；　for；　as　I　have　the　power　of　understanding　what　is　called　a　thing；　or　a　truth；　or　a　thought；　it　appears　to　me　that　I　hold　this　power　from　no　other　source　than　my　own　nature。　　But　if　I　now　hear　some　sound；　if　I　see　the　sun；　or　feel　heat；　I　have　hitherto　judged　that　these　sensations　proceeded　from　certain　things　that　exist　outside　of　me；　and　finally　it　appears　to　me　that　sirens；　hippogryphs；　and　the　like；　are　formed　out　of　my　own　mind。　　But　again　I　may　possibly　persuade　myself　that　all　these　ideas　are　of　the　nature　of　those　which　I　term　adventitious；　or　else　that　they　are　all　innate；　or　all　fictitious：　　for　I　have　not　yet　clearly　discovered　their　true　origin。　　　　　　And　my　principal　task　in　this　place　is　to　consider；　in　respect　to　those　ideas　which　appear　to　me　to　proceed　from　certain　objects　that　are　outside　me；　what　are　the　reasons　which　cause　me　to　think　them　similar　to　these　objects。　　It　seems　indeed　in　the　first　place　that　I　am　taught　this　lesson　by　nature；　and；　secondly；　I　experience　in　myself　that　these　ideas　do　not　depend　on　my　will　nor　therefore　on　myself￥for　they　often　present　themselves　to　my　mind　in　spite　of　my　will。　Just　now；　for　instance；　whether　I　will　or　whether　I　do　not　will；　I　feel　heat；　and　thus　I　persuade　myself　that　this　feeling；　or　at　least　this　idea　of　heat；　is　produced　in　me　by　something　which　is　different　from　me；　i。e。　by　the　heat　of　the　fire　near　which　I　sit。　　And　nothing　seems　to　me　more　obvious　than　to　judge　that　this　object　imprints　its　likeness　rather　than　anything　else　upon　me。　　　　　　Now　I　must　discover　whether　these　proofs　are　sufficiently　strong　and　convincing。　　When　I　say　that　I　am　so　instructed　by　nature；　I　merely　mean　a　certain　spontaneous　inclination　which　impels　me　to　believe　in　this　connection；　and　not　a　natural　light　which　makes　me　recognise　that　it　is　true。　　But　these　two　things　are　very　different；　for　I　cannot　doubt　that　which　the　natural　light　causes　me　to　believe　to　be　true；　as；　for　example；　it　has　shown　me　that　I　am　from　the　fact　that　I　doubt；　or　other　facts　of　the　same　kind。　　And　I　possess　no　other　faculty　whereby　to　distinguish　truth　from　falsehood；　which　can　teach　me　that　what　this　light　shows　me　to　be　true　is　not　really　true；　and　no　other　faculty　that　is　equally　trustworthy。　But　as　far　as　＇apparently＇　natural　impulses　are　concerned；　I　have　frequently　remarked；　when　I　had　to　make　active　choice　between　virtue　and　vice；　that　they　often　enough　led　me　to　the　part　that　was　worse；　and　this　is　why　I　do　not　see　any　reason　for　following　them　in　what　regards　truth　and　error。　　　　　　And　as　to　the　other　reason；　which　is　that　these　ideas　must　proceed　from　objects　outside　me；　since　they　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　do　not　find　it　any　the　more　convincing。　　For　just　as　these　impulses　of　which　I　have　spoken　are　found　in　me；　notwithstanding　that　they　do　not　always　concur　with　my　will；　so　perhaps　there　is　in　me　some　faculty　fitted　to　produce　these　ideas　without　the　assistance　of　any　external　things；　even　though　it　is　not　yet　known　by　me；　just　as；　apparently；　they　have　hitherto　always　been　found　in　me　during　sleep　without　the　aid　of　any　external　objects。　　　　　　And　finally；　though　they　did　proceed　from　objects　different　from　myself；　it　is　not　a　necessary　consequence　that　they　should　resemble　these。　　On　the　contrary；　I　have　noticed　that　in　many　cases　there　was　a　great　difference　between　the　object　and　its　idea。　　I　find；　for　example；　two　completely　diverse　ideas　of　the　sun　in　my　mind；　the　one　derives　its　origin　from　the　senses；　and　should　be　placed　in　the　catego